Hostage Deals According to Halacha - Rabbi Yisrael Meatuf shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast of the Chabad Halacha Institute.

00:09 Speaker 2 Every so often I give a class on a special, timely subject. Today we’ll touch on a subject that isn’t simple at all. Its implications aren’t simple, and the process of working through it isn’t simple either. But I want us to know the sources, so that when we hear people talking about it, we’ll know what they’re talking about. Right? We’re not going to settle the halachos or the conclusions now. We’ll work through the process and see what the Alter Rebbe’s view is and what the Rebbe’s view is. During today’s class, we’ll stop at several points in history that will help us get to the heart of the subject. There are several stories, really, and we’ll see how each one was approached. There’s the story of Levi bar Darga, whose daughter was taken captive. It appears in the Gemara, and he redeemed her for a very large sum. We’ll see later whether what he did was right. A second story: a child in prison. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya heard about a child in prison. He was told that the child was handsome and had beautiful curls, and that he was being held there. Rabbi Yehoshua came, spoke with him, and then redeemed him, as we’ll soon see. Then there’s Maharam of Rothenburg, who, as everyone knows, was imprisoned. Money was collected, but he didn’t want them to secure his release. Then there are the prisoners from Lubavitch, a story from the Alter Rebbe’s time. It isn’t entirely clear who exactly they were, but apparently they were chassidim from Lubavitch who had become involved in various matters concerning the law. They were imprisoned and needed to be redeemed. To some extent they had gotten themselves into trouble, so the question arose whether they had to be redeemed. We’ll see what the Alter Rebbe wrote and how it fits into the whole discussion. And finally, Operation Entebbe. I mention it because almost everyone who writes on this subject mentions Rabbi Ovadia’s ruling concerning Operation Entebbe. It was very well known that he was consulted before the operation. There was

02:43 Speaker 2 some thought of agreeing to their demands and carrying out a prisoner exchange. In the end, though, they chose the better course. Incidentally, even that course—rescuing captives—is problematic from a halachic standpoint, as we’ll soon see. We won’t discuss that in today’s class, but the Mishnah mentions it too. Let’s look at the Mishnah in source number one. The Mishnah says: “Captives may not be redeemed for more than their value, for the sake of the proper functioning of society.” Someone has been taken captive. Redeeming a captive is a great mitzvah, a very great mitzvah. There’s a Gemara that says captivity is worse than everything else—worse than famine or the sword. Why? Because all those troubles can be found in captivity. They’re all there, every one of them. That’s why redeeming captives is such a great mitzvah. But “captives may not be redeemed for more than their value”—they should be redeemed for what they’re worth. We’ll soon see what that means. Not for more, for the sake of the proper functioning of society. The Mishnah then says: “Nor may captives be smuggled out, for the sake of the proper functioning of society.” It’s the same sort of issue. One may not smuggle captives out or rescue them, for the sake of the proper functioning of society. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says it is for the sake of the captives themselves. We won’t discuss this in the class, but in a word or two: if you rescue captives, their captors will make conditions harsher for the others. The question is whether there are other captives in that situation or only one captive. That’s the disagreement here. The first tanna says it’s for the sake of the proper functioning of society. In other words, even if there’s only one captive, rescuing him will put future captives in greater danger. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says it’s for the sake of the captives themselves: in the present situation, if there’s only one captive, there’s no problem; if there are more, don’t rescue just some of them. Now, why may we not redeem captives for more than their value? The Gemara says in number two: “They raised a question: Is this provision for the sake of the proper functioning of society because of the burden on the community, or perhaps so that captors will not be encouraged to seize more people?” Is the reason

04:43 Speaker 2 the burden on the community? In other words, the community has to collect money to redeem captives. If you pay more than is appropriate, and the cost may keep rising, the community can’t bear it. The community is obligated to do what is reasonable, not more than that. That’s one explanation. Or is the reason that the captors will be eager to seize people and get more money? “Come and hear”—the Gemara brings a proof from an incident we mentioned earlier. “Levi bar Darga redeemed his daughter for thirteen thousand gold dinars.” Levi bar Darga redeemed his daughter for thirteen thousand gold dinars. That’s a very large sum. So here’s proof that the concern isn’t that others will be taken captive; it’s the burden on the community. This man is wealthy, he has enough money, and there’s no problem with his redeeming his daughter for thirteen thousand dinars. The Gemara answers by rejecting that proof: “Abaye said: And who says he acted with the Sages’ approval? Perhaps he acted without the Sages’ approval.” Who says the Sages approved of what he did? Perhaps they didn’t. So the Gemara actually leaves the question unresolved. Now, these two possibilities matter very much to how we understand the issue. According to one explanation, it’s simply a burden on the community. So if people want to pay, why not? According to that explanation, they aren’t obligated to. If the reason is the burden on the community, there’s no prohibition involved. We simply don’t impose it on you, ask it of you or obligate you to do it. But if the reason is what I’ve called the captors’ eagerness—if they’ll become eager to take more and more people captive—that’s already a problem, a matter of principle. So what do we do? There are two opinions here. What is the practical ruling? We’ll look in the Shulchan Aruch. If you pay a lot of money, they’ll be eager to take more and more captives, because they’ll

06:41 Speaker 2 get a lot of money.

06:42 Speaker 8 It invites the next kidnapping.

06:43 Speaker 2 Exactly.

06:50 Speaker 8 Exactly.

06:51 Speaker 2 The Shulchan Aruch.

06:53 Speaker 8 It’s interesting that they’ve calmed down a little now.

06:56 Speaker 2 What do you mean, “calmed down”?

06:57 Speaker 8 Israelis are willing to respond to that today, but lately, no—their thinking has changed a bit.

07:02 Speaker 2 I hope so.

07:03 Speaker 8 They aren’t rushing. What?

07:06 Speaker 9 No, I didn’t hear you.

07:08 Speaker 8 No?

07:08 Speaker 9 There’s a bit of [unclear] now.

07:15 Speaker 8 All right. As a matter of halacha, the Rema rules according to the second explanation. In other words, there is a prohibition here because the captors would be encouraged to take more and more people captive. So even if someone says, “I have plenty of money,” that doesn’t mean he’s permitted to pay. We have a problem: we have to think about those who might be next. This is where the story of Maharam of Rothenburg comes in. Maharam of Rothenburg. We brought it here in number six. The Maharshal tells this story: “I heard about Maharam of Rothenburg, who was held in the tower of Ensisheim for several years”—perhaps the place has another name—“and the ruler demanded a large sum from the communities. The communities wanted to redeem him, but he would not allow it, saying, ‘Captives may not be redeemed for more than their value.’” We see that Maharam of Rothenburg himself held that there was a prohibition here, not merely a burden on the community. The communities were willing; they had even collected the money. He refused because it might lead to more people being taken captive. Now let’s go back a little, to the story we mentioned at the beginning. Hold on. We’ve spoken about Levi bar Darga and Maharam of Rothenburg. We jumped ahead a bit. Let’s go back in time for a moment. This is number three on the page. “An incident occurred with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya, who went to a large city in Rome. They told him: ‘There is a child in prison, with beautiful eyes and a handsome appearance, and his locks arranged in curls.’ He went and stood at the entrance to the prison and said, ‘Who gave Yaakov over to plunder and Yisroel to looters?’” He recited a verse out of sheer anguish. How could such a beautiful child be in prison? “The child answered him: ‘Was it not Hashem, against Whom we sinned? They did not wish to walk in His ways, and they did not listen to His Torah.’” In other words, the child continued the verse he had begun. “He said: ‘I am certain that he will become a teacher of halacha in Yisroel. I swear that I will not leave here until I redeem him for whatever sum they demand.’” “I swear” is an expression of an oath. He swore that he

09:21 Speaker 8 would redeem him for whatever sum they demanded. In other words, at any price. And that is what he did—he said it and did it. “They said: He did not leave until he had redeemed him for a great sum of money. Before long, the child became a teacher of halacha in Yisroel. Who was he? Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha.” And here people ask: was this at the time of the Destruction, or while the Beis Hamikdash still stood? Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha was a Kohen Gadol. Some say there were two people by that name. In any event, he redeemed him for a very large sum. So the question arises: there’s an explicit Mishnah saying that captives may not be redeemed for more than their value. All the Rishonim ask this question. Now let’s look at Tosafos. Tosafos gives one answer in one place and another answer elsewhere, and that has halachic implications. Number four. We’ll skip to the second passage, then return to the first. Number four, in the second passage: “And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya, who redeemed that child for a great sum of money in Nezikin.” Why did Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya redeem that child? “Because he was exceptionally wise.” That’s one explanation: because he was exceptionally wise.

10:25 Speaker 10 Who, the child?

10:26 Speaker 8 The child.

10:26 Speaker 10 Oh.

10:27 Speaker 8 The child. The halachic authorities explain that, yes, there are restrictions so that problems won’t arise in the future and all that. But when there’s someone the generation needs, you can’t prevent it.

10:40 Speaker 10 Rothenburg.

10:40 Speaker 8 Right, that’s it. I remember we mentioned Rothenburg. The generation certainly needed him. Tosafos gives a second answer—

10:48 Speaker 10 His daughter, his daughter.

10:50 Speaker 8 Well, what about his daughter?

10:52 Speaker 10 That’s an exception, on the assumption that he—

10:56 Speaker 8 Yes.

10:59 Speaker 10 [unclear] It’s his father.

11:01 Speaker 8 No.

11:01 Speaker 10 Let’s think for a moment about generations, about great generations. We’re a generation now; tomorrow there will be another generation, right?

11:07 Speaker 8 Right.

11:08 Speaker 10 But think about it for a moment: the great sage of the generation may be especially dear to us now, but that won’t lead to a Rothenburg situation, because this case is a one-time thing.

11:15 Speaker 8 That’s the question. The question is what principle applies here. Every daughter has a father. That’s it. That’s it. He has a lot of money—but money can always be obtained. Right? When there’s a problem, the halachic authorities rule on it. Now, what he’s trying to say is that we’re talking here about a need of the generation, not a private matter. A need of the generation is different. A private person and his daughter—that’s... So what if she’s his daughter? But let’s see. Since you’ve already brought this up, let’s go back to the beginning of Tosafos. Tosafos asks a different question: “But what about what was taught in the chapter Na’arah,” in Kesubos: “She was taken captive, and they demanded up to ten times her value from him.” His wife was taken captive, and they want ten times what she’s worth. Is he obligated to redeem her? After all, every husband is obligated to redeem his wife, in return for the produce he receives from her property. Just recently someone asked me about this; I never thought anyone would ask such questions. I learned it in Even Ha’ezer, but these are obscure matters. Someone asked me whether a husband can waive his right to the produce from his wife’s property. It was a real case: a woman received some property, and her husband wanted to receive its produce. Now, as we know, all these enactments correspond to one another: a wife’s earnings in return for her maintenance. The produce is in return for his obligation to redeem her. Now, with her earnings and maintenance, she can waive that arrangement. But this is a special case, because it involves redeeming captives: neither the wife nor the husband can waive it. In other words, the wife can’t say, “I’m not giving you the produce. Don’t worry—if I’m taken captive, you won’t have to redeem me.” It doesn’t work, because redeeming captives is involved. Now, when he’s obligated to redeem his wife, how much must he pay?

13:03 Speaker 8 Must he pay ten times her value? So it says that the first time, he redeems her even for ten times her value. The question is: isn’t it forbidden to redeem captives for more than their value? Tosafos says that a wife is like one’s own body, more so than a daughter is. His wife is like his own body; that’s more than his daughter. In other words, I don’t know whether this follows how strongly the person wants to do it, how much he loves her, or anything like that. It’s simply a halachic principle that his wife is like his own body. As for himself, “A person will give all that he has for his life.” You can’t prevent a person from redeeming himself, even if there are consequences. So I extend that to his wife as well, but no further. More than his daughter—his daughter is no longer included.

13:55 Speaker 11 A wife and husband.

13:59 Speaker 8 Yes, that’s what follows.

14:00 Speaker 12 I don’t want to dwell on it. There are conditions there.

14:05 Speaker 8 According to the advance payment.

14:07 Speaker 12 If that was the usual amount there, it’s above the normal average. So for the usual amount, perhaps you wouldn’t pay.

14:13 Speaker 8 For himself, yes.

14:14 Speaker 12 Whatever the conditions are, at least that much. Let’s turn it around: could we say that someone can use his property to redeem a person needed by the generation? And if I redeem myself, and I’m needed by the generation?

14:26 Speaker 8 In other words, there’s some concern that it will cause all kinds of problems in the future.

14:29 Speaker 12 That’s not right.

14:29 Speaker 8 I mean, there’s a limit to how much you can forbid a person from doing. So that’s the point.

14:35 Speaker 12 You’re telling me that you’re redeeming the great sage of the generation. But I’m saying: if I redeem myself for a huge sum of money, I’m harming the generation. Why wouldn’t that be prohibited?

14:46 Speaker 8 That’s the question: to what extent is each redemption really a one-time event? As he said earlier, it’s not that doing something once automatically changes everything. It’s when it happens time after time. Yes, like here in this country: again and again and again. So they caught on.

15:00 Speaker 12 Matters of money. There were wealthy people; things happened. To this day, there are families in South Africa.

15:07 Speaker 8 Yes, I believe that most of the time it was a father and son, or someone else in the family, rather than the captive himself, because then there’s a stronger personal connection. The captive himself sometimes says, “All right, I’ll try to get free; I’ll give up on this.”

15:23 Speaker 12 Or escape.

15:25 Speaker 8 Smuggle him out, smuggle him out.

15:28 Speaker 12 Or escape ourselves.

15:29 Speaker 8 Yes, and they’ll make things harder too.

15:30 Speaker 12 Or maybe there’s no need to connect it to that, because the whole market is there, and it’s not pleasant either.

15:34 Speaker 8 I don’t know. Seemingly, I don’t know.

15:36 Speaker 11 I have a general question. Aren’t we now in a situation of exile, or [unclear]? It could be that the captor would demand ten times as much. Wouldn’t that already affect redeeming that same child now? At this stage, the person is already being held with cruelty, but he hasn’t found that it can go on. Isn’t there some way to approach this? It’s interesting.

16:02 Speaker 8 I think that’s exactly what you mean. Really. I think you’re referring to what it says further on here. Tosafos says at the end: “Alternatively, since the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, the concern that they will seize and bring more captives does not apply.” “Seize and bring more captives” means that they’ll seize and take more people captive. The destruction of the Beis Hamikdash was a period when—like a war now, right?—they already want to take captives all the time. It’s not that something we do now will give them an appetite for it. It’s a chaotic situation. In that situation, we no longer take that concern into account. That’s what you’re getting at in his second answer.

16:33 Speaker 13 In other words, you act in any situation.

16:35 Speaker 8 Yes, in a situation like the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. Then there’s no concern that they might take more captives, because presumably they’re going to take captives anyway.

16:41 Speaker 13 Like now.

16:41 Speaker 8 Seemingly, seemingly. Although—

16:42 Speaker 13 The question is what the motive was—whether it’s a political matter, where what they want is worth the official [unclear]—

16:48 Speaker 8 Good, good, good, good. We’ll get to that shortly—whether this involves a government. We’ll get to it shortly. I had actually prepared a certain order, but thanks to the discussion in this class, we’re going in a different order, and that’s excellent. Now let’s look at another answer in Tosafos. This is the one relevant to our times, and it’s the subject of today’s whole debate. Number five: “Any sum of money they set for him”—that’s in the account of what happened. Note that number four is Tosafos on the Mishnah, explaining why captives should not be redeemed for more than their value. Number five is Tosafos at the account where the child was redeemed. In both places, Tosafos compares the passages. Here Tosafos gives one answer, and there another. In number five, Tosafos says: “When there is danger to life, captives are redeemed for more than their value, as we say in the chapter Hashole’ach concerning someone who sells himself and his children to idol worshippers. All the more so here”—“here” means in the account of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya—“where there is a risk of being killed.” Saving a life takes precedence. According to what Tosafos is saying now, everything we’ve said about not redeeming captives concerns ordinary captivity, where there’s no danger to life. But if lives are at risk, there’s no choice: they have to be redeemed now, and afterward we’ll see what comes next. Seemingly, that’s the situation in our times.

18:13 Speaker 13 No, that’s—if you release the captives, you’re doing the opposite.

18:17 Speaker 8 Right, right, that’s the next stage. That’s the next stage. If we define it carefully, there are really three stages here. First, is it permitted to redeem captives for more than their value? That’s the question of money. Second, people in exchange for people. Is that considered money? Is that considered their value? Third, dangerous people. That’s already a question of danger. So right now we’re talking about money. When it comes to money, it depends on the answers Tosafos gives. Is a danger to life a different situation or not? In the answer here at the end, Tosafos says, “Or alternatively, because he was outstanding in Torah wisdom.” It goes back to the answer given earlier: because he was a Torah scholar. Now the Ramban challenges Tosafos. He says: Why should a danger to life be different? The Gemara says explicitly, as we mentioned earlier, that there are many troubles in the world—famine, the sword, and so on—and captivity is worse than all of them. Why? Because all of them are present in it. Captivity involves every problem, including danger to life. It’s all there. So how can you say that danger to life makes it different? That’s why he agrees with the other answer, that a Torah scholar is different. So there is a dispute among the Rishonim here. Tosafos is lenient. Tosafos itself gives several answers, but in one of them it is lenient because of the danger to life. The Ramban, by contrast, says that isn’t a valid answer, because the danger to life is always there. Some people make the distinction that—right, right, right, there were different situations, but the Gemara explicitly says, the Gemara explicitly says that captivity also involves the possibility of death. Apparently there were different kinds of captivity, but the Ramban says the Mishnah states the rule without qualification: “Captives are not redeemed for more than their value.” It doesn’t distinguish one kind of captivity from another. Rather, it understood that in every situation they are not redeemed for more. That’s his challenge to Tosafos. Now let’s see how the ruling is decided

20:15 Speaker 8 here. First of all, regarding Operation Entebbe, Rabbi Ovadia discussed the subject at length and brought all the Rishonim and everything. His main basis for leniency was that he relied on this Tosafos, which holds that a danger to life is different.

20:31 Speaker 14 That it is possible, yes. But there, the exchange was very, uh...

20:38 Speaker 15 Did they ask him beforehand?

20:38 Speaker 8 They asked him. That’s what people say: they consulted him before carrying out the operation.

20:41 Speaker 14 There were relatively few—only fifty people there.

20:43 Speaker 8 They wanted very few, yes. They wanted very few terrorists. It was fewer terrorists—so still, yes, still, still they thought that if they released a lot of people in exchange for a few terrorists, would that be accepted and happen? Unfortunately. Now, we’ve gone through almost everything here. Levi bar Darga: the Gemara essentially limited his case to a doubt, depending on the two answers, because of the future consequences. According to the answer, even the prisoners could have been redeemed. And here the question is why. We have a possible opening: either a Torah scholar, or danger to life, or, according to another answer, the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash.

21:22 Speaker 14 Where does it say that? Why?

21:24 Speaker 8 It’s in Tosafos in Gittin, on 45.

21:28 Speaker 14 Oh, I’ve already seen it.

21:32 Speaker 8 And—

21:32 Speaker 14 So here it’s simply the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, and that’s it, no? [unclear].

21:38 Speaker 8 Apparently that’s how it was then. I don’t know if the two are connected. In that story there was—

21:44 Speaker 14 The pioneers there—they took them to settle in the Golan Heights.

21:49 Speaker 8 Maybe. Maybe that’s exactly the story, but apparently there—

21:57 Speaker 14 They put them into [unclear]. No, here, where here it’s—

22:03 Speaker 8 Now what we have left is the story involving the Alter Rebbe.

22:06 Speaker 14 Maharam of Rothenburg.

22:08 Speaker 8 Maharam of Rothenburg. Maharam of Rothenburg, yes, yes, right, that too. Maharam of Rothenburg did not want them to redeem him. And the question here is: Wasn’t he a Torah scholar? So the Maharshal asks—

22:21 Speaker 14 He could have been redeemed.

22:24 Speaker 8 The question is what he held. The money was already there.

22:26 Speaker 14 The purpose of it—

22:27 Speaker 8 Could it be that he was stringent with himself? So let’s see. He says—

22:31 Speaker 14 Or where—

22:36 Speaker 8 Right, I also saw that they answer that he apparently did have contact with the outside world. Now, the Maharshal—look at number six—says: “And I am astonished.” He asks this very question: He was a Torah scholar, so they could have redeemed him. He says, “Perhaps he was humble,” and didn’t consider himself such a great Torah scholar and all that. But he still asks: His generation needed him, and he was, after all, a scholar, and so on. Then he says: “Certainly, he thought that if they redeemed him, there would be reason to fear that all the rulers would do the same to the outstanding Torah scholar of each generation, for the sake of the large sum of money.” Yes, as you said earlier, a Torah scholar isn’t... Okay, but every generation has someone. If they hear that whenever the Jewish people’s leading sage is taken captive, they redeem him for a great deal of money, they’ll capture him deliberately.

23:28 Speaker 14 That’s why he wasn’t responsible.

23:32 Speaker 8 Yes, there—

23:33 Speaker 14 I didn’t mean that. They wouldn’t need to target a child. And they would surely know that there was a great Torah scholar.

23:38 Speaker 8 They didn’t know who. [unclear]. Okay, now, regarding the incident in Lubavitch, the Alter Rebbe writes as follows. This is an excerpt from the middle of the letter: “Let no such thing happen in Israel—to set a fixed measure and limit on saving a life. For our Sages did not say, ‘Captives are not redeemed for more than their value,’ even to ease the burden on the community.” I want to pause for a moment on that phrase, “even to ease the burden.” What does “even” mean? Consider the two explanations we brought at the beginning: the burden on the community, or encouraging the captors. In general, the concern about encouraging captors is more stringent, while the concern about the burden on the community is more lenient. There is no prohibition. On the other hand, notice that when I ask the question now—there’s a difference between asking, “Am I allowed to?” and “Am I forbidden to?” This explanation says you’re forbidden: there are problems that could arise in the future, so you’re forbidden. The other explanation says you’re allowed. But I’m not asking whether I’m allowed or forbidden. I’m asking, “Am I obligated or not?” According to that explanation, you’re not obligated. Why? Because of the burden on the community. It’s only a matter of money, a burden on the community. So you can immediately say, “I’m not obligated to redeem them.” There are people in captivity, and I’m not obligated. According to the second explanation, I can understand why I’m not obligated, because of the future consequences and everything. But here, for something as relatively minor as a burden on the community, I’m forgoing the redemption of captives. So in a sense, this explanation is supposedly more lenient about redeeming captives. In other words, it lowers the level of the obligation to redeem captives. That’s why the Alter Rebbe uses the word “even.” He says that even according to the view concerned with the burden on the community—even when you would forgo redeeming captives for that relatively minor reason—that applies only

25:29 Speaker 8 “in their days, when captives were sold, and anyone wishing to redeem them could buy them, so there was no danger to life at all.” But when there is a danger to life, the Alter Rebbe says it is permitted.

25:41 Speaker 3 Permitted?

25:41 Speaker 8 Permitted, obligatory, and necessary. And even if the captive brought it upon himself, like someone who sold himself to non-Jews—even if he himself got into that situation—he still has to be redeemed.

25:52 Speaker 3 Like that person there who, in an ordinary case of danger to life, went to Iran.

25:57 Speaker 8 Yes. Right. Now, how do we explain the Alter Rebbe? The simplest explanation is that the Alter Rebbe ruled like Tosafos: danger to life is different, so it is permitted. But there are two explanations offered later on. One is by Rabbi Yehuda Diskin. He was a chossid of the Rebbe Rashab and the Frierdiker Rebbe. He gave a lengthy explanation of this letter of the Alter Rebbe. I’ve brought a very small excerpt from it here, number eight. He says: “In the case that came before our Rebbe, they were tried under the law of the kingdom,” as he mentioned earlier, “and so the concern about encouraging captors does not apply. And where there is danger to life, one need not be concerned about the burden on the community.” This is what he’s saying: There’s a difference between, let’s call them opportunists—all sorts of captors and terrorist organizations, and so on—where releasing people, redeeming them, and paying for them encourages the captors to take more people captive, and a case where the government arrested people because they were involved in various things that were against the law. Although later in the letter the Alter Rebbe writes that their innocence came to light, that they hadn’t actually done anything wrong, the fact that he mentions even someone who brought it upon himself suggests that what happened there was something they had, to some extent, gotten themselves into. In any event, the government arrested them. If you redeem them for a great deal of money, it won’t cause the authorities to start—they don’t arrest random people. They have laws; they have rules. So that concern doesn’t apply to a government. What concern remains? The burden on the community. Here the Alter Rebbe says there is a danger to life, and where there is a danger to life, we aren’t concerned about the burden on the community. That is how they explain the Alter Rebbe. According to this explanation, what the Alter Rebbe says here is not a blanket permission for every case involving a danger

27:57 Speaker 8 to life. It applies only in a situation where people had been arrested. Yes? If from there the—

28:12 Speaker 3 Explanation.

28:13 Speaker 8 There’s some explanation there. There’s some explanation there. Even after—perhaps even after it came to light, after their innocence came to light, right? They got there. In any case, some payment was needed. Now, I said “arrest” casually. Just like Hamas calls all these people “detainees,” “prisoners,” in their terminology. But in principle, if it’s a government arresting someone, according to his explanation, that’s different. Now, there was someone else—perhaps someone knows him—Rabbi Yekusiel Aryeh Kamelhar. That was his name. He published books and did various things. He responds to that Rabbi Yehuda Diskin in another issue. Rabbi Yehuda Diskin’s piece appeared in Yagdil Torah. He wrote it in a book, and they later printed it in Yagdil Torah; this response was printed there too, in the same place. He says the following. He cites a passage from the Yerushalmi, and I’ll read it because it’s relevant to what follows. The Yerushalmi has a story. Everyone knows the ruling from the Rambam: when people are told, “Hand someone over to be killed, or we’ll kill all of you,” the Rambam says, “They must not hand over a Jewish soul; they must all die rather than hand him over.” But what happens if they name a particular person? The Mishnah says there is a dispute about whether that person must already be liable to death. In any event, in that situation he may be handed over. There’s a story about exactly that: “Ulla bar Koshav—the name of a man—was sought by the government, and he fled to Lod, to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. They came and surrounded the city.” They told them, “If you don’t give him to us, we’ll destroy the entire city.” “Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi went to him, persuaded him, and handed him over to them.” He went

30:23 Speaker 8 to him and handed over the man, Ulla bar Koshav—that was the person. Afterward, “Eliyahu, of blessed memory, who had been accustomed to appear to him, did not appear.” Eliyahu would usually appear to him, but he stopped. “He fasted several fasts, and Eliyahu appeared to him.” Then he asked him, “What happened? Why didn’t you appear to me?” “He said to him: Would I appear to informers?” What, should I appear to someone who hands a person over to the government? That’s what Eliyahu said to him. He replied, “Did I not act according to the Mishnah?” I did what the Mishnah says. The Mishnah says you may hand him over in such a situation. “He said to him: Is that the teaching of chassidim?” That’s what the Yerushalmi says Eliyahu told Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: “Is that the teaching of chassidim?” Now, that sentence has various explanations. One person explains it one way, another person another way. We’ll get to other explanations shortly, but let’s see how the person writing here about the Alter Rebbe explains the Alter Rebbe. Number nine: “According to what is written in the Yerushalmi, this is not the teaching of chassidim.” He says that chassidim must go beyond the letter of the law and redeem captives for any amount of money in the world, rather than leave a Jewish soul in the hands of his captors. He says there is a halachah, but a chossid is not supposed to follow that halachah by handing over a Jewish soul. He’s not supposed to do that; he’s supposed to go beyond the letter of the law and give himself over. That’s it. And here they raise various questions. The Taz, for example, says something very simple: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi should not have involved himself in such a matter. He was a Torah scholar, the leading sage of that place; he should have let someone else deal with it. That’s how he explains the Yerushalmi. And there are various other explanations. So he wants to say—and then he quotes

32:15 Speaker 8 the Alter Rebbe as follows: “And so ruled our master and teacher, the author of the Tanya, who discussed the matter in Igeres Hakodesh in his holy words, out of the burning flame of Ahavas Yisroel within him, having compassion on the captives held in prison.” There’s really a disagreement here about what the Alter Rebbe meant when he said that one is indeed obligated. That gives us one view. The Rebbe of Lizhensk, essentially, is stringent. Yes, I ran through that rather quickly: he is stringent. He says it’s the government, and the law is different when it’s the government. In other words, if it’s the government and lives are at risk, you redeem them. If it’s an ordinary case of captivity, it’s forbidden. The halachah says it’s forbidden. That’s his explanation. But the other explanation of the Alter Rebbe is that, as an act of chassidus, you may do it. Meaning, not only is it permitted; beyond that, it’s incumbent on you. If it’s chassidus, you’re obligated to do it, without any “but.” How?

33:09 Speaker 4 That applies to our situation.

33:11 Speaker 8 Okay, that’s it. Now we have ten minutes left. I’m trying to move on to the situation today.

33:14 Speaker 4 Today’s situation isn’t about redeeming someone.

33:17 Speaker 8 Exactly. Exchanging, exchanging.

33:20 Speaker 4 And not exchanging him for all the—blood.

33:21 Speaker 8 Exactly, exactly. So now we—

33:24 Speaker 4 The Alter Rebbe doesn’t distinguish between this kind of captivity and that kind of captivity.

33:29 Speaker 8 Captivity?

33:31 Speaker 4 Yes. He says “captivity.” He doesn’t say captivity by a government or by—

33:34 Speaker 8 He was talking about a particular case. He wrote a letter to people at the time asking them to give money.

33:42 Speaker 4 It’s really [unclear] to see the holy words here, uh, it’s—

33:45 Speaker 8 This is part of a letter. It’s a story.

33:47 Speaker 4 It’s not a halachic ruling—

33:48 Speaker 8 No, it’s not actually written there.

33:50 Speaker 4 No, no.

33:50 Speaker 8 Shulchan Aruch. Now let’s discuss the next stage. Briefly, is an exchange equivalent to paying money? The poskim don’t mention it. They all speak only about money. No one speaks about an exchange. Today, various rabbis try to explain why it wasn’t discussed in the past. The simplest explanation is that, in the past, they didn’t have captives to exchange. There were captives held by various kings and so on, but from the time of the Mishnah onward, when the Jewish people were not in a position of power, they weren’t taking captives. They didn’t have a pool of people so that, whenever someone was taken captive, they could say, “Come, let’s make an exchange.” They were, from the outset—

34:22 Speaker 4 One thing: we have a ceasefire—

34:23 Speaker 8 Yes, yes.

34:24 Speaker 4 One side wins and one side loses. The winner takes everything. He takes captives.

34:31 Speaker 8 Yes.

34:32 Speaker 4 There’s no one to exchange them with.

34:33 Speaker 8 The things we have today existed in the past too. You see that everything repeats itself. Presumably, there were ceasefires back then too, and all kinds of arrangements and mediation. Now, what do we find? When they examine the phrase “more than their value,” what does “value” mean? Does it mean what a slave would be worth on the market? The poskim disagree. Some say it means what a slave would be worth on the market. What does the Radbaz say? What does a slave’s market value have to do with it? You look at the captives around you, at non-Jews who have been taken captive and are redeemed for money. You go by their market value as slaves and redeem them for that amount. He says no: you don’t go by a slave’s market value; you go by the customary amount paid to redeem captives. On that basis, perhaps the poskim didn’t discuss exchanges because they weren’t customary. But what is the underlying reason, after all? The concern is that the captors might become eager to take more captives. So if you redeem someone through an exchange that’s normal—one for one, two, I don’t know, something like that—fine, they won’t be so eager. But if you start giving them dozens, and later even thousands, you really make them extremely eager. So the halachah didn’t mention exchanges explicitly, but the same reason that applies to money applies here too: they’ll come back and capture more people afterward. Another stage—and this is what’s happening today—is the danger to life. When you release terrorists, you create a danger to life. The question is whether you have to put yourself at risk to save other people. So we’ll speak about that briefly. We have the well-known ruling of the Alter Rebbe in section 329, which the Rebbe always mentions, concerning gentiles who besieged—

36:12 Speaker 4 That was about Arabs.

36:14 Speaker 8 Yes, yes, yes, I want to mention that in a moment. Very briefly, right now. The Alter Rebbe says: “If someone sees a ship with Jews aboard, he should go on Shabbos to save it.” Then he writes: “Nevertheless, if there is danger, he must not endanger himself to save his fellow, since he himself is out of danger.” His fellow is in danger; you are out of danger. Don’t put yourself in danger for his sake. “Even though he sees his fellow facing death, and even though the danger to himself is uncertain while the danger to his fellow is certain, nevertheless, it says, ‘You shall live by them’—not that he should expose himself to possible death by fulfilling ‘Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow.’” He wants to fulfill the mitzvah of “Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow,” but it also says, “You shall live by them.” If it puts you in danger, you do not have to endanger yourself to save someone else. Okay? Very briefly, there are many, many discussions about this. For example, the Alter Rebbe brings two opinions on this. In Orach Chayim, he follows one opinion. In Choshen Mishpat, he brings two opinions: when one person’s danger to life is uncertain and the other’s is certain, must he rescue him or not? One opinion says he is obligated. Its source is the Yerushalmi we mentioned; that is how they explain it. The other opinion says he is not obligated. What does the Alter Rebbe rule? In a case of doubt concerning danger to life, we are lenient. That’s a little hard to understand, but we are lenient. Whose life? The life of... But his words imply that a person is not obligated to enter even possible danger for someone else. He is not obligated, though of course he may do so. And in wartime, of course, all the soldiers go in and put themselves in danger to save other people from danger. Now, regarding a prisoner exchange: in 5739, on Shabbos

38:18 Speaker 8 Parshas Bamidbar. It’s long, but we’ll read parts of it.

38:29 Speaker 5 We’ll talk about that.

38:30 Speaker 8 Yes, we’ll talk about that. The Rebbe says this: “In addition...” This is a very long sicha. By the way, I opened Sichos Kodesh to look for the source. In Sichos Kodesh, all it says is, “He spoke at length about the nations of the world.” Period. There’s nothing about this there, but there is a recording. So you can find the full recording in [unclear]. “In addition, something happened that shows just how far matters can go. There was a Jew in captivity, and they agreed to release him only in return for seventy-six prisoners. This happened at the same time that the United States signed a similar agreement with the Soviet Union, but there they exchanged five captives for two, while here they exchanged one for seventy-something.” Then the Rebbe says: “It is true that there is room for debate in halachah, since this concerns saving the life of one Jew, and when many times that number must be given in exchange, the matter can be debated.” That is really an allusion to the whole discussion we had about danger to life. How? Perhaps he will speak shortly about captives, too. So he says: “The matter can be debated in halachah. But here a central issue was added. They said openly that since there was no other choice, and since this was a Jew with a family, they could not begin calculating how many prisoners they would have to release from prison for him.” Really, just as is happening today: there are babies, children, mothers, and so on. “And when they were asked: After all, captives have been taken from Israel many times, but you always gave an equal number in exchange, or twice as many.” He is implying that there is room for a deal that is somehow equal, or twice as many—that is what the Rebbe mentions here—but never seventy times as many. “And you yourselves declared this a matter of principle: that you would never yield to any threat, even if there were halachic, logical, and diplomatic reasons to do so, arguing that yielding would encourage the Arabs

40:31 Speaker 8 to try to kidnap as many hostages as possible. So there is no alternative: they must be shown that it doesn’t work.” The Rebbe is saying, “There’s nothing to be done; it is very...” It’s a painful situation and all that, but they have to be shown that it doesn’t work. There is no other choice. And that is how they acted for years on end, despite the Jewish casualties that resulted. Then the Rebbe justifies it here, and... We’re out of time, but the Rebbe says here that even if afterward they are attacked over what they did, they will say it was a blessing and conceal all the problems. That is what happens in the media today, too: they publicize only what looks good, that everything is fine, and not what is happening behind the scenes. In short, the Rebbe says... The Rebbe gives us several stages here. We’ll go through them quickly. Let’s start with the sources and then come back to this. The Mishnah says that captives are not redeemed for more than their value. You may not pay more than their value to redeem captives. The question is, why? The Gemara offers two possibilities: either because of the burden on the community—why impose a greater cost on the community?—or because paying more money might encourage them to go on taking people captive. And we said that, in principle, both of these reasons involve a kind of uncertainty. But the halachic authorities, including the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, rule in accordance with the second reason. It is not merely a leniency for the community, that they are not obligated to pay; it is a prohibition, as we see here. If I say the reason is the burden on the community, then it is a kind of leniency. There is no prohibition, only a leniency. If I say the reason is that it will lead to more kidnappings, then there is a prohibition: you may not pay more. And here the ruling is that it is forbidden. What did we learn here? We saw the case of Levi bar Darga, the first story we brought, who redeemed his daughter for thirteen gold coins, and the Gemara says:

43:03 Speaker 8 “Who says the Sages approved? Who says it was the right thing to do?” Then there was the child in prison whom Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya redeemed at any price. He said he would redeem him for all the money in the world, and this became the basis for all the grounds for permitting it. You could say that this story became a basis for permitting it, while the other story became a basis for prohibiting it. In the story of the child in prison, he did redeem him—there’s the fact. How could he do that? So here the grounds were either danger to life or the fact that the child was a Torah scholar: when he saw that he was a Torah scholar, he understood that the generation needed him. Then there is the story of the Maharam of Rothenburg. He, too, was a Torah scholar, and yet he did not want them to redeem him with the money, even though they had already collected it. The Maharshal asked how that could be, and he said that surely the Maharam thought to himself that if he allowed them to redeem him for a great deal of money, next time they would go after the next leader of the generation and take him captive too, so that people would pay a great deal to redeem him. That is why he did not want them to redeem him. So that is the story of the Maharam of Rothenburg. Now, what is the halachic ruling about the grounds for permitting it that we mentioned? When there is danger to life, is it permitted or forbidden? That brings us to the next case: the prisoners from Lubavitch. Chassidim were arrested over various legal matters, and the Alter Rebbe wrote—by the way, what we read last time was one letter, but he wrote other letters on this subject too—that money should be paid. He asked people to send money to redeem these people, and among other things he explains that although it says captives are not redeemed for more than their value, danger to life is different, and saving a life overrides everything, and so on. That is what the Alter Rebbe writes. So on the face of it, it seems that the Alter Rebbe

44:55 Speaker 8 He ruled like the lenient authorities: when there is danger to life, one may even pay more money. But we presented two ways of understanding the Alter Rebbe here. We brought a book called Mishnas Yoel, by Rabbi Yoel Diskin, which explained why the Alter Rebbe said that danger to life overrides everything: because there was no concern there that they would take more captives. Why? Because it was a government that had arrested someone for getting into trouble with the law. Why would redeeming him make it want to take more captives? That was his explanation of the Alter Rebbe. We also mentioned that the Alter Rebbe cites the reason of the burden on the community. That fits with what he says. But Rabbi Yekusiel Aryeh Kamelhar gives another explanation: the standard of piety is different. We read a story from the Yerushalmi about someone whom the government wanted and who was handed over to it, after which Eliyahu did not want to reveal himself to the person who handed him over, and so on. What did Eliyahu tell him, essentially? That this was the standard of piety, the way of the pious. So that halachic authority explains the Alter Rebbe as follows: it is true that halachah says we do not redeem a captive for more than his value and so on, but the standard of piety is different. When a person sees that someone’s life is in danger, he saves him under any circumstances—even, so to speak, seemingly going against halachah to save him. So those are two ways of understanding the Alter Rebbe. In fact, it is not entirely clear what the Alter Rebbe rules regarding danger to life, and perhaps that is why the Rebbe writes—we read the Rebbe’s words then—that a situation involving danger to life “requires consideration according to halachah.” That is the Rebbe’s wording: “requires consideration according to halachah.” Now let’s look at two slides we did not see last time. A person who wants to save himself can certainly, according to all the halachic authorities, pay as much as he wants. All

46:54 Speaker 8 the restrictions do not apply to him: “A person will give everything he has for his life.” Regarding his wife, the halachic authorities disagree about whether his wife is considered like himself. This is also a disagreement between the Mechaber and the Rema. Is his wife like himself? His daughter and son certainly are not. That is explicit. Even the authorities who say his wife is like himself mean only his wife, not his daughter, as we see in the Gemara. Levi bar Darga redeemed his daughter, and they said that was a problem. We mentioned the case of a Torah scholar, and we said that danger to life is a dispute among the Rishonim. We also said that it is not clear how the Alter Rebbe ruled on this. Now, regarding the reasons for the general rule—is it the burden on the community or the concern that it will encourage the captors? Although the Alter Rebbe mentions the burden on the community, we see that the Maharam of Rothenburg was concerned about encouraging the captors, and that is also how the halachah was decided. So we explained that the Alter Rebbe did not mean to rule according to the view that the reason is the burden on the community; rather, a government is different. Okay, that covers that point. Now, that was the first stage, concerning money. I redeem a person with money; may I pay more? Then we moved to the next stage. I am not paying money; I am exchanging people. Is that considered like money? Is there a value to it? How does that work? We said that, seemingly, when you say, “Captives are not redeemed for more than their value,” what does “their value” mean? The halachic authorities disagree. Some say it is based on the market value of a slave, while others say it is not based on a slave’s value but on the customary amount paid to redeem captives in that area. Most halachic authorities say it follows what is customary. According to that, if it is customary to exchange captives at a certain ratio—one plus one for one, two, whatever is customary—then that is relatively

48:58 Speaker 8 not something that causes a problem, right? Unlike what they did with Gilad Shalit, when they whet the captors’ appetite enormously by doing something extreme. If it is something customary, then seemingly it counts as their value. The third stage is when you release murderers. There, you are putting the public in danger in order to save the captives, and it is very, very difficult to make a ruling here. But in general, we discussed the disagreement over whether a person must endanger himself to save others. The Alter Rebbe brings both opinions and concludes that in a case of doubt involving human life, we rule leniently. We said that you can explain “we rule leniently” this way or that way, but the meaning is that a person is not obligated to endanger himself to save others. Now I wanted to add a few points we did not cover in the previous class—things rabbis are saying today—so that we hear all the possibilities, the range of opinions. First, something from the Rebbe that we did not mention. Mr. Tzvi Kaspi recounts this. I looked for the source; the only source I found is an interview conducted with him at one point. He says that the Rebbe told him approximately this: “If someone comes to kill you, rise early and kill him first.” The Rebbe told him, “You will pay dearly for keeping the terrorists alive in custody, because afterward they will come to you with demands for prisoner-exchange deals.” In other words, instead of creating all the turmoil that leads to questions later—should we release them, and how many?—you need to make sure from the outset that those questions will not arise. Simply do not have a stock of living terrorists.

50:46 Speaker 6 Let’s say, that’s Jibril.

50:48 Speaker 8 What? What?

50:49 Speaker 6 There was a deal. I don’t remember if that’s right. There was the Jibril deal, as they called it.

50:54 Speaker 8 Mm-hmm.

50:55 Speaker 6 A year. Only three soldiers were killed.

50:58 Speaker 8 Okay.

50:59 Speaker 6 And hundreds of terrorists—the Jibril deal. That supposedly started here, opened the door to...

51:05 Speaker 8 Yes.

51:06 Speaker 6 That’s where the...

51:08 Speaker 8 Exactly. Now, a few perspectives from across the spectrum. I saw five responses here. I’ll give names for some and not for others. One perspective is this: some want to say that soldiers whom the state sent to war are its responsibility because it sent them. We said that a person may redeem himself with any amount of money in the world, so, in a sense, the state is redeeming itself. Since it sent the soldiers, it is responsible for them at any cost. That is one approach people have suggested. Another, similar approach is based on what is said about saving lives on Shabbos: if you impose stringent restrictions on people, they will not want to go out and save others. So they say soldiers need to know that they will be redeemed under any circumstances. Therefore, if you send them out, you must redeem them no matter what happens. A third approach is that of Rabbi Shlomo Zafrani. He says this: all the rules we discussed—whether something counts as its value or not, whether there is danger to life or not, whether to endanger yourself or others—apply in an ordinary situation. But when it comes to war, you are... To begin with, you endanger every soldier you send to war. For what? For the war. Now, he says, in a situation where the civilian population is also put in danger because you need to release terrorists to free the captives—and he is speaking explicitly about these cases—just as I send soldiers to war to save the public, so too I can endanger the civilian population to save the captives. That is what he wants to say. He says that once there is a war, everyone is in it together; everyone is expected to put themselves at risk, to shoulder the burden, so to speak. Now, seemingly, that’s it; seemingly there is an issue here of individuals versus the public. So of course it says that one does not hand over

53:08 Speaker 8 a life in the face of—

53:09 Speaker 7 It is also a matter of taking a short-term risk to save people in the long term, or the reverse.

53:15 Speaker 8 Yes.

53:16 Speaker 7 You put people at risk in the short term and at risk in the long term.

53:18 Speaker 8 Right. Now the question here is: what level of risk are we talking about? That’s open to discussion—murderers, not murderers, and so on. Now, with Esther, for example, it says that she was permitted to do various things that are normally forbidden. Why? Because saving the Jewish people is different. When you’re coming to save an entire people, the rules are supposed to be different. There’s another article I saw in Techumin, and I don’t remember which rabbi wrote it. He wanted to make an interesting point. He says that all the rules about not redeeming captives for more than their value, lest the captors be encouraged to seize more people, and so on—where do those rules appear? Look where they appear in the Rambam: in the laws of gifts to the poor. What does that mean? Gifts to the poor are the laws of tzedakah. He wants to say—and it’s quite a leap to prove it from there—that even the second reason, lest they be encouraged to seize more captives, ultimately comes down to the public having to pay a lot of money. In the end, it’s all about money. That’s what he wants to say. Okay? It’s all about money. Once it’s not about money, but about releasing terrorists, releasing people—well, he wants to say that these aren’t the rules that were stated. So what then? The government should decide according to its own rules and calculations. That’s what he wrote there. In my opinion, it’s a bit hard to prove from—what? It’s an article in Techumin. I saw it two months ago at Boaz’s house; it’s closed, so I can’t get in. What, what?

54:57 Speaker 7 True, it’s different, but in that respect it’s different.

54:59 Speaker 8 Right. More generally, when the Rambam writes something—it’s true that people bring proofs from the fact that the Rambam places things in one set of laws or another, but often, once the Rambam gets into a subject, he brings all the points connected to it. At the end of the day, this is about their value, redeeming them for their value. The Gemara certainly spoke about their value, so it brought all the rules. But the Gemara’s reason—that the captors might want to seize more people—applies in every situation, however you explain it. And one last point is from Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu. He cites the Torah’s statement that you may not accept a ransom to release a murderer: “You shall not pollute the land,” and so on. He says: What are you actually doing here? You’re releasing something in exchange for something else; you’re releasing murderers. The Torah tells you not to release murderers, even in exchange for something else. And again, he adds that experience has shown that many of those who were released went back to murdering, and so on. That’s more along the lines of what we’ve been discussing until now.