Trading in Non-Kosher Food - Rabbi Yisrael Meatuf shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to the “Lema’an Yishme’u” podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today we’ll learn about trading in prohibited foods.

00:13 Speaker 4 Trading.

00:13 Speaker 2 Trading in prohibited foods.

00:16 Speaker 4 About stolen goods.

00:16 Speaker 2 Not all stolen goods. Not all stolen goods—that’s a subject in its own right. It’s a very, very broad subject, affecting many areas, and it’s a little complicated to understand what’s what. There are several different issues here, several different areas. But we’ll try, as in every class, to go in order, ease into the subject, and then move along. First, the source for trading in non-kosher food. It’s hard to see, but... it also appears in Yoreh De’ah, section 187; there’s a section devoted to it. And there’s also something from the Alter Rebbe concerning the passage before “nor with neveilos, nor with treifos, nor with repugnant creatures, nor with creeping creatures.”

02:31 Speaker 4 Dye? Dye?

02:32 Speaker 2 Dye, yes. This is talking about shemitah. We’re not going to get into shemitah.

02:36 Speaker 4 Dye.

02:36 Speaker 2 Yes, dye.

02:38 Speaker 4 Like with kosher food.

02:39 Speaker 2 Yes, yes. There it’s talking about things used for dyeing that are connected to shemitah. But we also saw, “Nor may one dye for pay.”

02:49 Speaker 4 Dye the fruit?

02:50 Speaker 2 No, no, no. It’s talking about things you dye with. But incidentally, the Mishnah says that if someone dyes with produce of shemitah, he must not take payment for it, because then it becomes prohibited trading. Trading essentially means making a profit. So he profits by dyeing with it, just as others do by trading. That’s why it says he may not take payment: one may not trade in produce of shemitah. But that’s not—we’re more interested now in the continuation: “Nor with neveilos, nor with treifos, nor with repugnant creatures, nor with creeping creatures.” One may not trade in any of these. Now pay attention: we’re not talking about things from which benefit is forbidden. Right? Meat and milk, for example, are forbidden for benefit. If benefit is forbidden, there’s no way to profit from them. Here we’re talking about neveilos, treifos, repugnant creatures, and creeping creatures. Incidentally, it explicitly says, “or sell it to a non-Jew.” Regarding a treifah, it says, “Give it to the stranger within your gates, and he may eat it,” or “sell it to a non-Jew.”

03:52 Speaker 4 That’s rabbinic.

03:54 Speaker 2 A neveilah is also permitted. You can—what?

03:56 Speaker 4 That’s rabbinic.

03:57 Speaker 2 That’s the question. Let’s see. So the Mishnah in Shevi’is says it’s forbidden to trade in neveilos, treifos, repugnant creatures, and creeping creatures. Trading in them is forbidden. Now let’s look at the Gemara in Pesachim, and afterward we’ll move on to the halacha. The Gemara cites the view of Chizkiyah—or Rabbi Avahu, one of the two—that wherever the Torah says “it shall not be eaten,” rather than “you shall not eat,” it also means you may not benefit from it. That’s what he says. So they challenge him with what we’re reading now: “But what about creeping creatures? The Torah says, ‘It is repugnant; it shall not be eaten.’” The Torah says creeping creatures “shall not be eaten.” According to your approach, benefit from them should also be forbidden. “Yet we learned: hunters of animals, birds, and fish who happen upon non-kosher species are permitted to sell them to non-Jews.” Someone is hunting animals or birds or fishing, and he catches non-kosher fish. He catches non-kosher fish. What does he do? He doesn’t have to throw them away; he can sell them to a non-Jew. If benefit is forbidden, how can he sell them to a non-Jew? The verse says, “It shall not be eaten.” So he answers: “That case is different, because the verse says, ‘For you’—they shall be yours.” There the Torah says, “They shall be impure for you.” “For you” means they’re yours. You can—that is, this case is different. Wherever it says “it shall not be eaten,” both eating and benefit are forbidden. Here, where the Torah says “for you,” it says they’re yours. You may benefit from them. So if they have them—eating, no; benefit, yes. We’ll sort it out in a moment. The Gemara immediately asks, “If so, why not even deliberately in the first place?” If you say the Torah says “for you”—they’re yours, you may benefit from them—then what’s the problem? Trade in them freely. Why does the Mishnah say one may not trade in prohibited foods? The Gemara continues: “This case is different, for the verse says, ‘They shall be’—they must remain as they are.” In other words, it says “They shall be impure

06:04 Speaker 2 for you.” “They shall be impure” means they remain impure, but they are “for you.” There are two words here that seem to contradict each other. What does that mean? Initially versus after the fact. Don’t trade in them in the first place, but if you already, uh—

06:22 Speaker 5 Happen upon them.

06:23 Speaker 2 If you happen upon them, you shouldn’t have to take a loss, because benefit from them isn’t forbidden, so you may sell them. Yes. Don’t catch non-kosher species deliberately. Don’t deliberately catch them, but if you already have them, then... That’s another point, yes, another important point. We’ll discuss it in a moment. So, to sum up: In general, there are things from which benefit is forbidden, such as meat and milk, orlah, and other things. You may not profit from them in any way whatsoever. Other prohibited foods are permitted for benefit; you may profit from them. But don’t trade in them in the first place—don’t buy them in order to sell them. Now, why? Why not trade in them? He already mentioned earlier that it’s not a Torah prohibition; it’s rabbinic. But here we saw that it comes from a verse. So the halachic authorities do, in fact, disagree. Let’s look at the presentation. Some say it’s a decree of Scripture. Why can’t you trade in prohibited foods? It’s a decree of Scripture: it’s forbidden. It says here, “They shall be impure for you.” You don’t trade in these things. Others say—and this is the Rashba’s view—that the reason is you might eat them. You’re handling all kinds of—

07:44 Speaker 5 The prohibition involving meat and milk, or the prohibition involving other things?

07:46 Speaker 2 Other things. Meat and milk is clear: the Torah forbids benefiting from it. You may not benefit from it. The question is about things from which benefit is permitted and only eating is forbidden. Why can’t you trade in them? You might eat them by mistake. You’re handling them; you might taste them. You smell them, and they look tasty. After all, it says a person should not say, “I don’t want it,” but rather, “I do want it, but what can I do? The Torah has decreed against it.” He should say, “I want it, but the Torah has decreed against it.” A third opinion: Why is trading forbidden? Because of suspicion. It’s not that we’re saying you might eat it. I know myself; I know I won’t eat it. It’s forbidden. I won’t. I only eat Badatz and Landau. Why would I suddenly eat that? But what happens? Other people see me trading in these foods, selling them to people and so on. They’ll say, “Oh, if he trades in it, he probably eats it too.”

08:46 Speaker 6 What? Maris ayin?

08:47 Speaker 2 Yes, a kind of maris ayin. Exactly—that’s the term. Maris ayin. So we have three opinions: either it’s a decree of Scripture that trading in prohibited foods is forbidden, or the concern is that one might come to eat them, or it’s because of maris ayin, due to suspicion. Now let’s move on to the Shulchan Aruch and see what matters in practice. That’s number three.

09:13 Speaker 6 Three. And ten.

09:21 Speaker 2 Look at number three. “Anything forbidden by the Torah”—this is the Shulchan Aruch, a halachic ruling—“anything forbidden by the Torah, even if benefit from it is permitted, such as the neveilos, treifos, repugnant creatures, and creeping creatures we mentioned, if it is something intended for food, one may not trade in it. Except for cheilev”—forbidden animal fat. Cheilev is a special case, because the verse says of it, “It may be used for any purpose.” The Torah explicitly says you can use cheilev for whatever you want. You may even trade in it. But with anything else that is forbidden to eat, trading is forbidden. “If a hunter happens upon non-kosher animals, birds, or fish, or if a neveilah or treifah comes into his possession at home, he may sell it, provided he did not intend for that to happen.” So that’s what we said earlier, what the Gemara already said. Don’t trade in it in the first place. If you already have it, you can sell it and make a profit. How might he come to have it? If he’s a hunter—that’s the most common example, and today it happens in every slaughterhouse. Or, for example, a non-Jew came, gave him a gift, and left.

10:30 Speaker 6 Non-kosher things.

10:34 Speaker 2 Yes, non-kosher things. Now there’s a very important line here: “Anything prohibited only by the Sages may be traded in.” The entire restriction applies only to things the Torah forbids eating. But there’s no problem trading in things prohibited by rabbinic law.

10:55 Speaker 6 An example?

10:56 Speaker 2 Lots of things. All the decrees of the Sages. By Torah law, it’s only neveilah, treifah, things like that. The Sages prohibited poultry with milk and made all kinds of safeguards: milk from a non-Jew, cheese from a non-Jew. They made a safeguard. Right, they made a safeguard, but that’s a kind of decree on top of a decree, and we don’t make a decree on top of a decree. So according to those who say the prohibition on doing business with these things is rabbinic, it makes perfect sense: the Sages said not to trade in them, but that itself is only a rabbinic prohibition. We don’t make a decree on top of a decree. But even according to those who say the prohibition is from the Torah, if the food itself is prohibited only by rabbinic law, it’s permitted. Now, today, apart from actual treifos and neveilos and things like that, most of the other things are generally prohibited by rabbinic law, not by Torah law, because there are all kinds of mixtures. For example, once something is mixed into a majority of permitted food, it’s already a rabbinic matter. By Torah law it’s nullified by the majority; it’s only prohibited by rabbinic law. In short, all these mixtures and the products offered in stores today, the things you buy, are generally prohibited by rabbinic law. So, seemingly, one may trade in them. Now we’ll learn a few more things, and then we’ll move on to what’s more relevant to us, in Eretz Yisroel. In Eretz Yisroel it’s a little different. Everything we’ve discussed until now—who is he selling it to? He’s selling it to non-Jews. In Eretz Yisroel there’s the problem of causing people to stumble, and the question here is how far you have to go to avoid causing others to stumble. So let’s first take a few examples where the prohibition doesn’t apply. First, cheilev, forbidden fat: we saw this explicitly in the Torah. The Torah said it may be used “for any work.” The Shulchan Aruch explicitly says it may be traded in. Another thing the poskim mention is tevel produce. A person has a store where he sells to non-Jews, not Jews. He doesn’t have to separate tithes from all the fruit before selling it to them,

12:53 Speaker 2 because tevel is produce from which tithes can be separated. It isn’t something inherently forbidden. So even though eating it without separating tithes is prohibited by Torah law, he may trade in it. Tevel produce. Another example is worm-infested fruit. You can check worm-infested fruit; there are various methods of checking. So you’re allowed to sell it to non-Jews, even fruit known to be prone to worms. Now, if you sell it to Jews, you have to warn them. Yes, today there are even... I once saw figs with the certification of the Eidah Hachareidis Badatz, but they state explicitly that the certification does not cover worms. They certify that it isn’t orlah and things like that. Frozen strawberries or regular ones?

13:48 Speaker 7 Regular ones.

13:48 Speaker 2 Regular ones? Yes. Worm-infested strawberries?

13:54 Speaker 7 Seemingly, it depends on certain conditions.

13:56 Speaker 2 Yes. So they don’t take responsibility for checking them. But as far as the issue of trading in—

14:01 Speaker 7 The Eidah Hachareidis Badatz label says “Suitable for export.”

14:03 Speaker 2 Frozen ones, or these?

14:05 Speaker 7 No, fresh.

14:06 Speaker 2 Really?

14:06 Speaker 7 It’s rare, but they exist.

14:07 Speaker 2 Well, maybe that’s what they mean by “export.” So here, you aren’t causing anyone to stumble, because you inform them. And as far as trading in prohibited food goes, that prohibition doesn’t apply. Strawberries aren’t inherently forbidden, and so on.

14:29 Speaker 7 What do you mean that the prohibition doesn’t apply to them either?

14:33 Speaker 2 Which prohibition doesn’t apply to them?

14:33 Speaker 7 It says these are things to which it doesn’t apply.

14:34 Speaker 2 It means the prohibition on trading in them doesn’t apply.

14:36 Speaker 7 Oh.

14:37 Speaker 2 That there’s no prohibition on trading in them. That’s what it means.

14:39 Speaker 7 You also sell untithed fruit to a Jew as untithed fruit.

14:44 Speaker 2 Yes, right.

14:46 Speaker 7 Orlah.

14:47 Speaker 2 What?

14:48 Speaker 7 Orlah.

14:50 Speaker 2 Not orlah. That is prohibited; there is a prohibition there.

14:53 Speaker 7 Couldn’t he get confused about whether it’s orlah or not?

14:56 Speaker 2 What the person does with it is his concern. If you tell him, if you inform him, [unclear].

15:02 Speaker 7 I have another solution. I don’t have orlah.

15:05 Speaker 2 Another example is a garment containing shatnez, sold to non-Jews. The poskim wrote that we find a prohibition on trading only with regard to forbidden foods. Here it’s a garment. Even though wearing it is prohibited by Torah law, you can sell it to a non-Jew, provided there’s no concern that he’ll sell it to Jews. That’s what he mentioned earlier about selling a large quantity. And it says the same regarding chametz. The Alter Rebbe speaks about chametz before Pesach: you’re selling it to a non-Jew, and you sell him such a large quantity that some may be left over and he might sell it to Jews, because there’s no one else nearby to sell it to. That would be a problem. You need to sell an amount he’ll probably finish before Pesach. Today, these are products that keep; they aren’t things you can’t sell during Pesach itself. Okay, let’s look at another small, interesting point here, in number four. What if I sell sealed packages? Seemingly, then I won’t come to eat the food. So the Pri Megadim says, even if the packages are actually sealed, if they contain food for people, it’s obvious that the prohibition on trading applies— Food for people. Yes, yes, you wanted to say “food,” but... It’s obvious that trading is prohibited, even according to those who hold that the prohibition is rabbinic, lest one come to eat it. Even according to those opinions that say the concern is that one might come to eat it, you might think that if it’s sealed, it would be all right. But he says no: since this is the normal way for food to be packaged, there’s just as much concern as when prohibited food is kept in open containers. It isn’t locked away somewhere under a lock, so that we could say he won’t come to eat it. It’s closed—that’s how packages come—and he still might come to eat it. So it’s prohibited whether the packages are sealed or open. What is it?

16:59 Speaker 2 If the concern is that he might come to eat it, then perhaps we’d say that when it’s accessible to you, you might eat it, but if it’s sealed, perhaps— The concern is that you, the seller, might eat it. Oh. According to the opinions that give that as the reason, perhaps we could permit it. But he says no: even according to those opinions it’s prohibited, because packaging is the normal way to market it. Now, what is permitted? Let’s look at two more things that are permitted. Things that aren’t intended as food at all, even though they could be eaten. The example we discussed at the beginning was ornamental fish and parrots. Someone who wants to could eat them—he could eat the parrot or the fish—but in that place they’re sold for another purpose. So now it depends on local custom. If you’re in China or India, somewhere they eat rabbits, and you’re running a business selling rabbits and everyone there eats them, then that would be trading in forbidden food. But here in Israel, where people don’t eat rabbits, you aren’t really selling forbidden food. It’s a rabbit; it’s a pet. So ornamental fish and parrots, seemingly, everywhere today... they aren’t meant to be eaten. What? Cats. Cats too. It all depends on local custom, local custom. Yes. Now, some want to permit it even in an area where people eat them, if you’re selling them for a purpose other than eating. You sell them as fish for aquariums. People around you eat them, but you sell them for that purpose. Some permit it, but others prohibit it, so there is reason to prohibit it according to the practice in that area. Another thing: animal food. You have packaged animal food. So even now, today,

19:00 Speaker 2 I’m stocking things that aren’t fit for people to eat—and even if they are tasty and fit to eat—one of the poskim writes that the fact that the package says “intended for...” yes, for dogs and so on, puts it out of people’s minds. People don’t— Someone ate it. And, uh... Someone ate the bowl itself. Well? [unclear] It isn’t tasty, poor thing. So according to this, trading in these things would be permitted. Why? Because they’re intended for dogs to eat, not people. Now let’s move on to the situation today in Eretz Yisroel. There was an incident some time ago—I don’t know how many decades ago—at Tnuva, when an idea came up about what to do with all the treif meat they had. They needed to sell it to non-Jews. The idea was to put it in supermarkets, but to label it very, very clearly as treif, first of all. Second, to sell it at the same price as kosher meat. Because if you sell it more cheaply, first, you attract people to buy it; and second, people could commit fraud with it—take it, put a kosher label on it, and so on. They would market it in supermarkets and write very prominently that it was treif. Then the argument was: someone who eats treif anyway will buy it, and someone who doesn’t, won’t.

20:42 Speaker 8 Jews?

20:42 Speaker 2 In Israel. There are Jews in Israel. But they say, “I’m not—he would have bought treif anyway.”

20:49 Speaker 8 So I’ll tell him. There are Jews who don’t... no, no. They don’t mind having it marked. They sell it to them.

20:57 Speaker 2 Right. Meaning, they’d go to the store anyway.

21:00 Speaker 8 They aren’t careful about it.

21:02 Speaker 2 Whatever they want.

21:02 Speaker 8 Still, you’re selling them treif. Let’s be very careful about this.

21:09 Speaker 2 Yes. So there was a big debate about this, between the... Let’s see. I want to present the reasons he gave for permitting it and see what the Alter Rebbe holds about them. I’m not getting into what they were then. I don’t know what it is now—

21:23 Speaker 8 [unclear] For example, we’re not getting into that at all. Even people who [unclear].

21:28 Speaker 2 What is it—does it have non-kosher food there?

21:30 Speaker 8 Where? The fact that you brought in the... a little bit. You know that in that store it comes in; you can sell non-kosher food. A store too—in short, let’s avoid that.

21:40 Speaker 2 Yes.

21:41 Speaker 8 [unclear]

21:47 Speaker 2 Wait. By the way, you mentioned something else. There’s something here... one second.

21:59 Speaker 8 Something else.

22:01 Speaker 2 The Gemara says, “Cursed is a person who raises pigs.” That’s what it says. So they say that even trading in pigs for other purposes is prohibited—there’s the practice of treating hides, rubbing hides with pig fat, things like that. That would be forbidden because there’s something distinctive about pigs, a special prohibition. Now let’s look at the reasons that rabbi wanted to permit it, and see what the Alter Rebbe holds. He wants to say this: There is a concept in halachah, a Torah prohibition of “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” What does that mean? Causing someone to commit a transgression. “Before the blind” is a Torah prohibition. But it applies when, without you, the person could not have committed the prohibition. The example given is “two sides of a river,” right? He couldn’t have committed the prohibition without you. You came along and enabled him to do it. That is “Do not place a stumbling block,” and it is forbidden by the Torah. But what happens if he could commit the prohibition without you as well? Then it is no longer a Torah prohibition; it is the rabbinic prohibition of assisting those who commit transgressions. That is a less severe, rabbinic prohibition, and it applies when he can do it himself. Now, that rabbi wanted to say this: First, perhaps “assisting those who commit transgressions” only means helping him commit the transgression right now. But if you sell him food now, he isn’t eating it in the store. He goes home and eats it there. So he wants to say that there are opinions that would permit this. He wanted to make another point: Someone who already eats non-kosher food is considered a mumar, and there is no prohibition against causing a mumar to transgress. That’s what he—

24:07 Speaker 2 wanted to say: there is no prohibition against causing a mumar to transgress. No, no, not “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind”—not in a case where he could have bought it at another store. So here you aren’t... it isn’t “before the blind”; it’s only assisting. He wants to say there is no prohibition of assisting a mumar. And another thing he wants to say: even if you did not... did not bring the prohibition forward—even if you say it’s forbidden when it isn’t at the time of the transgression, you didn’t bring it forward or hasten it. He would have done it at the same time without you. That’s what he wants to say. Now let’s read the Alter Rebbe. Ah, one more thing: he wants to say that the prohibition of assisting does not apply to a rabbinic prohibition. We spoke earlier about trade: trading in something prohibited by the Torah is forbidden, but with something prohibited by the rabbis it is permitted. Causing someone to transgress—even a rabbinic prohibition—is forbidden under “Do not place a stumbling block.” But he says that assisting, where the person can do it himself, is not a problem when the prohibition is rabbinic. That’s what he wants to say. So let’s see. We’ll start with number seven and then go back to number six. Let’s see what the Alter Rebbe holds: “It is forbidden to feed someone whom one knows has not washed his hands, because of ‘Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.’” You know he hasn’t washed his hands, and you have bread that you’re giving him now. You are causing him to transgress “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” “And even if the bread belongs to the person eating it”—meaning that without you, too, he could have reached out, taken it and eaten it. “And you are only handing it to him”—you’re just picking it up. He’s sitting there; he could have got up and taken it, but you hand it to him. And what has he done? Only failed to wash his hands. “It is forbidden to assist those who commit transgressions, as in Yoreh De’ah, section 307.” In other words—

25:55 Speaker 2 This Gemara explicitly concerns washing hands, which is a rabbinic prohibition.

25:57 Speaker 9 A problem. If it’s a prohibition in its own right, he gives him—

26:02 Speaker 10 What? He doesn’t serve it to him.

26:04 Speaker 9 Huh?

26:04 Speaker 10 He doesn’t serve it to him.

26:05 Speaker 9 He does serve it to him.

26:06 Speaker 10 It gets to the table; he sits down and eats on his own.

26:09 Speaker 9 He got startled. He got startled. Maybe...

26:12 Speaker 10 He didn’t take it from the bread plate. He could eat from the plate too.

26:17 Speaker 9 You served it. You served it to him.

26:21 Speaker 10 Regarding Shabbos.

26:22 Speaker 9 The other case is when a person comes and doesn’t...

26:26 Speaker 10 You’re right. If you invited someone to your home for Shabbos and didn’t give him a place to sleep—

26:30 Speaker 9 He came to my wedding.

26:32 Speaker 10 That’s no good. This is Shabbos. If you invited a guest for Shabbos and didn’t give him a place to sleep, and you know he’ll drive home—

26:39 Speaker 2 Seemingly, if you put the bread on his plate, that might be similar to this case.

26:44 Speaker 9 If I put it straight on his plate—I know he’s coming, welcome! He won’t wash his hands. He’ll eat like that, without a blessing. Is that clear to us?

26:54 Speaker 2 Yes. By the way, the wording here is “whom one knows has not washed his hands.” I know he hasn’t washed his hands. But I don’t know—maybe he did wash his hands? He arrived at the event, [unclear], washed his hands. What? I don’t know.

27:05 Speaker 10 He isn’t serving him the bread. Here, is he serving him the bread, or what?

27:09 Speaker 9 What does he do? If I serve it to him, even if I don’t know... Say something to him; he won’t make a...

27:14 Speaker 10 Blessings.

27:15 Speaker 2 Ah, that’s another thing. That’s another subject, and it really is difficult to put into practice—the issue of eating without a blessing. Various tradespeople come to your home, and you offer them refreshments, knowing they won’t make a blessing. There are many discussions about how this is permitted, but first you should tell them, “Make a blessing. Come on, make a blessing.” Usually that works. Usually they don’t refuse to make a blessing. Now, there’s something here that, if you want, I haven’t said yet. If there’s time at the end, remind me. We already discussed number five. Let’s look at the Alter Rebbe on assisting, number six. First, there’s the case about carrying on Shabbos: how the poor man and the householder carried something out, and one took it from the other’s hand, and so on. That’s in the middle of the discussion here. But in this case, you take an object and do this: I haven’t carried anything out, but I handed it to someone standing outside, and he takes it and carries it out. I am “exempt, and it is permitted with respect to the prohibition of Shabbos,” because I haven’t done anything. As far as the Shabbos prohibition is concerned, I haven’t done anything. “But it is forbidden by the Torah because he causes his fellow to transgress by giving him an object to carry from one domain to another, and he violates ‘Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.’”

28:31 Speaker 11 You give it to him, and he carries it out.

28:32 Speaker 2 He carries it out.

28:33 Speaker 11 You, you, you’re the one...

28:34 Speaker 2 Yes. We’re talking about a situation where he couldn’t have done it himself. You gave it to him; you enabled him to do it. Let’s continue, above: “But if the object was placed in such a way that, even had he not given it to him, he could have taken it himself”—

28:47 Speaker 11 No, there isn’t.

28:48 Speaker 2 He could have taken it himself. No, even without you he could have taken it. Yes, you helped him, but you didn’t cause him to transgress in that sense. “He does not violate ‘before the blind’ under Torah law. But by rabbinic law it is forbidden to give it to him, even if he is a non-Jew and even in a karmelis.” There’s something particular here. It’s not because you’re causing him to transgress; it’s something specific. I’m talking here about something that benefits him, and that creates a problem there. But what interests us is what comes next: “And with a Jew there is an additional rabbinic prohibition, because he is assisting those who commit transgressions. Therefore, it is forbidden to hand a forbidden item to mumarim, even if the mumar could have taken it himself.” The Alter Rebbe says explicitly that even with a mumar... Is there a question?

29:32 Speaker 11 What makes someone a mumar? Someone who...

29:35 Speaker 2 That doesn’t matter to me, but even with a mumar it’s forbidden. Yes? So even someone—

29:38 Speaker 11 What makes someone a mumar?

29:38 Speaker 2 In principle, a mumar is someone who openly declares it.

29:41 Speaker 11 I mean... not just [unclear] who doesn’t know, or—

29:44 Speaker 2 Yes, someone raised without knowledge of Judaism is of course different. But even with a mumar, you’re forbidden to cause him to transgress.

29:49 Speaker 11 A mumar declares, “I no longer believe in the Creator.”

29:53 Speaker 2 Or someone can be a mumar regarding one particular matter: “This prohibition—I don’t observe it.” There is a mumar who transgresses out of defiance, and a mumar who transgresses out of desire. So it turns out that even with a mumar there’s a problem. Even with a rabbinic prohibition there’s a problem. So when people sell all kinds of things, even if the food is non-kosher only by rabbinic law, and you sell it in various places and people come—where does that leave us? Assisting. Even if the buyer is a mumar, even if the prohibition is rabbinic. Now, his point was that it isn’t at the time of the prohibition. The person isn’t eating in your store now; he takes it home for later. So that rabbi wanted to say that perhaps in this case there is no prohibition of assisting. Let’s see. He wanted to say there is no prohibition of assisting if it doesn’t happen at that very moment.

30:46 Speaker 11 Why?

30:46 Speaker 2 Ultimately... What?

30:48 Speaker 11 Why?

30:49 Speaker 2 Similar, along those lines. Along those lines. In the end, after all, this is only a rabbinic prohibition of assisting. It is not the Torah prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind. So this is assisting people who commit a transgression. That is called causing someone to stumble into a transgression. Though, incidentally, “strengthening the hands of those who commit a transgression” is also said about buying from a thief—the case you mentioned at the beginning. You buy from the thief, and you encourage him to keep stealing because you bought from him. It’s just that this happens after the act.

31:09 Speaker 11 If that is included in the prohibition.

31:14 Speaker 2 Come, let’s see. What you’re saying now is written right here. Section 4. The Alter Rebbe says: “It is likewise forbidden to lend a work tool on Shabbos to a Jew suspected of doing work on Shabbos, even if he can find a tool to borrow elsewhere.” If he can’t find one elsewhere, that’s already placing a stumbling block before the blind. You’re causing him to stumble. But even if he can find one elsewhere, it’s forbidden. Why? Because you’re assisting him. “And if it is possible to assume that he will use it for permitted work, one may lend it to him if it is a tool he can find elsewhere.”

31:50 Speaker 11 For a Jew’s use, you can assume that.

31:52 Speaker 2 What does “for a Jew’s use” mean? I don’t understand—on Shabbos. No, no, this is talking about a Jew coming to borrow a tool from another Jew.

32:02 Speaker 11 Someone who comes to you.

32:05 Speaker 2 Fine, so a car is certainly not. But no, that’s not what we’re talking about here. No, okay. That’s it. A car is something you can’t assume will be used for permitted work, unless he says it’s a matter of saving a life. Huh? He asks for scissors. What do you do with scissors? Can you open a challah bag? A challah bag is a bit of a question, because it makes a neat opening. What? But there are all kinds of things you’re allowed to do on Shabbos too. So you can assume he’ll use them for something permitted, and then it’s allowed. Why? Because there are really two factors here. He could have managed without you, so it’s only the prohibition of assisting, not placing a stumbling block before the blind; and you’re also not sure he’ll use it for something forbidden. So then it’s permitted. But if he can’t find one elsewhere, it’s forbidden to lend it to him. If he has no other option, that’s already placing a stumbling block before the blind, so you may not lend it to him, unless there are considerations of maintaining peaceful relations.

32:59 Speaker 11 Can you lie to him, tell him you don’t have one, or... so as not to bring him to a transgression?

33:08 Speaker 2 It could be that if you see it will cause hostility, that there will be a problem, then yes, for the sake of maintaining peaceful relations you can say something different. Yes, maintaining peaceful relations. Now let’s see.

33:19 Speaker 11 Which is worse.

33:23 Speaker 2 Fine, that’s another matter. Yes, that’s a separate matter.

33:26 Speaker 11 If it’s a non-Jew, then what?

33:28 Speaker 2 If there’s time for him to do it. Now let’s look at the work. With this work tool, he isn’t sitting around the house using the hammer. He takes it home and uses it there. Nevertheless, it’s forbidden. That shows that even when it isn’t at the time of the transgression, the Gemara’s principle still forbids it. Incidentally, this ruling that it’s forbidden to lend it isn’t written only in this Gemara; it’s a ruling mentioned elsewhere. The Gemara wanted to make certain distinctions. One distinction—I don’t remember it right now; I have it written down here. Hello?

34:07 Speaker 11 Did the rabbi want to explain the discussion?

34:10 Speaker 2 Yes, to apply it to chullin as well. You could say that it isn’t at the time of the prohibition. In other words, it’s true that lending tools is forbidden, but he said this case is different. He gave two distinctions. I don’t remember the first one. The second was that perhaps they specifically meant lending, because when you lend something—there’s a rule about a person lending something to someone else. You lend him a hammer now, right? You didn’t tell him for how long. Now you suddenly need it yourself. Can you ask for it back? You can. If you told him, “I’m lending this to you for thirty days, for a month,” you can’t ask for it back. Until the month is over, even if you need it, you lent it to him for a month, and for now it’s as if it’s his for that month. But if you didn’t specify a time, you can take it back whenever you want. So he says: you lend him something, and the moment you see that he wants to use it for something forbidden, you should immediately take it back. Tell him, “I need it,” and take it back. In other words, it’s in your hands. That’s why it’s forbidden. But when you sell it to him, you’ve sold it; it no longer has anything to do with you. That’s why he wanted to distinguish between lending and selling. But that’s a very, very fine distinction. So, to sum up. Let’s summarize the class and see if there’s time for number five. Let’s go back to the presentation. We have things from which benefit is forbidden, and it is certainly forbidden to do anything with them—no deriving benefit from them in any way. Then there are things the Torah forbids us to eat, which we may not trade in. The reason trading in them is forbidden is either that it’s a decree of the Torah, or that one might come to eat them, or that people will suspect that someone trading in them also eats them. There are

35:55 Speaker 2 things to which the prohibition does not apply. We said that the Torah permitted fat. Produce that is tevel can be rectified, so it isn’t inherently forbidden, and one may trade in it. Infested produce is also permitted, because it can be inspected. And a garment containing shatnez—the prohibition on trading that we’ve discussed concerns food, not clothing. To sell here—to sell to a Jew, of course. To a non-Jew, sorry. To a non-Jew. Selling a shatnez garment to a Jew is certainly forbidden. Things that aren’t fit for human consumption are permitted. As a rule, according to most halachic authorities, we follow local custom: if something isn’t used as food in that place, it is permitted. The same applies to animal feed that is produced for that purpose. Let’s mention the Tzemach Tzedek, whom we skipped—number five. He says: “If a transaction involving kosher fish comes his way, and the fisherman is unwilling to sell them without the nonkosher fish.” In other words, he’s a fish seller. A fisherman comes to him: “I have a bag full of fish here. Buy it.” And he tells him, “Wait, there are nonkosher fish in here. I want just the kosher fish.” The fisherman says, “No. It’s all or nothing.” So the Tzemach Tzedek says it isn’t clear that this should be forbidden. Even though this is something he’s doing from the outset, not after the fact, he says it’s like a case where the nonkosher fish came his way, because you didn’t really set out—what does “from the outset” mean? That you deliberately set out to trade in forbidden things. It isn’t about the laws of nullification; it’s more about your intention... No, it’s more—more about your intention. What are you focused on? So the Tzemach Tzedek says: “If your intention really is to acquire the nonkosher fish, it will certainly be forbidden. But if they came your way and everything is together here, it may be permitted.”

37:51 Speaker 3 You can sell it.

37:52 Speaker 2 To trade in them means to buy and sell them. Now let’s sum up the last—the final point: selling in a place where there are Jews is much more serious. Even something prohibited only by rabbinic law will be forbidden, because you are causing Jews to stumble and assisting them. According to the Alter Rebbe, it’s forbidden even when dealing with a Jew who does not observe the mitzvos, even when the prohibition is rabbinic, and even if the prohibited act isn’t happening right now—perhaps it will happen later—because there is a prohibition against assisting. When is it permitted? When can you assume that he won’t use it for something forbidden? Because then you know you aren’t causing him to stumble.