The Labor of Cooking - Rabbi Boruch Bilizhansky shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to the “Lema’an Yishme’u” podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today we’re beginning to discuss the melacha of cooking in the laws of Shabbos. This melacha is relevant to everyone, as we’ll see. These laws appear in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, section 318. We’ll also study the Alter Rebbe’s rulings in the Siddur, which were the last rulings he wrote. He wrote a number of rulings there concerning the laws of cooking, and we’ll study those too and apply them in practice. Some of them have practical implications: even where he ruled differently in Shulchan Aruch, the binding ruling is the one in the Siddur. So, as I said, we’re discussing the melacha of cooking. Cooking is one of the 39 melachos learned from the Mishkan. In the Mishkan, they cooked dyes: they took various herbs and cooked them to extract color for dyeing materials needed for the Mishkan. The herbs were cooked over a fire, and from this we learn that cooking over a fire on Shabbos is prohibited under the melacha of cooking. At first glance, it might seem that the definition of this melacha is making food fit to eat. In other words, I have a potato that isn’t edible, and cooking makes it edible. But that isn’t actually correct. I could take something that can be eaten raw, such as an apple—even if it’s more tasty raw, or simply eaten raw—and if I cook it, I still violate the prohibition of cooking. So what have I done by cooking something that can be eaten raw? Here we need to arrive at a definition that is fundamental to the melacha of cooking, as we’ll see: it isn’t defined by the outward question of whether something is edible. Rather, it’s defined by what the fire does to the thing placed on it. Today we could call it a chemical process; we understand it better scientifically,

02:46 Speaker 2 that the fire acts on whatever is placed on it. Some things it softens, while other materials it hardens. Whatever you put on a fire, the fire has the power to change it. That’s why someone who cooks metal also violates the prohibition of cooking. Again, the definition is the effect the fire has on the internal makeup of whatever is placed on it. That’s how we learn it from the melacha performed in the Mishkan. In the Mishkan, we saw that the cooking was done by fire. From this we learn that, under Torah law, fire is what has the power to change and affect the substance of the thing placed on it in the way that constitutes the melacha of cooking. Why am I emphasizing fire? For example, we know that there’s a ruling stated in the Gemara and codified in Shulchan Aruch that cooking in the sun is permitted. In other words, I can take an egg, put it outside in a very hot spot on a sunny day, and it will cook. It will cook, and doing that is permitted from the outset. The question is: I’m cooking—how can I be allowed to put it in the sun? How can I put something in the sun when it will cook? The explanation follows from what we’ve already said. Rashi says in Tractate Shabbos: Why is cooking in the sun permitted? Because “this is not the manner of cooking.” At first glance, Rashi seems to mean that it’s an unusual way of doing it. People don’t normally cook in the sun. But that’s difficult to explain, because we know that with all the melachos of Shabbos, if a person performs one in an unusual manner, he may not violate a Torah prohibition, but it’s still prohibited by rabbinic law. So why is cooking in the sun permitted even by rabbinic law? Even if people don’t normally do it, it should still be rabbinically prohibited. Why, then, did the Sages permit cooking in the sun? Rather, “this is not the manner of cooking” means that the process

05:06 Speaker 2 the food—the dish, or let’s say the egg—undergoes over a fire is different from what the sun does to it. That’s what Rashi means by “this is not the manner of cooking”: this isn’t the form of cooking the Torah prohibited. The Torah spoke about cooking with fire. We should clarify at the outset that when we speak of fire producing the effect of cooking, electricity is included in the definition of fire. When electricity came into use about 150 years ago, the halachic authorities discussed this and concluded—at least with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbos—that cooking with electricity is, in principle, treated like cooking with fire. So someone who cooks with electricity, on an electric stove and the like, also violates a Torah prohibition. Apparently, electricity too has a powerful capacity to cook, like fire. This cooking power of fire and heat exists at the temperature described in halacha and in the Gemara as yad soledes bo—a temperature from which the hand recoils. What temperature is that? Later halachic authorities say it’s approximately 40 to 45 degrees Celsius. When we have a pot or something heated on a fire—even a pot we’ve already taken off the fire—if it’s at yad soledes bo, it has the power to cook, and cooking with it is prohibited by Torah law. But we need to know that if I put something for just one second into a pot at yad soledes bo, at 40 or 45 degrees, I haven’t yet cooked it according to Torah law, because food doesn’t cook in one second. Rather, the degree of cooking that constitutes a violation is called ma’achal ben Derusai. In the time of the Gemara, there was a well-known bandit whom the authorities were looking for, so he never stayed in one place long enough to eat. He would eat food that wasn’t fully cooked. How much cooking is that? Rashi and the Rambam disagree: Rashi says one-third

07:26 Speaker 2 cooked, and the Rambam says half cooked. That means that if I put food on to cook and it reaches even one-third cooked according to Rashi, or half cooked according to the Rambam, I violate a Torah prohibition, even though it isn’t fully cooked. That’s the Torah law of the melacha of cooking. In practice, though, we must know that it’s prohibited—prohibited—to put it there even for one second. A person can’t say, “I’ll put the potato into the hot pot for just one second; it won’t cook there.” We say it’s forbidden to do that, because if you leave it there—if you forget and leave the food in that pot—it can reach the stage of ma’achal ben Derusai. True, you haven’t cooked it yet, but your action could bring it to that point. So it’s forbidden even to put it into a vessel—we’ll come to the laws of a kli rishon and a kli sheini. Wherever we say cooking is forbidden, you mustn’t do it. Although the Torah prohibition of cooking is violated only once the food reaches the stage of ma’achal ben Derusai, the law is that I may not even put it for one second in a place that’s at yad soledes bo. We’ll come to the laws of a kli rishon and a kli sheini, but I may not do that. Yes, that’s the basic Torah law concerning the melacha of cooking. Since we’ve mentioned cooking in the sun, I want to address a very practical point. You might ask: Where do we find cooking in the sun today? Who cooks in the sun? I brought it as an example to explain that the melacha of cooking involves an internal process. So although the sun makes the egg edible, it undergoes a different internal change, and cooking it that way is permitted. But there’s also a practical ruling that follows from this: the issue of a solar water heater. The question is whether one may use the hot water from a

09:52 Speaker 2 A solar water heater? Let’s put it this way. Say I have an electric water heater, and we said that electricity counts as fire. What happens when someone opens the hot-water tap at home? New cold water enters the tank and is heated there. So if, on Shabbos, the water in my tank was heated by the electric heating element, that water was heated by fire. When I open the hot-water tap, I bring in new cold water. It’s as though I’m pouring cold tap water into a pot on the fire, and that is clearly forbidden. There’s no dispute about that: if the water in the tank was heated electrically, one certainly may not open the hot-water tap on Shabbos. The question begins with a solar water heater, where the water was heated by the sun. Am I violating the prohibition of cooking or not? On the face of it, the water is heated by the sun. But let’s define what happens when someone opens the hot-water tap connected to a solar heater. New water enters the system. How is it heated? It passes through pipes beneath the solar collectors, where it warms up. So when I open that tap, I bring new cold water into the system, and it warms beneath the collectors. Is that considered water heated by the sun? We said that cooking directly in the sun is permitted. But there’s a new issue here: something called a derivative of the sun’s heat. The Sages said that you may not heat an object in the sun and then use it to cook. You can’t place a piece of fabric in the sun until it reaches forty degrees,

12:18 Speaker 2 hot enough to scald the hand, and then put an egg in it. Why? Didn’t we say that heating something in the sun is permitted? This is a decree of the Sages: people won’t know why the fabric is hot. They may think it was heated by fire and conclude that cooking with something heated by fire—a derivative of fire—is permitted. So the Sages said that when it isn’t clear what is doing the cooking, we may not use it. In other words, they prohibited cooking with a derivative of the sun’s heat because of a derivative of fire. Cooking directly in the sun is permitted. But cooking with something that was heated by the sun is not considered cooking directly in the sun, and the Sages prohibited it. The question, then, is whether water heated beneath solar collectors is considered heated directly by the sun. On the one hand, the collectors receive the sun’s heat directly. Or perhaps the collectors transfer the heat to the metal pipes, and the pipes heat the water, making it a derivative of the sun’s heat. That is the question: may one use a solar water heater? May one open the hot-water tap on Shabbos when the water was heated by a solar heater? Naturally, this is a dispute among later halachic authorities, since solar heaters appeared only in recent generations. Many authorities forbid it, considering it a derivative of the sun’s heat, while others permit it, considering it direct solar heating. In practice, the accepted approach in the chareidi community, and particularly in Chabad, is to be stringent: we do not open the hot-water tap even when the water was heated by the sun. We don’t even leave a mixer tap in the middle for lukewarm water. If you turn it at all toward hot, new cold water enters the system, as we said.

14:27 Speaker 2 And that water is heated. So on Shabbos, the tap must be turned completely to cold, not left in the middle or turned toward hot, because we are concerned that this is considered a derivative of the sun’s heat. But cooking with a derivative of the sun’s heat is a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages permitted rabbinic prohibitions for a person who is ill but not in danger, and for a young child. In halachah, the needs of a young child or baby are treated like those of someone who is ill but not in danger. A Torah prohibition is set aside only to save a life, for someone whose life is in danger, but a rabbinic prohibition may be set aside for someone who is ill without being in danger. For an adult, that means someone who cannot function because of a high fever, who has to lie down and cannot walk around. A baby’s needs are treated in that category. So if there is no other hot water at home and you need to wash the child, the baby—though, let’s put it this way, the definition of a young child is itself debated by the halachic authorities. There are many views, but certainly a child up to the age of two or three, or one who still eats porridge, is considered a baby. If you need to wash that child on Shabbos with water heated by the sun—and I stress, by the sun—it is permitted. With an electric water heater, of course, it is cooking prohibited by the Torah and is permitted only to save a life. So we’ve discussed direct solar heat and a derivative of solar heat as they apply in practice to a solar water heater. What has the power to cook? We said that fire does. Of course, a pot on the fire that is hot enough to scald the hand is subject to the Torah prohibition of cooking. The law is that even a pot removed from the fire and now standing on the counter still cooks if it is hot enough to scald the hand, approximately forty degrees. In that case, it

16:31 Speaker 2 cooks under Torah law. If I put something into a pot that has been removed from the fire, I could violate the Torah prohibition of cooking. This is called a kli rishon, a first vessel: a vessel that stood on the fire, even if it is no longer on the fire. If I put into it something that was not cooked at all before Shabbos—which is what we’re discussing now—I violate the Torah prohibition of cooking. It is forbidden. A kli sheini, a second vessel, means that I poured from the first vessel—say, from the original pot—into a plate, a cup, or another pot that did not stand on the fire. That is called a kli sheini in halachah. There are questions about how much power it has to cook. The Alter Rebbe cites those who hold that certain foods cook more easily and that a kli sheini might cook them in a way prohibited by the Torah. But for most things, the accepted ruling is that cooking in a kli sheini is prohibited rabbinically. The Sages decreed that one may not cook in a kli sheini either. In other words, if I poured directly from the pot that stood on the fire—the kli rishon—into a cup or another vessel, and the contents are hot enough to scald the hand, putting something uncooked into it is prohibited. At the very least, it is rabbinically forbidden to put into it something that was not cooked before Shabbos. There are exceptions, though—things that a kli sheini is said not to cook. What are they? Spices or liquids. Spices or liquids may be placed in a kli sheini; that is what the Gemara says, and what is stated in halachah. But we’ll have to define what counts as spices or liquids. I just want to emphasize an important point again: we said that a kli rishon cooks under Torah law if it is hot enough to scald the hand—around forty degrees. But the Alter Rebbe writes in Shulchan Aruch: “It is best to refrain from putting anything into a kli rishon even if it is not hot enough to scald the hand.”

19:09 Speaker 2 In other words, I took a pot off the fire and it has been on the counter long enough to cool down. It is no longer hot enough to scald the hand; it is a little below forty degrees. So, strictly speaking, there is no prohibition against putting something uncooked into it. As we said, if it is not hot enough to scald the hand, it no longer has the power to cook. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe wants us to keep our distance from the prohibition and says that as long as it is still somewhat hot, we should not put anything into it—nothing that was uncooked before Shabbos should be put into a kli rishon. As for a kli sheini, which we said is generally prohibited only rabbinically because it is uncertain whether it cooks—though one must know which things it might cook under Torah law—if it is not hot enough to scald the hand, one may put something into it, provided one knows that for certain. If I know clearly that the contents of this kli sheini are below forty degrees, I may put something into it. The Alter Rebbe’s stringency applies only to a kli rishon, even when it is not hot enough to scald the hand. With a kli sheini, the prohibition is a rabbinic decree, so if it is not hot enough to scald the hand, it is permitted. All right, so we’ve learned that we distinguish between a kli rishon and a kli sheini. A kli rishon cooks under Torah law. A kli sheini has less power to cook, and the Sages therefore permitted certain things to be put into it: spices or liquids. Let’s ask: What is the difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheini? Both are boiling hot—the pot and the second vessel into which I poured from it. The second vessel is also hot, even hotter than the threshold of scalding the hand. Why doesn’t it cook in the same way, and why were the Sages more lenient with it? How is it different from a kli rishon? Tosafos asks this question in Tractate Shabbos and answers it, and the Alter Rebbe cites the

21:06 Speaker 2 This is also in the Shulchan Aruch. A kli rishon is a vessel that was on the fire, so its walls were on the fire. The heat of the fire permeates them, and they have a greater power to cook. But a kli sheini is not a vessel that was on the fire, so it does not have the power of the fire and keeps cooling down. It does not have that power to cook. Yes, still. But here we need a bit of an explanation. After all, you could have what looks like an absurd situation. You could have a kli rishon, a pot of soup that I took off the fire. It is now at forty, forty-five degrees Celsius. Cooking in it is prohibited by Torah law, right? By Torah law. And you could have a kli sheini: I poured water from the urn into a cup. The water is now at a hundred degrees, boiling even in the cup. How can it be that this kli sheini, this cup with very hot water in it, does not cook, while the kli rishon, the pot of soup that is only yad soledes bo, forty or forty-five degrees, does cook by Torah law? This still needs an explanation. But according to what we said earlier, the definition of cooking is not something external, whether the food is edible or not. Rather, the food, the thing placed on the fire, must undergo some internal process. What brings that about is the fire, the power of fire. We learn that from the Mishkan. So a kli rishon has the power of fire because the fire is present in its walls. But a kli sheini does not actually have the fire. The power of fire is not actually present there, so it does not have the power to cook. It is like what we said about the sun: even though the egg was cooked in the sun, it is nevertheless permitted. Why? Because it does not have the power of fire. So now we understand why a kli sheini lacks the power to cook and is treated more leniently than a kli rishon.

23:02 Speaker 2 So we said that a kli rishon is a vessel that was on the fire. Even though it is no longer on the fire, it was on the fire, and cooking in it is prohibited by Torah law. Why? Because the heat of the fire permeates its walls. It has the power of fire. A kli sheini is a vessel that was not on the fire. I poured from the kli rishon into a second vessel, so the law regarding it is more lenient: the prohibition is only rabbinic. There may be things we do not know about, but in any event, it cooks according to rabbinic law, apart from certain things—spices or liquids—that are permitted in a kli sheini. Now, with this law of kli rishon and kli sheini, a question arises about how to define them. We know the definition: one was on the fire, and the other was not. But there could be a case involving a ladle. I took the pot of soup off the fire. The pot of soup is a kli rishon, and I serve soup from it with a ladle. Now the question is: what is the status of the ladle? Is the ladle a kli sheini, so that when I pour into a bowl, the bowl becomes a new category called a kli shelishi? We will discuss its status shortly. Or does the ladle retain the status of a kli rishon because I put it into the pot, so that the bowl into which I pour the soup from the ladle is a kli sheini? The halachic ruling is that if I did not leave the ladle in the pot for some time, it has the status of a kli sheini. If I did leave it in the pot for some time, it has the status of a kli rishon. So if a person does what many people generally do—puts the ladle in and takes it straight out—the ladle has the status of a kli sheini, and the bowl of soup has the status of a kli shelishi. But if the ladle is left in the pot, it has the status of a kli rishon, so if I pour into a bowl, the bowl will be

25:16 Speaker 2 a kli sheini. So we have learned the law of kli rishon and kli sheini. In practice, a kli sheini also cooks. True, the prohibition is rabbinic, but it cooks, apart from certain things that it does not cook. The Shulchan Aruch states that pouring from a kli rishon cooks to a depth of kedei kelipah, the thickness of an outer layer. In other words, if I poured hot water from the urn, say, onto a potato—onto something that was not cooked before Shabbos—then even though the water has now left the kli rishon and is being poured onto the potato, it cooks to a depth of kedei kelipah. That violates the Torah prohibition of cooking, because I have cooked part of the potato. Kedei kelipah is the thickness of a finger, but it is prohibited by Torah law. In other words, the prohibition involving a kli rishon applies not only when something is placed inside it. If I pour from a kli rishon whose contents were yad soledes bo, I also violate the prohibition when I pour onto, as we said, a potato—or, in any event, something that was not cooked. The law is that I violate the Torah prohibition of cooking. But pouring from a kli sheini—say, from a bowl or a cup that is a kli sheini—is different. I poured from the urn into a cup. The urn is a kli rishon, and the cup into which I poured is a kli sheini. I poured from the cup onto a potato. Pouring from a kli sheini no longer cooks; its status is simply that of a kli shelishi. The accepted ruling is that a kli shelishi does not cook. What is a kli shelishi? I poured from the urn into a cup. Right, the urn is a kli rishon, and that first cup is a kli sheini. I then poured the water from that cup into another cup. The second cup is a kli shelishi. A kli shelishi does not cook; it has no power to cook. It does not cook even according to rabbinic law. So pouring from a kli sheini—that is, if I pour from the first cup—has the status of a kli

27:42 Speaker 2 shelishi, which does not cook. But the Shulchan Aruch states that pouring from a kli sheini does cook something that is easily cooked. The Shulchan Aruch gives an example: kolyas ha’ispanin, a kind of salted fish that came from Spain. It cooks easily even when liquid is poured over it from a kli sheini. This gives rise to a concern. The poskim discuss whether we should also say that one may not put easily cooked foods into a kli shelishi. In any event, the accepted ruling is that a kli shelishi does not cook, but we must be careful: we are careful with easily cooked foods. Now the question begins: what counts as easily cooked? We know that kolyas ha’ispanin, the salted fish we mentioned, cooks easily and is prohibited even in a kli shelishi. But later poskim write that perhaps an egg, too, is easily cooked, and therefore one should be careful not to put an egg even into a kli shelishi. When we say that easily cooked foods are prohibited in a kli shelishi, that includes a fourth or fifth vessel, as long as its contents are yad soledes bo—as mentioned, around forty degrees Celsius. One may not put easily cooked foods into it, but foods that are not easily cooked may be put into a kli shelishi. Of course, a fourth vessel and beyond do not cook. Pouring from a kli sheini has the status of a kli shelishi and is permitted. If I pour from a kli sheini onto something, it is permitted because it does not cook, provided that the food is not easily cooked—and most things are not easily cooked. We will still get to things that perhaps are easily cooked. But the things we said are clearly easily cooked are, as far as we know, kolyas ha’ispanin, salted fish, and an egg. As for this point that a kli sheini cooks, one may not put uncooked things into it—or, as we will see later when we learn whether cooking applies to something already cooked, even some cooked things. We said that spices or liquids may be put

29:50 Speaker 2 into a kli sheini. The Sages did not decree against them. It does not look as though you are trying to cook. These are simple things: spices or water. We will get to what is meant by “liquids.” The Sages did not include them in the decree and did not prohibit them in a kli sheini. What is the definition of a spice? That is where the difficulty begins. What is the definition of a spice? In simple terms, spices are things you add to season a dish. You do not put them in because you want to eat them; you put them in to season the food. But we still need a clearer definition. Take a carrot, for example. I put a carrot into soup or another dish—not because I want to eat the carrot, but because I want to flavor the dish. Is a carrot also considered a spice? The accepted definition is that something not eaten on its own is a spice. Something eaten on its own is not called a spice, even if I have now added it for flavor. So a carrot is not called a spice. But the question of what does and does not qualify as a spice comes up with things that are relevant in practice, and we will discuss them in more detail. For example, a lemon. On the one hand, a lemon is a flavoring, right? People do not usually eat it on its own. On the other hand, some people sometimes put sugar on a lemon and suck on it. So the poskim discuss whether a lemon is considered a spice. Our practice is to be stringent about this. The accepted practice is to treat a lemon as not being in the category of spices. Mint is certainly a spice. Certainly a spice. Tea—the Tzemach Tzedek writes, quite explicitly, that tea is in the category of spices. Tea is a spice. Although it arrived in Europe from the East only in the last few centuries, the Tzemach Tzedek writes that its status is that of a spice. That is our accepted practice: it is a spice. I emphasize, our practice in Chabad, following the Tzemach Tzedek. However, there are other poskim who wish to say that perhaps

32:04 Speaker 2 Tea is among the things that cook easily, and so it is forbidden even in a third vessel. But as noted, the plain reading of the Tzemach Tzedek’s words seems to be that tea is considered a spice, and is therefore permitted in a second vessel. Ah, coffee. Look, there’s regular instant coffee, and there’s black coffee. Regular instant coffee has been cooked, and we’ll get into whether cooking applies to something that has already been cooked—we’ll discuss that later. But there is a discussion about whether coffee is also considered a spice. The halachic authorities discuss this. It’s hard to say with certainty that it’s a spice, because perhaps it has already become more like a cooked dish. Black coffee hasn’t been cooked at all; it’s been roasted, and... there is cooking after baking. We’ll look at and discuss that concept. All right, so it’s hard to say that it would be a spice, and we don’t... With coffee, we don’t rule stringently on the possibility that it isn’t a spice and is forbidden in a second vessel. I just want you to know that some halachic authorities say black coffee is among the things that cook easily and is forbidden even in a third vessel. Some authorities do say that. We don’t have a ruling from the Alter Rebbe on this. It’s hard to say definitively what the halachah is, but some authorities are stringent. Someone who wants to be stringent should be stringent for himself. If he wants to say that black coffee is among the things that cook easily, he should be stringent for himself, but the plain understanding is not like that. In the plain understanding, black coffee can be permitted in a third vessel. Sugar—in our day, there’s no greater spice than sugar, and sugar is a spice. It may be put into a second vessel. Salt. What could be more of a spice than salt? So, seemingly, salt should be permitted in a second vessel. But the Alter Rebbe writes, citing an opinion held by some halachic authorities, that salt cooks easily and will cook even in a second vessel. Therefore—and this is how the Alter Rebbe rules stringently—salt is not

34:25 Speaker 2 treated like a spice. Salt may not be put into a second vessel; it is permitted only in a third vessel. All right, so we now have a definition here: a second vessel cooks, except in the case of spices. We’ve given examples to define what a spice is. As for liquids, the Alter Rebbe rules that all types of liquid are considered liquids. In other words, I take water from the tap and want to pour it from [unclear] into a second vessel, into a hot cup that is a second vessel. I may do so, because liquids may be added to the water in a second vessel. And this is what the Alter Rebbe writes: all types of liquids, milk, all types of liquids. The Alter Rebbe doesn’t limit this, and they are permitted in a second vessel. The Sages did not impose a restriction on them. In other words, if I also made juice from a fruit—orange juice and the like, lemon juice and the like—it has the status of a liquid and may be put into a second vessel. Yes, that’s the rule; that’s the halachic ruling. There is a situation mentioned by the halachic authorities: today there are blenders that completely pulverize a whole fruit. The entire fruit is turned into juice. Here there is a concern that perhaps this juice is still part of the fruit. It’s actual fruit, and perhaps it may not be put into a second vessel. Now, regarding what we’ve just discussed: a first vessel cooks according to Torah law; with a second vessel, we say it is forbidden, at least by rabbinic law; and spices and liquids are permitted in a second vessel. Seemingly, then, let’s bring this down to practice. If I now want to make tea or coffee on Shabbos—say I’m talking about regular coffee, not black coffee—then seemingly, based on what we’ve learned, I may do this: I’ve poured water from the urn into a cup; the cup is a second vessel; tea is a spice, so it is permitted in a second vessel. Ah, we’ll talk a bit more about tea bags shortly, but in principle I’m talking about the tea itself. If we say

36:46 Speaker 2 that it’s a spice according to the Tzemach Tzedek, I may put it into a second vessel and make a cup of tea that way, and add sugar. Sugar is a spice. But what? In practice, we don’t do it that way initially. We’re stringent. Why are we stringent? Because the Tzemach Tzedek writes about the following rule. It is brought in the halachah in the Shulchan Aruch from the Gemara. The Gemara discusses the rule concerning a bathtub. In their time, how did they get hot water into a bathtub? They would heat water over a fire outside, then pour it into the bathtub. A bathtub is a second vessel. But here, one is not permitted to add water to it—to cool it by pouring in cold water. We said that water, that liquids, are permitted in a second vessel. But if I now want to pour a little cold water into this bathtub, I may not. Ah, it’s a second vessel, and we said liquids are permitted in a second vessel. But because the bathtub is very hot, and a bathtub naturally contains a lot of water that retains its heat, the heat is intense. So we said that the Tzemach Tzedek is concerned that water which stood over the fire for a long time has the same status as a bathtub. In other words, even when I’ve poured from the urn into a cup, this cup—because the water is hot—has the status of a bathtub. And in a bathtub, too, one may not add liquids or spices. In a bathtub, one adds liquids, but never mind. The rule is that it is forbidden there; the leniency allowing liquids or spices to be put into an ordinary second vessel was not extended to this case. So we need to be concerned that this cup has the status of a bathtub, and I can’t put a spice into it; I can’t put the sugar or the tea into it. So what do we do? To avoid the doubt, we are stringent and pour from the first cup into another cup. Then the second cup is a third vessel, and we said a third vessel does not cook. So we put the tea and the cof... and the coffee and the sugar into the second cup, into a third vessel. This is what we make a point of doing. That

39:11 Speaker 2 is, we pour water from the urn into the first cup, then pour the water from the first cup into another cup, and after that add the tea, coffee, and sugar. There’s another way to do it: first put the sugar and the coffee or tea into the second cup, and pour the water from the first cup over the coffee and sugar. Why is that permitted? Because, as we learned, pouring from a second vessel has the status of a third vessel. So it can be done that way too. Halachically, the two ways are equivalent. A person can do whichever is more convenient; that’s how we do it in the first instance. Now that we’ve mentioned tea, I want to talk here about tea bags. As noted, we hold that tea is a spice and not among the things that cook easily. We hold that it is not among the things that cook easily and that it may be put into a third vessel. The question is whether a tea bag may be used on Shabbos. Let’s see: what problem could there be with using a tea bag? What might we say—coloring? I’m now coloring the water. The Alter Rebbe writes that the prohibition of coloring does not apply to food and drink; that is how the Alter Rebbe rules. The fact that I’m coloring food or a drink does not constitute the forbidden labor of coloring. That labor applies to things intended to be colored, and water, food, and drink are not intended for coloring. The prohibition of coloring doesn’t apply. So there’s no problem of coloring. Could we say that I’ve colored the bag? The bag isn’t intended for appearance... so the bag turns brown. Yes, it’s like cotton wool. Just as I may put cotton wool on blood on Shabbos. Why am I coloring the cotton wool? Because it isn’t intended to be colored. So the bag itself isn’t a problem of coloring either. What else could we say? Some also say that perhaps there’s a problem here of separating. I

41:16 Speaker 2 I take out the teabag. If I take out the teabag—yes, if I take it out, I’m removing waste from food, because I don’t want the teabag now. So by taking it out, I’m sorting, and on Shabbos it’s forbidden to sort waste from food. Now, some say that it’s hard to call this a violation of borer, the prohibition against sorting. Why? Because the teabag is clearly separate; it isn’t mixed into the water, so borer doesn’t apply. It’s like receiving a bowl of soup with a whole potato or carrot in it that I don’t like. I’m allowed to take it out. Why? Isn’t it waste to me? But since it’s clearly separate, that isn’t borer. Borer applies to things that are mixed together, not to something clearly separate. So borer doesn’t apply to the teabag. At any rate, it’s hard to say that borer applies, and it’s permitted to take the teabag out. For example, if the teabag tore and tea leaves fell into the water—into it, yes—then the leaves really are mixed with the water, and it’s forbidden to take them out because of borer. They’re small and become mixed into the water. But the teabag itself is clearly separate, so borer doesn’t apply to it. There could be a problem if someone takes out the teabag and shakes it over the cup; that could be a form of squeezing. That’s something to discuss. So if someone wants to use a teabag, they should take it out right away with a spoon, or take it out right away without shaking it, and avoid that question. And as we said, we do this in a third vessel. That way we’re stringent, as the Tzemach Tzedek ruled. Good. So we’ve learned the laws of a first vessel, a second vessel, and a third vessel, and how to make tea or coffee on Shabbos. I

43:13 Speaker 2 just want to finish with some laws concerning a second vessel and a third vessel. There’s a concept in halachah called a gush: a whole, solid piece, visibly intact. Because it’s solid, it retains heat longer, and it may retain the heat it had in a first vessel even after I put it in a second or third vessel. Some poskim say that a gush—a whole piece, say a potato or a whole piece of meat—has the status of a first vessel even if I put it in a third vessel. It always has the capacity to cook, as a matter of Torah law. Other poskim say no: even a solid, whole piece doesn’t retain that capacity to cook, and if I put it in a third vessel, it won’t cook. This is a disagreement among the poskim, and the Alter Rebbe doesn’t write about it explicitly. There’s a Kuntres Acharon in which the Alter Rebbe addresses something related and mentions it, but the question is how to understand that Kuntres Acharon. Can we say with absolute certainty what the Alter Rebbe’s view is? That’s difficult. So in practice, we’re stringent about this, at least initially, because, as we’ll learn later, the Alter Rebbe is very stringent in the laws of cooking. What does that mean for a gush? If I took a whole potato out of cholent—or any cooked dish—and put it on a plate, then even if I used a ladle, making the plate a third vessel, it matters if I’m concerned that a gush can cook. A piece of meat has the status of a gush if it’s a whole piece. If we’re stringent and concerned that a gush can cook even in a third vessel, then it makes no difference that the plate is a third vessel. As long as the meat is at forty degrees, it can cook. So if I want to put salt or vinegar on the meat, I need to be careful not

45:24 Speaker 2 to put it on. The same applies when people put meat on a plate over a raw salad, over something that hasn’t been cooked. Are we concerned that the meat is a gush and has the cooking capacity of a first vessel? We need to be careful and avoid putting it on anything that definitely wasn’t cooked before Shabbos. For example, we shouldn’t put the meat on a salad, because, if we’re concerned that the law of gush applies, it cooks like a first vessel. There’s a leniency from Rabbi Chaim Naeh in Ketzos Hashulchan. He says that if the gush is immersed in liquid—for example, a whole potato in soup—then the liquid cools it, and it loses its status as a gush. It’s no longer considered a separate solid piece and doesn’t have the law of a gush. This can apply when it’s in a large amount of liquid. For example, if I have a liquidy cholent with whole potatoes in it, according to Ketzos Hashulchan they don’t have the status of a gush, and I may, for example, put salt on one. As I said, that’s only in the particular case where it’s actually immersed in liquid. There’s a novel point in the law here. We learned that pouring from a first vessel cooks to the depth of a peel. That is, if I pour hot water from the urn onto a potato, I violate the Torah prohibition against cooking. It cooks only to the depth of a peel, the thickness of a finger. The halachah rules that if I pour liquid onto liquid—for example, if I have tap water in a cup and pour water from the urn, a first vessel, onto it—we say that the lower one prevails. In other words, the water at the bottom “prevails,” so to speak: it doesn’t get cooked, and this is permitted. That’s because pouring cooks when the stream strikes something solid. I’m pouring liquid directly onto a solid. But when I pour liquid onto liquid, there’s no such impact, and then I say that the lower one prevails. That is, if the lower one

47:42 Speaker 2 is the thing that hasn’t been cooked, it prevails and doesn’t get cooked. When the Alter Rebbe brings this law, he doesn’t distinguish based on the quantity of the lower liquid. In other words, if this cup contains tap water and I pour water from the urn into it, the amount of water doesn’t matter. Even if there’s very little, it prevails and doesn’t get cooked. The Alter Rebbe doesn’t make a distinction. But the Tzemach Tzedek says we must be careful: if there’s only a tiny bit of water, then we say that the upper liquid prevails, and pouring from a first vessel cooks it. When does this come up? For example, you rinse a cup under the tap and then pour water from the urn into it. If just a thin layer of tap water remains in the cup, then according to the Tzemach Tzedek, pouring hot water from a first vessel onto that small amount of water may cook it. So you need to be careful: when you rinse a cup under the tap, you should at least shake it out thoroughly. I’m not saying you have to dry it completely; that’s not the point. You should shake it so that no water remains there, and then pour in the hot water. If what remains in the cup is hot water from tea I drank earlier, that’s different. We’ll get to the law of cooking something that has already been cooked, and it’s permitted. Even the Tzemach Tzedek wouldn’t be stringent if the water has already been cooked. But if the water hasn’t been cooked, it’s forbidden. So that’s what we need to watch out for: even where we speak of the lower one prevailing, it can be forbidden. But what about the reverse case, where the lower one prevails in the other direction? If I have a pot of soup and I want to pour a little water into it to cool the soup—whatever the reason, even just a drop—the lower one here is hot, and it prevails. So I

49:40 Speaker 2 actually violate the prohibition against cooking. If it’s a first vessel, as we said, a pot of soup that is a first vessel, it’s forbidden. Now, what we’ve been discussing is liquid poured into liquid. But clearly, a solid first vessel placed on liquid cooks it. So you need to be careful when you take a pot off the fire and put it on the counter. If there’s an actual layer of water on the counter—tap water that spilled there—and I put the pot on that water, the pot is a first vessel. Here we can’t say that the lower one prevails, because this isn’t liquid poured into liquid; it’s a solid pot placed on liquid. So I violate the prohibition against cooking. That’s why, when putting pots taken off the fire on the counter, you need to make sure there isn’t a layer of water there. As I said, a few drops of water aren’t a problem. Similarly, don’t put a pot on a really wet towel, because that raises questions of cooking. Good. In general, there are more details we could go into here. We can’t cover every last detail, but let’s take an example. Suppose I want to wash a pot that I’ve emptied. I took soup out of it and served it into bowls, and it’s still hot enough that the hand recoils from it. If I want to wash it, and I turn on the tap so water runs into the pot while it’s still that hot—the key point is that if there’s a strong flow of water, it doesn’t have time to cook before it runs off, and that’s permitted. If I put in a little water that might heat up, that’s forbidden. But washing it thoroughly with a strong flow isn’t a problem. As I said, these are the basic laws of the melachah of cooking. We’ve learned about first vessels, second vessels, third vessels, and what’s permitted and forbidden.