Introduction to the Laws of Shabbos - Rabbi Avraham Mizrachi shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You are listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 With Hashem’s help, we will study a very important lesson. Its title is: The Foundations of the Laws of Shabbos. We’ll begin with a short introduction about why studying the laws of Shabbos is so necessary and important. With Hashem’s help, we’ll quote from the end of Tanya, where the Alter Rebbe emphasizes this. These are his holy words in Kuntres Acharon, on the very last page of Tanya: “Because of the weakness of this generation, not everyone has the strength to fast as much as is fitting for him. Therefore, the recommended course is as our Sages, of blessed memory, said: Whoever observes Shabbos according to its laws is forgiven for all his sins. ‘According to its laws’ specifically. Therefore, everyone is obligated to be well versed in the extensive laws of Shabbos.” That is one quotation. Another is from the Alter Rebbe’s Igeres Hakodesh, section 23. These are his holy words: “On the holy Shabbos, toward Minchah, they should study the laws of Shabbos, for the laws of Shabbos are extensive, and a person can easily stumble in them, G-d forbid, even into a prohibition punishable by kareis or stoning, for lack of knowledge; and an error in one’s studies is treated as deliberate wrongdoing, G-d forbid. Needless to say, this applies to the prohibitions instituted by the Sages, which are exceedingly numerous, especially the prohibitions of muktzeh, which arise very frequently. And the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah.” Those are the quotations from the Alter Rebbe. There are other places in Tanya that speak about the severity of desecrating Shabbos, but this is enough for us to understand how important it is to study the laws of Shabbos. In the Rebbe’s Igros Kodesh, too, there are a number of letters in which the Rebbe strongly stresses the need to study practical halacha, and the Rebbe specifically mentions the laws of Shabbos. In our lesson, with Hashem’s help, we’ll examine the laws of Shabbos. But everyone understands that these laws are numerous, stringent, and also difficult to understand. It is hard to cover all the laws of Shabbos in one or two lessons. That is why we are studying their foundations and general principles.

02:59 Speaker 2 When a person knows the general principle, it is much easier to assess and discuss the details and relate them to that principle. That is the goal of our lesson: to give the general principles, foundations, and concepts of the laws of Shabbos, so it will be easier for us to understand what the question is and what the answer we received actually means. In this way, we’ll become familiar with the concepts of the laws of Shabbos. Before we turn to the lesson itself, a few more important introductory points. Studying the laws of Shabbos is not merely studying one area of Torah law among others; there is also a positive Torah commandment to study them. That may sound surprising, but when the Ramban explains the commandment “Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it,” he says that we should remember it constantly. There is an earlier source in the words of our Sages stating that this commandment includes an obligation to study the laws of Shabbos. As our Sages said in Toras Kohanim: “‘Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it’—how do I fulfill ‘remember’? By reviewing it aloud.” And the Raavad explains that “reviewing it aloud” means the laws of Shabbos. So we have a very early source, in the Ten Commandments, that “remember the day of Shabbos” means studying its laws. There is another interesting, very early source in the words of our Sages. It appears in Yalkut Shimoni, in Devarim. Hakadosh Boruch Hu said: “Gather large assemblies and teach them the laws of Shabbos in public.” This is the only parsha about which it says, “Moshe assembled the entire community of Israel,” and then he tells them the laws of Shabbos. That is because Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded him to assemble the Jewish people and tell them the laws of Shabbos. The Midrash adds that this was so future generations would learn from him to gather assemblies every Shabbos and enter study halls to teach and instruct the Jewish people in words of Torah, and so on. So we have seen sources both from the holy Tanya and from our early Sages, the Rishonim and our

05:34 Speaker 2 holy Tannaim, showing how important it is to study the laws of Shabbos. To conclude this part, it is important to quote the book Ya’aros Devash by Rabbeinu Yonasan Eibeschutz. He writes very clearly and unequivocally that someone who is not thoroughly familiar with the laws of Shabbos will inevitably, G-d forbid, stumble into violating Shabbos. So the only choice is simply to study, review, and go over them again. He also adds that one should consult a rav who can teach him the laws of Shabbos well. Then, with Hashem’s help, we can be assured that we will observe Shabbos according to its laws. And as the Alter Rebbe says in the name of our Sages, whoever observes Shabbos according to its laws is forgiven for all his sins. That is the first part of the introduction, in which we explained the necessity and importance of studying the laws of Shabbos. Since this lesson deals with general principles and foundational concepts, we will, of course, make use of the familiar rule that every rule has exceptions. We cannot go into every detail and fine point here. So everything we learn should be taken as a general principle, but we should not be surprised if, as we continue studying, we encounter exceptions. That is entirely to be expected. Still, a general principle has its place and its basis, and there is real value in knowing and understanding it well. As we approach the laws of Shabbos, this lesson will deal mainly with the prohibitions of Shabbos, with their foundations. We will hardly address the positive aspect of “Remember the day of Shabbos”; that is not the subject of this lesson. Our main focus will be the foundations of the prohibitions of Shabbos. We need to know that the Torah did not spell out exactly which forms of work are forbidden on Shabbos. It spoke in general terms. The Torah says: “You shall observe Shabbos, for it is holy to you. Whoever desecrates it shall surely be put to death, for whoever does work on it, that soul shall be cut off from among its people,” and so on. “For six days work shall be done, and on the seventh day there shall be a Shabbos of complete rest,

08:04 Speaker 2 holy to Hashem. Whoever does work on the day of Shabbos shall be put to death,” and so on. The Torah does define the prohibition in terms of work, but it does not specify what that work is. As the Alter Rebbe addresses this point in siman 351: the Torah told us about work. But what is the specific definition of work? The Torah did not go into detail. There are, however, certain forms of work that the Torah does mention explicitly. For example: “You shall not kindle a fire in any of your dwellings on the day of Shabbos,” and “You shall rest from plowing and harvesting,” along with a few other forms of work that the Torah specifies. But in general, the Torah speaks in terms of work. What is this work that is forbidden? For that, we need the halacha given to Moshe at Sinai, where he received the details of the forbidden forms of work. Moshe was told at Sinai that the forms of work forbidden on Shabbos are those connected with building the Mishkan. This is also alluded to in the Written Torah. In the same parsha in which Moshe Rabbeinu is commanded about the work of the Mishkan, the observance of Shabbos is also stated. That is no coincidence: by placing Shabbos alongside the Mishkan, Hakadosh Boruch Hu hints to Moshe Rabbeinu that although the work of the Mishkan is very important, it does not override Shabbos. What does it mean that it does not override Shabbos? It means that performing the work of the Mishkan on Shabbos would desecrate Shabbos. From this we understand that the forms of work involved in the Mishkan are the ones that may not be done on Shabbos. So this gives us a way to understand which forms of work the Torah meant us to refrain from on Shabbos: those performed for the construction of the Mishkan and all its components. Here we also draw on the words of Targum Onkelos. From them we understand not only which forms of work are forbidden, but also the nature of the work—how it must be performed to be forbidden by the Torah on Shabbos. Targum Onkelos speaks of skilled craftsmanship, the work of artisans. “Artisans” means skilled workers. The work of the Mishkan was skilled craftsmanship. It was the work of artisans.

10:42 Speaker 2 They performed the work there with a great deal of thought, with a purpose, with intention, and in a particular way. We learn all of this about the laws of Shabbos from the Mishkan. In other words, if we want to understand which kinds of work the Torah meant to prohibit on Shabbos, we focus on understanding the work of the Mishkan—both the nature of the work and the manner in which it was done. We learn both from the Mishkan. We know that building the Mishkan involved thirty-nine primary categories of work. What is a primary category of work? It is an action that serves as a model, but there are also actions similar to it, and they too are prohibited by the Torah. Both the primary category, which was originally performed in the Mishkan, and an action similar to it—even if that action was not necessarily performed in the Mishkan—are prohibited with equal severity. The thirty-nine primary categories of work fall into several groups. We will now list them and divide them into groups, while also reminding ourselves, in general terms, where they were used in the Mishkan. The first group relates to growing things from the ground. Dyes were needed for the Mishkan, and those dyes came from plants. Growing those plants required a number of agricultural activities, starting with the earliest stages. These are the primary categories in the first group: sowing, plowing, reaping, gathering sheaves, threshing, winnowing—a form of sorting by means of the wind—sorting with a tool made for that purpose, grinding, sifting—also a form of sorting—kneading, and baking. Altogether, we have seen a group of eleven kinds of work related to growing things from the ground. In addition, there are thirteen primary categories related to weaving, since the curtains of the Mishkan had to be woven. Here we move, so to speak, from agricultural activities to making clothing and fabrics. In this group we encounter thirteen

13:48 Speaker 2 primary categories of work. They are shearing wool from an animal, whitening it, combing it, dyeing it, spinning it, making heddles, stretching the warp, weaving, separating threads, tying, untying, sewing, and tearing. These are the thirteen primary categories related to weaving the curtains of the Mishkan, and they also relate to making clothing and the like. Another group consists of seven kinds of work related to the hides used to cover the Mishkan. Preparing those hides required several kinds of work: trapping, slaughtering, skinning, tanning the hide, smoothing the hide, marking lines, and cutting. We have another eight kinds of work—this is the third group—related to writing, erasing, building, demolishing, kindling and extinguishing a fire, giving the final hammer blow, and carrying from one domain to another. These are the headings of the thirty-nine primary categories of work used in the Mishkan and prohibited on Shabbos. The categories in the last groups we discussed were also present in the Mishkan: writing and erasing were used to mark the boards. When working with metals in the Mishkan, they kindled and extinguished fires and performed the final hammer blow. When people brought their contributions for the Mishkan, carrying from one domain to another was involved, and so on. Every kind of work we mentioned in those last groups was performed in the Mishkan. There are other kinds of work prohibited by the Torah that do not fall precisely within the thirty-nine primary categories. We will not go into them in this class, but I will mention them: for example, “So that your servant and your maidservant, your ox and your donkey may rest.” Having a servant or an animal do work is also prohibited by the Torah. But we will focus mainly on the thirty-nine primary categories associated with the work of the Mishkan. In this part of the class, we will understand the severity of violating Shabbos. Of course, there are several categories of Shabbos prohibitions: Torah prohibitions and rabbinic prohibitions, intentional violations and unintentional ones. But as part of learning the foundations of the laws of Shabbos, we need to understand the severity of violating its prohibitions, G-d forbid. The Torah says, as we quoted in a previous class: “One who desecrates it shall surely be put to death, for whoever performs

16:57 Speaker 2 work on it, that soul shall be cut off from among its people.” These verses address intentional desecration of Shabbos, and the Torah tells us that it is very severe. Of the four forms of capital punishment administered by a beis din, the most severe is stoning. That is what the Torah means when it says of one who desecrates Shabbos, “shall surely be put to death”: the punishment is stoning, the most severe of the four forms of capital punishment administered by a beis din. The Torah also says, “That soul shall be cut off from among its people,” meaning kareis. What is the difference? When is a person liable to stoning, and when is a person liable to kareis? The rule is as follows. For someone who violates Shabbos intentionally to be subject, G-d forbid, to stoning, six conditions must be met. First, as we said, the act must be intentional: the person is aware of what he is doing. Second, qualified witnesses must see the act of Shabbos desecration together. Third, before he acts, the witnesses must warn him that what he is about to do is prohibited and carries a particular punishment. Fourth, he must commit the prohibited act immediately after the warning; the warning and the act must be close together. Fifth, he must accept the warning and say, “I hear what you are saying, and nevertheless I will do it.” Sixth, a qualified beis din must find the person who intentionally committed the violation liable to stoning. So there are six conditions for a person to become subject, G-d forbid, to stoning for intentionally violating Shabbos. If not all these conditions are met, then although the violation was intentional, an earthly beis din will not administer stoning. But there is still the punishment of kareis, may it not befall us. This means that the soul is cut off and does not merit life in the World to Come, and so on. All of this concerns someone who intentionally desecrates Shabbos. The second case is someone who desecrates Shabbos unintentionally. What does “unintentionally” mean? Pay attention here to the precise definition. It means that a person performs a particular action on Shabbos and knows perfectly well

19:42 Speaker 2 what action he is about to perform, but does not know the severity of the act. Therefore, he is not subject to stoning or to kareis. But someone who unintentionally violates a Torah prohibition on Shabbos—whether a primary category of work or a derivative of one—is obligated to bring a sin offering. When the Beis Hamikdash stood, he had to bring a sin offering to atone for his unintentional sin. What are possible examples of an unintentional violation? There are three possibilities. First, he does not know the halachah. He knows he is watering the garden, but he does not know that watering a garden on Shabbos is prohibited. He does not know that watering is related to sowing because it encourages the plants to grow. He does not know the halachah. That is one type of unintentional violation. Second, he does not know it is Shabbos. He has learned the laws of Shabbos and knows what action he is about to perform, but he has not noticed that Shabbos has already begun. This could easily happen when the clocks change between winter and summer time. Perhaps he had not heard about the change and thought Shabbos would begin in another hour. He went ahead and performed several kinds of work in the middle of Shabbos without knowing it was Shabbos. That is called an unintentional violation. Third, he does not know the severity of the punishment for performing work on Shabbos, as we said earlier. He does not know how severe the punishment is for violating Shabbos prohibitions, and this too is included among unintentional violations. The next part is to distinguish between an unintentional violation and what halachah calls misasek—someone who performs a prohibited act without intending to perform that act. A misasek is not obligated to bring a sin offering; he is exempt. To sum up, we saw that an intentional violation carries a punishment of stoning or kareis. We saw that an unintentional violation requires a sin offering. Now, in the final part of this class, we will see what is considered misasek, for which there is not even an obligation to bring a sin offering. The term misasek means that he performed the action while occupied with

22:10 Speaker 2 Without paying attention to what he is actually doing with his hands. This can happen in several different ways. One possibility is that he intended to cut a detached plant. For example, there is a vase of flowers in the house, and he is sure the flowers are detached, not connected to the ground. He wants to pick a leaf from a flower. In itself, there is no prohibition: if the flower was already detached before Shabbos, he is not harvesting. But after he picks it, he realizes that the flowers are actually connected to the ground. They are still drawing nourishment; they are alive. He performed the act of harvesting without realizing that he was harvesting. That is a different category. It is called misasek—acting without awareness—and someone who is misasek is not even obligated to bring a sin offering, because he is not even considered someone who acted unwittingly. Another example: a person intends to do one prohibited act, but in practice does a different prohibited act that he did not plan. For example, someone wants to throw a stone at a creature to kill it. Of course, killing a creature on Shabbos is forbidden—killing a butterfly, let us say, or trapping it, for example. As he throws the stone, it strikes an attached fruit and detaches it, which is the melachah of harvesting. He intended to perform the act of killing, of slaughtering, but in practice he harvested. That is called misasek. He is unaware of the act he is doing: he plans to do one thing, and something else happens. Both are forbidden, but he had no intention of doing the act he actually performed. An even clearer example: he knows what act he is about to perform, but the object on which he intended to perform it changes. Changes. For example, he intends to light a candle on Shabbos. Lighting a candle on Shabbos is the melachah of kindling. It is forbidden to kindle a flame on Shabbos, but he goes to light the candle on the right, and by mistake

24:47 Speaker 2 the candle on the left lights instead. We are in Chanukah. We can all picture how sometimes a person brings the flame toward one candle, and it catches another wick and lights it. So he did intend to kindle a flame, and a flame was kindled, but the object he intended to light—the candle on the right—was not the one that lit. It was the candle on the left. This too is called misasek. It is a lesser category than acting unwittingly, and he is not even obligated to bring a sin offering. Another example is misasek in the order of the melachos. Let us return to the candles. One candle was lit and one was unlit, and he intended first to extinguish the lit candle and then to light the unlit one. In practice, while doing these melachos, it came out the other way around: he first lit one and then extinguished the other. The reverse of what he intended. This too is called misasek, because what he actually did did not match what he had planned. That is misasek. Another example of misasek: a person wanted to perform a melachah in a more effective way, but ended up doing it in a less effective way. This comes up with the melachah of carrying from one domain to another on Shabbos. A person intends to carry an object in front of him, so that he can watch over it as he goes, but in practice it shifts behind him, and he carries it with less oversight. That means he performed the melachah in a less effective way than he had planned. This too is called misasek. What is the law regarding misasek? He is entirely exempt from punishment. One cannot ask whether an act of misasek is permitted or forbidden. Everyone understands that when something happens completely unintentionally, one cannot ask beforehand whether it is permissible to do it. But after it has happened, we can ask whether the penalty applies. The answer is no, because the Torah forbade deliberate, purposeful melachah, and with misasek there was no such intention at all. He is entirely exempt. Let us sum up this part

26:56 Speaker 2 of the lesson. We have seen the severity of Shabbos prohibitions ranked from highest to lowest. There are Shabbos prohibitions whose penalty is very severe—stoning for a deliberate violation, when all the conditions for a deliberate violation are met. We have seen melachos performed unwittingly, which are also forbidden by the Torah and require a sin offering. Below that, we saw a case in which a person did something that, in practice, violated Shabbos, but it happened entirely through misasek. There is another example that comes to mind as I speak, one that is unfortunately all too familiar: a person leans against a wall and accidentally turns on the... moves the switch, turning the light on or off. This is a classic example of misasek that unfortunately occurs. One cannot even say that this was an unwitting Shabbos violation, because he had no awareness of the act whatsoever. So we have now finished this part of the lesson and established clear categories for the severity of Shabbos prohibitions. In the next part of the lesson, we will understand the terms “liable,” “forbidden,” and “permitted.” These terms come up very often in the laws of Shabbos. Usually, “liable” means a melachah that is forbidden by the Torah. “Forbidden” usually means that the act is permitted by the Torah, but our Sages saw fit to prohibit it. A similar term is “exempt”: it means that he is not subject to a Torah-prescribed penalty, but the act is still forbidden by rabbinic law. When we hear the term “permitted,” it means that there is no trace of a prohibition, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic law, and the act is entirely permitted. To understand the role of our Sages in Shabbos prohibitions, let us first say this: the Torah commanded the Jewish people to listen to the Sages. “Do not turn aside from what they tell you, right or left,” and “You shall do according to all that they instruct you.” “Ask your father and he will tell you, your elders and they will say to you.” Furthermore, the Torah commanded our Sages to make safeguards for the Torah: “Make a fence around the Torah.” This is derived from the Torah, as the verse says, “You shall keep My charge—

29:31 Speaker 2 make a safeguard for My charge.” In other words, our Sages saw that although the Torah prohibits a particular act, if we kept only to the Torah’s boundaries, situations might arise in which a person could accidentally, unwittingly, G-d forbid, cross that boundary. So they extended the boundary and made a safeguard around the Torah’s prohibition, so that even if someone were, G-d forbid, to cross the rabbinic safeguard, the Torah prohibition would still be preserved. What principles guided our Sages when they instituted rabbinic prohibitions? Several principles guided them when they made decrees concerning Shabbos prohibitions. What were those principles? The first: certain acts resemble acts that the Torah forbids. The second: certain acts might inadvertently lead a person into a Torah prohibition. There are also acts that relate to the very character and holiness of Shabbos. Although a particular act is permitted by Torah law, the Sages saw fit to prohibit it in order to preserve the distinctiveness of Shabbos, its holiness, its character, and its rest, even though the Torah permits it. Let us give examples. The first case we will discuss involves an act forbidden by the Torah and another act that is not forbidden by the Torah, but that the Sages prohibited because it resembles the Torah prohibition. For example, grinding. Grinding on Shabbos is forbidden. What is the essence of grinding? Taking a grain of wheat and crushing it, grinding it, breaking it into tiny pieces—in effect, turning it into flour. That is the act of grinding forbidden by the Torah: taking something that is not currently fit for use. I will give another example more connected to our kitchen routines. I take an eggplant, for example. An eggplant is not eaten raw as it is. I take it and cut it into tiny cubes so that I can then cook it and make it into food fit to eat. The acts

32:15 Speaker 2 These are prohibited by the Torah, because I’m taking something that is one solid mass and breaking it into tiny pieces. It is still not fit to eat. That is the Torah prohibition. The Sages went a step further with the prohibition. For example, there is something called fodder—food for animals. The fodder is, in a sense, already fit to eat. If someone crushes it to make it easier for an animal to eat, that action is not prohibited by the Torah. Because, as we said, the Torah prohibits grinding or crushing something that is not yet fit to eat and that will still not be fit to eat after it is crushed. The Sages saw something similar to the Torah prohibition, but involving something that is already fit for use. As I said, take fodder, which an animal can already eat, more or less. A person wants to crush it to make it easier for the animal to eat. That is prohibited by rabbinic law. The Sages saw a certain similarity here, and the distinction could become blurred, so they made a safeguard and said that this, too, is prohibited. Even though it is already fit to eat, the Sages prohibited it as well. Another example of the second principle is actions that the Torah permits, but while doing them, a person might be drawn into a Torah prohibition. For example, writing is prohibited by the Torah. We mentioned that writing is one of the thirty-nine forms of work: in the Mishkan, they wrote on the boards for its construction. Writing is prohibited by the Torah. The Sages said: We will also prohibit other activities that are not actually writing, but during which a person might accidentally end up writing. For example, the Sages prohibited all commerce, all buying and selling on Shabbos. In the course of a transaction, a person will want to remember details: what he sold, how much he sold it for, whether he received payment. He might then, without thinking, immediately write down

34:35 Speaker 2 the details, and thereby violate a Torah prohibition. The Sages increased the margin of safety and said: On Shabbos, we do not buy and sell or make loans, and we do not judge monetary disputes between people, lest someone write down the rulings. So here is an example of the second principle: the Sages prohibited certain activities because doing them might lead a person to an action prohibited by the Torah. The third principle, to conclude this part of the lesson, is preserving Shabbos’s distinctiveness and character. The prophet says, “If you turn back your foot because of Shabbos, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day,” and so on, “and honor it by not following your usual ways, pursuing your affairs, or speaking of them.” These are activities that are not prohibited by the Torah at all, but it is not appropriate for a person to occupy himself with them on Shabbos. It would detract from what makes Shabbos special. For example, a person wants to visit his farmland on Shabbos to see how things stand and whether it needs more irrigation or spraying. Not, G-d forbid, that he would do those things on Shabbos; he just wants to know the condition of his crops so that after Shabbos, on Sunday, he can do what needs to be done. That walk is prohibited by rabbinic law, under “pursuing your affairs or speaking of them.” One final example relates to “not following your usual ways” and “If you turn back your foot because of Shabbos.” There is a certain way of walking that is also inappropriate on Shabbos. One may not take long strides on Shabbos. A person walks calmly on Shabbos, not rushing or taking long strides. If he does, he has not violated a Torah prohibition, nor even a rabbinic prohibition in the earlier sense of rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, it simply detracts from the distinctiveness and tranquility of Shabbos, and the Sages saw fit to issue a decree about that too. So in this part of the lesson, we have learned the principles behind the Sages’ decrees concerning Shabbos. And to conclude, we need to know that when it came to Shabbos, the Sages went very far

37:01 Speaker 2 with their decrees, more than with any other Torah prohibition. That is because the Sages saw how strongly the Torah itself warns about Shabbos, how severely it punishes its violation, and how the Tanach is full of verses urging the observance of Shabbos and warning against its desecration. The Sages saw that this is a very fundamental and important matter in Judaism, and they went very far with their decrees. In this part of the lesson, with Hashem’s help, we will learn about the differences between Torah prohibitions and rabbinic prohibitions. First, differences in the severity of the punishment, and then, with Hashem’s help, differences in how halacha treats Torah-level prohibitions as compared with rabbinic ones. Let us begin with the severity of the punishment for a Torah prohibition as compared with a rabbinic prohibition. We have already learned that for a deliberate violation of a Torah prohibition there is the punishment of stoning or kareis, and for an unintentional violation, a sin offering. What happens with a rabbinic prohibition? If a person violates a rabbinic prohibition on Shabbos, is his punishment as severe as for a Torah prohibition? Is there no punishment at all? Is it a lighter punishment? Let’s see what the sources say. The Sages say that the punishment for violating a rabbinic prohibition is makas mardus, disciplinary lashes. What is makas mardus? We know that lashes for a Torah prohibition are generally thirty-nine lashes. Sometimes a person may receive fewer than thirty-nine, according to what he can endure. With rabbinic disciplinary lashes, the definition is not necessarily more lenient at all; it is quite stringent. A person is lashed as many times as the beis din sees fit. There is no limit of thirty-nine here. For a Torah prohibition, there is no situation in which a person receives more than thirty-nine lashes for a single offense. With makas mardus, that is possible; it all depends on the beis din’s judgment. If the beis din considers the act very serious, and the way he showed contempt for the Sages deeply disturbing, it can even prescribe more than thirty-nine lashes. It depends on its judgment. If a person persists in his defiance, he is beaten until

39:42 Speaker 2 his life leaves him—that is the expression the Sages use. That is one thing. Second, someone who transgresses the words of the Sages is liable to be placed under a ban of ostracism. Hashem protect us. What is this ban? It means that a person who treated rabbinic teachings with contempt is placed under a ban until he repents and asks for the ban to be lifted. A person under such a ban, may we never know of it, is not counted for a minyan or a zimun; he may not get a haircut or wash his clothes. In short, it is a very unpleasant situation, imposed because he violated a rabbinic prohibition brazenly and with contempt. That is the severity of the punishment for a rabbinic prohibition. We have already discussed the severity of punishment for a Torah prohibition in earlier lessons. Now, not at the level of punishment, but at the level of how halacha treats the difference between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition: why is there a difference at all? The difference lies in the words of the Sages themselves. The Torah gave the Sages the authority to issue decrees, and in their wisdom the Sages knew how to decide which situations their decrees would apply to, while also saying that in certain situations they would not issue the decree. In the words of the Sages, “They said it, and they said it.” They said that, as a general rule, this action is prohibited, but they also said that there are exceptions to which the decree does not apply. Again, we are entering a very broad subject with many details, and of course we will not go into the details in this lesson. What we need to know is the general rule: when we move from a Torah prohibition to a rabbinic prohibition, the same Sages who prohibited an action generally also have the authority to say that there is an exception to which their decree does not apply. As a general rule, when there is doubt about a Torah prohibition, we rule stringently; when there is doubt about a rabbinic prohibition, we rule leniently. A very simple, classic example is Kiddush. Although we said that in this lesson we are generally discussing prohibitions rather than positive obligations, for the sake of making this concept easier to understand

42:10 Speaker 2 Let’s take an example specifically from the positive actions we do on Shabbos: Kiddush. There is a well-known difference between Kiddush on Friday night and Kiddush on Shabbos day. Friday-night Kiddush is, in principle, a Torah obligation: “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” We sanctify Shabbos with words as it begins. Shabbos begins, as we know, toward evening on Friday. So Friday-night Kiddush is grounded in the Torah’s command to remember the Shabbos day. Shabbos-day Kiddush, by contrast, is a rabbinic obligation instituted by the Sages. If someone is unsure whether he made Kiddush, we apply the rule here: for Friday-night Kiddush, a doubt concerning a Torah obligation is treated stringently, so he should make Kiddush. For daytime Kiddush, a doubt concerning a rabbinic obligation is treated leniently, so he need not make Kiddush again. That’s a simple example of the difference. Another fundamental difference between Torah and rabbinic prohibitions on Shabbos concerns setting a prohibition aside and doing the prohibited act in certain circumstances. If an action is prohibited by the Torah, setting the prohibition aside and doing it on Shabbos is permitted only in fairly rare, uncommon cases. The most familiar example is saving a life. When there is a concern for danger to life, even a Torah prohibition becomes permissible, because the Torah did not prohibit even actions ordinarily forbidden on Shabbos when the cost would be a human life. There are a few specific mitzvos—not many—for which the Torah tells us that the mitzvah may be performed on Shabbos even though it entails actions that would otherwise be forbidden. The most familiar example is the mitzvah of circumcision. Circumcision is, in principle, an action forbidden on Shabbos if not done for the sake of the mitzvah. But the Torah says, “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised”—on the eighth day, even if it is Shabbos. In other words, to set aside a Torah prohibition on Shabbos, we need a very, very significant reason, such as saving a life or an explicit

44:35 Speaker 2 command in the Torah permitting such an action on Shabbos. Short of those circumstances, the prohibition remains in force, and we do not violate Shabbos. With a rabbinic prohibition, however, the circumstances in which it can be set aside and the action performed are much broader. For example—and again, we have to be careful with these rules, because every rule has exceptions and every detail has many conditions. I’m giving only the general principles; for practical halachah, each case really has to be examined on its own merits. But as a general rule, some rabbinic prohibitions can be set aside under circumstances other than those we mentioned for Torah prohibitions—for example, in a case of substantial financial loss. There are actions ordinarily forbidden by rabbinic law that the Sages did not prohibit in certain situations where refraining from them would lead to a major financial loss. Another example is preventing animal suffering. The Sages set aside certain prohibitions, such as some muktzeh restrictions, when animal suffering is involved. And in the case of illness—when a person is, G-d forbid, ill—certain actions prohibited by rabbinic law are permitted if refraining from them could, G-d forbid, harm the sick person, even when there is no danger to life. In this lesson, we’ve laid out the fundamental differences between Torah and rabbinic prohibitions, including the penalties. We saw that the penalty for a rabbinic prohibition differs from that for a Torah prohibition. We also saw the difference in how halachah treats setting aside a Torah prohibition, which happens only in very specific circumstances, and setting aside a rabbinic prohibition, for which the Sages allowed more possibilities. They instituted the prohibition, and they also defined its limits. And, of course, there is the question of doubt: with a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, we are stringent; with a doubt concerning a rabbinic prohibition, we are lenient. We identified melachos prohibited by the Torah and actions prohibited by rabbinic law, and saw the difference between them. We went into detail about the definitions of rabbinic prohibitions and the reasons the Sages prohibited certain actions on Shabbos. Today we return to the melachos prohibited by the Torah. We will learn that for these melachos to be prohibited by the Torah—and, more than

47:12 Speaker 2 that, for the actions to carry a Torah-prescribed penalty—several conditions must be met. Only when all the conditions are present does the action involve a Torah prohibition and even liability for a penalty under Torah law. Once one of the conditions we’ll learn is missing, the action’s level of severity drops. It may still be prohibited by the Torah, but carry no penalty. Or it may even be permitted by the Torah and prohibited only by rabbinic law. In this lesson, we’ll identify several conditions—five conditions in the first part of the lesson—that must be met for an action forbidden on Shabbos to be prohibited and carry liability under Torah law. In a previous lesson, we learned that the Torah prohibited meleches machsheves, purposeful work. We learned about the laws of Shabbos and the melachos prohibited by the Torah through the Torah’s comparison between the work of the Mishkan and work on Shabbos. We added that, regarding the work of the Mishkan, the Torah uses the term meleches machsheves: work that is thought out, planned, and skillfully executed. Several conditions follow from this definition, and only when they are met is a melachah prohibited by the Torah. Let’s begin with the first principle: the work must be done in its usual manner, the way it was done in the Mishkan. The opposite of “in its usual manner” is called, in halachic language, “with a variation.” When an action is performed on Shabbos in an unusual way, rather than the accepted way of doing it, there is no Torah prohibition. For example, someone clips his fingernails on Shabbos. Clipping fingernails falls under the melachah of shearing, because he detaches something from its source of growth. If he clips them in the usual way, with an implement made for that purpose, he is liable under Torah law. If he does it in an unusual way, for instance with his teeth or another fingernail, the action no longer carries liability under Torah law. He is exempt under Torah law, but the action is still forbidden by rabbinic law. Another example is writing. The melachah of writing is prohibited by the Torah on Shabbos. That applies when a person

50:10 Speaker 2 writes in his usual way, the accepted way of writing. A right-handed person normally writes with his right hand, not his left. So if he writes with his left hand on Shabbos, he does not violate a Torah prohibition. He is exempt under Torah law, though of course the Sages prohibited the melachah even when done in an unusual way. Another condition is intention. Meleches machsheves involves thought in the sense of planning. A person must have planned what he is doing. The action and the result it produces must have been planned in advance: he wants that result and intends to bring it about. But if he intends to do one thing and, in practice, something else happens that he never planned to do—something that occurred while he was occupied with the first task, without any intention whatsoever—he has no liability under Torah law. This is called mis’asek. We discussed the definition of mis’asek at length in previous lessons; for our purposes, we’ll briefly mention it again. For example, someone plans to cut a particular vegetable or fruit, thinking it is already detached. Suppose he wants to pick a flower from a container that he thinks is a vase with water, or even an empty vase. It turns out that the container is a flowerpot full of soil, and even has a hole in the bottom, so the plant draws nourishment from the ground. When he picks a flower from that pot, he has performed the melachah of harvesting—but he had no intention of harvesting at all. As far as he was concerned, he was picking something already detached. He was certain those flowers were detached. So when he performed the action, the element of intention was missing. He did not intend to harvest, and there is no Torah prohibition here. Another example is an unintended action. Someone walks across grass and, without intending to, uproots blades of grass. His sole intention is to walk; he has no intention of uprooting the grass. Since he has no intention of uprooting it, this is an unintended action. In this case, not only

52:49 Speaker 2 That it is not forbidden, but actually permitted—and completely permitted even by rabbinic law. Third, one is exempt for a melachah that is not needed for its own purpose. What does that mean? Unlike the previous definition, where a person does one thing and something he did not plan happens as a result, here we are talking about something different. A person does something, intends it to happen, and it happens exactly as planned. But his purpose in doing it is not the usual one. That was not the purpose for which this melachah was performed in the Mishkan. Let’s give an example: carrying from one domain to another. The Torah forbids taking an object from a private domain into a public domain, and one is liable for doing so. The purpose of carrying in the Mishkan, from which we learn all the melachos of Shabbos, was to have the object in the other domain—whether taking it from a public domain into a private domain or from a private domain into a public domain. The point was to have the object in the domain to which it was being taken. But suppose someone takes an object out solely because he does not want it where it is now. For example, a person takes out garbage. The dirt in his house bothers him, so he takes it outside and puts it in the public domain. What is his purpose? He has no interest in having it in the public domain; he just wants it out of his house. This is called a melachah that is not needed for its own purpose, for which one is exempt according to halachah. Another example is milking on Shabbos. Milking is forbidden by Torah law because it is connected to the melachah of threshing, which means separating something from its source of growth. Separating milk from an animal is considered threshing. But that is when the milking is done for the milk. I need the

55:26 Speaker 2 product that I am separating from its source. But if I want to milk the cow because otherwise it will suffer—because of concern for the suffering of animals—then my purpose is to relieve the animal’s pain, not because I need the product, the milk. That falls under the definition of a melachah that is not needed for its own purpose, for which one is exempt. Of course, one is exempt, but it is still forbidden by rabbinic law. And this brings us to the fourth condition: the act must be done to improve something, not to spoil it. In the words of halachah, “All who act destructively are exempt.” For example, one of the melachos of Shabbos is cutting to size. A person takes a piece of leather, say, and cuts it to the exact dimensions he needs. If he cuts it because he needs leather of a certain size for a rug or a table covering, his action improves it. He cuts the leather so it will be suitable for what he wants to make. But if he cuts it into thin strips or tiny pieces so that it is no longer useful for the work, what has he done? He has cut it, but in a way that ruined the leather. “All who act destructively are exempt.” There is no Torah prohibition here, though there is, of course, a rabbinic prohibition. The fifth and final definition in this part of the lesson is that the act must have lasting effect. With several melachos, to be liable by Torah law, the result must endure. It cannot be something temporary that disappears on its own. Take writing, for example. To be liable for writing on Shabbos, the material we write with and the surface we write on must produce writing that lasts. This excludes writing on something that will blow away: someone writes in sand or in dust. That writing does not last; a light breeze blurs it

58:13 Speaker 2 and it disappears. So with the melachah of writing, for example, permanence is very significant. If the result does not endure, there is no Torah prohibition, though there is a rabbinic prohibition. To sum up this part of the lesson: we have seen that even with melachos forbidden by the Torah, for the act to actually be forbidden and for a person to be liable by Torah law, it must meet the conditions of meleches machsheves. We divided those into five points. We said that the melachah must be done in its usual manner and with intention; it must be needed for its own purpose, the purpose for which that melachah is normally done; it must be done to improve something rather than spoil it; and its result must last rather than disappear on its own. That concludes this part of the lesson. Thank you very much. In the next lesson, we will continue with a few more conditions for an act to be forbidden by Torah law. In this part of the lesson, we will expand on a concept we touched on in previous lessons: an unintended result is permitted. We will go into more detail, definitions, and examples of what counts as an unintended result. When something fits that definition, it is permitted. But if a certain condition is missing, it may go from being permitted to being forbidden by rabbinic law. The definition was very clear: a person intends to do one thing, and while doing it, something else happens that he did not intend. That other act may occur, but he has no intention of doing it. The second act is forbidden, but because he did not intend it, he is permitted to do the first act. An example we gave earlier is someone walking on grass and uprooting blades of grass as he walks. Walking is permitted; uprooting grass is forbidden under the melachah of reaping. But since he intends only to walk and has no intention of uprooting anything, even though grass may be uprooted, an unintended result is permitted. Another example

1:00:55 Speaker 2 given in halachah is dragging a bench through a garden. As the bench is dragged, it makes a furrow in the ground. Making a furrow in the ground in a garden is forbidden under the melachah of plowing. But in our case, the person’s sole intention is to move the bench from one place to another in the garden. He has no interest in the furrow. A furrow may be made, and making one is forbidden under the melachah of plowing, as we mentioned. But because he does not intend to make a furrow, he may drag the bench. An unintended result is permitted. But for something to qualify as an unintended result, we must be careful to say that the forbidden act is not certain to happen. If the forbidden act will definitely happen while one is doing something permitted, it is no longer called an unintended result. In the language of halachah, it is called pesik reisha velo yamus—“Cut off its head, and will it not die?” Taking an animal’s life is forbidden on Shabbos under the melachah of slaughtering. Suppose someone says, “I have a chicken, and I want to pull off its head so my child can play with the chicken’s head on Shabbos.” He cuts off the chicken’s head, and in the process another act takes place: the animal is killed. But he says he did not intend that at all; he only wanted to amuse his child with the chicken’s head. This is not called an unintended result, because the animal will certainly die when its head is severed from its body. So this act is called pesik reisha velo yamus. In other words, the permission for an unintended result does not apply, because a forbidden act definitely occurs. That is why pesik reisha is forbidden. Going back to the earlier example of dragging a bench: it is permitted to drag it despite the possibility of making a furrow only if a furrow is not certain to be made. But if the bench is heavy and the soil is soft, so dragging it will definitely make a furrow, we enter the category of pesik reisha.

1:03:46 Speaker 2 “And it will not die,” and indeed, it is forbidden to drag the bench. To understand the concept of pesik reisha, we need to add another element: the person benefits from the prohibited result. Not only will the prohibited result definitely occur, but he also wants it to happen. In that case, he becomes liable under Torah law. For example, a person washes his hands over plants in his garden on Shabbos. Those plants need watering. He might say, “All I intend to do is wash my hands.” But washing his hands also means pouring water on the plants in his garden, and the plants will certainly benefit. Improving the plants by watering them is the melachah of planting. So although he intends only to wash his hands, because the plants will definitely benefit, we cannot say that he does not intend the result. In halachic language, this is called pesik reisha d’nicha lei: the result is inevitable, and he benefits from it. He wants the result that accompanies washing his hands, and he is therefore liable under Torah law. In other words, we have moved from an unintended result, which is permitted, to a case where the prohibited result will definitely occur and is also desirable and beneficial to him. That brings us to liability under Torah law. A somewhat less severe case is when a person washes his hands over plants in someone else’s garden, rather than his own. He has no interest in watering his friend’s plants. The plants will certainly be watered, so it is still a pesik reisha, but it is not called pesik reisha d’nicha lei. Rather, it is pesik reisha d’lo nicha lei, and it is therefore prohibited by rabbinic law. There are, however, halachic authorities—among them the Aruch—who hold that when it is pesik reisha d’lo

1:06:43 Speaker 2 nicha lei, it becomes permitted. But the halachah does not follow that view, unless it is combined with other grounds for permitting it. So, to sum up this part of the lesson, we have expanded on the concept of an unintended result. For an action to fall into this category, the prohibited result must not be certain to occur. For example, if someone drags a bench that is not too heavy over ground that is not too soft, a furrow will not necessarily form. We define that as an unintended result, and it is permitted. If, however, the result is certain to occur, it is forbidden. If he also wants and benefits from that result, he becomes liable under Torah law. That concludes our discussion of the concept of an unintended result. This brings us to the end of this part of the lesson, and we can say that we have covered more or less—though, of course, as we said in the first lesson, we cannot cover all the principles of the laws of Shabbos in this format. But we have learned very important fundamentals of the laws of Shabbos. And as we mentioned in the first lesson, by studying and reviewing the laws of Shabbos, we are fulfilling the Torah’s command, “Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it.” We now continue to another part of the lesson, in which we will learn additional conditions for liability under Torah law. These are not connected to the previous discussion of “the Torah prohibited purposeful work.” We are now speaking about further conditions emphasized by the Torah in other verses: to incur liability and punishment under Torah law, the following conditions must be met. With Hashem’s help, we will study four more conditions. The first condition: the Torah uses the words “You shall not do any work.” The emphasis on “do” is that the melachah must be performed directly, not indirectly—not through grama. The result must follow directly from the person’s action. Then he violates the Torah prohibition, “You shall not do work.” Of course, grama is also prohibited by rabbinic law. But when we move from a direct action to grama, we move from a Torah prohibition to a rabbinic prohibition. And as we learned in earlier lessons, there are situations in which the Sages themselves permitted actions that are ordinarily forbidden by rabbinic law. For example, extinguishing a fire is prohibited under the melachah of extinguishing. That is when a person extinguishes it directly. If he causes it to be extinguished indirectly, he does not violate a Torah prohibition; he violates a rabbinic prohibition. There are situations in which the Sages permit indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished. For instance, when property is in serious danger, one may take an action that will cause the fire to go out. One example is placing vessels full of water in the path of the fire, if the vessels are made of materials that cannot withstand the flames. When the fire and heat reach them, the water will burst out and extinguish the fire. Placing those vessels in the fire’s path does not directly extinguish it; it causes it to be extinguished. Indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished is generally prohibited by rabbinic law, but the Sages permitted it when property is at risk. Of course, grama is a very broad and deep subject. To address it properly, one must understand both the halachic definitions and the practical circumstances: What counts as direct? What counts as grama? What counts as a delay? What if I activate something, which then activates something else, and only then is the melachah performed? This is a very broad subject, and since our lesson focuses on the general principles, we will leave it there. Condition number two: the verse says, “If one person sins unintentionally,” and so on, “by doing one of Hashem’s commandments that must not be done, and incurs guilt, he shall bring his offering.” From the word “by doing,” the Sages learned: by doing the whole act, not just part of it. If a person performs only one stage of a melachah, there is no Torah prohibition, only a rabbinic prohibition. For example, the melachah of carrying. Under Torah law, carrying consists of three

1:09:22 Speaker 2 The Torah says, “You shall not do any work.” Of course, grama—indirectly causing an action—is also forbidden by rabbinic law. But when we move from a direct action to grama, we move from a Torah prohibition to a rabbinic prohibition. And as we learned in earlier classes, when a prohibition is rabbinic, there are situations in which the Sages themselves permitted actions that are usually forbidden by rabbinic law. For example, extinguishing a fire. Extinguishing a fire is forbidden under the prohibition of extinguishing. That is when a person extinguishes it directly. But if a person causes it to be extinguished, he does not violate a Torah prohibition; he violates a rabbinic prohibition. There are situations in which the Sages permitted indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished. For example, when property is at serious risk, one may take a certain action that will cause the fire to be extinguished: placing vessels full of water in the path of the fire, when those vessels are made of materials that cannot withstand the fire. Once the fire and heat reach the vessels, the water will burst out of them and extinguish the fire. So placing those vessels in the path of the fire is not directly extinguishing it; it causes the fire to be extinguished. Indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished is generally forbidden by rabbinic law, but the Sages permitted it in situations where property is at risk. Of course, to get into the concept of grama—this is a very broad, very deep subject. You need to understand the halachic definitions here well, and the physical circumstances too. What is considered direct? What is considered grama? What is considered a delay? What if I activate something that then activates something else, and only then the prohibited work takes place? It is a very broad subject, and for our class, where we are learning the general rules, we will leave it at that. Condition number two: The verse says, “If one person sins unintentionally,” and so on, “by doing one of Hashem’s commandments that must not be done, and becomes guilty, he shall bring his offering.” From the word “by doing it,” the Sages learned: by doing all of it, not just part of it. If a person performs only one stage of a prohibited work, there is no Torah prohibition here, only a rabbinic prohibition. For example, the prohibited work of carrying. According to the Torah, the prohibited work of carrying consists of three

1:12:09 Speaker 2 stages. The first is lifting the object from where it rests; then transferring it to the other domain; and finally setting it down in that domain. If a person performs only one stage, or even two, but not all three, he is not liable under Torah law. For example, shortly before Shabbos ends—fifteen minutes before its conclusion—a person takes an object from a private domain and sets out. He walks and walks and walks without stopping, and Shabbos ends. Only after Shabbos has ended does he set the object down in the public domain. He lifted it and transferred it from one domain to another, but he did not set it down during Shabbos. So in this case there is no Torah prohibition, though there is a rabbinic prohibition. All this is learned from the word “by doing”—by completing the entire act. Another condition comes from the verse we mentioned earlier, “If one person sins unintentionally.” The Sages learned from this that when one person performs the entire melachah, there is liability under Torah law. But if several people perform the melachah together, they are both exempt from Torah liability: “When two do it, they are exempt.” For example, take a melachah that one person can perform alone, such as writing. A person takes a pen, a writing instrument, and writes with it. If two people hold the writing instrument together and write, that is called “two doing it,” and there is no liability under Torah law. Of course, this refers to melachos that can be performed by one person. It follows that if a melachah cannot be performed by one person in the first place and requires two people, they are certainly liable under Torah law when they do it together. For example, suppose an object is so heavy that one person cannot lift and transfer it from one domain to another, but two people can. If the two of them lift the heavy object, transfer it and set it down, both are liable, since the melachah could not have been performed without them both. The fourth condition is a minimum measure. To become liable under Torah law, a person must perform

1:14:52 Speaker 2 A melachah has a certain minimum measure. If a person does less than that measure, there is no Torah-level liability. Here we make an important distinction: when someone performs a melachah below the required measure, there is no Torah-prescribed punishment, but there is still a Torah prohibition. The halachah is that even half the required measure is prohibited by the Torah. This differs from the cases we discussed earlier, where the absence of Torah-level liability meant the act was permitted by the Torah and prohibited only by the Sages. When the measure is insufficient, the act remains prohibited by the Torah, but there is no punishment. For example, the minimum measure for the melachah of writing is two letters. Someone who writes one letter is exempt. Someone who carries food from one domain to another must carry at least the volume of a dried fig. If he carries less than the required measure, there is no Torah prohibition—sorry, there is no Torah-level liability. There is a prohibition, but no liability. The Torah prohibits even half the required measure, but there is no punishment: no sin offering for an unintentional act, no kareis for an intentional act, and no stoning when there were witnesses and a warning. Let’s sum up this part of the lesson in an interesting way: we found four kinds of exemption. One is exemption from Torah-level liability even though the act is prohibited by the Torah. That’s the last example we gave: half the required measure. The person did not perform the melachah in its full measure, so he is exempt from Torah-level liability, but the act is prohibited by the Torah. Another kind is permitted by the Torah but prohibited by the Sages. That includes most of the examples we gave earlier, such as a melachah not needed for its own sake or one performed in an unusual manner. There are acts for which one is exempt from Torah-level liability and which are permitted even by the Sages. For example, an unintended act. An unintended act is permitted: that’s the example we gave of someone walking over grass without intending at all to uproot it. That is permitted

1:17:40 Speaker 2 even by the Sages. There is also a case of exemption from Torah-level liability where you cannot say that the act is permitted to do in the first place, because it happens by chance, entirely without the person’s awareness. That is the case of someone occupied with something else. He is not at all aware of what he has done. He intended to do one thing, and something else happened that he did not intend at all. So of course he is exempt, and there is no prohibition on him. But you cannot call it “permitted,” because you cannot instruct someone to do it in the first place: it happens by chance, without his awareness. That concludes this additional part of the lesson, in which we learned several more conditions for Torah-level liability.