Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 38 - Part 2

00:01 Speaker 1 Ah, the line beginning “Just as.” Yes. What are we discussing here? The Alter Rebbe cites the teaching of our Sages: “A mitzvah without intention is like a body without a soul.” If a person fulfills a mitzvah without intention, it is like a body without a soul. So the question arises: After learning in the previous chapters about the importance of actually performing mitzvos, and how this fulfills the entire purpose of making a dwelling for Hashem in the lower realms, how can we say that a mitzvah without intention is like a body without a soul? After all, the deed is the main thing. The Alter Rebbe gives a full explanation of this. What does that mean? Let’s first review the explanation we have learned so far. In this world, both body and soul are creations that Hakadosh Boruch Hu created. And not only did He create them; He is constantly creating them. At every moment, Hakadosh Boruch Hu creates, gives life to, and sustains both the body and the soul of a created being. That is what Chassidus teaches us. Nevertheless, when we compare them, the existence of the body is in no way comparable to that of the soul. Both are created beings, and both are equally subject to the concealment of Hashem’s face. As we explained in the previous class, “concealment of the face” means that, in creating the world, Hakadosh Boruch Hu concealed Himself. There is a concealment and hiding of the Creator from the created being. That applies to both body and soul: the concealing garments conceal Him from both body and soul. For example, if a person’s soul comes from kelipas nogah, his body also comes from kelipas nogah. And if

02:14 Speaker 1 his soul is a soul of holiness, his body is holy as well. In other words, body and soul are on the same level with regard to the concealment of Hashem’s face. Nevertheless, there is a difference when it comes to contraction and expansiveness. Because the soul is spiritual, there is a greater expansiveness of spirituality there. Its attachment to G-dliness is more openly apparent. In the body, by contrast, there is more contraction. In previous classes we explained the difference between concealment and contraction. Concealment of the face exists on every level. Nevertheless, there are differences in contraction and expansiveness. In some things there is a greater expansiveness of G-dliness; in others there is more contraction. That is how it is with created beings. We see this difference between body and soul. More broadly, created beings are divided into four categories—inanimate, plant, animal, and human—corresponding to the four letters of Hashem’s name. Each has a body and a life force, and each differs from the others in terms of contraction and expansiveness. That was the point we explained. But the concealment of the face exists in all of them. Let’s continue inside. The Alter Rebbe brings this as an analogy for understanding mitzvos performed with and without intention. Page 100, the line beginning “Just as”: “Just as the light and flow of life-force in inanimate and plant life bear no comparison to the light and flow of life-force clothed in animals and humans.” As we said regarding contraction and expansiveness, the life-force in inanimate things and plants bears no comparison to the life-force in animals and humans. Here the Alter Rebbe divides them into two groups: inanimate things and plants in one group, animals and humans in the other. We’ll explain that shortly. “Although in all of them the same light is equally subject to the concealment of the face and clothed in

04:24 Speaker 1 the same garment, the garment of nogah.” Although, with regard to the concealment of the face, all four levels—inanimate, plant, animal, and human—are within kelipas nogah. In that respect, all four have the same concealment of the face. They are all within kelipah in this regard. Nevertheless, when it comes to contraction and expansiveness, they are not comparable. In inanimate things and plants, what we see is only physical matter. Animals and humans also have an element of spirituality. So in terms of contraction and expansiveness, they are not comparable. “Similarly, the light and flow of the light of Ein Sof, blessed be He, which is within His innermost will, without any concealment of the face or garment at all, and which shines and is clothed in the actual performance of mitzvos—as well as in mitzvos dependent on speech and the utterance of the lips when performed without intention, which are considered like actual deeds, as explained above—bear no comparison to the light and flow of the light of Ein Sof, blessed be He, which shines and is clothed in the intention behind practical mitzvos, when a person intends through performing them to cleave to Him by fulfilling His will, for He and His will are one. The same applies to the intention in prayer, in the recitation of Shema, and in its blessings, through which a person attaches his thought and intellect to the Creator.” The Alter Rebbe says that we can apply the same idea to mitzvos and their intention. There is one respect in which the deed of the mitzvah and its intention are equal, and another in which they differ. That is the principle the Alter Rebbe is explaining here. So let’s try to explain it again. There are several details we still need to explain, but first let’s understand the central point.

06:31 Speaker 1 In the analogy of body and soul, the Alter Rebbe says: What do we see? In one respect, body and soul are equal; in another, they differ. With regard to the concealment of the face, they are equal. There is no difference between inanimate things, plants, animals, and humans. All four are equal in that they are clothed in the garment of nogah. That is one side. Nevertheless, in terms of contraction and expansiveness, there is a difference: inanimate things and plants are matters of physical substance, of body, while animals and humans have an element of spirituality and soul. That is a difference from one extreme to the other. The Alter Rebbe says the same can be said of mitzvos, but in reverse. What is the common point shared by both the deed of a mitzvah and its intention? In both, there is light without concealment of the face—the opposite of created beings. Among created beings, the common point is concealment of the face. Among mitzvos, the common point is the opposite: Hashem’s own face is present there. The same presence of Hashem’s face that is in the intention of the mitzvah is also in the deed of the mitzvah. We cannot say that Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants one more and the other less. He wants both the deed and the intention. It is the same innermost will that the Alter Rebbe explained earlier, in chapter 35: the whole matter of a mitzvah is the Creator’s innermost will. There, that innermost will shines without any concealment of the face. Mitzvos have no concealment of the face at all; they are the innermost will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That applies to all mitzvos, both

08:23 Speaker 1 to the intention behind them and to their performance. That is why I say it is the reverse of the analogy. In the analogy, all physical things, all created beings—from humans to inanimate things—share the concealment of the face. With mitzvos, we say the opposite: both their intention and their performance reveal Hashem’s face. Hashem’s face is present there without any concealment at all. This is His will, His essential will, both in the deed and in the intention. But when it comes to contraction and expansiveness, to how much is revealed and how much remains hidden, there is a difference. In the intention behind mitzvos, G-dliness is more revealed. As the Alter Rebbe will soon explain in greater detail, we cannot distinguish between intention and deed with regard to the essential will: Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants both the intention and the deed. But when it comes to revelation, more is revealed in the intention behind mitzvos. G-dliness is present there with greater expansiveness and openness. In the performance of a mitzvah, by contrast, on the level of the mitzvah’s external, physical aspect, there is more concealment. It is not as openly revealed there. So in terms of the light—its contraction and expansiveness—there is a difference. That is the point the Alter Rebbe is making here.

09:37 Speaker 2 The deed is the main thing—so why does that diminish it?

09:39 Speaker 1 Huh?

09:40 Speaker 2 The deed is the main thing—so why does that diminish it?

09:43 Speaker 1 Oh, wait. We’ll explain in a moment. Action is the main thing. We already discussed that in chapter 37. The Alter Rebbe explained that, from the standpoint of making a dwelling in the lower realms, action is primary. We said there are two things: the purpose of a dwelling in the lower realms, and the matter of revelation—where G-dliness shines more brightly. Those are two different things, right? A dwelling in the lower realms applies to the performance of mitzvos, because that is the essence of the “lower realms.” The lower it is, the more it is a dwelling. Right? But regarding revelation, as the Alter Rebbe explained at the end of chapter 37, when we come to the revelation of light, light follows a completely different reckoning. Something may be more important in terms of making a dwelling in the lower realms, but that is why the Alter Rebbe distinguished there between Torah and mitzvos. The same applies there: in terms of making a dwelling in the lower realms, mitzvos take precedence over Torah. But where is there more light? There is more revelation in Torah. The same applies here to the body and the intent, to the act of the mitzvah and its intent. So the Alter Rebbe says here that even the act of the mitzvah, in terms of His will—His innermost will, without any concealment—both the intent and the act express the innermost will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. But when it comes to revelation, contraction and expansion, we say that the act of the mitzvah involves greater contraction. G-dliness is contracted into something physical. By contrast, in the intent of the mitzvah, we sense more revealed G-dliness. We’ll understand this better in a moment, but that is simply the point the Alter Rebbe is explaining here. That is the relationship between these concepts. According to this, what does it mean that a mitzvah without intent is like a body without a soul? What does that mean—without intent? What is the explanation? After all, we asked: How can you say that the body of a mitzvah without intent is

11:25 Speaker 1 a body without a soul? A mitzvah is the Supernal Will, as we said earlier. So the Alter Rebbe explains what “like a body without a soul” means. No, it does not mean that the body is the soul. The point is that a body without life is a dead body; it is worth nothing. That is a body without a soul: you have a piece of a body with no soul, so it is a dead body. It has no, it has no, it has no value. But that is not what it means here. It does not mean that the act of a mitzvah has no value. The act of a mitzvah is the Supernal Will. Rather, when the Midrash compares the mitzvah and its intent to a body and soul, the comparison concerns the vast difference in revelation and contraction. In this respect, it is like a body in relation to a soul: although a higher power is present in both, and although there is concealment in both, nevertheless, in terms of contraction there is a difference. Here revelation is more apparent; there, it is more contracted. But in a mitzvah, too, the converse point remains true: both its intent and its performance contain the innermost will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu—what He Himself wants. Yet when it comes to revelation, there is more revelation in the intent of the mitzvah, while in its performance there is more... That’s it. As for why the Alter Rebbe divides the inanimate, vegetative, animal and human into two groups, the Rebbe explains this in Likkutei Sichos—the same sicha we mentioned in the previous class. In Likkutei Sichos, volume 6, Parshas Yisro, the Rebbe explains that these four categories can be divided in several ways. Chassidus divides them in different ways. In the simplest division, they form four groups: inanimate, vegetative, animal and human, as we explained—yud, kuf, vav—

13:03 Speaker 1 yes, four categories. But when dividing them more broadly, Chassidus sometimes puts the human category on its own and the inanimate, vegetative and animal categories together. Sometimes the inanimate is on its own, and the vegetative— Here in Tanya, you see, he divides them into two groups: inanimate and vegetative in one group, and animal and human in another. He says there are two groups: inanimate and vegetative belong to the category of body, while animal and human belong to the category of soul. What is the explanation? It is as we mentioned in the previous class. What is the point? The difference between inanimate and vegetative on one hand, and animal and human on the other, is the same kind of difference as that between body and soul. In other words, what the inanimate and vegetative have in common is that their primary feature is matter. Everything has life and form, body and soul. But with the inanimate and vegetative, the primary feature is matter. Although a plant also has a soul—it grows, after all, and growth is a spiritual quality—what does growth mean? It means an increase in matter. In growth, the material thing gets bigger: a small thing becomes a large thing. You have a small tree, and it becomes a big tree; a small body becomes a big body. That bodily growth is only an increase in matter. It has nothing to do with spiritual movement and form. Right? A person who is fatter is not more of a Jew. There is a story about this from the Baal Shem Tov, right? There was a Jew who was very fat, and he said he wanted to be more of a Jew. The more flesh there is, the bigger the fire will be if they ever burn you al kiddush Hashem. He had once seen a Jew being burned. There is a story from the Baal Shem Tov: he saw them burning a Jew, and he said the Jew was

14:51 Speaker 1 thin, small, scrawny—a poor fellow. So he said, “I decided I would eat a lot and become fatter, so that if I merit to be burned al kiddush Hashem, it will make a bigger fire.” Yes, this simple man had genuine sincerity. And the Baal Shem Tov said that, in his case, this was called eating for the sake of Heaven. That was his intention; for him, it was serving Hashem. He wanted there to be a bigger fire. But when it comes to the actual spiritual rectification, we understand that there is no difference in the rectification itself. It is only a difference in how long it takes; it makes no difference to the rectification. So a plant’s increase in matter is only a matter of physical substance. That is why we put the vegetative and inanimate into one group, even though a plant has a vegetative soul. And in truth, even an inanimate object has a soul. The Baal Shem Tov showed this; he revealed that even the inanimate has a soul. The fact that an inanimate object does not move does not mean it has no soul. As the Alter Rebbe cites in Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, there is life in everything—though actually, this teaching is from the Arizal, not the Baal Shem Tov. The Arizal says that even stones, earth and water have a dimension of soul. In other words, soul and vitality exist in everything, not only in living creatures. Everything has vitality; everything has a soul. Nevertheless, what the inanimate and vegetative have in common is that matter is primary. Certainly that is true of the inanimate: the soul produces no visible spiritual movement there. And in a plant, too, it is a matter of increasing the physical substance. By contrast, animal and human both belong to the category of soul. In other words, the same principle applies there: although a plant, an animal and a human each have a body

16:30 Speaker 1 and physical substance—an animal has a material body, and a human, too, has life and a body—nevertheless, their primary quality, their defining feature, is specifically the quality of the soul. So much so that the body is subordinate to the soul. In an animal, this is expressed in the way its body is subordinate to its soul. We see this in halachah as well, in the principle that a living being “carries itself.” The Rebbe goes into an entire discussion there, on the revealed side of Torah, about the laws of carrying on Shabbos. In halachah there is a principle that a living being carries itself. Where do we see, in simple terms, that the body is subordinate to the soul? A living person weighs less than a dead person. Weigh a person while he is alive, and he weighs less. When that same person dies, he weighs twice as much—or I don’t know how many times as much. What happened? Apparently it is the same flesh. His death did not add another piece of flesh. The flesh that was alive is now dead. Before, he weighed a certain amount; now he weighs more, much more. What happened? Where, where, where was any body added? The explanation is the principle that a living being carries itself. Because the body is subordinate to the soul, the soul lifts the body. It makes the body, even physically, more spiritual, more refined, and consequently lighter even in a physical sense. This applies both to a person and to an animal. Nevertheless, the Gemara in tractate Shabbos says that with an animal it is not so. If a person carries another person in the street on Shabbos, he is exempt. Why? Because

17:58 Speaker 1 “A living person carries himself”—it is like two people doing the work. So if someone carries another person down the street on Shabbos, he is exempt, because it is as though two people did it: a living person carries himself. That is what the Gemara says. But regarding an animal, the Gemara says this is not so. Why? Because “they weigh themselves down.” What does that mean? It means they push themselves downward. The Rebbe explains that, in essence, an animal too has this quality of “a living being carries itself.” By its nature, the soul animates the body, and the body is subservient to the soul. But an animal also has a tendency to weigh itself down. That is not because it lacks this quality of the body’s subservience to the soul. In other words, this idea that the body is subservient to the soul, and therefore follows the soul’s will, is present in an animal too. We see this regarding the Land of Israel as well: the body follows the soul’s will. It exists in both the speaking being and the animal. So when we divide them into the body group and the soul group, inanimate things and plants belong to the body group, to the material side, while animals and speaking beings belong to the soul group. That is what the Rebbe says here: when it comes to contraction and expansion, there are two groups. Inanimate things and plants belong to contraction; animals and speaking beings belong to expansion. In animals and speaking beings, life is plainly evident, whereas in inanimate things and plants, life is contracted. As the Rebbe will explain later, in the analogy there are four parts but two groups, with two elements in each group: inanimate things and plants in the body group, and animals and speaking beings in the soul group. So the Rebbe will also explain

19:47 Speaker 1 later, when we come to mitzvos and the intention behind a mitzvah, that there are four parts there too: two levels in performing the mitzvah and two levels in the intention behind mitzvos. We will see that shortly. The Rebbe will explain it. The Alter Rebbe now continues: “Although the attachment of a person’s thought and intellect to the Creator is, in itself, higher than the attachment achieved through the actual performance of practical mitzvos.” So this does not mean, G-d forbid, that the attachment of a person’s thought and intellect through intention is greater than his attachment through action. One might mistakenly think that since we say there is a greater revelation of G-d’s will in the intention behind mitzvos, while the performance of a mitzvah involves greater contraction, the intention is inherently higher than the act. But no. Rather, this too is His will: Hakadosh Boruch Hu also wants a person to cleave to Him with his intellect and thought through intention in performing mitzvos, in saying Shema, in prayer, and in other blessings. But what does it mean that this too is His will? What is the Alter Rebbe saying here? He is making a very fundamental point. We say that the intention behind a mitzvah is higher than the act. Why? Because there is more revelation in the intention, while there is more contraction in the act. The Alter Rebbe says: that is not true in and of itself; it is G-d’s will. G-d’s will is that a person cleave to Him through both action and intention. What is he actually explaining? We need to clarify a point here, because we see that many, many people get this wrong. Many people simply think: intention and feeling are more spiritual. Right? Take a person who gives tzedakah: he performs an action. An action is something external, a physical deed. But a person who has feelings does not just act—he has feelings. Love of

22:44 Speaker 1 Hashem. Take, for example, someone who prays with intention and is on a very high spiritual level, with love of Hashem. So seemingly he is far higher. That is how it looks, right? And he is actually closer to G-dliness. You have one person who acts, who fulfills mitzvos, but has no life in it. He does it in practice. Then you have another person with all kinds of intentions and feelings of attachment. So it seems that the person with the intentions is closer to G-dliness. You can see that he feels something. Often you hear bachurim complain—though they may not even notice what they are saying—that a bachur is trying to be a chassidishe bachur, trying to do all sorts of things. He goes to the mikveh, studies Rambam or other subjects, studies Gemara. He does all these things, but he says, “I don’t feel anything. I don’t feel that it does anything for me. I don’t feel it.” He goes to the mikveh. Once, a bachur wrote to the Rebbe that he went to the mikveh every day but did not feel it was changing him. So what often happens? Because a bachur does not feel anything, he concludes, “It’s pointless. What difference does it make? Why do I need it?” Then one day he stops going to the mikveh and sees that nothing happened. His davening had no less life because he missed the mikveh that day. Perhaps on the first day he felt a little bad about not going. On the second day he feels less bad, and after that it becomes a whole struggle for him: go or not go, go or not go. But why does this happen? Because he

24:22 Speaker 1 does not feel anything. What does “not feel anything” mean? When we speak about feeling, we mean that you feel holy, you feel something spiritual, you feel close to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. You sit at a farbrengen, there is a niggun, you step a little beyond your usual limits, and you feel that you have grasped something spiritual. By contrast, when you perform an actual deed, something dry, you feel nothing. “What did I do here?” So with intention, there is more of a feeling of G-dliness than with the act. That is the reality. The Alter Rebbe comes and explains to us that when there is more of a feeling of G-dliness, more of a feeling for Hakadosh Boruch Hu, in love and awe, for example, that feeling has no inherent advantage. What does that mean? If Hakadosh Boruch Hu had not wanted intention in mitzvos, if He had not wanted feeling, but had wanted only action—like the Alter Rebbe’s well-known saying, “Had we been commanded to chop wood.” As the Rebbe explains, “Had we been commanded to chop wood” means that Hakadosh Boruch Hu could have given us a commandment with no intention behind it. When you put on tefillin, there is an intention: to subject the heart and mind to Hashem. That is the intention of tefillin. So when you put on tefillin, you have the act, the fulfillment of the mitzvah, and you have its intention: subjecting the heart and mind. But “had we been commanded to chop wood” means that Hakadosh Boruch Hu could have commanded us to do something without any intention behind it. There would be no purpose here other than chopping wood, no other intention. In that case, Hakadosh Boruch Hu would not

26:08 Speaker 1 have wanted intention, and if a person stood there concentrating on all sorts of intentions from morning till night, it would accomplish nothing. The fact that I feel more spiritual and more attached to G-dliness when I have intentions does not make me closer to G-dliness. Feeling closer does not make me close. What does? The fact that Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted intention too—that gives intention its value and purpose. But intention in itself? Take, for example, a non-Jew who sits and meditates, thinking about Chassidus for three hours a day. Nothing happens. It does not make him closer to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. He picks up a guitar, thinks about Hakadosh Boruch Hu, sings, experiences a yearning of the soul and all kinds of revelations and feelings of attachment. Nothing has happened; he has not drawn closer to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. “But he feels that he has!” What you feel does not prove anything. Why? Because Hakadosh Boruch Hu did not want that. He did not choose it or ask it of you. So your feeling is not decisive. That is not what the Alter Rebbe is saying. The idea that intention in a mitzvah has a certain advantage, that there is more revelation of G-dliness there, is not because intention has that quality in itself. First and foremost, it is the Supernal Will. Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted action and He wanted intention, and the same Supernal Will wanted both. You do not become closer to G-dliness through the intention behind a mitzvah, nor do you become less close to G-dliness through performing mitzvos. But in practice you say, “I do feel something,” or you say, “I don’t feel anything.” It makes no difference. That is the point: it is the Supernal Will. Hakadosh Boruch Hu

27:48 Speaker 1 He wanted there to be the performance of mitzvos. Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted you to put on tefillin, and by putting on tefillin you draw closer to G-dliness—through the very act of putting them on. And Hakadosh Boruch Hu also wanted the heart and mind to be devoted to Him. So when, in addition to putting on tefillin, you also have in mind that devotion of the heart and mind, you draw closer to G-dliness. But if Hakadosh Boruch Hu had wanted only the putting on of tefillin, without the devotion of the heart and mind, then that devotion would not have brought you closer to Him. If Hakadosh Boruch Hu had wanted only the devotion of the heart and mind, without the act, then the act would not have accomplished that. So what are you saying? First of all, we need to know that it is the same Divine will. It is the very same will that wanted both the intention and the act, and that same Divine will is present in both. And the fact that here I sense more of a revelation of G-dliness and there I sense less—that in the act I sense it more, I sense it—is because here Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted to reveal Himself more, and there less. So here He is more revealed, and there less revealed. But as far as the essence of the will is concerned, it is the same will present here and there. That is the point of her explanation.