Intent in Performing Mitzvos - Rabbi Gershon Avtzan shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You are listening to the “Lema’an Yishme’u” podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 We’re discussing the case of someone who ate matzah because he was forced to eat it: whether he fulfilled his obligation, and why. We’ll bring the Rambam, the source in the Gemara, the Rishonim, and the questions, and then we’ll see how a sicha of the Rebbe explains it simply. After that, if there’s time, we’ll get to the Rebbe’s main point. In Hilchos Chametz Umatzah, chapter 6, halacha 3, the Rambam says as follows, and these are his words: “One who ate matzah without intent—for example, if non-Jews or bandits forced him to eat it—has fulfilled his obligation. One who ate matzah without intent, such as someone whom non-Jews or bandits forced to eat, has fulfilled his obligation. But if he ate a kezayis of matzah while afflicted by a period of mental incapacity and subsequently recovered, he must eat again after recovering, because that eating took place when he was exempt from the mitzvah.” So the Rambam—and this is based on the Gemara, which we’ll see shortly, in Rosh Hashanah—says that if a person eats without intent because he was forced, it’s not merely that he had no intent; it’s as though he intended not to fulfill the obligation. Nevertheless, he fulfilled it. But if he ate during a period when he was not of sound mind—someone who is sometimes lucid and sometimes not—then after eating during that period he must eat again, because at the time he was exempt. Before we get to the questions and the sources and everything else, let’s first come to the Gemara. The Gemara says as follows. On page 28a, further down, it says: “They sent word to Shmuel’s father. They sent word to Shmuel’s father.” Then it says: “If someone was forced and ate matzah, he has fulfilled his obligation.” Forced by whom? Who forced him? What does “forced” mean? If you say a spirit compelled him—that is, he wasn’t well—then the Gemara asks: “But wasn’t it taught:

02:57 Speaker 2 One who is sometimes lucid and sometimes not—when he is lucid, he is considered competent in every respect, and when he is not of sound mind, he is considered incompetent in every respect? Rav Ashi said: He was forced by Persians. Rava said: This means that someone who blows the shofar for the sake of music has fulfilled his obligation.” The Gemara goes on and wants to compare this ruling. Someone who blows for the sake of music—that is, as Rashi and the commentators say, he is merely occupied with the act—has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: “Isn’t that obvious? It’s the very same thing.” The Gemara says: “You might have thought that there, the Torah said to eat matzah, and he did eat. But here it says ‘a remembrance of the shofar blast,’ and this person is merely occupied with the act. Therefore, it teaches us otherwise.” There is a reason one might say that he fulfilled the obligation, so it says, “It teaches us otherwise.” The Gemara concludes: “This shows that Rava holds that mitzvos do not require intent.” After that, the Gemara raises various questions. Regarding this Gemara, we’ll first look at the Rishonim, but we need to understand it first. We won’t go into every detail of why it says he was forced by Persians and all those things; there are precise readings by the Rogatchover and others. But the Gemara wants to say that if someone eats matzah, he fulfills his obligation. Likewise, someone who performs a mitzvah fulfills it without intent. And the Gemara says, “Isn’t that obvious?”—as though the two cases are the same. At first glance, they aren’t the same at all. We know that one reason a person who eats matzah fulfills the obligation is that he derives pleasure from it. There is a principle that someone who unwittingly eats forbidden fats or engages in forbidden relations is liable because he derives pleasure. Since here, too, he derives pleasure from eating the matzah, he gets something out of it. That is why he fulfills his obligation. So why does the Gemara compare the cases as though it is obvious they are the same? Rashi goes further: “You might have thought

05:52 Speaker 2 that there, the Torah said to eat matzah, and he ate and enjoyed eating it. Therefore he is not considered merely occupied with the act, for even regarding liability to bring a sin offering, we say that someone who unwittingly eats forbidden fats or engages in forbidden relations is liable, since he derives pleasure.” So what does Rashi say? “It teaches us that even though he is merely occupied with the act, he has fulfilled the obligation, because Rava holds that mitzvos do not require intent.” According to Rashi, then, it still isn’t so simple. That is why the Gemara teaches us something new: even someone merely occupied with the act fulfills the obligation, because mitzvos do not require intent. But for the Gemara to say, “Isn’t it obvious? It’s the very same thing”—at first glance, it isn’t the same thing. As Rashi says, in one case he derives pleasure, and in the other he does not. The Gemara says that even though he does not derive pleasure, he has still fulfilled his obligation. Besides that, we need to understand what it means to blow the shofar “for the sake of music”—whether that means to make music or something else. We also need to understand what it means to be “merely occupied with the act.” Now let’s turn to the Rambam. Here, the Rambam says he has fulfilled his obligation. What does he rule in the laws of shofar for Rosh Hashanah? First, let’s look at the Maggid Mishneh here. The Maggid Mishneh says as follows: “They sent word to Shmuel’s father,” and our master rules accordingly. “I have seen someone write that, since he knows it is the night of Pesach and he is obligated to eat matzah, he has fulfilled his obligation even though he did not intend to fulfill it, and he derived pleasure from eating it. But if he thought it was an ordinary day and ate it, or thought it was not matzah and ate it, he has not fulfilled his obligation.” The Gemara did not mention that. In other words, this introduces another distinction: it is specifically when he knew that today was Pesach and ate it unwillingly. We’ll soon see this in the Ran and the commentators. But if the person thought it was not Pesach or thought the food was not matzah, he did not

08:40 Speaker 2 fulfill his obligation. In other words, he has to know that today is Pesach. Now Rabbeinu Manoach, commenting on the Rambam, says that “our teachers ruled this way because mitzvos do not require intent to fulfill the obligation,” as it says in the Gemara. He cites the Baal Hamaor, who ruled that way. But the Raavad says that this differs from the Rif, who ruled according to Rabbi Yosi—that is, that one must intend to fulfill the obligation. We learn from this that mitzvos require intent. In other words, we rule that mitzvos require intent. And he asks: How did the Rambam rule in Hilchos Shofar, chapter 2, halacha 4, and in the laws of Megillah, that intent to fulfill the obligation is required, while here he rules that intent is not required? At first glance, that is a question on our Rambam. So he answers: Since we hold that someone who commits a transgression unwittingly, merely occupied with the act, is exempt—except in the cases of forbidden fats and forbidden relations, where he is liable because he derives pleasure—the same applies here. Since he derives pleasure from eating the matzah, he fulfills his obligation even though he did not intend to. He brings this point from the Raavad. In other words, the Gemara says, “Isn’t it obvious? It’s the very same thing,” as though they really are identical cases. The Gemara then teaches us something new: that in the other case, too, he fulfills the obligation. But not only is it not obvious; the Rambam actually rules here that he fulfills his obligation by eating matzah, while there he says that he does not. So it’s not merely that the comparison isn’t obvious; we don’t rule that way. Many commentators discuss this, but we won’t go into all of them. We’ll come to one point and then move on to the Ran. Here the Maggid Mishneh says, at the end: “If so, his words also do not prove that mitzvos do not require intent.” We don’t know whether the Rambam rules that mitzvos do or do not require intent, because mitzvos may generally require intent, while this case is different. That is why he says: “The Tur wrote well in section 475 that it is not known from the Rambam

11:49 Speaker 2 whether he rules that mitzvos require intent.” [unclear] has difficulty with this point. In other words, the Gemara wants to say that from here we learn that mitzvos do not require intent. But since the Rambam rules in one place, in Hilchos Chametz Umatzah, that the person fulfills his obligation, while there he rules that he does not, we don’t know whether mitzvos require intent or not. Now we turn to the Ran, both in Chiddushei HaRan and in the Ran’s commentary on the Rif. The Ran discusses the Gemara and the rulings. He cites the Ramban and the Baal Hamaor and raises several points, but we won’t go into all of them. One thing he brings is... The Ran writes, on page 7b in the old edition of the Ran, [unclear]: It is specifically in a case like this that he fulfills his obligation—when he knows it is the night of Pesach and that this is matzah, but does not intend to fulfill the obligation. But if he thought it was an ordinary day and ate matzah, or thought he was eating meat and ate matzah, he has not fulfilled the obligation. For if you don’t say that—if you say he fulfills it in those cases too—why specify someone who thought he was eating meat? Give one of these other examples instead. Rather, it must be as we said. That is what appeared in the Maggid Mishneh; the Ran makes the point more strongly, that otherwise the Gemara would have had to say so. And [unclear]. In other words, regarding the person who blows the shofar and fulfills his obligation, the Gemara asks, “Isn’t it obvious? It’s the very same thing.” So he says—but he says here, meaning that the person blowing is not merely occupied with the act, as is understood from... And what he is saying is... in connection with the conclusion that mitzvos do not require intent. After that there is a whole discussion about the eighth day of Sukkos, whether one sleeps outside the sukkah, and all those matters. Then he brings that the Rif did not... Regarding this, [unclear], and he says that intent to fulfill the obligation is not required. Then he cites the Baal Hamaor and the Ramban, and the Ramban says that, yes, he fulfills the obligation even if mitzvos require full intent.

14:51 Speaker 2 That is, to fulfill the obligation. And afterward he discusses this aspect of it. But many of the Geonim hold that the halachah is that mitzvos do not require intention, and that is also the Rashba’s view. As we have written elsewhere, he agrees that mitzvos do not require intention only when a person has no particular intention; but if he intends not to fulfill the obligation, he does not fulfill it. In other words, even if we say that mitzvos do not require intention, if a person has the opposite intention—an intention not to fulfill the obligation—he does not fulfill it. So there are several things we first need to clarify in this sugya. One is whether we rule that mitzvos require intention or do not require intention. According to the Rambam, there seems to be a contradiction. We said that here there is physical enjoyment. Besides the fact that the Gemara asked, “Isn’t it obvious?” we can see that this whole matter is not so obvious after all. And then... we need to know whether we actually rule that mitzvos require intention or not. If we rule that mitzvos require intention, then why does he fulfill the obligation here? We need to explain: although mitzvos require intention, here, because he derives enjoyment, it is like someone who inadvertently engages in a prohibited act—if a person derives enjoyment, he is liable. The same applies to a mitzvah. And what, in fact, is the principle of inadvertently engaging in an act? We know the famous responsum of Rabbi Akiva Eiger. In one responsum he says that it does not mean the person committed no transgression. He committed a transgression, but is exempt from liability. No, the act is not attributed to him. These are different ways of explaining it. But regarding meleches machsheves—the requirement of purposeful labor on Shabbos—he says that the act is not attributed to him at all. In an ordinary case of inadvertent action, though, it is his act, but he is exempt. And if... that is something we... If so, we can understand why the Gemara thought the cases were the same. An ordinary inadvertent act is not simply nothing at all. But we need to understand this.

17:28 Speaker 2 One more thing. Even if we say that mitzvos do not require intention, here there is an opposite intention. It would seem, then, that we have to explain that even with an opposite intention, the principle that mitzvos do not require intention can still apply. Usually, a person with an opposite intention does not fulfill the obligation, but with Pesach he does, because there is physical enjoyment. In short, in the Turei Even, the author of the Shaagas Aryeh explains this Ran at length. He cites the case of being forced by Persians and brings the Ran. He says that one fulfills the obligation only when one knows it is now Pesach and so on. He says this because it is comparable to being forced by Persians. He could make one of these points. So he says that certainly, if one thought of it in a different way, one would not fulfill the obligation. But then he says, “I see no proof.” [unclear] did not address that, and he says it is no proof: even in such a case, a person might fulfill his obligation. But there is another point he makes, about inadvertently engaging in an act, as we discussed earlier. He says that, according to those who hold that mitzvos do not require intention, the Turei Even has a remarkable insight: even if someone intends the opposite, he fulfills the obligation. I also... Yes, I saw in the Ran: Why not? If mitzvos do not require intention, even if he stands there shouting that he does not want to fulfill the obligation, he still fulfills it against his will. But then how does that fit with the case where he thought it was not matzah and ate it? There, everyone agrees he does not fulfill the obligation. [unclear] It is comparable to thinking it was not matzah. And then he says, “It is surprising that the Ran wrote that if one intended not to fulfill the obligation, everyone agrees that he does not.” There are approaches that hold that even someone who intends

20:25 Speaker 2 not to fulfill the obligation nevertheless does fulfill it, if mitzvos do not require intention. It makes no difference whether he intended not to fulfill the obligation or simply ate without any particular intention. The two are the same, and he fulfills the obligation. That is a remarkable insight. According to this, we can really understand the Gemara’s progression. The Gemara considered one case to be an inadvertent act and the other a case of someone intending not to fulfill the obligation. It treated them the same way. We can say that the two are alike: if we say mitzvos require intention, a person does not fulfill the mitzvah, whether it is sounding the shofar, eating matzah, or something else. But if we say mitzvos do not require intention, in both cases he fulfills his obligation. So the Gemara thought, “Isn’t it obvious?” It is the same thing, because the main point here is to tell us whether mitzvos require intention, and both cases seem to support the same conclusion. Both hold that mitzvos do not require intention. But he says that this case is different, because there is enjoyment. Let’s look at the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. In section 475, paragraph 28, it says: “If one ate matzah without intention—that is, he did not intend to fulfill his obligation through this eating—he has fulfilled it. The rule that if one performs a mitzvah without intention, meaning that he did not intend to fulfill his obligation through that act, he has not fulfilled it applies only to mitzvos that do not involve bodily enjoyment, such as reciting Shema, sounding the shofar, taking the lulav, and the like. When one does not intend the act as a mitzvah, one has not fulfilled a mitzvah at all.” The Radbaz says it is not a mitzvah at all: it is merely an inadvertent act, and what he did is not called the performance of a mitzvah. It is not called the performance of a mitzvah. That is not exactly what we said from Rabbi Akiva Eiger, because he describes it as an inadvertent act. We said that the act is called a transgression. In other words, here it should be called

23:22 Speaker 2 a mitzvah, because we keep comparing a mitzvah to a transgression. But the Radbaz says that the act is not called the performance of a mitzvah. It is not called the performance of a mitzvah. First he says that without intention one has not fulfilled a mitzvah at all, and here he says that it is not the performance of a mitzvah. We will not get into the details. “But mitzvos involving eating, such as the Pesach offering, matzah, maror, and the like—since they involve bodily enjoyment, even if one did not intend to fulfill the obligation by eating, one has fulfilled it, for the body inevitably derives enjoyment from the food.” He enjoys it, and therefore he fulfills the obligation. “It is therefore called eating, and it follows that he has fulfilled the mitzvah of eating.” That is it: he has fulfilled the mitzvah of eating. Some say the mitzvah is the enjoyment, but the Alter Rebbe does not say that. “Therefore, even if he did not want to eat matzah and a non-Jew or robbers forced him to eat it, he has fulfilled his obligation through this eating, since his body inevitably derives enjoyment from it.” Because there is enjoyment, you cannot say he did not fulfill it: this is a mitzvah of eating. Ah, but “all this applies when he knows that the night is Pesach and that this is matzah, but he eats it without intention or against his will.” Here he equates eating without intention and eating against one’s will. Why? Because even against his will, he derives enjoyment from it. But with other things that do not involve enjoyment, there is a distinction. “If, however, he did not know it was Pesach night and ate matzah, even willingly; or even if he knew it was Pesach night but thought he was eating meat and instead was given matzah and ate it”—he thought it was meat, though it was matzah—“he has not fulfilled his obligation through this eating.” Now, he did derive enjoyment, and he thought he was eating something enjoyable—meat. But here it is different. So according to this, the Alter Rebbe gives us several points. First, he explains why there is no contradiction in the Rambam. Because the Rambam

26:03 Speaker 2 is discussing things like those mentioned here—sounding the shofar, taking the lulav, and so on. Since those things involve no bodily enjoyment at all, he has not fulfilled a mitzvah at all. He has not fulfilled the mitzvah, and that is why the Rambam rules there that he has not fulfilled his obligation: it is merely an inadvertent act. That is all it is. Here, though, he says that even without intention one has fulfilled the obligation. But the Alter Rebbe does not enter into the question of whether mitzvos require intention or do not require intention. In other words, whether mitzvos require intention or not, according to the Alter Rebbe, even with matzah there can be an opposite intention—an intention not to fulfill the obligation—and he nevertheless fulfills it. Some want to compare this to a case of coercion: someone does not want to give a get, and he is forced to give it. He does give it, and then the question is why the get is valid. Some explain that it is because he eventually consented. In other words, on this basis the Rogatchover wants to say that since he reclines while eating it, and because he eats it while reclining, this is no proof against the view that mitzvos require intention. Nevertheless, with matzah he fulfills the obligation because he reclines. In other words, he proposes a new insight: it is because of the reclining, because he eats it while reclining. You cannot say that he does not want to fulfill the obligation, since he eats it while reclining. If he does that, it means that deep down he wants to—just as someone who is forced to give a get then agrees to give it. Here too, since he does it, his intention is apparent from

28:35 Speaker 2 His actions, which he intended for the sake of a mitzvah. But the Rebbe doesn’t say that. According to the Rogatchover, someone who intends not to fulfill his obligation does not fulfill it, even if he benefits. Here, specifically, because there is also reclining, he does fulfill it. But the Rebbe doesn’t say that. Now, we know that in Likkutei Sichos, volume 4, the Rebbe discusses the difference between mitzvos and transgressions. At first glance, we might say that to commit a transgression, you have to actually intend to go against Hashem’s will. The Rebbe discusses this and introduces several remarkable points. But then, toward the end—let me just take his final point—he says: Regarding mitzvos, there is a dispute over whether a mitzvah requires intent. Some halachic authorities rule that certain kinds of mitzvos do not require intent. That is, if a person does them as a matter of course, without intending to fulfill a mitzvah—and, what’s more, with some mitzvos a person can even be compelled to perform them—he fulfills his obligation. And the Rebbe cites this discussion. In other words, when it comes to intent, there is a difference between a mitzvah and a transgression. With transgressions, if a person does not intend even the action, he does not violate the prohibition; with mitzvos, even if he does them without intent, he fulfills the mitzvah. The Rebbe explains the difference between them. He says that, at first glance, it should be the other way around: mitzvos are commands, and a person should have to do them intentionally, wanting to fulfill them. Whereas with a transgression, you would have to act against the command. It should have been exactly the opposite. So he explains: when we rise in the morning, we say Modeh Ani. That draws a person close; he is connected to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. So his actions now have a connection with G-dliness that begins

31:26 Speaker 2 the day. It is like the case of betrothal: if they are discussing that very matter and he gives the woman a coin without saying that he is giving it to her for betrothal, she is betrothed to him. That is how it is with mitzvos. But with a transgression, there must be a definite intent to go against. Then the Rebbe goes further: because a person says Modeh Ani at the beginning of the day, throughout the day he has, in a latent form, an intent that is the opposite of a transgression. He then says that, halachically, we still need to understand the rule that mitzvos do not require intent, and he goes into that. But the Rebbe adds several points in footnotes 43 and 44. In footnote 43: “From this it is understood that even with the kinds of mitzvos that require intent, that requirement is not inherent to the mitzvah itself—in that respect, all mitzvos are alike—but stems from some particular feature of those mitzvos, beyond the mitzvah as such.” In other words, when we say mitzvos require intent, there are mitzvos that do and mitzvos that don’t. Since some do not, intent is not intrinsically necessary. Where it is required, it is an additional requirement of that mitzvah. And in footnote 43 with an asterisk, he says: “See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch: They do not require any intent at all, and he did not intend to fulfill his obligation, but acted merely as someone occupied with the act, or with some other intent and not for the sake of that mitzvah.” That is what he is talking about. Even if a person acts as a matter of course, without intending to fulfill a mitzvah—without any such intent, merely occupied with the act, or intending something else and not that mitzvah—he still fulfills it. In other words, the Rebbe says that a number of mitzvos really do not require intent. So why, then? If a person fulfills his obligation in cases like taking the lulav and all these things, even if he doesn’t—if he intends not to fulfill

34:17 Speaker 2 his obligation, it is understandable here because he benefits, even though he acts without intent. But if a person acts with some other intent, or is merely occupied with the act—what does “merely occupied” mean?—not intending the mitzvah, but merely occupied with the act or intending something else, then what should the rule be? It would seem that in other cases, too, he should fulfill his obligation. Unless we say that there is a special requirement of intent there. As we know, with the recitation of Shema there is a special intent required: accepting upon ourselves the yoke of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Some speak of “a remembrance of the shofar blast,” perhaps in connection with sounding the shofar and taking the lulav. So it may be that even though we say mitzvos do not require intent, and according to what the Rebbe says here, being merely occupied with the act might also be enough, those cases have a special requirement. Or perhaps the Rebbe simply does not address the law of someone merely occupied with the act in other cases. Fine. But here, with the matzah on Pesach, there is no difficulty with the Rambam at all. And the Rebbe does not understand the case like Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who treats being merely occupied with the act as something different, nor like—what is it called?—the Turei Even. He understands the Gemara’s ruling, and the Rambam’s ruling here, straightforwardly: even where there is intent—even contrary intent—because the person benefits, that itself is the intent. You cannot say he did not benefit: he benefited and knew it was matzah. That is, he benefited from the matzah. It is not as the Rogatchover explains it, that reclining creates a particular condition, so that because he reclines it is as though he has intent for the mitzvah. Here he does not want to fulfill his obligation, but he fulfills it nonetheless because he derives benefit from the mitzvah. May we have a joyous Yom Tov! And may we eat and take the year of freedom to heart.

37:02 Speaker 2 Literally.