Consumer Boycotts in Halacha - Rabbi Yisrael Meatuf shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lemaan Yishme’u,” a podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today’s class is on a very interesting subject: consumer boycotts. We had a whole class on the cost of living, price gouging, and all those issues. We spoke more about what beis din does and how it oversees prices, and so on. But what happens when that doesn’t work? Prices are high. So there’s a very common tool that people have recently started using: consumer boycotts. Now, at first glance, the question immediately comes up: What’s the problem? Are you going to tell me whom to buy from? I don’t want to buy; that’s my right. Why is there even a question here—is it permitted or forbidden? So let’s take it step by step. Today we’ll first learn what the problem is with starting a boycott. Do we find, in halachic history, that people organized or threatened boycotts over sales? Who has the authority to create a boycott? In practice, who can do it? When is it obligatory to participate in a boycott, and when, on the other hand, is it forbidden? Then we’ll move on to protests in our own time. We’ll take the recent 9.90 boycott as an example, and also the protest against Angel. We’ll open that up a little.

01:44 Speaker 4 What about 9.90?

01:46 Speaker 2 What?

01:46 Speaker 4 What about 9.90?

01:48 Speaker 2 There’s something people are trying now—I don’t know whether it’s catching on or not—buying fruits and vegetables only at 9.90. I don’t know, maybe it’s already over... Oh, you haven’t heard about it either.

02:02 Speaker 4 No, no.

02:02 Speaker 2 No, no more than 9.90. Okay, so let’s see. First of all, what’s the problem? What’s wrong with organizing a boycott? Let’s look at two examples from the Alter Rebbe concerning how one person treats another. How should a Jew behave toward another Jew? A lot of our assumptions come from today’s marketplace. Today’s marketplace is a free-for-all, a place where it’s already the law of the jungle. But when the Torah speaks about one person’s dealings with another—one man with his brother, one man with his fellow—it expects a little more. We’ve discussed this many times. Take selling at a high price: overcharging someone, misleading someone about the market price. With a non-Jew, there’s no problem. You don’t tell him what you think of the price; you just say, “This is the price,” and he buys it. With a Jew, the Torah expects you to act differently. If you want to sell it for more, tell him how much higher this is than the market price. Let’s look at two examples.

03:12 Speaker 4 What are you saying—that you should tell him that?

03:15 Speaker 2 Yes. That’s what we’re—there are two options. Two options: either tell him, “You should know that my price is ten percent above the market price. You can find it in the market for ten percent less. If you want it, buy it; if not, don’t.” The second option is to tell him, “I’m setting aside the market price. I don’t know what the market price is; I’m not taking it into account. I’m telling you: I bought this for such-and-such, and I’m selling it for such-and-such.” Now, when he says, “I bought it for such-and-such,” he doesn’t have to give only the exact price he paid. He bought it and spent—he also invested in advertising, incurred various expenses. He includes all of that in what he effectively calls his purchase price, and then says how much profit he’s making. So here are two examples. The first is in source number one: “It is forbidden to damage another person’s property.” Notice what the Alter Rebbe says: “Even causing another person a loss, whether through an action or through speech, is forbidden. For example, Reuven is selling merchandise to a non-Jew, and Shimon comes and tells the non-Jew that it isn’t worth that much.” Notice: we said earlier that it’s permitted to sell to a non-Jew at a high price, but forbidden to do so to a Jew. Thank you. It’s forbidden to overcharge a Jew; with a non-Jew, it’s permitted. Now you see someone taking a book that costs fifty shekels and selling it to a non-Jew for a hundred, and you tell the non-Jew, “Watch out, he’s taking advantage of you.” Is that permitted or forbidden? The Alter Rebbe says it’s forbidden.

04:41 Speaker 5 What is forbidden?

04:43 Speaker 2 It’s forbidden to tell the non-Jew—

04:46 Speaker 5 A non-Jew.

04:46 Speaker 2 —that the Jew is selling it to him at a high price.

04:48 Speaker 5 If the buyer is a Jew, right?

04:50 Speaker 2 If the buyer is a Jew, it’s not only permitted to tell him; you’re obligated to, because otherwise it would be overcharging. But here it’s a non-Jew, and it’s forbidden to tell him. The Alter Rebbe says here, “Even though he is telling the truth.” You’re telling him the truth; you aren’t lying. It’s forbidden. Why? Because overcharging a non-Jew is permitted. If overcharging a non-Jew is permitted, then here—

05:11 Speaker 5 Without his knowledge.

05:12 Speaker 2 What?

05:13 Speaker 5 Without the non-Jew’s knowledge.

05:15 Speaker 2 The non-Jew doesn’t know. He doesn’t know the price.

05:17 Speaker 5 Isn’t it forbidden if the non-Jew could find out that you...

05:21 Speaker 2 Oh, because of chillul Hashem?

05:23 Speaker 5 Yes.

05:23 Speaker 2 In a case like this, there’s no chillul Hashem. Why? Because I’m selling it; this is the price. If you want it, buy it. That’s not it. Chillul Hashem is more an issue with theft, defaulting on a loan, and other things. But here a Jew could have made a profit. Notice, you aren’t actually damaging his property. You aren’t taking anything out of his pocket. He could have made a profit from the non-Jew, and he could have done so in a way that isn’t exactly deception, though it may not sound entirely straightforward. Even so, if you tell the non-Jew, you’re forbidden to do so because you’re causing the Jew a loss. We see how serious it is to cause a Jew a loss, even by preventing him from making a profit. I’ll give a second example. Number two: the whole subject of encroaching on someone else’s livelihood. Someone opens a store next to another person’s store, selling the same products, and so on. It’s a broad subject with many halachos. Here it’s a little different... I also want to earn a living. I want to open a store because I know this market. For example, I studied law, and now I’ve come to live here. All I know how to do is practice law, but there’s already a lawyer here. Can I open a practice in the same area? There are many halachos about this, depending on whether it’s the same city or a different city. But if you do something that cuts off someone else’s livelihood—meaning you open a store and you know you’ll finish off the other person, that in the end he’ll have to close his store—that’s different. For example, the halachic case is opening a store on a dead-end street. People enter and leave from the same end of the street, and his store is at the far end. You open a store at the entrance, selling the same products. Everyone who comes will go into your store and won’t go to his. Why

07:11 Speaker 2 would they go all the way to his? In a situation like that, you can’t say, “Listen, it’s competition.” It’s forbidden because it cuts off someone else’s livelihood. Now I’ll ask: What did I do? All I did was open a store. Nevertheless, it’s forbidden.

07:24 Speaker 5 If livelihood comes from Above, then how is it not—

07:31 Speaker 2 Everything, including livelihood, needs a means within the natural order.

07:34 Speaker 5 That doesn’t matter, but if you—you open a store, how much do you have? How much is there? How much? You have—

07:47 Speaker 2 Okay, shanah tovah.

07:49 Speaker 5 Shanah tovah, and may you be sealed for good. That doesn’t matter, but why, if you—why give him a livelihood?

07:55 Speaker 2 Look, you can—

07:56 Speaker 5 I don’t know you. If he came to me—

08:00 Speaker 2 You could take that question very, very far. For example, suppose someone harms another person. He could say, “After all, everything is by hashgachah pratis. There’s no chance the other person will be harmed unless Hakadosh Boruch Hu has decreed that he’ll be harmed, so I’ll harm him.” But in the end, you’re doing something that harms another person. There’s an answer to this in terms of how we look at things.

08:28 Speaker 5 You’re preventing him from attaining something.

08:29 Speaker 2 Yes. Now, along those lines, let’s take the example of a boycott. Someone decides, let’s say, to boycott another person simply because he’s angry with him. Angel[?]—Angel[?] is an example we’ll discuss at the end. He’s angry with him, just angry with someone, so he organizes a boycott: “Don’t buy from his store.” What is he actually doing? He’s cutting off his livelihood. Now, even if you say he isn’t cutting off his livelihood or closing his store, he is still causing him a loss, reducing his income and preventing him from making profits. That isn’t something you can simply do as you please. Now that we’ve learned it isn’t so simple, let’s see when this was used in halacha and what the rules are.

09:12 Speaker 5 But that halacha is only about a non-Jew. If the buyer were a Jew, you’d be allowed to tell him.

09:17 Speaker 2 Right, right, right. Now let’s look at number three, an example of a boycott in halacha. This is from the Alter Rebbe: “If the non-Jews raise the price of fish, and as a result some people cannot buy fish for Shabbos, it is proper to institute that no Jew buy fish from them for several Shabbosos, so that afterward they will lower the price and everyone will be able to fulfill the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos.”

09:47 Speaker 5 Even if the sellers were Jews?

09:49 Speaker 2 What?

09:49 Speaker 5 Even if the sellers were Jews?

09:52 Speaker 2 Here it’s talking about non-Jews.

09:54 Speaker 5 Non-Jews.

09:54 Speaker 2 Yes, this was about non-Jews. Right, right. We’ll get to that in a moment. This was about non-Jews. If the non-Jews raise the market price of fish, then the Alter Rebbe says here, citing the earlier Tzemach Tzedek—not the Rebbe known as the Tzemach Tzedek, but an earlier Tzemach Tzedek—that an ordinance should be made not to buy from the non-Jews for several weeks, so they’ll lower the price and people will be able to buy. Now, what’s happening here isn’t only a matter of dealing with the non-Jews. Jews also lose out for several weeks: they lose the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos. Nevertheless, it’s right to make this ordinance so that in the future they’ll be able to fulfill the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos. There are many discussions about this. For example, if esrogim are expensive, should an ordinance like this be made, and so on? But this is an example in halachah of using a boycott. Now, that earlier Tzemach Tzedek took this from sources, something from the Mishnah and also from the Gemara. We’ll briefly look at two passages in the Gemara that provide a source for this, though in those cases they didn’t actually do it; they only threatened to. Number four. “Rabbi Yishmael says: three hadassim, even if two are clipped and one is not clipped. Rabbi Tarfon says: even if all three are clipped.” They disagree about what condition the hadassim must be in. And it continues at the top of the next column: “Shmuel sent word to those who sold hadassim: Set a fair price and sell; if not, I’ll rule for you according to Rabbi Tarfon.” He told the people selling hadassim to lower their prices. If they didn’t, he would announce that the halachah follows Rabbi Tarfon. Then people would be free to buy clipped hadassim, which would be much easier to obtain, and the sellers would lose out. In effect, he threatened them with a boycott. Of course, he wasn’t trying to change the halachah, because he really held that the halachah follows Rabbi Tarfon. Rashi discusses it there in the Gemara. Another very similar example. Number five. “Rava said:

12:05 Speaker 2 The halachah is: Chametz during Pesach, whether mixed with its own kind or with a different kind, is forbidden even in the smallest amount, following Rav. After Pesach, whether mixed with its own kind or with a different kind, it is permitted, following Rabbi Shimon.” We won’t go into the whole subject, but only during Pesach does even the smallest amount of chametz make a mixture forbidden. Once Pesach has passed, it doesn’t. This has practical implications for pots that have absorbed chametz and that you cook in after Pesach. If you say chametz makes a mixture forbidden even in the smallest amount after Pesach too, then there’s a problem: you have to buy a whole new supply of pots. So there, too, Shmuel said to those selling pots, “Set a fair price and sell; if not, I’ll rule for you according to Rabbi Shimon.” They had raised the prices of the pots, so he told them to lower their prices; otherwise, he would rule according to Rabbi Shimon, and then no one would want to buy from them at all. Yes, we’re talking about earthenware pots; they can’t be kashered through boiling. Now, these are examples where we see an attempt to use a boycott. But as he pointed out, the fish boycott explicitly involved non-Jews. What about Jews? So it’s like this. Let’s recall for a moment: there’s a list here of all the boycotts. There’s one more that I didn’t mention, which doesn’t appear on this sheet: the flax boycott. I’ll discuss it more fully later, but there was a case involving non-Jews as well. The non-Jews raised the price of flax, and all the merchants in the city were Jews, so they reached an agreement among themselves: they wouldn’t buy from the non-Jews until they lowered the price. One of them didn’t agree to the boycott and ruined the whole thing for them. He went and bought from the non-Jews and sold the flax there, undermining the entire boycott. So they took him to a din Torah. We’ll discuss later whether he really was obligated to go along with them or not, but that’s another

14:12 Speaker 2 boycott that was carried out historically. Now let’s very briefly recall what we learned in the class on the cost of living. Market prices are subject to two restrictions. One is that you must not mislead people about the price. In other words, if an individual seller—one store—charges more than everyone else, there’s a problem: he’s misleading people, because they don’t know it’s more expensive. The second is price controls on essential products. We spoke about this then, and I won’t go on at length. We discussed one way of setting a price based on your expenses, and another way of pricing something by looking at market conditions. Even if your expenses are low, you charge a high price because you know people will buy it anyway. It’s like the current problem with childcare providers. Another daycare center or something has closed, and now any childcare provider can name a price and people will rush to hire her. She can charge a very high price. That’s less a matter of cost-based pricing and more a matter of what the market will bear: if the demand is there, I can raise the price.

15:18 Speaker 6 Supply and demand.

15:19 Speaker 2 What? Exactly, supply and demand. Now, in halachah there’s a concept called inflating prices. It means that when it comes to essential products—foodstuffs—I regulate you: don’t set your price according to the market; set it according to your expenses. Check what your costs are, how much you paid, all your expenses, including, as we said earlier, everything—even advertising and all that. Add no more than a sixth as profit, another twenty percent. A sixth comes to twenty percent when calculated as a share of the total price. So, twenty percent profit. We discussed that, in principle, a beis din is supposed to oversee the market and make sure that no one selling foodstuffs earns more than twenty percent. That way prices remain stable and don’t rise. Now—

16:14 Speaker 6 In Tzfas, the rabbi there, uh, [unclear].

16:21 Speaker 2 To earn such-and-such an amount.

16:22 Speaker 6 Yes, something like that, and not... They tell them, “You’re not allowed to, uh, you’re not allowed to.”

16:28 Speaker 2 In principle—

16:30 Speaker 6 No.

16:30 Speaker 2 In principle, that’s the authority community leaders and the beis din have. In the past, the beis din was the body that ran the community. So they had the authority to put all these measures in place to protect the market. Now, what part of the market are they protecting? Foodstuffs. With everything else, it says a person may charge as much as he wants. It’s the market for foodstuffs that they protect. Some want to say that things that are very, very important to people, even if they aren’t foodstuffs, should also be subject to price controls.

17:00 Speaker 6 Housing matters too.

17:02 Speaker 2 Housing, for example, is one case.

17:03 Speaker 6 That’s one example.

17:04 Speaker 2 So in various communities they tried to do this. They put different measures in place concerning rent and so on.

17:09 Speaker 6 Something.

17:11 Speaker 2 Now—

17:12 Speaker 7 And the example of the telephone—a telephone.

17:15 Speaker 2 I’m saying that’s also an example of something that isn’t a foodstuff. On the other hand, it’s essential. The example in the Gemara, in halachah—

17:22 Speaker 6 It’s

17:22 Speaker 2 It’s foodstuffs. That’s what it says.

17:24 Speaker 6 It goes into the fund.

17:25 Speaker 2 I’m saying that the example in halachah is foodstuffs. Some people nowadays have suggested that perhaps things that are very important to people, things that are very essential, would be included too.

17:35 Speaker 7 Oh, that’s not stated?

17:36 Speaker 2 It isn’t stated. It isn’t stated. Now, the idea is this: the beis din should oversee the market. What happens when there’s no oversight? As the source says—that’s why we read it then—if there’s no oversight, it isn’t fair for the righteous person to suffer while everyone else... Everyone else will charge more and more, and only that one person who wants to be righteous will sell cheaply. So he, too, is allowed to sell at the same price as everyone else, but he may not charge more than everyone else. If he charges more, he’s inflating prices, even if there’s no oversight. Based on this, we said, first, that an individual who wants to charge more than everyone else for foodstuffs may not do so. Second, if they all want to band together, form a cartel, and agree to raise the price, they may not do that either. Even if they say, “What? We’re raising the market price.” There’s no misleading anyone here, and there’s no price control, but even without price controls, you yourselves may not raise the price, because these are foodstuffs. According to—what?

18:36 Speaker 6 That’s price inflation.

18:37 Speaker 2 That’s inflating prices. So what happens when there’s no oversight, there’s no beis din, and that individual seller simply ignores the rules and charges high prices? Take, for example, someone who has the only grocery store in a particular community or village. He raises prices as much as he likes because he knows they’ll all buy from him. At that point, the power returns to the consumers. And if we ask whether they’re allowed to organize a boycott, of course they are. It isn’t considered that they’re causing him a loss; on the contrary, he’s the one causing them a loss. According to halachah, he may not sell for more than a twenty-percent profit. Once he exceeds that, they have the right to say, “We won’t buy from you until you return to a price you’re permitted to charge according to halachah.”

19:22 Speaker 6 At a roadside inn, you can’t say that. Like at a piazza or a place where... you’re somewhere without...

19:32 Speaker 2 I’ll tell you what.

19:36 Speaker 6 Because there, really, the... you’re there, it’s...

19:38 Speaker 2 I’ll tell you what: the person at the inn generally has higher expenses too, right? And he has to travel somewhere to bring in the goods. Now, it says that he is reimbursed not only for his expenses but also for his trouble—the work he does sitting in the shop. That, too, is included in the expenses, and on top of that he may add twenty percent. So if we calculate how much higher his expenses are than everyone else’s, and everything else involved, we add twenty percent to that. But to come along and say, “I’m the only one here, so I’ll set whatever price I want”—if we’re talking about luxuries, that’s something else. Those are the laws of overcharging, and those laws are determined by the local market. So he could say, “I’m the only one here, and given that people accept this as a customary price here, I’m allowed to charge it.” But if it’s food, food is a different matter. Now, here’s what follows. If we’re talking about the—let me use the example of the “9.90 boycott,” okay? In principle, someone—and at least the person organizing that boycott—needs to find out what’s happening behind the scenes. If prices were raised without justification, if someone along the way is taking a cut—as people generally say about fruits and vegetables, the farmer barely makes a profit; all the profits come later on—if there’s someone along the way pocketing a profit, and through your protest that person will end up—uh, he’s making more than twenty percent, and these are food items, fruits and vegetables. In that situation, it would seemingly be permissible to organize the boycott to bring his profit back down to what halachah permits. But if you look into it and see that there’s really nothing to be done—the farmers worked hard, they had a small harvest this year, and that’s why prices are high—then what are you doing? It could

21:26 Speaker 2 be that your boycott will cause them to lower prices. But if they lower them because they don’t want to lose too much, they’ll lower the prices and charge you the boycott price. You still have no right to prevent them from making a profit. They’re supposed to earn a living. Just as you want to live, they want to live too. In other words, organizing a boycott without a genuine halachic reason would be forbidden, because you’re causing them a loss; you’re preventing them from earning a profit.

21:54 Speaker 8 But how are you supposed to know all the facts? These things aren’t—

21:58 Speaker 2 Right. Right. Now, let’s see. We spoke about this: who can organize a boycott? Okay? There are essentially three possibilities. First, the beis din itself. That’s the original rule: the beis din itself, as we saw there in what the Alter Rebbe says: “It is proper to enact that no Jew buy from them.” Who makes that enactment? The community’s beis din. It’s an enactment by the beis din; they know exactly what’s going on there, and they enact it. There’s a second possibility, and that’s number seven here. The Shulchan Aruch says: “Members of a trade are permitted to make regulations concerning their work, such as agreeing among themselves that one will not work on a day on which his fellow works, and the like, and that anyone who violates the agreement will be penalized by such-and-such an amount.” We’ll skip a line. “These rules were stated only in a place where there is no distinguished Torah scholar appointed over the community. But if there is one, their agreement, or even that of all the townspeople, has no effect. They cannot penalize or cause a loss to someone who did not abide by the agreement unless they acted with the scholar’s consent.” So he’s basically saying here that people can band together and do something, but they need to consult the city’s Torah scholar. Yes, so you’re saying now that you need to know what’s happening behind the scenes. You want to—let’s approach it from the other direction. Why do you think you have the authority to come and take public action without checking what’s happening behind the scenes? If you think you can just do whatever you like, fine, but that’s not the halachah. You’re causing harm to people here. Check it out. So what does it say? There needs to be a Torah scholar appointed over the community, and you have to consult him before doing something that causes other people a loss. So they should have consulted him about it.

23:48 Speaker 8 How can you find out what’s going on there?

23:50 Speaker 2 How?

23:50 Speaker 8 No, no, we don’t see it with our own eyes.

23:54 Speaker 2 Yes, but usually there are several companies in every field. You can find out what’s going on, get an understanding. There are people who specialize in it, all kinds of professors. I believe it’s possible to find out. Take farmers, for example. The country is full of farmers. You can ask many of them and find out what’s going on behind the scenes, whether it’s justified or not. Now, we’ll get to the Angel boycott in a moment, but first: the person who organized the boycott. What he’s doing is either forbidden or a mitzvah, if it’s a price increase that’s un-justified. And by the way, even regarding that case with the fish, where the non-Jews were raising the prices of fish, one of the halachic authorities writes that you make such an enactment only if they’re raising prices unjustifiably. But if there really was a shortage of fish and they raised prices because of market conditions, he says not to make the enactment. Not because he feels sorry for the non-Jews, but because, he says, it won’t be effective. Once demand is genuinely very, very high, it won’t help much to enact that Jews shouldn’t buy. There will be enough non-Jews buying, and the market will stay the same. So what have you accomplished by keeping Jews from fulfilling oneg Shabbos for several weeks? Let them buy fish, and that’s it. But you can see the approach: if prices rose for a justified reason, it’s treated differently. Now the question is whether I, as an individual, have to participate in a boycott. And if the boycott is unjustified, am I permitted to participate in it, or is it forbidden? So, if it’s a boycott that should be enacted—prices were raised, as in the case here with the fish, and the beis din established a rule, or the townspeople

25:48 Speaker 2 established one with the consent of the city’s Torah scholar—it binds everyone. Everyone has to participate in that boycott. And to this extent: with the Angel boycott, people asked, “If I have bread at home that I already bought, am I allowed to eat it?” It sounded funny, as if to say, “Come on, that’s going too far.” But the same question appears here about the fish. The Kaf Hachayim discusses what happens if a person has already bought fish and has fish at home. He says that the person may eat the fish, because the whole point of the boycott was not to buy fish; fish you already have, you can eat. In other words, that question was addressed.

26:24 Speaker 9 Was the Angel boycott about f-f-fish?

26:27 Speaker 2 No, no, no, no. I was just giving that as an example... Now, that is to say, a boycott enacted properly, either by a beis din or by the community with the consent of the city’s Torah scholar, is binding, and people must participate in it. Now, what about a boycott that was not enacted properly? Or one that was organized spontaneously? It might be justified, but it was organized spontaneously. So it doesn’t obligate me. The question is, if it was not enacted properly, am I allowed to participate in it or not? What do you think?

27:03 Speaker 9 Certainly not.

27:04 Speaker 2 City.

27:04 Speaker 9 It wasn’t done properly.

27:05 Speaker 2 Why wasn’t it done properly? If I personally don’t buy from a store, that doesn’t mean I’m harming it. I’m not buying. As a private individual, I have the right to decide to buy here or buy there. If, for example, I’m angry with someone and don’t buy from him, is that permitted or forbidden? It’s permitted; it’s my right. I’m angry with him, so I don’t buy from him. I haven’t enacted anything here; I haven’t cut off his livelihood. Now, I personally am angry with Angel because they did this or that. I’m allowed not to buy from them. But if I post on social media and persuade other people to participate in the boycott and all that, then I’m already an active participant in the boycott. If the boycott isn’t justified, I’m forbidden to do that. Now let’s turn to the Angel boycott. What actually—now, I’m not getting into—I’m only using all this as a case to study the law. None of this is a practical halachic ruling. As an example, there was the issue of disrespecting a Torah scholar. Did it actually happen or not? I’m not getting into that, but that was the issue people were discussing. Now, what actually happens if someone disrespects a Torah scholar? What are we supposed to do? Let’s look at the Shulchan Aruch here, number six: “If testimony was given that someone disrespected a Torah scholar, even verbally and even in his absence, the beis din places him under a ban, and they do not release him from it until he appeases the scholar on whose behalf testimony was given,” and so on and so forth. The Rema writes in his gloss: “But a Torah scholar nowadays does not have the legal status that would require the person who shamed him to give him a gold litra.” There was an ancient enactment that anyone who shames an elder—that’s the wording there—

28:48 Speaker 10 An elder.

28:48 Speaker 2 An elder—but the meaning is a Torah scholar—he must give him a litra of gold. That is a certain amount of gold he has to pay. So the Rema says that applies to a Torah scholar in the original sense. Nowadays, we no longer have that. There are many halachos where they say we do have Torah scholars, and others where they say we don’t. So on this matter, the Rema says, there is no Torah scholar for this purpose, and no litra of gold. “Nevertheless, the beis din should fine the person who shamed him according to the person who did the shaming and the person who was shamed.” Ultimately, the beis din should impose a fine based on both people, just as, in principle, anyone who shames another person is supposed to pay for the shame based on both of them. But here’s the thing: nowadays, we don’t adjudicate cases involving fines. In this situation, though, he says it is appropriate for the beis din to impose one, because the person disgraced a Torah scholar. Now, on the face of it, the ruling is to fine that person. So the beis din would say to take that person and fine him. But to go and penalize the company’s employees, the franchisees in all sorts of places who were... I don’t know whether they would actually want to do anything irreversible, but some wanted to close their businesses and change the name from Angel to something else. They weren’t really part of Angel at all. They had just bought the license as franchisees, and they started losing customers. Now, you want to penalize one person, after all, who disgraced someone. How do you fine him through so many other people, those close to him and those further removed? According to Torah law, it doesn’t work that way. “Shall one man sin, and You be angry with the entire congregation?” You aren’t supposed to punish everyone around him. But... I’d like to read this out. Could you perhaps bring the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, volume six? It’s—

30:46 Speaker 10 Six?

30:46 Speaker 2 Yes. It’s there in the bookcase by the window, the [unclear].

30:50 Speaker 10 Volume six?

30:50 Speaker 2 Yes, volume six. There is a subject we’ve discussed before: the beis din’s authority to administer punishment beyond the letter of the law. Sometimes, if wrongdoing has become widespread in a generation, the beis din has the authority to act even beyond the letter of the law. Now, this situation could, on the face of it—I’m not saying what the actual halachah is—be one where, if a beis din were sitting now and looking at the state of the generation, they might say: “Disgracing Torah scholars has become widespread, and something needs to be done about it. Something beyond the letter of the law needs to be done here.” Now... the Alter Rebbe’s point is: “When the needs of the moment call for stemming the breaches of a generation, because the generation is lax—or likewise, if the offender is habitually lax—he should be punished somewhat more severely than the punishment he deserves under Torah law.” Later he says: “But if neither the generation nor the offender is lax, and he sinned only incidentally, there is no authority to punish him at all beyond what he deserves.” Now, this power to fine a person more than he deserves is given to a beis din that can impose fines. Nowadays, we don’t have such a thing. What do we have? We spoke about this at length then: the community leaders. These are people appointed by a majority of the community. They have the authority of the entire community, and the power to address breaches. In other words, if, theoretically, there is a committee—let’s say... it’s not quite the case here, but there are communities that elect a committee by a vote of the community. They hold elections and choose a committee. That committee has the authority of the community, and the community has very considerable authority. He says here: “Community leaders who were selected and appointed with the consent of a majority of the public, or by a lottery to which a majority of the public agreed, stand in the place of the entire public, and each community in its own place is

32:59 Speaker 2 like the gaonim and leaders of all Israel, who have the authority to declare property ownerless as they see fit, for property declared ownerless by a beis din is ownerless.” Notice: that applies once they’ve been given the authority to lead the community. Now, it also depends on custom, right? Nowadays, when a committee is appointed, people don’t intend to give it that kind of power to do whatever it wants. But if it really has authority over the community—as in other communities, where they actually institute rules about how to hold weddings and so on—then it has the power to lead the community. So it also has the authority of “property declared ownerless by a beis din is ownerless.” They can institute rules and address breaches.

33:38 Speaker 11 To choose in elections?

33:40 Speaker 2 What? Choose what?

33:43 Speaker 11 Choose what?

33:47 Speaker 2 That’s a question, that’s a question. Because choosing—the whole idea of choosing is itself about giving the public a choice. If you dictate what they can choose, I don’t know. That’s taking it a step further.

33:57 Speaker 11 Of the state.

33:58 Speaker 2 That could be, yes.

34:01 Speaker 11 It’s straightforward: people come to choose the...

34:03 Speaker 2 As in the community; it’s for the good of the community right now. Now he goes on to say here: “Therefore, any community leaders who have a little fear of Heaven—

34:14 Speaker 11 A little.

34:14 Speaker 2 Even a little is enough. “Should not subject any Jew to any fine or punishment without consulting a beis din, which will instruct them according to the law. Their intentions must be solely for the sake of Heaven, and they must not take human dignity lightly.” Here he’s talking about punishments such as isolation or lashes and so on. But before that, he said “any fine or punishment.” In other words, don’t be too quick on the trigger—or on the keyboard. When you’re about to organize a boycott and all that, even if it’s about the honor of a Torah scholar, you need to consult someone. He says here to consult the beis din, because you are the community’s leaders: to examine whether it is really appropriate, whether it really fits. Only in exceptional circumstances could you actually do something that harms other people. And this isn’t relevant only to boycotts; it’s relevant to demonstrations too. When people demonstrate and block roads, do you know how many people you harm along the way? Now, there may be situations where you can do that, but it has to be with the consent of the community’s leading figures, the beis din, the community’s Torah scholars, and so on. So, to sum up what we’ve learned: generally speaking, when we were talking about non-Jews, the rules of the marketplace are much more lenient. You don’t have to worry about non-Jews in that way. So if you want to boycott non-Jews for various reasons, in principle you’re entitled to do so, because you haven’t taken anything away from them. People chose not to buy from them. Did I force anyone? And even if I did persuade people, ultimately they just didn’t buy from them. I didn’t damage their property or break their shop; I didn’t do anything. But with Jews, the expectation is different. With Jews, you have to be careful not even to prevent them from making a profit. We won’t bring another example: if he sells to a non-Jew at a high price, you’re not allowed to tell

35:59 Speaker 2 the non-Jew about it. Therefore, in principle, a boycott against a Jew is forbidden. Unless the Jew sells essential food products and is making a profit of more than twenty percent on them, and either he is the only seller in that place charging high prices, or all the sellers are raising their prices together. Then you would be permitted to organize a boycott, because you’re coming to restore the situation to what it should be under Torah law. That’s why it would be permitted. What?

36:34 Speaker 3 You can organize a boycott over ona’ah, don’t you think—

36:36 Speaker 2 Over price gouging.

36:37 Speaker 3 Ona’ah has to concern something concrete.

36:39 Speaker 2 Right, that’s price gouging. Ona’ah is different, as we discussed at length. Ona’ah isn’t about how much profit someone makes. It’s more about misleading someone. That means, for example, if a person tells you, “I’m charging twenty percent above the market price,” he’s allowed to. If he’s selling essential food products, then—yes. No, with essential food products, that won’t help. Even if he tells everyone he charges high prices, he’s not allowed to.

37:07 Speaker 3 That he’s almost not allowed—

37:08 Speaker 2 He’s not allowed to make that profit. With essential food products, he may not make more than twenty percent profit unless everyone around him is making that much. But if he’s the only one, it’s forbidden. So under the laws of ona’ah, there will be fewer situations where such a boycott applies. All right, what? Unless someone is misleading the public, perhaps—I don’t know, that’s a question. But with essential food products, it would be permitted if it’s justified. And even if it is justified, before doing it you need to consult a Torah scholar or someone else, to make sure it really is appropriate and that you aren’t also harming other people around them. And we said that if it’s not a matter of the cost of living but of disgracing a Torah scholar, or other matters, political issues and the like, then you really are harming people without cause, and you’ll have to consult someone. The authority to do this would belong only to people chosen by the community, and even they would have to consult the rabbi, the beis din, the Torah scholars of the generation, to see whether it’s appropriate.