Half the Minimum Measure Forbidden by Torah Law - Rabbi Yitzchok Eizik Koenig shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to the “Lema’an Yishme’u” podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 We’re going to discuss the subject of a half-measure. There’s a law brought by the Gemara in Yoma, on page—tractate Yoma, page 74, that a half-measure is forbidden. In other words, the measure for all the Torah’s prohibitions on eating is a kezayis, an olive-sized amount. Take forbidden fat, for example. If someone eats a kezayis of forbidden fat, he is liable to kareis, and the same applies to the other prohibitions. The liability applies specifically when he eats a kezayis. But if he eats a half-measure—for example, half the required measure of forbidden fat—he is not liable to kareis, though it is still forbidden. Liability applies only if he eats a kezayis, but eating even half a kezayis is forbidden. Is that prohibition from the Torah or from the Rabbis? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about this. Rabbi Yochanan holds that a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah. There is no liability, but it is forbidden by the Torah. Reish Lakish holds that the Torah permits it; the prohibition on a half-measure is only rabbinic. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan derives this from the words “any forbidden fat.” When the Torah forbids this fat, it says “any forbidden fat.” What does “any” mean? That word includes even a half-measure. That is Rabbi Yochanan’s view. In tractate Shabbos—which we’ve begun studying in the yeshivos—the first Mishnah deals with the law of transferring an object on Shabbos. It is forbidden to transfer something from a private domain to a public domain on Shabbos. The Mishnah goes into several details of this. It begins, “The acts of transferring on Shabbos are two, which are four.” In other words, there are two ways to transfer an object for which a person is liable. As with anyone who performs a forbidden labor on Shabbos, if he does so deliberately, he is liable to stoning; if he does so inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. He is liable when he performs the entire labor. If someone transfers an object from a private domain to a public domain, he is liable. But there are two ways this can happen. There is

02:43 Speaker 2 one way of transferring an object where he stands inside and takes it outside: he reaches out his hand and takes it outside. And there is another way: he stands outside, reaches his hand in, and takes it outside. Both are transfers from a private domain to a public domain, but done in two different ways. In one, the homeowner inside the private domain takes it outside; in the other, the poor person standing outside takes out what the homeowner gives him. In any case, the Mishnah says there are two. There are two under Torah law that are four—meaning another two that are only rabbinic. What are the two that are only rabbinic? Cases where each person does half the labor. That is, the homeowner lifts the object from the private domain but does not set it down in the public domain. The poor person takes it from him and sets it down in the public domain. Each has done half the labor: the homeowner did what is called the lifting from the private domain, and the poor person did the setting down. Since each did half, they are exempt; they are not liable. But it is forbidden, and that is what “which are four” means. There are two ways in which, although a person is not liable under Torah law, it is forbidden by rabbinic law. So the Mishnah says that in the additional two cases, he is not liable, because each person did only half, but it is forbidden. Now, the Mishnah does not state explicitly whether it is forbidden by rabbinic law or by Torah law. Rashi there says it is forbidden only by rabbinic law. Since each person is doing half, it is only rabbinic. The commentators ask: Why shouldn’t it be forbidden by Torah law under the rule of a half-measure? As we said earlier,

04:45 Speaker 2 according to Rabbi Yochanan, a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah, and the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan. So here, too, it would seem that a person is doing a half-measure. He is not performing the entire labor, but one person does half—lifting the object—and the other sets it down. Why not say that this is forbidden by the Torah? Why does Rashi say it is forbidden only by the Rabbis, only by rabbinic law? After all, the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan. That is the question they ask about Rashi. One might suggest that Rashi holds that the rule that a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah applies only to prohibitions on eating, not to the Torah’s other prohibitions. We said earlier that we learn the Torah prohibition on a half-measure from forbidden fat, because the verse says “any forbidden fat.” Forbidden fat is a prohibition on eating. So from it we learn that a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah for all prohibitions on eating. But here we are discussing the prohibition on doing labor on Shabbos, not a prohibition on eating. Perhaps a half-measure of other prohibitions is not forbidden by the Torah; we do not learn those cases from forbidden fat. Who makes this argument? In the responsa of the Chacham Tzvi, section 86, the Chacham Tzvi offers one approach that the rule forbidding a half-measure by Torah law applies only to prohibitions on eating, not to other prohibitions. He is discussing the prohibition of bal yeira’eh. On Pesach, besides the prohibition on eating chametz, there is another prohibition: chametz may not be seen in one’s home. “No chametz shall be seen in your possession.” That is not a prohibition on eating. Now, just as the measure for eating chametz is a kezayis, making a person liable to kareis, the measure for the prohibition of bal yeira’eh—possessing chametz—is also a kezayis. We learn it from the prohibition on eating: just as the measure for eating is a kezayis, so too the measure for bal yeira’eh is a kezayis. What, then, is the law if someone has half a kezayis

06:58 Speaker 2 of chametz in his home? Does he violate bal yeira’eh—or is it at least forbidden? If I say that a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah, do we say that having a half-measure also violates bal yeira’eh under Torah law? I mean that it is forbidden. It would not be as severe as possessing the full measure—we would not administer lashes for it—but would it be forbidden? Most halachic authorities hold that it is not: the prohibition of bal yeira’eh does not apply to a half-measure. The Magen Avraham rules this way, and so does the Alter Rebbe in Shulchan Aruch, section 442. The Alter Rebbe rules that there is no Torah prohibition on a half-measure, on half a kezayis, with regard to bal yeira’eh. The Chacham Tzvi discusses why a half-measure is not forbidden by the Torah in the case of bal yeira’eh. He says it is because the rule about a half-measure applies only to prohibitions on eating, and bal yeira’eh is not a prohibition on eating. And in the Kuntres Acharon there, subsection 17 of section 442, the Alter Rebbe cites the Chacham Tzvi. When he says that bal yeira’eh does not prohibit a half-measure, he praises the Chacham Tzvi’s reasoning. We’ll see, though, that the Chacham Tzvi gives another explanation as well for why a half-measure is not forbidden by the Torah in the case of bal yeira’eh. But his first reason is that the rule applies only to prohibitions on eating. So, seemingly, we could say that this is why Rashi holds that here, with regard to labor on Shabbos, someone who performs half a labor does not violate a Torah prohibition concerning a half-measure: like the Chacham Tzvi’s case, this is not a prohibition on eating. But that is not correct. We cannot explain Rashi that way, because later in the tractate, on page 74, Rashi explicitly

09:00 Speaker 2 says that the Torah’s prohibition on a half-measure applies to labor on Shabbos as well. There the Gemara discusses baking. What if someone baked less than the required measure on Shabbos—less than a dried fig’s volume? There is a required measure for baking, and he baked less than that. The Gemara asks in surprise, “Is it permissible to bake less than the required measure?” Rashi there explains at length that a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah. So according to Rashi, even with a Shabbos labor, which is not a prohibition on eating, a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah. Well, what is the difference, then? If Rashi holds that a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah when it comes to baking, the question comes back here with regard to transferring. If someone performed half the act of transferring—he only lifted the object or only set it down—that would seemingly be a half-measure. Why shouldn’t it be forbidden by the Torah? Why does Rashi say here that it is forbidden only by rabbinic law? The straightforward explanation of Rashi appears in the book Totzaos Chaim by the gaon Rabbi Menachem Zemba. He cites the Meiri, who distinguishes between a half-measure and half a labor. Half a labor is not a half-measure. Here is what that means. If someone transfers food from a private domain to a public domain, how much must he transfer to be liable? For food, for example, it must be a dried fig’s volume: the object he transfers has to have a certain significance. If he transfers a dried fig’s volume from a private domain to a public domain, he is liable. That is considered a labor. If he transfers half a dried fig’s volume, he has performed the entire act of transferring: he lifted it from the private domain and set it down in the public domain, but the amount was only half a dried fig’s volume. That is called a half-measure, because the labor is complete—the transfer is complete—but it involves only half the required measure. But if someone only lifts the object,

11:20 Speaker 2 As we’re discussing in our Mishnah here, this isn’t called half the required measure; it’s half a melachah. He didn’t complete the act of carrying out. He didn’t put it down in the public domain; he only lifted it from the private domain. The second person put it down. That isn’t half the required measure; it’s half an act of carrying out. Half an act of carrying out amounts to nothing. It isn’t half the required measure. If he performs the entire act of carrying out with only half the required quantity, that’s called carrying out half the required measure, and that really is prohibited by Torah law. But here we aren’t talking about carrying out half the required measure. We’re talking about half an act of carrying out. It’s half a melachah, not half the required measure. Half a melachah amounts to nothing. It isn’t called half the required measure. That’s why Rashi says it’s prohibited only by rabbinic law. In simple terms, the difference is whether it’s half in quantity or half in quality. If he performs the entire act of carrying out, then qualitatively it’s the same act: there has been an act of carrying out, but the quantity is only half a dried fig’s measure. That’s called half the required measure. But if one person only lifts it, or only puts it down, that’s half a melachah. In other words, qualitatively the act isn’t complete; there’s only half a qualitative act, and that amounts to nothing. It isn’t half the required measure. That’s what the Meiri says. Totzaos Chaim cites this from the Meiri, and it’s the straightforward explanation of Rashi. So when the Gemara discusses baking on page 74, it’s talking about someone who baked half the required measure, but the baking itself was complete. There’s no shortcoming in the quality of the act, only in the quantity. That’s called half the required measure, and half the required measure really is prohibited by Torah law even on Shabbos. But here it’s half a melachah. That would seem to be the explanation. This isn’t quite so simple, though. There’s room to challenge this distinction between half the required measure and half a melachah. Why? Well, because

13:15 Speaker 2 the Gemara in Yoma, which we mentioned earlier, says that half the required measure is prohibited by Torah law. It derives this from “any forbidden fat,” yes, but the Gemara adds an explanation. The Gemara asks why half the required measure really is prohibited by Torah law. It says, in the Gemara’s words, “because it can combine.” What does that mean? It can combine with more. What’s the idea? If someone eats half a measure of forbidden fat, half an olive-sized measure, then so far he hasn’t eaten the full measure of forbidden fat. But if he eats another half-olive-sized measure, he’ll have eaten a whole olive-sized measure. In other words, this half-olive-sized measure can combine with another half. So I can’t dismiss it and say that half an olive-sized measure is nothing. It is something, because as soon as he has another half, the two halves combine into a full prohibition. So that means there’s already a problem, a prohibition, in half an olive-sized measure. The Gemara’s wording is that since it “can combine,” it’s prohibited. How do we understand that? We can explain it in two ways. We can explain it as a kind of safeguard. True, the Torah forbids eating an olive-sized measure of forbidden fat, while it seemingly doesn’t forbid half an olive-sized measure—or, at least, doesn’t impose liability for it. But there’s a concern: if we permit him to eat half an olive-sized measure, he may think, “I’ll eat half now, and later I’ll eat another half.” In other words, he could come to eat a full olive-sized measure. It’s like a safeguard, just as we know the Sages instituted various decrees to keep people from violating a Torah prohibition. So the Torah itself has a similar concept: since eating an olive-sized measure of forbidden fat

15:23 Speaker 2 makes a person liable for kareis, the Torah forbids even half, so that he won’t come to eat a full olive-sized measure. That’s the reasoning; that’s what “it can combine” means. It might combine with another half-olive-sized measure. So it’s like a safeguard. Later authorities define this as a cause: there’s a reason to prohibit half, because it could lead him to eat the full measure. That’s one explanation of “it can combine.” But we can explain it differently: “It can combine” doesn’t mean we’re concerned that he might eat the full measure. Rather, it’s an indication. In other words, if someone eats an olive-sized measure, he’s eaten the full measure. If he eats half an olive-sized measure, what does that mean? Hasn’t he eaten forbidden fat? One might say that the substance counts as forbidden fat only when there’s an olive-sized measure of it. If there’s half an olive-sized measure, is it not forbidden fat? It is forbidden fat. The proof is that if he eats this half and then eats another half, he’s eaten an olive-sized measure of forbidden fat. In other words, an olive-sized measure is made up of two halves; two halves make a whole measure. So it makes no sense to say that if you eat half an olive-sized measure of forbidden fat, you’ve done nothing. What do you mean, nothing? If half is nothing, then half plus half is two nothings. That’s zero twice, as they say. How can zero twice become one? The fact that two halves combine into an olive-sized measure and make him liable itself shows that there’s a problem even with half. That’s because the quality is the same. It makes no sense to say that the quantity creates the prohibition—as though, until there’s an olive-sized measure, it isn’t forbidden fat but just ordinary fat. That’s not so; it is forbidden fat.

17:25 Speaker 2 And the proof is that it can combine with another half. In other words, “it can combine” shows why the prohibition makes sense; it isn’t the reason for prohibiting it. It’s an indication. It indicates that there’s already a problem with each half, which is why two halves make a person liable. But if there were no problem with either half, it wouldn’t make sense to say that the quantity creates a different quality, as though it adds significance. Yes, an olive-sized measure is more significant; eating that amount is a more significant act of eating. But it makes no sense to say that half is nothing, since it can combine. So there are two explanations for why half the required measure is prohibited by Torah law on the grounds that “it can combine”: either it’s a reason to prohibit it so that he won’t come to eat the full measure. There’s no problem with the half itself, but I prohibit it so that he won’t come to eat an olive-sized measure. Or no—the half itself already has grounds for prohibition, not because of a safeguard against his eating more. Now, regarding what we said earlier about the difference between half the required measure and half a melachah, as the Meiri says: it’s easier to understand if we follow the second approach, that “it can combine” is an indication. With forbidden fat, I say: if you hold him liable for an olive-sized measure, and that measure is made up of two halves, then that itself shows that each half has a problem. That’s because it’s qualitatively the same. But half a melachah, as we said earlier, isn’t qualitatively the same. With half a melachah, the shortcoming isn’t in the quantity. With forbidden fat, when there’s half an olive-sized measure, the quantity is lacking, but the quality is the same, so reason tells us it’s prohibited. With half a melachah, though, there’s no such reason to prohibit it, because it’s half a qualitative act. Half a qualitative act amounts to nothing. That makes the Meiri’s distinction understandable. But if we say the reason the Torah prohibits half

19:27 Speaker 2 the required measure because “it can combine” is as a safeguard—that if you permit him to do half, he’ll come to do the whole thing—then you could prohibit half a melachah too. Once you permit him to do half a melachah, he might think, “Oh, if I can do half, I can do the whole thing.” If it’s a safeguard, there’s reason to prohibit half a melachah too. Yes. So it would seem that our explanation of Rashi based on the Meiri works better if we understand “it can combine” according to the second approach: as an indication. But if we say it’s a reason, a safeguard, the distinction isn’t so clear. And in fact, the Rambam’s words would seem to indicate quite plainly that he doesn’t understand it like Rashi. In the laws of Shabbos, chapter 12—I think it’s law 9—at any rate, the Rambam says this: if one person— The Rambam discusses the law in our Mishnah: one person lifted it and the other put it down, meaning each performed half a melachah. The Rambam writes that if one person lifted it and the other put it down, or if someone carried out half the required measure—performing the whole melachah, the entire act of carrying out, but with half the required measure—then in both cases he’s exempt from liability, but the act is prohibited. So what is the Rambam telling us here? He equates these two cases. He says either one person lifted it and the other put it down, which is half a melachah, or someone carried out half the required measure. That’s no longer half a melachah; it’s half the required measure. For both, the Rambam gives the same ruling: exempt from liability, but prohibited. So we see that the Rambam doesn’t distinguish between half a melachah and half the required measure. The Rambam explicitly equates them, grouping them together: in both cases, whether it’s half a melachah or half the required measure, one is exempt from liability, but the act is prohibited. So—or—so we can’t—so according to the Rambam

21:43 Speaker 2 You can’t make that distinction; the Rambam explicitly makes no distinction between them. So the Sfas Emes says that, according to the Rambam, it’s clear that a half-measure is presumably forbidden by Torah law. The Rambam says, “He is exempt, but it is forbidden.” But what does “forbidden” mean here—by rabbinic law? The Rambam is also talking here about a half-measure, which would seem to be forbidden by Torah law. And the Rambam writes about one person lifting an object and another placing it down in the same passage, using the same words, “exempt, but it is forbidden.” So if a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law, that implies that one person lifting and another placing it down is also forbidden by Torah law. The Sfas Emes therefore understands the Rambam as disagreeing with Rashi. Rashi said that when one person lifts and another places it down, it’s forbidden only by rabbinic law, because each has done half a melachah. The Rambam makes no distinction: he holds that this, too, is forbidden by Torah law, just like a half-measure, because he discusses them together. That’s how the Sfas Emes understands the Rambam. And we could say why: the Rambam understands “fit to combine” along the lines we mentioned—that it’s a safeguard against coming to commit a complete prohibition. So half a melachah, too, must be forbidden by Torah law, lest a person come to perform a complete melachah. According to the Sfas Emes, then, there appears to be a disagreement between Rashi and the Rambam. But in the book Totzaos Chaim, which we mentioned earlier, by Rabbi Menachem Zemba—I think it’s in section 8—he wants to understand the Rambam differently. He wants to explain that the Rambam does not disagree with Rashi. Or rather, what does it mean that he doesn’t disagree with Rashi? He doesn’t disagree with Rashi here,

23:39 Speaker 2 regarding one person lifting and another placing it down, but he does disagree with Rashi on the question of baking. In other words, he wants to understand the Rambam in the opposite way: the Rambam holds that both when one person lifts and another places it down, and when someone carries out a half-measure, the act is forbidden only by rabbinic law, not Torah law. But why? At least a half-measure should seemingly be forbidden by Torah law. So the Sfas Emes—rather, Totzaos Chaim—says as follows. He cites the Rashbam in Bava Basra. The Gemara there also discusses carrying out a half-measure. It says that if someone carried out half a dried fig, he is exempt from liability. The Rashbam explains there why he is exempt: on Shabbos, there is a requirement of meleches machsheves—a significant, purposeful melachah. The Torah forbids a melachah on Shabbos only when it is significant. “The Torah forbade meleches machsheves.” If someone does a melachah that isn’t significant, it isn’t considered a melachah for purposes of Shabbos. For example, on Shabbos, one who acts destructively is exempt. If someone performs a melachah, but instead of producing some improvement, it causes damage—for example, he tears something and ruins it by tearing it. There is a prohibition against tearing on Shabbos if, for example, he tears in order to sew; that is considered constructive, and he is liable. But if he tears something and that causes damage, he is not liable. He tore it; he performed an act of melachah, but it isn’t meleches machsheves. Because it is destructive, it isn’t considered a significant melachah, so it isn’t a melachah. That is the rule. So the Rashbam says that if someone performs a melachah with a half-measure, since a half-measure lacks significance, it isn’t called meleches machsheves. And if it isn’t meleches machsheves, it

25:54 Speaker 2 isn’t a melachah. So Totzaos Chaim understands the Rashbam to mean that on Shabbos, a half-measure is like half a melachah. Why? Usually, with a half-measure, I say that the nature of the thing is the same. With forbidden fat, for example, it is the same substance; there’s just half the required quantity. But on Shabbos, once there’s only half the quantity, that also means the act lacks the requisite significance. If it isn’t significant, it isn’t a melachah. So what’s lacking is not just the measure, but the melachah itself. In that sense, on Shabbos a half-measure is like half a melachah. He therefore wants to say that this is why the Rambam groups one person lifting and another placing it down together with a half-measure. Just as the first case is half a melachah and is therefore forbidden only by rabbinic law, carrying out a half-measure on Shabbos is also considered half a melachah, because it lacks significance. Once it isn’t meleches machsheves on Shabbos, it isn’t a melachah. So Totzaos Chaim understands that the Rambam would indeed hold, regarding our Mishnah’s case of one person lifting and another placing it down, that it is forbidden only by rabbinic law, like Rashi. But he would disagree with Rashi about baking. Rashi says that baking a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law, because it is a half-measure. The Rambam, however, would follow the Rashbam and hold that there, too, it is considered half a melachah, because it isn’t meleches machsheves. All right, so we have two ways of understanding the Rambam. As the Sfas Emes understands him, the Rambam holds that both cases are forbidden by Torah law, and he disagrees with Rashi here. According to Totzaos Chaim’s opposite reading, he agrees with Rashi here, in the laws of carrying on Shabbos, and disagrees with Rashi about baking. So those are the two ways of understanding the Rambam. Earlier, we mentioned the question of

27:58 Speaker 2 how to understand “fit to combine”: is it a reason for the prohibition, or a sign of an existing prohibition? In other words, is it a safeguard or a sign? One straightforward practical difference between these two approaches, besides what we’ve discussed until now, would be this: what if someone ate half an olive-volume of chametz at the very end of the seventh day of Pesach? In other words, at the very last moment when chametz is forbidden, he ate half an olive-volume. Would we say that it is forbidden to him by Torah law because it is “fit to combine,” or not? Because if he ate that half an olive-volume at the very last moment, he can’t eat another half: Pesach has already ended. In practice, that half cannot combine with another half. So would a Torah prohibition apply in that case? The same applies to Yom Kippur. If he ate half an olive-volume at the very last moment of Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur is over; he can no longer eat another half on Yom Kippur, because the next moment is no longer Yom Kippur. So seemingly it isn’t “fit to combine.” If I understand “fit to combine” as a safeguard against eating another half, then that doesn’t apply here. If he ate that half an olive-volume of chametz at the very end of the seventh day of Pesach, it would not be forbidden by Torah law, because it isn’t fit to combine. But if we say that “fit to combine” shows that the half has the same forbidden nature—that the concern isn’t that he might go on to eat another half, but that a half is, in general, capable of combining with another half, which shows that this half itself is problematic—then what difference does it make if it’s the end of the day? The half itself is problematic, so it would certainly be forbidden by Torah law. The Tzlach, in Pesachim, suggests one approach according to which, if he ate it at the very last moment, it really would not be forbidden by Torah law. He understands “fit to combine” as a safeguard, so at the very end of Pesach, the person would not violate a Torah prohibition. Now there’s another question that can seemingly be linked to these two ways of understanding “fit to combine,” which the Rebbe discusses in volume 39.

29:49 Speaker 2 The Rebbe explains a passage in Igeres Hateshuvah there, concerning Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, who fasted many times because he did not protest his neighbor’s conduct. We won’t go into the subject the Rebbe discusses there, but in that context, the Rebbe examines the issue of a half-measure. It’s in the explanations of Igeres Hateshuvah, section 29. Anyone who wants to see it inside can find it in section 29 of the explanations of Igeres Hateshuvah in Likkutei Sichos, volume 39. The Rebbe discusses a half-measure there, and one of the main questions he examines is: what does it actually mean that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law? The Rebbe puts it this way: Is it a specific prohibition or a general prohibition? What does that mean? There is a half-measure of forbidden fat, and there is a half-measure of neveilah, an animal that died without shechitah, let’s say. Which is more severe, forbidden fat or neveilah? Forbidden fat is more severe, because someone who eats an olive-volume of forbidden fat is liable for kareis. Someone who eats an olive-volume of neveilah is liable for lashes, but not kareis, because it is a negative commandment,

32:05 Speaker 2 That is less severe. That is when he eats a full measure: for a k’zayis of neveilah he is liable for lashes, and for a k’zayis of cheilev he is liable for kareis. Now, in both cases, eating half a k’zayis is also prohibited by the Torah, though it does not carry that liability. So the question is: Is half a k’zayis of neveilah less severe than half a k’zayis of cheilev? Or, since it is only half the required measure, is a half-measure a general prohibition, regardless of which forbidden food you eat? In other words, half a measure of neveilah and half a measure of cheilev are both just half a measure—as though half a measure were a separate prohibition. Under that separate prohibition, it makes no difference which forbidden food you ate half a measure of. That is called a general prohibition. Whether it is cheilev, neveilah, treifah, or anything else, it is all a half-measure. The prohibition of a half-measure is the same across all prohibitions. That would mean that eating half a measure of cheilev is no more severe than eating half a measure of neveilah. That is one approach. But you could say no: it depends on which food you ate half a measure of. Since cheilev is more severe than neveilah, half a measure of cheilev is also more severe than half a measure of neveilah. In other words, when the Torah prohibits a half-measure, it is a specific rule within that particular prohibition. Since the prohibition itself is severe, even half a measure of it has a particular severity. That is called a specific prohibition. A practical difference would arise, for example, if there is a dangerously ill person who must eat, and the only food available is forbidden. We have two options: to give him half a measure of cheilev—that is one thing available—

34:09 Speaker 2 and we also have half a measure of neveilah. Which is preferable? We must feed him because saving a life overrides all the Torah’s prohibitions. But I can choose whether to give him half a measure of cheilev or half a measure of neveilah. Is it preferable to give him neveilah rather than cheilev, because neveilah is less severe, or not? If each half-measure is a specific prohibition, then half a measure of cheilev is more severe, and I would certainly give him the neveilah, not the cheilev. But if this is a general prohibition, then it makes no difference which I give him. I could give him the cheilev; there would be no particular reason not to. That is the practical difference. In any case, the Rebbe dwells here on whether this is a general or a specific prohibition, and there is something interesting about it. We will soon see what the Rebbe concludes. The Ramban discusses this subject in his sefer Toras Ha’adam, and the discussion is cited in the Talmudic Encyclopedia. The Ramban offers two approaches. He discusses the Gemara in Yoma, on page 83, which states this rule about saving a life. There it speaks about Yom Kippur: a dangerously ill person who must be fed on Yom Kippur. But it also addresses, more generally, feeding forbidden food to a dangerously ill person. The Gemara says to give him the less severe prohibition rather than the more severe one, if that is possible. The Gemara’s expression is to feed him “the lighter, the lighter”—

36:13 Speaker 2 whichever is less severe. For example, the Gemara speaks of neveilah and tevel. It says to give him the neveilah rather than the tevel, because tevel carries the death penalty, while neveilah carries only lashes. In that respect, tevel is like cheilev: it carries a more severe penalty. So the Gemara says it is preferable to give this patient neveilah rather than tevel. The Ramban asks: What case is the Gemara discussing? Does the patient need to be given a whole k’zayis, so that the Gemara says to give him neveilah rather than tevel? Or does it apply even when he is given half a k’zayis? Usually, even when someone must be fed forbidden food, we try to give him less than the required measure. On Yom Kippur, for example, even if he needs to eat, we give him one half-measure, then another half-measure, and another. So when the Gemara says to give him the less severe food, is it talking about a half-measure? If a half-measure is a general prohibition, what difference does it make what we give him? As we said, it would make no difference whether you gave him tevel or neveilah. That is the Ramban’s question. In his first approach, the Ramban says that even with a half-measure, if the underlying prohibition is more severe, its half-measure is also more severe. In other words, it is a specific prohibition. Then the Ramban offers another approach: the Gemara’s instruction to give him the less severe food applies when he must be given a full measure. If I must give him a k’zayis at once, I give him the less severe food, not the more severe one. But if I can give him a half-measure, it does not matter which one I give him. That is his second approach. So we see that the Ramban offers two approaches: in the first, it is a specific prohibition, and in the second, it is a general prohibition. Now, in the explanations of Igeres Hateshuvah, the Rebbe brings up the Rambam’s view on this. The Rebbe says that there is something apparently puzzling in the Rambam. In chapter 1 of Hilchos Chametz Umatzah, halachah 7, I think, the Rambam says that eating even the smallest amount of chametz—less than the required measure—is prohibited by the Torah. Why? Because the verse says, “Chametz shall not be eaten.” “Shall not be eaten” is unusual wording. Generally, for a prohibition against eating, the Torah says, “You shall not eat.” Why did the Torah change the wording here and say, “Shall not be eaten,” regarding chametz? To prohibit even the smallest amount. Ordinarily, when the Torah says, “You shall not eat,” eating means a k’zayis; that is the required measure. But here the Torah changed the wording to teach that even less than a k’zayis of chametz is forbidden. The Rambam says it is prohibited, though he would not be liable for kareis. So all the commentators there ask the Rambam: The Torah prohibits a half-measure of any forbidden food. Why does the Rambam say that even the smallest amount of chametz is prohibited because the verse says, “Shall not be eaten”? Why do you need a special teaching for chametz? The smallest amount is less than the required measure, and a half-measure is prohibited by the Torah in every case. So what is special about chametz?

38:14 Speaker 2 Why would the Torah need to state a special rule for chametz, as though it would not otherwise be prohibited? How is chametz different from every other forbidden food, where a half-measure is prohibited by the Torah? Why do we need the teaching from “shall not be eaten”? That is the question asked of the Rambam. The Rebbe offers a possible explanation based on the point we have been discussing: Is the prohibition of a half-measure general or specific? Perhaps this is what the Rambam means. Had the Torah not said, “Shall not be eaten,” I would certainly still say that half a measure of chametz is forbidden, but I would say it is prohibited under the general rule. There would be no special rule giving half a measure of chametz a particular severity as chametz. It would be a half-measure like any other; the half-measure prohibition would be general. So the Torah states a special rule, “Chametz shall not be eaten,” to teach that eating half a measure of chametz has the particular severity of chametz. It is a specific prohibition, not a general one. In other words, without “shall not be eaten,” I would take the position the Ramban presents in his second approach: that it is a general prohibition. The Torah therefore says “shall not be eaten” regarding chametz, to teach that at least for chametz, it is a specific prohibition. But the Rebbe wants to suggest more. There is a principle: “Anything that was included in a general rule and was singled out was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire rule.” So perhaps, once the Torah has revealed, according to the Rambam, that for chametz it is a specific prohibition, that teaches us that it is a specific prohibition for all forbidden foods. If “shall not be eaten” had not been written, I would say that for all forbidden foods, including chametz, it is a prohibition

40:31 Speaker 2 Why does the Torah need to state a special law about chametz? If the Torah hadn’t written it, would it not have been forbidden? How is chametz different from every other prohibition on eating, where even half the required measure is forbidden by Torah law? So why do we need to derive it from “lo ye’achel”? That’s the question they ask about the Rambam. The Rebbe brings an explanation here: perhaps the Rambam understood that—that’s the point. We spoke about this regarding half a measure: is it a general prohibition or a specific one? So perhaps this is what the Rambam means. If the Torah hadn’t written “lo ye’achel,” I certainly would still have said that half a measure of chametz is forbidden. But I would have said it was a general prohibition. It wouldn’t be a special law concerning chametz, giving half a measure of chametz a particular severity. It would be half a measure like with all other prohibitions. With all other prohibitions, it’s a general prohibition. That’s why the Torah stated a special law, “lo ye’achel chametz,” to tell us that when someone eats half a measure of chametz, it has the particular severity of chametz. It’s a specific prohibition, not a general one. In other words, if “lo ye’achel” hadn’t been written, I would have said it was a general prohibition, like that position of the Ramban, who holds that it’s a general prohibition. So the Torah writes “lo ye’achel” regarding chametz to tell us that, at least with chametz, it’s a gen—uh, a specific prohibition. But the Rebbe wants to say that there’s a rule: anything that was included in a general category and was then singled out was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire category. So the Rebbe wants to say that if, according to the Rambam, the Torah has already revealed to me that with chametz it’s a specific prohibition, perhaps that teaches us that with all prohibitions it’s a specific prohibition. In other words, if “lo ye’achel” hadn’t been written, I would have said that with all prohibitions, including chametz, it’s a prohibition

42:26 Speaker 2 A general prohibition, not a specific prohibition. But that is why the Torah wrote another, separate verse, “No chametz shall be eaten,” to tell us that chametz is a specific prohibition, and from it we learn that all the prohibitions are specific prohibitions. So the Rebbe’s conclusion, it would seem, is that this is a specific prohibition, not a general one. And he wants to say that according to the Rambam, this is learned from “No chametz shall be eaten,” which is a specific prohibition. This can also be linked to the question we discussed earlier, the two ways of understanding chazi le’itztarufei—its capacity to combine with another amount. If we understand chazi le’itztarufei as telling us why half the minimum measure is forbidden by the Torah, it is because it has the same essential character. That is an indication, not a cause. It indicates that since the same essential character is present even in half the minimum measure, it is clearly forbidden. It would not make sense for the quantity, as it were, to create that character. So if that is the meaning of half the minimum measure—that it has the same essential character—then of course it is a specific prohibition. With forbidden fat, it has the essential character of forbidden fat; with neveilah, it has the essential character of neveilah. So by this reasoning, it is certainly a specific prohibition. When could we say it is a general prohibition? If we understand chazi le’itztarufei as a safeguard. The Torah, as it were, did not want a person to end up violating the prohibition against eating a kezayis, so it made a safeguard: “Don’t eat even half.” If it is a safeguard, then that safeguard is, as it were, a general safeguard covering all prohibitions. So it could be a general prohibition. According to the view that chazi le’itztarufei concerns its essential character, it is certainly a specific prohibition. It means that half the measure has the same essential character: with forbidden fat, the character of forbidden fat; with neveilah, the character of neveilah. So it is certainly a specific prohibition. But if we take the view that chazi le’itztarufei

44:32 Speaker 2 is a safeguard, then we can say here that it is a general prohibition. So this can be connected to that question. All right, the Rebbe dwells there on Igeres Hateshuvah. The Rebbe says that just as there is a discussion about half the minimum measure—whether it is a general or a specific prohibition—the later authorities have the same discussion about something else: “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” There is a law of “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” What does that mean? Someone causes another person to stumble. He does not commit the transgression himself, but he causes the other person to commit it. By causing the other person to stumble, he violates “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” Here, too, we can ask whether the prohibition depends on what transgression he causes the other person to commit. For example, if he caused him to eat forbidden fat, is that more severe than causing him to eat neveilah? Or no—he has violated the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before the blind. In other words, we can ask the same question there. Does the severity of “placing a stumbling block before the blind” depend on what you caused him to do? If you caused him to eat forbidden fat, then your violation is more severe. In other words, you have a part in the other person’s transgression, in the prohibition he violated. Here, you have a part in the eating of forbidden fat. You did not eat forbidden fat yourself, but you caused the other person to eat it. But if I caused the other person to eat neveilah, I still caused him to stumble, but in a less severe prohibition. So my violation of “placing a stumbling block before the blind” is also less severe. That would mean it is a specific prohibition: it depends on what I caused him to do, whether it was a more severe or a less severe prohibition. Or we could say no: I did not commit the transgression myself in either case. What did I violate? I caused someone else to stumble. Here, the Torah makes no distinction. The transgression is that you caused the other person to stumble; it is not necessarily more severe if you caused him to violate a prohibition

46:27 Speaker 2 that is more severe than if you caused him to violate a less severe one. The Rebbe points out there that the same question applies to “placing a stumbling block before the blind”—whether it is a general or a specific prohibition. This is connected to what he discusses there in Igeres Hateshuvah, because Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, in that case, in a sense caused someone to stumble. Not exactly—he failed to protest his neighbor’s actions. She desecrated Shabbos, and he did not protest, so it is considered as though... After all, the Gemara says that if someone is able to protest another person’s conduct and does not, he is held accountable, as it were, for the other person’s sin. That is the subject the Rebbe discusses there in connection with Igeres Hateshuvah. Does it depend on what he failed to protest? If he failed to protest the desecration of Shabbos, that is a more serious transgression. If he failed to protest a less serious transgression, then although he did not protest, his failure is less serious because the sin was less serious. That is the issue the Rebbe discusses there as it relates to Igeres Hateshuvah. So the Rebbe brings in the whole subject of half the minimum measure there almost in passing: there is this question both regarding half the minimum measure and regarding “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” All right, that is the subject. Anyone who can should look at the discussion inside Likkutei Sichos, volume 39, page 184, section 29.