Trade with Gentiles - Rabbi Yisrael Meatuf shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today’s class covers a very broad subject: doing business with non-Jews. In previous classes, we discussed trading in various prohibited things, forbidden foods and the like. Today we’re talking about doing business with non-Jews in general. Now—

00:30 Speaker 4 Is it permitted?

00:32 Speaker 2 That itself divides into two questions. First, am I allowed to sell to non-Jews, or not?

00:38 Speaker 4 It’s permitted.

00:39 Speaker 2 Of course it’s permitted, but there are things you may not sell.

00:43 Speaker 4 Listen—

00:44 Speaker 2 In the second part...

00:47 Speaker 4 He did that to me once; that’s what he did.

00:49 Speaker 2 The second part is about what happens after I’ve sold to non-Jews, when I’m doing business with non-Jews. There are all sorts of halachos that differ from doing business with Jews. Now, today, although here in Israel selling to non-Jews isn’t so common for us, it is common over the internet.

01:06 Speaker 4 In Israel.

01:07 Speaker 2 There too, right. People used to go into non-Jewish shops to buy things more often. Less so today, but it still happens. And today, too, it’s starting to happen within mixed cities, within...

01:21 Speaker 4 They’ve settled into their lives.

01:23 Speaker 2 Yes.

01:25 Speaker 4 Right. But there are also lots of Arab tradespeople. Lots of carpenters and carpentry shops.

01:30 Speaker 2 Right, tradespeople. People here also hire someone who makes curtains. A lot of people here hire him.

01:36 Speaker 4 He comes to work here.

01:37 Speaker 2 Yes. But there are all sorts of halachos about doing business with non-Jews. So we’ll start with the whole question of what is and isn’t permitted. It’s a rather broad subject, and I’ll go through it very briefly. At the end of the class, if there’s time, we’ll come back to it; if not, then in the next class. What will we study at greater length? Robbery, deception, misleading a non-Jew—is it forbidden or permitted? A non-Jew’s mistake. In other words, you didn’t mislead him, but he made a mistake. What may you do from the outset, and what if it has already happened? He gave too much money, bought something in a store and took fewer items, or left a bag there and went home. Things you may not sell to non-Jews—that, as we said, we’ll cover at the end if there’s time—and how the laws concerning non-Jews today apply to those things. So, as we said, let’s briefly mention what may not be sold to non-Jews. First, around the time of their festivals. Again, what I’m saying now applies generally to Eastern countries; there are grounds for leniency, things are different today, and so on. But generally, there is a ruling in the Gemara and the Shulchan Aruch that around the time of their festivals, one does not sell to non-Jews who practice idol worship, or buy from them. Ritual items—things they use for idol worship. Third, weapons and instruments of harm. Selling them weapons, handcuffs, all sorts of things. That, too, is listed as generally forbidden. Fourth is a prohibited condition that isn’t apparent. We’ll see an example later. You have wheat that got wet, and nobody knows it got wet. You sell it to a non-Jew, who may then sell it to a Jew.

03:39 Speaker 4 What kind of prohibition would that be?

03:41 Speaker 2 More a matter of causing someone to stumble before Pesach. I’m talking—yes, yes, I’m talking about before Pesach. Yes, yes, yes. And there are other things. Bread. Some Jews are lenient about bread baked by a non-Jew. Now, what’s very interesting is that if you prepare bread belonging to a Jew and a non-Jew makes it entirely, from beginning to end, without the Jew putting even a small piece of wood into the fire and so on—even those who are lenient about bread baked by a non-Jewish baker, who permit buying bread from a non-Jewish bakery, may not eat this bread belonging to a Jew. We won’t get into that now. Bread belonging to a Jew that a non-Jew baked is more stringent than a non-Jew’s bread. So a Jew may not sell it to a non-Jew either, lest the non-Jew sell it to a Jew. Okay, that’s a little complicated. Maybe we’ll touch on it at the end if there’s time. Another thing is land in Israel, because of the prohibition of lo sechaneim. And not only in Israel: selling them a house in a Jewish neighborhood, even outside Israel, is also, uh, a problem. Now let’s move to the second part, which is the main part of our class. How exactly do you do business with non-Jews? What halachos apply? What differs from doing business with Jews, and what is the same? The Torah says, “You shall not oppress your fellow, and you shall not rob.” “You shall not oppress your fellow, and you shall not rob.” In other words, “your fellow” is mentioned only in connection with oppression. Regarding robbery, it simply says, “You shall not rob.”

05:24 Speaker 5 So “you shall not rob” applies even to someone who isn’t your fellow.

05:25 Speaker 2 Exactly.

05:26 Speaker 5 It doesn’t exclude someone who isn’t your fellow.

05:27 Speaker 2 Yes. So “you shall not rob” applies to everyone, even someone who isn’t your fellow. “You shall not—”

05:33 Speaker 5 “Your fellow” means only a Jew.

05:34 Speaker 2 “Your fellow” means a Jew. “You shall not oppress your fellow.” The prohibition against oppression applies only to a Jew, not a non-Jew.

05:41 Speaker 5 Whereas robbery is prohibited by Torah law.

05:44 Speaker 2 Robbery is prohibited by Torah law.

05:46 Speaker 5 For everyone.

05:47 Speaker 2 Let’s look at the Alter Rebbe’s wording. Look at number two. At the end he writes, “This is like stealing money and is forbidden by Torah law, as explained in the laws of robbery.” In the laws of robbery, he cites the verse we brought here.

06:08 Speaker 5 I—there was... They say people used to show credit-card numbers that came with the phones. Today—

06:16 Speaker 2 People rationalize it. Ah—

06:19 Speaker 5 Until they... until they blocked it.

06:22 Speaker 2 Yes.

06:22 Speaker 5 From one time to another.

06:24 Speaker 6 They don’t sell.

06:26 Speaker 2 That’s it. In a moment we’ll see some very strong language from the Alter Rebbe concerning a non-Jew.

06:31 Speaker 5 Less than what?

06:32 Speaker 2 What?

06:32 Speaker 5 Even if it’s less.

06:34 Speaker 2 What kind of robbery is forbidden?

06:36 Speaker 5 There’s no such prohibition.

06:39 Speaker 2 We’ll see that shortly. There is a source among the Rishonim for—let’s call them these sorts of schemes—but the Alter Rebbe certainly does not rule that way. There is an opinion among the Rishonim that permits misleading a non-Jew.

06:55 Speaker 5 Misleading him?

06:55 Speaker 2 Misleading him. Not actually robbing him, but misleading him. For instance, you bring him products, and when you count them, you “accidentally” count one fewer, or something like that. One more.

07:08 Speaker 5 Money.

07:09 Speaker 2 Huh? It’s like—the Alter Rebbe forbids that. The Alter Rebbe says it’s a Torah prohibition.

07:14 Speaker 5 But that’s about a Jew who’s very honest.

07:17 Speaker 2 If that fellow comes back later and checks, that’s already approaching a chillul Hashem, which everyone agrees is forbidden. But we’ll see in a moment. There are situations, as we’ll see, that even the Alter Rebbe permits. Let’s look.

07:31 Speaker 5 With these laws, it seems to be talking about Jews and not non-Jews.

07:34 Speaker 2 “You shall not oppress your fellow.” Oppression is forbidden only when it concerns a Jew, not a non-Jew. Robbery is forbidden even when it concerns a non-Jew. What’s the difference between oppression and robbery? We’ll read the Alter Rebbe’s words in a moment. But robbery—

07:47 Speaker 5 You could also say that “you shall not rob”—

07:49 Speaker 2 Let’s continue, let’s continue to the next verses. Let’s go on. Huh?

07:51 Speaker 5 Why can’t you say that “you shall not oppress your fellow, and you shall not rob” goes together?

07:54 Speaker 2 It could have said, “You shall not oppress or rob your fellow.” But it says—

07:59 Speaker 5 No, no, it connects them.

08:01 Speaker 2 It’s another prohibition, but the Torah could have put “your fellow” at the end: “You shall not oppress—you shall not oppress or rob your fellow.” It put it in the middle.

08:10 Speaker 5 That already connects them.

08:11 Speaker 2 They’re connected in a general sense, but not regarding a non-Jew. Let’s go on to the next verse, and I’ll answer what you’re saying as well. The next verse: “When you sell something to your fellow or buy from your fellow, do not wrong one another.” Here too, you see that ona’ah, the prohibition against overcharging, applies only to a Jew—“one another”—and not to a non-Jew. The term ona’ah here is closely tied to how we commonly use the word in Hebrew. We’re used to calling any kind of deception ona’ah: he deceived him, he did this to him, and so on.

08:48 Speaker 5 Right, right.

08:49 Speaker 2 People call every kind of dishonesty ona’ah. In the Torah, in halacha, ona’ah is one specific law. I’m talking about monetary ona’ah. Monetary ona’ah is when someone sells another person a product at an inflated price. That’s what it means.

09:06 Speaker 5 Even something with a value, a value... He sells him something—

09:10 Speaker 2 In exchange for something else. If they wanted the exchange to be based on equal value, they made an appraisal. But if they simply exchanged one thing for another, [unclear]. Right? The Rambam says, “When exchanging utensils for utensils, the laws of overcharging do not apply.” But if they went to the trouble of appraising the utensils, to check their value and make sure they were equal, and it later turned out that they had made a mistake in the valuation, then the law of overcharging would apply. A third law: “And so shall you do”—a third verse: “And so shall you do with anything your brother loses.” You find a lost item and have to return it—but only to a Jew, not to a non-Jew. So there are actually three leniencies here concerning a non-Jew. First, the prohibition against withholding what is owed applies only to a Jew, not to a non-Jew. Second, the laws of overcharging apply only to a Jew, not to a non-Jew. And third, returning a lost item. Now let’s go into the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. There’s something interesting here. Let’s read a little from the laws of overcharging, in number two. The Alter Rebbe says—pay attention: number two is the Kapust printing, the first printing of the Alter Rebbe’s work. Number three is the Vilna printing, the commonly available edition in which people studied the Alter Rebbe’s work for many, many years. Notice the change. Number two says: “The entire law of overcharging applies only to a Jew. But if a non-Jew makes a mistake about the value of the item or the value of a coin”—he comes to buy something and thinks it’s worth a hundred shekels, when it’s really worth fifty. Or he looks at a coin and thinks it isn’t underweight, that it weighs enough—back when the weight of a coin mattered in practice—so he is mistaken about the coin’s value. “One need not inform him of his mistake.” You don’t have to tell him he’s mistaken. With a Jew, you must tell him: “Listen, that’s too expensive.” Even if he comes on his own and offers to buy it from you for a hundred shekels, if you know it

11:21 Speaker 2 costs fifty, you tell him, “Sorry, it costs fifty.” But with a non-Jew, you don’t have to tell him. The Alter Rebbe continues: “But it is forbidden to mislead him, whether about the value of the item or in the calculation, as will be explained in the laws of theft. Likewise, every kind of deception is forbidden,” and so on. We’ll read that later. Now look at number three, at how it appears in the later printings. Notice how the paragraph begins. Section 11, the same section: “It is forbidden to mislead a non-Jew, and every kind of deception is forbidden,” and so on. Does anyone have an idea why that happened? Why did it happen? Censorship. The censors removed the entire first half of the paragraph and made it look as though the Alter Rebbe forbids everything. They omitted the entire leniency. But the Alter Rebbe explicitly permits charging a non-Jew more than an item is worth. Now let’s move to number five. Or perhaps before that, let’s read number one, which makes a general point. The Alter Rebbe doesn’t bring it, but let’s read it. The Be’er Hagolah writes: “I write this for future generations: I have seen many who rose and became wealthy through non-Jews’ mistakes, but did not prosper. Their assets were lost, and they left no blessing behind them. And I have seen many who honored Hashem and made a point of returning money received through non-Jews’ mistakes; they rose, became wealthy, prospered, and left a blessing behind them.” So we’ll see various leniencies later. He says—

13:13 Speaker 7 When did he live?

13:14 Speaker 2 When did he write that?

13:15 Speaker 7 When did he live?

13:17 Speaker 2 A few hundred years ago. Now, later we’ll see various leniencies, but he’s saying not to make a business out of all those leniencies. Let’s move to number five. We’ll come back to the laws of overcharging and so on, because we want to focus more on buying and selling. The Alter Rebbe says in number five—and note that number five is one long section. I divided it into A, B, and C to make it easier for us, but it’s one long section in the Alter Rebbe’s work. The Alter Rebbe says: “It is forbidden to withhold from another person what is owed to him, even the smallest amount, as it says, ‘Do not withhold what is owed to your fellow.’ What does withholding mean? When another person’s money came into one’s possession with the owner’s consent—for example, one owes him a loan repayment or rent—and one does not want to pay, or keeps putting him off, saying, ‘Go and come back, go and come back.’” Withholding means the money came into your possession lawfully. How? Levi, you rented a house from him and you owe him rent. You haven’t paid yet, so you have a debt, but the money is in your possession lawfully. And what does that person do? He says, “I don’t want to pay you.”

14:41 Speaker 7 Or he puts him off.

14:44 Speaker 2 Or, in parentheses, “he keeps putting him off, saying, ‘Go and come back, go and come back.’” He may not say outright, “I don’t want to,” but he hints that he doesn’t want to. Each time he tells him, “Later, later, later.” So that is a Torah prohibition: “Do not withhold what is owed to your fellow.” The Alter Rebbe says, “This prohibition applies only with regard to a Jew, not a non-Jew, as the verse says, ‘your fellow.’” So it comes out like this: you are forbidden to rob a non-Jew. And not only to rob him—you are forbidden to take money from him through various means, like the examples I gave involving credit cards and so on. You take actions that steal money. If we go back for a moment to number two, where we stopped in the middle, he says: “Likewise, every kind of deception in buying and selling is forbidden, even with a non-Jew. For example, if the item one is selling has a defect, one must inform the buyer, even if he is a non-Jew.” Notice: he’s now selling him a product with a defect. He isn’t stealing money from his pocket; he isn’t taking his money. The non-Jew willingly gives him the money because he wants to buy the product, but the seller doesn’t disclose the defect. That isn’t considered giving the money willingly. Why is he giving the money? To receive an undamaged product. You’re giving him a defective product. That’s considered robbing him; it isn’t considered giving willingly. The Alter Rebbe continues: “For if he does not inform him, he is misleading him and deceiving him, and it is as though he stole money from him. This is forbidden by Torah law, as explained in the laws of theft.” Robbery is forbidden, and all forms of deception are forbidden. What is permitted? Withholding what is owed. What does that mean? The money has already come into your possession. How did it get there? Lawfully. Once it has come into your possession, you can refrain from returning it to him. On that basis, generally speaking, one could borrow from a non-Jew and not repay him.

16:41 Speaker 2 But the Alter Rebbe adds: “Provided this does not involve a chillul Hashem. For example, if one borrowed from a non-Jew and the non-Jew died, one may deny the debt to his son.” His son comes to him and says, “You owe him four…” and he can say, “I paid it back.” The son doesn’t know exactly whether he paid it back or not; he doesn’t know. “For he does not know for certain that he is lying. But when the non-Jew knows that he is lying, one may not deny anything to him, because of chillul Hashem.” Now, perhaps two lines on this subject. It often raises questions. You borrowed from a non-Jew and you don’t repay him—is that right? First of all, of course, the Torah says so; it’s a decree of Scripture, and that can sound a little troubling. We may not rob or steal. A person approaches this from a moral standpoint: it isn’t moral. That line of reasoning can lead to all sorts of distant places, such as a poor person stealing from someone wealthy who has a lot of money. But we do this because the Torah said so. And the same Torah that said it is forbidden to steal or rob from a Jew, or withhold what is owed to a Jew, says that with a non-Jew, robbery is forbidden and every form of deception is forbidden. But if the money is already in your possession, you may keep it. In a moment, we’ll see that there is room to say not only that you may keep it, but that you may not return it to him. We’ll see that later.

18:12 Speaker 8 He doesn’t know.

18:14 Speaker 2 He doesn’t know.

18:15 Speaker 8 Doesn’t know.

18:16 Speaker 2 No. If there is a chillul Hashem, then you certainly have to return it. Here it’s the opposite: you may not keep it, because that would be a chillul Hashem. We’re talking about a situation where he isn’t expected to know—he made a mistake, or it’s his son. So he isn’t expected to know. As for strengthening the hands of the wicked of the world—we’ll mention that later. We’ll see that it’s somewhat problematic. With a lost item, that’s certainly the case. Regarding a lost item, it says that one may not return a non-Jew’s lost property. If one does it to sanctify Hashem’s name, or if not returning it would cause a chillul Hashem, that’s different. But let’s—yes.

18:56 Speaker 8 You may not return it to him.

18:58 Speaker 2 In principle, you may not return it unless you are doing so to sanctify Hashem’s name. There is a nice saying here: sanctify Hashem’s name, but don’t sanctify yourself. In other words, if you return it so that he’ll be grateful to you, or so that—then leave it. It’s not just preferable; you’re actually not allowed to return it to him. And he says this is a matter entrusted to the heart: knowing whether you are really doing it to sanctify Hashem’s name or for yourself. So if you genuinely feel that there’s no sanctification of Hashem’s name here, you may not return it to him. Now, we could add something else—just as an aside. What really—perhaps. First of all, it’s a Scriptural decree: withholding payment is permitted, robbery is forbidden, and all forms of deception are forbidden. That’s the Scriptural decree. But perhaps, perhaps, perhaps we can suggest a reason for it based on something we once learned here from the Maharal of Prague, who explains the subject of yei’ush—giving up hope of recovering something—very nicely. He says that a person’s ownership has two elements. One is that he has control over the item; it is in his possession. It’s right there in his home, or someone is keeping it for him, so he has control over it. The second is that his mind is still on it. He has control over it, and he also knows what it is and wants it. The Maharal says there that once you lose control over something—how might that happen? You lose an object. Or let’s say, as in our case, you gave it to someone. Control involves knowing where it is. You gave it to him, and now he owes you a debt. That money is no longer a deposit; it’s a loan. Or there was a mistake: you mistakenly gave it to someone, and it’s now with someone else. Here, the element of control is gone. You no longer have control over it.

20:47 Speaker 2 What remains? Your mind is still on it. You still want it. The Maharal says that once a person’s mind is no longer on it either—for example, he has given up hope of recovering it—then he no longer has... there’s no ownership here. It’s no longer considered his. That’s why, in the case of a Jew, once it is no longer in his possession and he has also given up hope of recovering it, it is permissible to take it. Perhaps, on this basis, we can say that with a non-Jew, whether his mind is still on it is not relevant to me. What matters to me is only whether it is under his control. As long as it is under his control, you may not take it. And not only may you not take it—you may not deceive him in any way. Once it has left his control—if it’s a lost object, a mistake, or something like that—then, from the standpoint of the non-Jew, it is no longer subject to the laws of ownership. Perhaps that’s one way to explain it. Section 3: another example that shows the difference between withholding payment and robbery. “Even where the non-Jew does not know, one may not evade repayment of a loan or any other debt one owes the non-Jew. But when an object belonging to the non-Jew is still in existence, one may not deny having it, for that is outright robbery.” For example, the non-Jew gave you something to look after—an actual object. It isn’t a debt you owe him; you have his object right here. The moment you say, “It never happened,” you are robbing him. That is called robbery, not withholding payment. Withholding payment means keeping a debt you owe instead of paying it. And incidentally, we could also say, as an aside, that even among Jews, to some extent, when someone lends something to another person, he factors in a certain chance that it won’t be returned to him. A certain percentage, right? So perhaps we can say that with a non-Jew, that percentage alone is enough to remove his ownership. Now, that was

22:48 Speaker 2 really an introduction—the discussion of withholding payment and robbery—to our subject, which is commerce with non-Jews. Someone ordered a product from a non-Jewish website or store, received it, and suddenly received the same product again. They mistakenly sent the shipment twice, and he got the same product twice. Or he received a more expensive product, a higher-end model. Is he obligated to call them and say, “There’s been a mistake here”? Let’s see. In section 4, the Alter Rebbe begins with what is forbidden and then moves to what is permitted. “Furthermore...” Perhaps before I continue, I’ll put a summary in the presentation to help us keep it straight: robbery and mistakes involving a non-Jew. Robbing a non-Jew is, in principle, forbidden by Torah law, with no leniencies. If it’s robbery, there are no leniencies. Deceiving a non-Jew—if you deceive him, that is like robbery; it has the same law as robbery, because you are taking action. That’s the rule: I take an action that causes the non-Jew’s money or an object belonging to him to pass into my possession. Incidentally, there are handouts here for anyone who needs one. A4 sheets.

24:09 Speaker 9 Because of a chillul Hashem or something?

24:11 Speaker 2 What?

24:11 Speaker 9 Because of a chillul Hashem?

24:13 Speaker 2 No. Robbing and deceiving are forbidden by Torah law, regardless of chillul Hashem. The next part will relate to chillul Hashem. As for a non-Jew’s mistake or lost property—things that have already left his possession and come into yours—those are permitted. Where it would cause a chillul Hashem, it is forbidden to keep them; you must return them to prevent a chillul Hashem. As for someone who wants to return them to sanctify Hashem’s name, we haven’t really discussed that yet. If he does it, he is praiseworthy. We touched on it briefly, but let’s just mention the source. It is praiseworthy to return them in order to sanctify Hashem’s name. Now let’s continue with the Alter Rebbe. Afterward, we’ll summarize and clarify the differences between a mistake and deception. Continuing section 4: “Furthermore, even if one buys an object from a non-Jew, one may not deceive him in calculating and paying the money for the object.” You may not pay him less by counting out less money. As it says, “He shall reckon with the one who bought him.” The Torah explicitly says there that even in a sale involving a non-Jew, one must calculate accurately and pay the correct amount. Now why is that? Why isn’t it considered a mistake on the non-Jew’s part? All I’m doing is deceiving him. The Alter Rebbe explains: “For the non-Jew transfers ownership of the object to him only in exchange for the sum of money they agreed upon.” The non-Jew is not willing to give it to you for ninety shekels, only for a hundred. “And one who deceives him in calculating the money is considered to be stealing the object, not evading repayment of a debt.” If you pay him only ninety and take the object, you are robbing him of the object. It’s not the ten shekels you’re robbing him of; it’s the object, because he hasn’t agreed to that. He wants to sell it to you for a hundred, not ninety. So that is called robbery, not evading repayment of a debt. The Alter Rebbe continues: “Even deception that causes no monetary loss is forbidden in buying and selling, as is written

26:24 Speaker 2 in the laws of ona’ah.” That’s something we haven’t read yet. Depending on the time, perhaps we’ll get to it afterward. Now let’s move on to what is permitted in buying and selling. You may not deceive him. What is permitted? Section 5: “Nevertheless, if the non-Jew made a mistake on his own, it is permitted, provided it will not cause a chillul Hashem because he will not find out.” If the non-Jew makes a mistake on his own—he gives you money, you count it, and you see there is less—then it is permitted. Now the Rambam sets a condition here. When is a non-Jew’s mistake permitted? He gives a condition: it is permitted provided that, from the outset, you tell him, “I’m relying on you for the calculations.” When you say that, it is permitted. If you don’t say it, as we said, it is forbidden. Why is it forbidden? Perhaps he is deliberately testing you now to see whether you’ll return it to him. That’s what the Rambam writes. Notice that the Alter Rebbe rules for everyone not quite like the Rambam.

27:34 Speaker 9 Right.

27:34 Speaker 2 Right, yes. He writes, “And it is proper for the Jew to tell him, ‘See, I’m relying on your calculation.’” It is merely proper; it is not a condition.

27:44 Speaker 9 Ideally.

27:45 Speaker 2 Ideally, you should do this, but after the fact, it isn’t necessary. And anyone who opens the Alter Rebbe there—uh, the Rambam—will see the Maggid Mishneh on that passage. The Maggid Mishneh says it is only a pious practice. A pious practice. He disagrees with the Rambam. He disagrees with the Rambam. He explains that the Rambam brings this from the Gemara, but the Gemara meant it as a pious practice. What Rav Kahana did there in the Gemara was a pious practice. So the Alter Rebbe ruled like the Maggid Mishneh, that after the fact it is permitted. Ideally, you should do it. So to sum up: when a person is about to do business with a non-Jew, before starting the transaction, whether he’s buying or doing something else, it’s advisable to say, “I’m relying on you; you’re a trustworthy person.” Ideally, that’s what you should do, in case mistakes occur. But if he didn’t say it and, in the end, finds that he has money because of a mistake, he may keep it. But what does the Rambam say? “Provided it does not become known to him.” The other person must not realize that you did something forbidden to him. Now there’s a middle case here that needs some discussion. What happens—what does “it does not become known” mean? Say you’re sure that when he gets home, he’ll count the products and realize he received less. Now there are two possibilities. He might realize that you lied to him. It’s hard to picture the exact cases, but there’s a case where he’ll realize you lied, and a case where he’ll realize there was a mistake but think that perhaps you made a mistake too. He won’t suspect you of actually lying. Now, the Rambam’s wording here is a little unclear. He writes, “Provided it does not become known to him.” What does that mean? That he won’t find out at all what happened, or

29:30 Speaker 2 that he won’t find out you lied to him? That isn’t entirely clear, seemingly. Where can we learn the answer? From what we read at the beginning. He spoke about the son of a non-Jew: someone borrowed from the father, the father died, and now you—

29:46 Speaker 10 Not the one who lent the money.

29:48 Speaker 2 Notice his wording there, though. Look at the bottom right. He says, “He may deny it to his son, who does not know for certain that he is lying.” Notice: the son may suspect you’re lying. He says, “What? You borrowed a substantial sum from my father, a hundred thousand shekels, and suddenly you say you paid it back?” He looks at you and says, “I’m not so sure,” but he can’t know, because the dealings were with his father.

30:15 Speaker 10 He has no proof.

30:15 Speaker 2 He has no proof. “Because he does not know for certain that he is lying.” Seemingly, that’s already enough.

30:19 Speaker 10 What happens if he does know you’re lying? You made a deal with him.

30:25 Speaker 2 Yes.

30:25 Speaker 10 The next day he tells you, “Listen, you made a mistake. We need to correct it in such-and-such a way.”

30:29 Speaker 2 Okay. Now he tells you that you made a mistake. If you don’t give it back to him, what happens?

30:34 Speaker 10 A chillul Hashem.

30:34 Speaker 2 A chillul Hashem. So—

30:36 Speaker 10 In a case where he remembered the debt and came to you—

30:38 Speaker 2 Yes. If he comes and asks, you have to give it back, because otherwise it’s a chillul Hashem. We’re talking here about a case where he doesn’t ask, where you discover it on your own.

30:45 Speaker 10 What if he comes and says, “I trust you, and…”

30:48 Speaker 2 Now, if you can come to him and say, “Are you sure? Are you sure there was a mistake? Look, I relied on you. I don’t think so; it seems to me that I… Let’s see, I’ll count.” In other words, you reach a point where, in the end, he isn’t sure you’re lying to him. Then again, it’s exactly like what we discussed. He’s sure there was a mistake; he just doesn’t know whether you’re lying to him or not, whether it was deliberate or not. Seemingly, we can infer from here that it’s permitted. Seemingly. Now let’s sum up the subject of mistakes and deception. When is it a mistake, and when is it deception? That’s the major dividing line here: it takes us from a Torah prohibition to something entirely permitted. So we have to be very, very precise and see whether I’m deceiving someone or whether this is a case of a mistake. Let’s take a look. We’ll start with the prohibition against deception. I’ll give a few examples. Concealing defects in a product: I sell him a product and don’t tell him it has a flaw, a defect. What do you say—is that deception or a mistake? It’s deception. Why? Because he doesn’t want to pay that money for something defective. He wants something intact. Failing to disclose defects. Notice that there’s concealing, and there’s failing to disclose. Concealing means taking action—as we discussed before, doing various things to hide it. But failing to disclose is also forbidden. Incidentally, as an aside, we spoke about selling at a high price. We said it’s permitted. Now, when you sell at a high price, you don’t tell him that the price is high either. So why is that permitted? Let’s look at the Alter Rebbe’s wording now, in number four.

32:36 Speaker 11 He can report it anywhere. He can—

32:39 Speaker 2 Yes, he says something similar. At the end of number four, in the second passage, he discusses measuring for him. He was talking about measuring. Giving him too little or too much in a way that robs him is forbidden. “This is unlike overcharging, where he sees what he is buying and assesses the value of the purchase himself, and his mistake is permitted, as stated above. But this person deceives him and steals from him.” In other words, he sees it. He’s willing to pay a hundred shekels for it. That’s not like the case where there’s a defect inside, and he isn’t willing to pay a hundred shekels for something defective. Here he sees it, thinks it costs a hundred shekels, and agrees to pay a hundred shekels for that kind of product. It’s just that he doesn’t know he could find it for less on the market. That’s no longer your concern. If he’s your fellow Jew, you have to tell him, “Listen, it costs less.” But if he’s a non-Jew, that’s not your concern. So that’s failing to disclose defects: if it’s a defect, it’s called deception. If you don’t disclose that the price is high, that isn’t called deception; it’s his mistake. Second: persuading someone through a lie. This is important too. We said it’s permitted to sell at a high price. Let’s read something we already read but perhaps didn’t notice. Number two, at the end of the third line. The Alter Rebbe says, “But it is forbidden to deceive him, whether regarding the value of the purchase or regarding the calculation.” “Whether regarding the value of the purchase.” Wait, we said you may sell at a high price. Suddenly he says, “It is forbidden to deceive him regarding the value of the purchase.” So is it permitted or forbidden? One of the editors of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch wrote about this, “We cannot make head or tail of how to explain the Alter Rebbe.” That’s the expression he used. Because you read it and say: wait, if the other person made the mistake on his own, what difference does it make whether it’s theft or—even

34:35 Speaker 2 with theft, it’s permitted if he made the mistake on his own. If you deceive him, it’s forbidden even regarding the value. What’s the distinction? What do you say?

34:41 Speaker 11 You could mislead him about what it costs, not just about what it’s worth.

34:45 Speaker 2 What it’s worth. Exactly. That’s the point. You tell him what it’s worth—that’s deceiving him regarding the value of the purchase. He says to you, “What? Really, a hundred shekels?” And you tell him, “Of course, it’s worth a hundred shekels.” That’s where you’re deceiving him.

34:56 Speaker 11 A hundred shekels.

34:58 Speaker 2 Yes, you tell him the price. There’s also a proof for this. I don’t know, perhaps another time, elsewhere—anyone who wants can look at the laws of ona’ah [unclear] in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, in the first section. There the Alter Rebbe says that if you see another Jew selling to a non-Jew at a high price, you may not tell the non-Jew. You may not tell the non-Jew. Why? Because that’s considered harming the Jew: after all, a non-Jew’s mistake—overcharging a non-Jew—is permitted. So why are you telling the non-Jew? You’re harming the Jew. That’s what he says. So you see that the Jew is selling it to him at a high price, and that’s permitted because he isn’t deceiving him about its value. That’s what I mean by persuading someone through a lie: persuading him about the value, or persuading him in general. Say you tell him, “It’s really worth it, because you won’t find it anywhere else,” or “This is what everyone’s buying today”—I don’t know, all sorts of lies. That’s forbidden. It’s called deception.

35:52 Speaker 11 Is it permitted with a Jew?

35:53 Speaker 2 With a Jew it’s certainly forbidden. What?

35:54 Speaker 11 For a Jew to tell another Jew not to buy it.

35:58 Speaker 2 Ah, telling someone not to buy it is permitted, because you’re saving him. You’re saving the buyer from being charged too much. You’re saving the seller from the prohibition of overcharging, because he may not sell it at an inflated price without telling him. Changing the agreed price is also important. You agreed on a price and paid him one shekel less. We talked about that. Now, that isn’t governed by the laws of overcharging. Wait, one shekel is less than a sixth; it isn’t considered overcharging. Overcharging means selling at an inflated price. But taking more money than was agreed, or paying him less, isn’t overcharging; it’s a prohibition against theft. And counting incorrectly—counting products in an inaccurate way—is also forbidden. That’s what’s prohibited. What is permitted? A mistake. A mistake is permitted. What counts as a mistake? There are three possibilities here: selling him a product at a high price. Why is that called a mistake? Because he’s making the mistake himself. You’re not giving him any incorrect information; you’re just saying, “I’m selling this for such-and-such a price.” That’s permitted. Receiving an excess payment—you’ve already been paid too much. And, when buying and selling, receiving an excess quantity. You bought something and mistakenly received more; that, too, would be permitted. So, to sum up—

37:22 Speaker 3 A chillul Hashem.

37:23 Speaker 2 Yes, that’s it. That’s a good point. This is exactly the place to mention it. Even in these situations, if it would cause a chillul Hashem, it would be forbidden. Now, in the minute we have left, I want to add the point we mentioned earlier about returning a non-Jew’s lost property. It’s forbidden to return a non-Jew’s lost property. The Rambam says, “Returning his lost property is forbidden.” He says, “For this strengthens the hands of the wicked of the world.” As an aside, the Shoel U’Meishiv says this refers to strengthening the hands of idol worshippers. Therefore, he says that today, since they aren’t idol worshippers, that prohibition doesn’t apply. You can keep it; that’s permitted, but—

38:03 Speaker 3 They don’t believe in Hashem at all, like in Sweden—Sweden, where they found that people are atheists.

38:13 Speaker 2 They violate the requirement to believe in Hashem, but I don’t know if that makes them idol worshippers. They don’t worship idols. Now, there’s a lot to discuss on the subject of idol worshippers. I’ve already prepared the pages here. I said that if there’s time, we’ll discuss it in the next class. We’ll discuss quite a few things about non-Jews today—what’s permitted and what’s forbidden. Now, in the next halachah, the Rambam writes, “A non-Jew’s mistake is like his lost property: it is permitted.” That’s what he writes. What does it mean? You’re permitted to keep it. Now, what if I want to return something he gave me by mistake? Am I permitted to, or is it forbidden? Is it like lost property, which I’m forbidden to return? He doesn’t say. He writes, “A non-Jew’s mistake is like his lost property: it is permitted.” He doesn’t say, and the Tur doesn’t say either, that it’s forbidden to return it to the non-Jew. But some later halachic authorities I’ve seen—two responsa that are somewhat similar to each other, Teshuvos Malko[?] and Shedeh Haaretz, I think—wrote that if the Rambam says a non-Jew’s mistake is like his lost property, then the same rule applies. So just as you may not return a non-Jew’s lost property unless it’s a case of kiddush Hashem or chillul Hashem, here too, ultimately, returning it would be forbidden. Do we need another summary, or perhaps a summary of the summary? Deception and theft—

39:22 Speaker 3 We want to [unclear] a non-Jew so that he’ll, he’ll have a lot of something.

39:25 Speaker 2 Yes, that’s what we found. Deception and theft are forbidden; a mistake is permitted. That’s the summary.