Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 38 - Part 3

00:00 It’s here in Tanya. Look at the bottom of page 52. What does he say? There are two things: the act of a mitzvah and the intention behind the mitzvah. And the Alter Rebbe says that in the intention behind a mitzvah, there is more revelation of G-dliness than in the act of the mitzvah. But he says this about the question of Divine will—wait. Where are we? Let’s start again, from the line beginning “And not,” six lines from the top. We said that the difference between performing a mitzvah and having intention in the mitzvah is like the difference between body and soul. In the soul there is a greater expression of G-dliness, more spirituality. The soul is spiritual; the body is physical. So this brings us to concealment and expression. There is more expression in the soul, while in the body there is more concealment. That is also the difference between the intention behind a mitzvah and the act of a mitzvah: in the act, the G-dliness is present in a concealed way, whereas in the intention, the G-dliness is more revealed. The Alter Rebbe continues: “It is not that the attachment of a person’s thought and intellect to Him, blessed be He, is in itself higher than the attachment achieved through actually performing practical mitzvos.” We shouldn’t think that attachment and intention are inherently higher than the act of a mitzvah. As we explained in the previous class, it doesn’t mean that spirituality is inherently higher than physicality, as many people might think. You might feel closer to G-dliness through intention and feeling than through a mitzvah, because a mitzvah is physical and the physical is something lowly. So you might think you aren’t as close to G-dliness through it. As we explained, when we speak of soul and body, the soul is more elevated, more spiritual, while the body is more material. The soul is higher than the body.

02:05 When we simply divide things in our world into higher and lower, the soul is certainly elevated—it is higher—and the body belongs to the lower category. This is the order from above downward: Atzilus is higher than Asiyah. The spiritual is higher than the physical, and a speaking being is higher than an inanimate object. That is how they stand in themselves. So I might think that the same applies to a mitzvah and its intention: the intention is higher than the act because it is more spiritual. The Alter Rebbe says no. Intention is not higher in itself. As we explained in the previous class, if Hakadosh Boruch Hu did not want the intention behind a mitzvah, it would have no value. Even if you feel closer to G-dliness, that feeling does not bring you any closer. What you feel doesn’t change anything. As we said, if a non-Jew were to spend a thousand hours in deveikus, that would not bring him closer to G-dliness. A created being cannot draw close to the Creator by choosing for himself the way to do so. So spirituality in itself is no closer to G-dliness than physicality. Rather, it is because this too is His will: Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted a person to have attachment through spiritual means as well. It is His will “to cleave to Him through the intellect and thought, through the intention behind practical mitzvos, and through the intention in the recitation of Shema, prayer, and the other blessings.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted this too. He wanted a person to perform mitzvos, and He also wanted a person to cleave to Him through spiritual things—intellect and thought, the intention behind a mitzvah, and intention in prayer. So—

03:53 First of all, the reason the intention behind a mitzvah connects me to G-dliness is not that intention has some inherent advantage. No. It is because Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted it. Just as with the physical tefillin, it is not the inherent virtue of the physical material, the animal hide, that connects us; it is because Hashem wanted it. The same is true of the intention behind a mitzvah. Intention brings me closer to G-dliness not because intention is inherently elevated, but because Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted it that way. That is the first point. But then, “The radiance of this Supernal will, which shines and is clothed in this intention, is infinitely greater than the radiance of the Supernal will that shines and is clothed in the performance of the mitzvos themselves, in action and speech.” In other words, once we know that Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted a person to draw close to Him through both things—the intention behind the mitzvah and the act of the mitzvah—and that He wanted both not because of an inherent advantage in either one, but because that is what Hashem wanted, we are told something further: there is more revelation of G-dliness in the intention behind the mitzvah, while in the act of the mitzvah the G-dliness is more concealed. So first, Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted your connection with Him to come through both intention and action. Then there is an additional point: when it comes to revelation and concealment, there is more revelation of G-dliness in the intention and less in the act. We’ll soon explain the straightforward meaning and reason. But he immediately emphasizes, “in this intention.” What does “this intention” mean? Intention that is in accordance with the will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. If you have an intention that has nothing to do with His will, then it is like the example we gave earlier: an intention held by a person who is not obligated—

05:40 —to observe mitzvos. If a non-Jew has that intention, it will not accomplish anything for him. It works only when this is an intention that Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants. Similarly, as the Alter Rebbe writes regarding fasting and self-mortification, when a person fasts and mortifies himself, even if he feels holy as a result, it does not bring him closer to G-dliness, because Hakadosh Boruch Hu does not want it; He has no desire for it. Hakadosh Boruch Hu decided that He does not want fasting and self-mortification. So even if someone claims that he fasts and mortifies himself and feels close to G-dliness, it won’t help. “But I feel that way, and I really do feel that way!” Still, it does not bring you closer to G-dliness, because Hakadosh Boruch Hu said He does not want it. Hakadosh Boruch Hu instructed us through the Baal Shem Tov, through the Alter Rebbe, and through the Rebbe that this is not appropriate for our generation. So even if it makes you feel holy, it does not bring you closer to G-dliness. You are living in your imagination. Similarly, take drinking mashke more than four times, for example. If the Rebbe said it doesn’t accomplish anything, then it doesn’t. “I feel that for me it does accomplish something.” You think it does? That’s false. The fact that you feel that way doesn’t change the reality. The reality here depends on the Divine will. Once the Divine will has determined that something does not accomplish anything, even what you feel does not change that. What matters is what the Divine will has determined. Therefore, it is specifically “in this intention”—an intention that Hashem wanted, that Hashem said He wants—that there is more revelation than in the act. The light of His will shines more openly in the intention.

07:14 More than the light that shines automatically from the will clothed in the actual performance of the mitzvah, in action and speech without intention. That is how great the distance is between the revelation that shines in the intention and what shines in the action. The distance is as great as the superiority of the soul’s light over the body. The body is a vessel and garment for the soul, just as the body of the mitzvah is a vessel and garment for its intention. So just as there is a distance between body and soul—the light that shines in the soul is incomparably greater than what is found in the body—that is the distance between the soul’s light and the body. In the same way, there is a distance in the degree of revelation between the intention of the mitzvah and the performance of the mitzvah. The Alter Rebbe continues: “And although in both of them, in the mitzvah and in its intention, one simple will, utterly simple, is clothed.” How can there be more revelation in one and less revelation in the other? After all, if you say that the intention’s superiority over the action is not because of anything inherent in it, but because of His will—that is, Hashem wanted this and wanted that—both are His will. And seemingly, the Alter Rebbe now asks, since His will is utterly simple, you cannot divide it into higher and lower parts. So if everything comes from the same will, and within that will it is all one point, how can one actually be revealed and the other be constricted? Let’s look at the question inside the text: “And although in both of them, in the mitzvah and in its intention, one simple will, utterly simple, is clothed, without any change or multiplicity, G-d forbid, and it is united with His blessed essence and being in absolute unity.” Hashem’s will in the mitzvos is one with Hashem Himself. Just as you cannot distinguish between great and small, higher and lower, in Hashem Himself, seemingly you cannot make such distinctions in His will either. It is one simple will.

09:13 So seemingly, since both the intention and the action are that same single, simple will, one point of will, how does one end up more constricted and the other more expansive? The Alter Rebbe says: “Nevertheless, the illumination is not the same with respect to constriction and expansion.” Although both come from the same point of His will, from the same essence, there is nevertheless a difference in constriction and expansion. What is the question, and what is the answer? First, regarding the question, let’s understand it a little better. Chassidus explains this in general—let’s first understand the depth of the question. After that, we’ll better understand the answer. The question the Alter Rebbe asks here is this: As we know from Chassidus, and as is explained at length in the maamarim, there is a difference between the will expressed in the mitzvos and the will expressed in this world. In general, there are two kinds of will. We know this from the human soul, too. When speaking about an ordinary person’s will, there is, broadly speaking, a will based on a reason and a will that comes from the essence. Let’s say it this way: A person might want something because it has a particular virtue. He wants it for some desired result, some benefit, some particular goal. So you ask him, “You want this thing? Why do you want it?” “I want it because of the benefit I’ll get from it.” For example, I want to eat because I’m hungry. I want to learn because learning is a good thing; it does my soul, my heart, and my mind good. Similarly, I want to dance because it gives me exercise. Or what do I know? It makes me happy. In other words, the things a person does involve will. But what kind of will is it? It is

10:57 a will with some desired outcome, some reason and cause behind it. So it has a particular purpose, and you can ask: What are you doing? Why do you want it? What will you gain from it? What is the benefit? That is one kind of will. In general, it is called a reason-based will. Then there is another kind of will, called an essential will. An essential will is like choice, or what Chassidus calls desire. You ask him why, and he wants it because that’s what he wants. Not for any reason. Because I want to. Freedom. That’s the essence. No, it is not about some virtue, not intellect, not emotion, not will, not pleasure, not perfection—none of these things are involved. There is only the essence, and the essence chose this way. Free choice. It chooses independently and freely. Free choice. Chassidus explains that free choice means being completely free, beyond all kinds of limitations—not just external limitations, but internal ones as well. It is not only that someone else is not forcing me; my own mind is not forcing me either. It is not because of some positive quality or some ideal of perfection. It is not because of anything at all, but because that is what the essence chose. It chooses freely. So we say that this is the nature of mitzvos. The will expressed in the mitzvos is true will; a mitzvah is an essential will. Hashem wanted a person to fulfill mitzvos because that is what the Essence chose, not because there is some virtue inherent in mitzvos. This applies to all the mitzvos, not just the mishpatim or the chukim—sorry. Rather, it is an essential point underlying all the mitzvos. In essence, that is what all mitzvos are. The Rebbe explains that the Torah has a classification: mishpatim, eidus, and chukim. Mishpatim means things understood by reason. Eidus are things that remind you of something that happened to the Jewish people in the past. Chukim means things beyond reason and understanding. But what is a mitzvah, really? The Rebbe says: A mitzvah is not that. A mitzvah is not mishpatim, not eidus, and not even chukim. It is higher than all three. Why? Mishpatim are matters of reason, but a mitzvah is not a matter of reason. It is His will; that is what Hashem wanted. A mitzvah is not eidus either. That, too, is simply what Hashem wanted. But it is not even chukim. Because even chukim, as we ordinarily understand them, mean that Hashem says, “I specifically want you not to understand.” Here, too, there is a goal, a reason. There is a level of mishpatim, where Hashem wants a person to understand. Then there is a level where Hashem says, “I will specifically give him something he won’t understand, to test how devoted he is to Me. Will he do things even when he does not understand them?” So that, too, is a factor. Even chukim, then, have a reason. The reason is to set aside the person’s own framework and see his devotion. That is not the essence of a mitzvah. A mitzvah is not that. It is not even chukim. A mitzvah is the will of the Essence. Hashem wanted it; that is how He chose in His free choice. Now that we know this—that mitzvos come from the Essence, that they are an essential will—the question arises: Since the Essence is utterly simple, beyond any form, definition, or description whatsoever, and the mitzvah comes from the Essence, how can you make a distinction within the mitzvos, between the intention of a mitzvah and its performance? If the will itself includes both the intention and the action, how does this distinction arise, so that we say there is expansion here

12:40 that happened to the Jewish people in the past. Chukim means something beyond reason. But what is a mitzvah, really? The Rebbe says: A mitzvah is not mishpatim, it is not eidos, and it is not even chukim. It is beyond all three. Why? Mishpatim are based on reason, while a mitzvah is not about reason. It is Hashem’s will; that is what Hashem wanted. A mitzvah is not eidos either. That, too, is simply what Hashem wanted. But it is not even chukim. Because even chukim, as we ordinarily understand them, mean that Hakadosh Boruch Hu says, “I specifically want you not to understand.” There is a purpose there too, a reason. There is a level of mishpatim, where Hashem wants a person to understand. Then there is a level where Hashem says, “I will specifically give him something he will not understand, to see how devoted he is to Me. Will he do things even when he does not understand them?” So even chukim involve a reason: to set aside a person’s own framework and see his devotion. That is not what a mitzvah is. A mitzvah is not even chukim. A mitzvah is the will of the Essence. Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted it; that is what He chose of His own free choice. So once we know that mitzvos, in their essence, are a matter of essential will, the question arises: Since the Essence is utterly simple, beyond any form, definition or description, and a mitzvah comes from the Essence, how can you distinguish between mitzvos, between the intention of a mitzvah and the performance of a mitzvah? In the will itself, both the intention and the action are present. How does this distinction arise, so that we say that here there is an extension

14:23 And here there is tzimtzum? So the Alter Rebbe answers: Indeed, everything stems from the same essential will. Nevertheless, that does not contradict the fact that, when it comes to revelation and tzimtzum, here there is revelation and here there is tzimtzum. What is the explanation? What is the explanation? There is a gloss here, and we need to understand the gloss too. What does it say? It says, as written in Eitz Chayim, that the intentions of the mitzvos and Torah study are on the level of light, while the physical performance of the mitzvos is on the level and in the category of vessels. In the spiritual realms there are lights and vessels. The intention in a mitzvah comes from the aspect of light; the act of the mitzvah comes from the aspect of vessels. Yes, and vessels are an aspect of tzimtzum. Vessels mean tzimtzum. Since the act comes from the vessels, and vessels mean tzimtzum, the act also has tzimtzum in it. The tzimtzum takes place in those vessels. Since the vessels are the tzimtzum of the light, from there the distinction between intention and action developed below. That is why intention has revelation, while action has tzimtzum. How does this answer what we said above? What is the answer? It draws a parallel between action and intention, and lights and vessels. Since there are lights and vessels in the spiritual realms, there are also action and intention below. And since lights and vessels mean expansiveness and tzimtzum, intention has expansiveness and action has tzimtzum. We need to understand this whole subject, but time does not permit it. I will just make one point here, and perhaps in the next class we will explain it further, with Hashem’s help. The central point is that we are talking about the true oneness of Hashem. The Baal Shem Tov revealed the concept of Hashem’s true oneness. From the perspective of Hashem’s true oneness—of “Hashem is one,” of how Hakadosh Boruch Hu is the one true One by virtue of His Essence—when a person speaks about Hakadosh Boruch Hu, when we use terms to approach Hakadosh Boruch Hu, then Hakadosh Boruch Hu...

16:28 You cannot say that Hakadosh Boruch Hu is defined by revelation. You cannot say that Hakadosh Boruch Hu is a matter of revelation. If someone says that Hakadosh Boruch Hu is a light of revelation, then, chas veshalom, he is not speaking about Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is not a matter of revelation. Revelation is light. Yes, as it says in [unclear], that is for revelations. Revelations are outside oneself. Revelation already involves a spreading forth, some degree of tzimtzum; it is something that is no longer He Himself. He Himself is above revelation. But on the other hand, just as you cannot say that His Essence is defined by revelation, you also cannot say that His Essence is defined by concealment.

17:18 If someone says that the Essence must be concealed—since revelation is not the Essence, the Essence must exist in a state of concealment—you cannot say that either, for the same reason that you cannot say the Essence is revelation. Revelation is not what Essence is about. Revelation is a definition. But to say that the Essence specifically cannot be revealed is also a definition. It is the Essence: just as the Essence is not bound to revelation, it is also not bound to remaining unrevealed. That, then, is the root of the matter. So what can we say? Not revelation, but not non-revelation either. Rather, whatever the Essence wills. It can be this way or that way. In the terminology of Chassidus, this is called “His ability to bring into being and His ability not to bring into being.” In other words, the Essence has the ability to be in a state of light, of revelation, and equally has the ability not to shine, not to be in a state of revelation. That ability itself comes from His Essence. There is no definition here—neither a definition of revelation nor a definition of non-revelation. It is Essence. The ability is an ability, and His ability is expressed along both lines: revelation and concealment. Later, in the order of hishtalshelus, these become lights and vessels. Lights and vessels together—the existence of both lights and vessels—is found throughout the order of hishtalshelus. Before the tzimtzum, it is called the light of Ein Sof, extending upward without end and downward without limit; the power of limitation and the power of the unlimited; the power of concealment and the power of revelation. Or, after

19:05 the tzimtzum, they are called lights and vessels. This entire matter within the order of hishtalshelus stems from the point that, as we see, the Essence has the ability to bring into being and the ability not to bring into being. In the Essence these are not two things; they are one point. He can be revealed, and He can also not be revealed. But when the Essence willed to reveal Himself in the world, these two lines emerged. From His ability to bring into being came the light of revelation, the lights and all these matters: unlimited revelation, expansiveness and so on. From His ability not to bring into being came the whole concept of the power of concealment, the power of limitation, and after the tzimtzum, what are called vessels. And it is specifically lights and vessels together that express the oneness of Hashem. If there are only lights, that is not the oneness of Hashem. As we said, revelation is not the Essence. If there are only vessels, that too is not the oneness of Hashem, because concealment is also not the Essence. But lights and vessels together express the fullness of the Essence: His ability to bring into being and His ability not to bring into being are equal. Where is this expressed in Torah and mitzvos? In the act of the mitzvah and the intention of the mitzvah. When a person performs a mitzvah through action alone, the very nature of action is connected with the power of concealment within the Essence. Yes. The intention of the mitzvos is connected with the power of revelation within the Essence. So if a person says that a mitzvah means specifically action without intention—because action is primary, and making a dwelling in the lower realms is about action—then insisting on action without intention is no longer the Essence. As we said, if you say that the Essence is specifically concealment and not revelation, that is not the Essence, just as it is not the Essence if you say it is specifically revelation and not concealment. In other words, if someone comes and says that connecting to Hakadosh

20:48 Boruch Hu is only through intentions, without action, that is not Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Hakadosh Boruch Hu does not require intentions. But the reverse is equally true. If I say that connecting to Hakadosh Boruch Hu is specifically through action without intention, that too is not the Essence. It is precisely the joining of the two—action and intention, revelation and concealment, lights and vessels—as expressed in the performance of mitzvos and the intention behind them, that expresses this wholeness. And that is what the Alter Rebbe says here: when it comes to tzimtzum and expansiveness, there is a difference. In the act there is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s power of concealment—vessels. In intention there is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s power of revelation. That is why, in the intention of the mitzvos, revelation shines as revealed light, and there is more expansiveness, whereas in the act there is more of Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s power of concealment, so the act is more limited. And it is specifically by joining these two together—performing the act with intention—that the purpose of making a dwelling in the lower realms is fulfilled. Another time I will explain this further.