Items Suspected of Being Stolen - Rabbi Yisrael Meatuf shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast of the Chabad Halacha Institute.

00:09 Speaker 2 Last class—we spoke about items you know are stolen. Are you allowed to buy them or not? That situation isn’t so common. Knowing with one hundred percent certainty that something is stolen isn’t so common. In this class, we’ll talk about situations where you suspect something is stolen, which is much more common. I’ll give a few examples. Say you’re out somewhere, at a gas station or another place. This used to happen more often, but it still happens today. An Arab guy comes up to you with a sack full of things—new items, not used ones—and says, “Do you want this? Do you want this?” He offers you all sorts of things to buy. You try to bargain him down, and within seconds you get him down to half price, a third of the price, and so on. On the one hand, you figure it’s stolen. On the other hand, you don’t know for certain. Are you allowed to buy it or not? Does it make a difference whom he stole it from—a non-Jew or a Jew? We spoke about that briefly last class. If there’s time, we’ll discuss it today too. A second case—we mentioned this last week as well: a garage that offers you replacement parts and has a reputation in the area for getting its parts from questionable sources. You don’t know for certain, but that’s its reputation. Or someone selling bicycles in his yard, when everyone knows that at least some of the bicycles weren’t bought at full price. They came into his possession in... another way. Another case sounds less problematic, but there’s still reason for concern. You go around the back of some factory—Angel Bakery, say, I don’t know—and a factory worker is selling the factory’s products there. He works at the factory and sells its products,

02:26 Speaker 2 but not through the usual channels. He sells them from his home or behind the factory. Right. Or let’s give another example, an even easier one: a stall near a shul. You get there and see products that are very, very cheap. Someone is selling things for a quarter or half of their usual price. Are you supposed to say, “That’s too cheap—I’m not touching it”? I want to quickly review, in just five minutes, the foundations and rules we covered in the previous class, and then we’ll turn to our cases. First, the Torah says, “He shall return the stolen item that he stole.” We said that the Gemara explains: as he stole it, in the form in which he stole it. The robber must return the stolen item as it is. If it has undergone a change, he is no longer required to return the item itself; he can repay its value. That makes a big difference for us. If I want to buy something from the robber, and it is still the same item he stole, I may not buy it. But if he has changed it—we spoke about this and won’t go into it at length now: what sort of change, temporary or permanent, substantial or not—if he has made a change that qualifies as a change according to halacha, he is no longer required to return the item itself, only its value. So when I come to buy it from him, I’m not considered to be buying a stolen item, because according to the Alter Rebbe, the item itself is no longer considered stolen. There are other opinions, but according to the Alter Rebbe, one may buy that item from him. Now, that’s what we said. We learn from the verse that when the stolen item remains as it was, you return it as it is. If it has undergone a change, you repay only its value. There is another possibility: the owner has despaired of recovering it—not a change, but despair. We won’t go into all the details, but generally speaking, despair doesn’t help the robber himself. Even after the owner has despaired, while the item is still with the robber,

04:32 Speaker 2 it remains forbidden. But once it changes hands after the owner has despaired, the prohibition associated with the stolen item no longer applies to it. So if the circumstances tell me that the owners have already despaired of recovering it and it has also changed hands, there is no longer a problem with buying it.

04:53 Speaker 3 I didn’t quite understand the question.

04:57 Speaker 2 That’s the general question. Maybe let’s go to this slide for a second. Why is it forbidden to buy stolen items? There are three reasons here: you support the thief and cause him to continue. Yes, you could call that one reason, but last week—or two weeks ago—we saw that the Alter Rebbe’s wording separates them into two. We won’t go into that. And you benefit from theft. There is a prohibition against benefiting from theft. Now, the question you’re asking is a general question that troubles many, many halachic authorities. It’s why, as I mentioned earlier, the Alter Rebbe holds that it’s permitted. It’s also why the Maharshal takes the stricter view. He says you may not buy a stolen item even after it has undergone a change, or after the owner has despaired and it has changed hands. It’s a stolen item, and the moment you buy it from the thief, you encourage him to steal more. As we said, it isn’t the mouse that steals; it’s the hole. Once he has someone to sell to, that will lead him to steal again. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe says it’s permitted—and not only the Alter Rebbe; respected earlier halachic authorities do too. The Rivash says it’s permitted. They challenge the Maharshal, pointing out that the Rivash permits it and that this is also implied by the Gemara. I won’t go into all the detailed arguments, but broadly, it seems that encouraging the thief is not a prohibition in its own right. Why? Because we have rules about an aveirah that you don’t commit yourself but help someone else commit. There is “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” That applies when you cause him to commit the aveirah—without you, he would not have done it. Then there is a case where he could have done it without you, but you actively help him commit it. That is no longer “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind”; it is assisting someone who is committing an aveirah.

06:46 Speaker 3 It’s the same thing.

06:47 Speaker 2 Right. In our case, it would seem to be neither. Why? Because you didn’t help with the theft itself. He already stole it, right? And as for the next theft he commits, you aren’t actually helping him steal. You’re only giving him reason to think, the next time he steals, that he has someone to sell to. That would seem to be a step removed even from assisting someone who is committing an aveirah. Now, I’m saying this is a good question, but the ruling itself is certain. According to the Alter Rebbe and many halachic authorities going back to the earlier authorities, including the Rivash, it is permitted to buy an item that has undergone a change, or where the owner has despaired of recovering it and it has changed hands. It’s permitted. The question is why. I think the explanation is that the main prohibition is benefiting from theft. That is the main prohibition. All the other considerations reinforce it, and once the item is no longer considered stolen because it has undergone a change, the prohibition against buying it no longer applies. Of course, you can always be stringent, but according to the basic halacha, it is permitted. Now, in the previous class we learned the details of what counts as a change. I won’t repeat them, but anyone who wants a reminder can look at the slides from last time. We spoke about a change that didn’t even change what the item is called. It wasn’t a substantial change; it didn’t change the item’s name, so it doesn’t count as a change. We spoke about a temporary change that can be reversed. That counts as a change only when combined with the owner’s despair. It’s hard to remember, but broadly speaking, there are details to this. And a permanent change: if you made a truly permanent change, that works on its own. It removes the prohibition associated with the stolen item. That’s regarding a change. We also mentioned the details regarding the owner’s despair. Despair alone is not enough. Despair together with a temporary change, as we said earlier, does work; so does despair together with a change of ownership. All right, no, no—

08:40 Speaker 2 We’ll expand on this. This is what we said last week, in the last class. Now I’ll give a few practical examples involving items that are definitely stolen, and then we’ll move on to our situation, where the items are suspected of being stolen. Buying a stolen item from a non-Jew: A non-Jew comes to you with a laptop and says, “I want to sell you this for five hundred shekels.” You look at it and see that it’s new and costs at least two thousand shekels. You say, “What? How can it be five hundred shekels?” So he tells you, “I stole it from a store in Tulkarm.” He says that— Now, you might say: But he stole it from a non-Jew, so maybe that isn’t a problem. Let’s see. Oh, I see this was left out; I wanted to include it in the sources. Bring me the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, volume six, Choshen Mishpat. It’s over there near the plants. We’ll read the Alter Rebbe’s wording shortly. I want to read it inside, so I’ll go over the next case and then come back to this one, because it’s easier. A stolen cellphone. We gave this example last time. Someone bought a secondhand cellphone. He knew it was used, but looking at it, he suspects it’s stolen. He scrolls through the phone numbers and calls a number listed as “Dad” or something like that. He calls, and the person who answers tells him, “Of course it’s stolen.” The question is whether he has to return it to him. So what is the ruling here? Generally, a stolen item must be returned to its owner, but there is a takanas hashuk, a provision protecting buyers, under which the owner has to reimburse you for what you paid. You shouldn’t have to take a loss, because you bought it innocently from someone who didn’t seem suspicious. If you buy it from someone who

10:29 Speaker 2 seems suspicious, when it’s forbidden to buy from him, then you don’t get reimbursed afterward. But if you bought it innocently, the takanas hashuk provides that you get your money back. If, however, one of the changes we discussed earlier took place—if there was a complete change to the item, or the owner despaired of recovering it and it changed hands, all those things—then, strictly speaking, you can keep the item. You are not required to return it, strictly speaking. But the Alter Rebbe—

10:55 Speaker 4 Someone has to pay.

10:57 Speaker 2 I bought the cellphone, and by then the owner had certainly given up hope of recovering it, and it had changed hands.

11:02 Speaker 4 The person who stole it.

11:02 Speaker 2 So the thief has to pay, not me. But the Alter Rebbe writes, “The custom is to return it because dina demalchusa dina—the law of the land is law.” And it appears from the Rosh and other halachic authorities that this is a provision they enacted: to return the stolen item in any case, even if that isn’t the law of the land. There, it was the law, but even where it isn’t, the custom is still to return a stolen item. No, he has to—he is obligated to pay. He is obligated to pay.

11:29 Speaker 4 To you.

11:29 Speaker 2 Yes, yes.

11:31 Speaker 4 The person it was stolen from.

11:32 Speaker 2 The person it was stolen from has to pay. It’s as though he’s buying it from you, so to speak. Now let’s turn for a moment to the subject of a non-Jew, theft from a non-Jew. He pays the amount you paid, whether you paid less or paid twice as much. You have to get back what you paid. The Alter Rebbe discusses a situation... We spoke earlier about, for example, someone who stole wood, planed it into boards, and built a table out of them. At that point, the item no longer has the status of stolen property. Am I allowed to help the thief alter the item after he steals it? What am I actually doing? The moment I help him alter it, it becomes his. It’s as though I’m helping him steal. The Alter Rebbe says: “It is forbidden for anyone to help him alter the stolen item, for by altering it he removes it from its owner’s possession and it becomes his, so he is assisting transgressors.” Here he uses the word “assisting,” not “supporting.” He means literally assisting him in the transgression by altering the item; it’s like taking part in the theft. “Needless to say, it is forbidden to help a robber or thief with anything they need for their wrongdoing.” That includes everything surrounding the theft. Then, in parentheses, he writes: “Even a non-Jew who comes to rob or steal from a non-Jew.” You see a non-Jew about to steal from a non-Jew—may you help him? No. “Likewise, all prohibitions against benefiting from robbery or theft apply when a non-Jew steals from a non-Jew.” So even if you’re certain that a non-Jew stole it from another non-Jew, you may not benefit from it, because it’s stolen property. All the prohibitions against benefiting from stolen property apply between one non-Jew and another. Why? The Alter Rebbe says: “For with regard to the prohibition against robbery or theft, there is no distinction at all between a Jew and a non-Jew.” And those who remember the previous classes will recall that we mentioned this several times. The verse says, “You shall not withhold what is due to your fellow, and you shall not rob.” “You shall not withhold

13:48 Speaker 2 what is due to your fellow.” Withholding means keeping something you already have rather than returning it. The phrase “your fellow” applies to withholding it. But “you shall not rob” doesn’t say “your fellow.” In other words, if you already have a non-Jew’s money and don’t return it, that is permitted if it does not cause a chillul Hashem. If there is no chillul Hashem, it’s permitted, but taking something from a non-Jew is forbidden. So a non-Jew, too, is forbidden to rob another non-Jew. The Alter Rebbe continues: “Non-Jews, too, are warned against robbery and taking by force, just as Jews are, for these are among the Seven Noahide Laws, and the penalty is death—even if he robs or steals from a fellow non-Jew.” So when a non-Jew steals from another non-Jew, that violates one of his seven mitzvos. You may not help him do it, and you may not benefit from it. Thus, robbery is forbidden even when a non-Jew robs another non-Jew. The third example from last week’s class was building materials. There is a special rule here, the takanas hashavim, specifically the takanas marish: since the materials have already been used and are part of the house, and restoring things to their original state would be very difficult, the item itself need not be returned. If, for example, a homeowner knows his workers stole materials and used them in construction, he doesn’t have to return the materials themselves, even if the owner never gave up hope of recovering them; he has to pay their value. And that applies even if the materials weren’t altered, right? Some materials haven’t been altered. It’s a board that was simply attached and could be removed, but he isn’t required to do all that, because of the takanas hashavim. Now let’s move on to today’s class itself: various things that are only suspected of being stolen; we don’t know for certain that they are. Here we’ll divide people—there are tzaddikim, beinonim, and resha’im—into four categories. There is a person who makes his living from robbery. His entire livelihood comes from robbery. The example here—it’s written here, though you can’t see it clearly—is a tax collector.

15:46 Speaker 2 This is not, G-d forbid, a description of customs officials in Israel today. But the example in halachah is a tax collector, because the practice used to be that tax collectors would take more money than they were entitled to. The Alter Rebbe writes here that there are rules governing such a case, but all his money is considered stolen. If the king tells him to collect a hundred shekels from you and he collects a hundred and fifty, it isn’t that he collected a hundred lawfully and stole fifty. All one hundred and fifty are considered stolen. Now that’s what this person does for a living. He’s a tax collector; that’s his livelihood. He is considered someone whose entire wealth is stolen. You may not have any dealings with such a person at all. Nothing. Don’t buy from him, don’t sell to him, don’t exchange money with him, don’t accept tzedakah from him—nothing. When it comes to money, you have to avoid dealing with him altogether. Why? Because his livelihood comes from robbery, all his wealth is considered stolen. Even though you don’t know for sure—you might say, “Maybe some of it was given to him as a gift,” or something like that. Since this is his job, presumably it’s all stolen. That’s the worst case. The next case—here you see a symbol of a thief—is a known thief. People know he steals. But what? It isn’t his job. He works too, but people know he steals. Yes, he works both days and nights. Now you want to buy something from him. Is it permitted or forbidden? How do you classify this? Let’s go a little further, and then I’ll tell you the rulings. The next case: here you see a symbol of a worker, the factory worker we discussed. This is a person who handles other people’s property. That is, he is entrusted with other people’s money. Here, of course, every person is presumed honest; I

17:46 Speaker 2 You don’t immediately suspect a person like that, but the very fact that he has other people’s money in his possession means that if various suspicious signs come up, I’m supposed to stay away. We’ll talk about it shortly and give examples. Why? Because he handles other people’s money. The fourth case is an ordinary person. Someone simply comes along and sells you something; you don’t think it belongs to anyone else. In that situation, even if a few things seem suspicious, that doesn’t prevent you from buying from him. Okay? Now let’s go through the halachos in detail. Let’s look at the first ruling of the Alter Rebbe. We’ll start with the first possibility. A person who makes his living from theft is number one. The Alter Rebbe says: “People who are presumed to be robbers, and all their money is presumed stolen. Why? Because their occupation is the occupation of robbers, and they have no other occupation at all.” He doesn’t give examples here, but in the following sections he gives the example of a tax collector. “It is forbidden to derive any benefit from them at all, whether for free or by buying from them; it is even forbidden to sell to them, because their money is presumed stolen.” Because apparently all their money was stolen. Even making change with them is forbidden; everything is forbidden. Now, he brings up making change for the next point: “Even exchanging currency for an equal amount.” You exchange money for the same amount; all you’ve done is get change from him. You haven’t gained anything, but you have benefited. How? Because, for example, you wanted two five-shekel coins rather than a ten-shekel coin. That counts as a benefit. It’s a small benefit, but it’s a benefit. You’ve benefited from stolen money. “It is even forbidden to accept tzedakah from them.” That’s a mitzvah performed through a transgression. If their money is stolen, it’s a mitzvah performed through a transgression. More than that, the money itself is stolen. Taking it is simply out of the question. Now, we might stop and ask: What? You’re automatically saying it’s all stolen? Who says so? Maybe he has some money of his own

19:49 Speaker 2 too. Why do you immediately say it’s all stolen? The Alter Rebbe says: “We do not assume leniently that he has a little of his own, since he has no occupation other than that of a bandit.” If he had another job, I could make that assumption. But once this is his job, it’s all stolen. You may not benefit from him at all. Now, incidentally, it says later that if you’re recovering money from him, that is permitted. For example, that tax collector comes to collect money from you. He comes to collect a hundred shekels, and you give him a two-hundred-shekel note. You can’t, uh, make change right now. He gives you a hundred in change. If you don’t take the hundred, you’ll lose money. You only owed a hundred, not two hundred. So in this situation it is permitted, because you’re recovering your money from him. You’re saving yourself from a loss, so accepting the change is permitted. If you don’t want to deal with him, you don’t have to; don’t deal with him. But if you do have to deal with him because he’s come to collect from you and you need to receive change, that is permitted. That’s the worst category: a person who makes his living from theft. Now let’s move to the next possibility: a known thief. What does “a known thief” mean? The second section, number two. The Alter Rebbe says—in section 9 he writes that it is forbidden to buy from a thief an item he stole, and so on. He goes into detail there. Section 10—we’ll get to section 10 later: “Even if it is not known that this particular item was robbed or stolen, since the seller is a known robber or thief, it is forbidden to buy from him anything that there is reason to suspect was robbed or stolen.” For example, a person is a pickpocket. Everyone knows he’s a pickpocket. Now you come to buy a washing machine from him. He didn’t pickpocket it, so you’re allowed to buy the

21:49 Speaker 2 washing machine. But if it’s something there is reason to suspect was robbed or stolen—not something that is highly likely to have been stolen, just something there is reason to suspect—like a wallet, money, or other things he might have stolen, since he’s a known thief, you’re supposed to stay away from it. You may not buy it. But note this very, very significant leniency: “Unless it is known that he also has similar items of his own; then it is permitted both to buy from him and to benefit from him for free.” In other words, he pickpockets wallets, but you know he also buys wallets. You know that he bought at least one wallet and it’s his.

22:32 Speaker 5 Why would he need to buy the kind of thing he steals?

22:33 Speaker 2 What? To launder it.

22:36 Speaker 5 No, that’s not

22:36 Speaker 2 Ah.

22:37 Speaker 5 what he does.

22:37 Speaker 2 Right. He—why buy one? He could pickpocket that one too. The Alter Rebbe continues: “Even if he has only a few similar items of his own and many similar stolen items, we assume leniently that this one is his.” Right? You know he bought only one, and he stole another hundred. Now, with each item you come to buy, you say, “Wait, maybe this is the…”

23:08 Speaker 5 Purchased one.

23:08 Speaker 2 The purchased one? So you’re allowed to buy it. And why is that? Because you aren’t actually committing an act of theft. You’re only benefiting from theft. Benefiting from theft is not a Torah-level prohibition; it’s a rabbinic prohibition, as the Levush says. So when there’s doubt about a rabbinic prohibition, you can rule leniently. Now the next case: someone who handles other people’s property. The possibilities include a factory worker, a person entrusted with his employer’s property, a fruit watchman, or a woman or a minor. Things are different nowadays, but in the time of the Gemara, a woman had no money of her own, nor did a minor. One of these people comes and sells things—where did they get them? You’re supposed to have some suspicion that they may have stolen them. So what does the halacha say? Let’s skip to section five for a moment. Afterward we’ll return to three and four. The Alter Rebbe says: “Just as it is forbidden to benefit from something that was certainly robbed, unless the owner has despaired of recovering it and it has changed hands,”—just as, when a robber has stolen something, you may not benefit from it until there has been despair and a change of possession—“so too it is forbidden to benefit from something stolen.” Stolen or robbed, it’s the same thing: you may not benefit from either. “Even if it is not certainly stolen, but it is presumed stolen—for example, fruit watchmen who sell fruit in a secluded place, such as behind the garden.” Fruit watchmen: their job is to guard the fruit. They’ve put the cat in charge of the milk, and then they turn up selling it somewhere a bit hidden. So you immediately suspect them. What do we have here? A fruit watchman handles other people’s property. Add a suspicious sign: he’s selling in a secluded place, selling it secretly. Once someone handles other people’s property and there’s a suspicious sign, you may not buy from him. Or another example: when most items of that kind are presumed stolen. What’s an example? “Shepherds tending other people’s animals who sell milk and cheese, since most shepherds

25:29 Speaker 2 sell what they steal, not what belongs to them, and do so without the owners’ knowledge.” Shepherds are basically babysitters for flocks. Every morning people come and leave their flocks with a shepherd. He watches them, and at the end of the day they collect them. Now, during the day you see him setting up a stall and selling milk and cheese. What does he have with him? All these animals that aren’t his, that he took into his care from other people. And apparently in those days, most shepherds who sold milk and cheese were selling stolen goods, without the owners’ permission. So because most of them sold stolen goods, when you come along, you don’t know whether the person in front of you got permission or not, and you may not buy from him. You may not buy from them or benefit from them for free. And now a question immediately comes up, one that the halachic authorities ask and discuss, with lots of answers and complications. Do we follow the majority or not? Earlier we spoke about the known thief. Take the example of bicycles. Everyone knows he steals bicycles at night and sells them during the day. But they also know he buys damaged bicycles. What are you telling me? With every bicycle you buy, you assume it’s probably one of the legitimate ones, and you’re allowed to buy it. Yet suddenly, when it comes to a shepherd and most shepherds are thieves, you say it’s probably stolen. Why is it probably stolen? Assume it probably isn’t stolen. What’s the difference between the known thief and the shepherds? That’s a question the commentators ask. There are many answers, and each answer changes the practical halacha completely. For instance, the bicycle case would depend on which opinion you follow. According to one opinion it’s permitted; according to another it’s forbidden. Each case will come out differently, because each authority gives different rules. Now, so that we don’t get tangled up in all the rules here, I’ll give only the Alter Rebbe’s opinion.

27:30 Speaker 2 The Alter Rebbe rules as follows. In the main text, the Alter Rebbe gives his ruling, and then, below, in the Kuntres Acharon, he writes something a little more stringent. So let’s first emphasize what he says in the main text—that’s the basic halachah. Afterward we’ll see where there is room to be stringent. What, he asks, is the difference between the two cases? I’ll show you with a slide. Look at what you see here. The black represents stolen goods. The shepherds are on the right, and on the left is the known thief. Here, a person is either a thief or not a thief. If he’s a shepherd selling without permission, everything he has is stolen. If he’s a shepherd selling with permission, then none of it is stolen. It’s either black or white. That’s what we have here. Over there, it’s divided differently: that same known thief has lots of bicycles, some stolen and some not. The Sma, the Sefer Me’iras Einayim, says—and the Alter Rebbe follows him; you can see it from his wording, and he cites him as well—that there’s a big difference. When I come to buy from the known thief, I see black and white. I see several possibilities. I can buy from all of them. But when I come to buy from the shepherds, if I happen to come to this shepherd, everything he has is stolen. So that, he says, is the difference. You don’t know which person you’ve come to, but once you’ve come to him, everything he has may be stolen. So when it comes to the items, I have to consider the possibility that perhaps all his items are stolen. I’m now coming to buy an item, so I can’t go by the majority of the other people. That’s irrelevant here. I’m standing in front of him now, and perhaps everything he has was taken by theft. I may not buy from him. But

29:22 Speaker 2 when I come to this thief, who definitely has a small amount of his own property, then, standing in front of him, I can’t say that what he has is definitely stolen. He definitely has at least a little of his own. That permits me to buy from him. That’s the principle the Sma gives. The Alter Rebbe rules accordingly as a matter of basic halachah, so the rule will always be this: If your doubt concerns the people—perhaps this person is a thief through and through, perhaps he isn’t—you may not buy. But if the doubt concerns the items—you come to a person who has some stolen items and some that aren’t stolen—then you may buy from him. That’s the conclusion. Now I’ll briefly mention the stringency the Alter Rebbe raises in the Kuntres Acharon. It really changes the whole picture. This ruling, that one may buy if he has a little of his own, comes from the Gemara. In the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, the halachah follows Shmuel: if he has a little of his own, it is permitted. What is the Gemara’s wording? From when is it permitted to buy? It says: A robber—from when may one buy from him? Rav says one thing; Shmuel says another. Now, some versions don’t say, “From when may one buy from him?” but, “From when may one benefit from him?” There are versions like that. The Alter Rebbe says in the Kuntres Acharon: If not for the words of the Sma and the Maggid Mishneh, who also wrote about this, I would have offered a much simpler answer. I would have said there is a difference between buying and benefiting. With the shepherds, the case is that you’re buying from them. When you buy from them, you both benefit from what you bought and strengthen the hands of those committing a transgression. You give them money and receive a stolen item from them. That is much more serious, so it’s forbidden even if most—even if a minority of the items aren’t stolen, it’s forbidden. But if you only come to benefit from him, you may use it—go ahead and use it. You

31:24 Speaker 2 aren’t paying him anything. That’s less serious, because you’re only benefiting from stolen property. You don’t have the other problems we showed earlier, both of those problems. There’s only one problem. They permitted this situation when he has a little of his own. Buying, though, they forbade entirely. That’s what the Alter Rebbe writes in the note. Using his cup, using—there are examples the Alter Rebbe gives of—

31:46 Speaker 6 Not buying.

31:48 Speaker 2 Not buying. According to the stringency the Alter Rebbe writes in the Kuntres Acharon—

31:53 Speaker 6 Using the bicycle, using the car, using—

31:55 Speaker 2 Yes. “If not for their words, one could say that buying is more serious than benefiting for free, since he is not supporting him or causing him...” Never mind. The other conditions aren’t present. He concludes, “And this requires further examination as a matter of practical halachah.” That’s how he ends: “And this requires further examination as a matter of practical halachah.” Now, in the main text, he clearly rules that if the person has a little of his own, one may buy from him. He makes no distinctions. But in the Kuntres Acharon he writes: “If not for their words, there would be room to be stringent, and this requires further examination as a matter of practical halachah.” So it would seem that his ruling is that it’s permitted as a matter of basic halachah, but it’s proper to be stringent, because of what the Rambam writes below. So if someone asks about that bicycle seller, or a garage that has a reputation for stealing a lot but also has some goods that aren’t stolen: in that situation, it’s permitted as a matter of basic halachah, but it’s proper to be stringent. But in the situation where some people steal and others don’t, and you may have come to a person whose goods are all stolen, that is completely forbidden. Now I want to touch on another point. We spoke about that Arab seller who comes with a sack full of various items and sells them cheaply. Now, he isn’t known as a thief, and he also doesn’t—if we take the examples I gave earlier, he doesn’t—you don’t know him to make his living from theft. Let’s say he’s someone you don’t know. You don’t know him to make his living from theft. He isn’t a known thief, and he doesn’t deal in other people’s property. So maybe everything is fine; maybe it’s permitted to buy—I don’t know anything about this person. Why should—why should buying from him be forbidden? On the other hand, he’s selling it to you very, very cheaply.

33:35 Speaker 7 A warning sign.

33:35 Speaker 2 It’s a warning sign. That is, in fact, a warning sign. So let’s look at example number three. The Rivash, the same Rivash we mentioned earlier, discusses a woman who was having problems with her husband. She went and had copies made of her husband’s keys, stole merchandise from him, and sold it to people. The Rivash now gives his ruling concerning the blacksmith who copied the keys and the people who bought the merchandise from her. Let’s look at his wording in number three. He says: “Indeed, that blacksmith who secretly made her two keys without the husband’s knowledge, and took double payment from her for the work...” In other words, she paid double. She wanted it done quickly, so he wouldn’t suspect anything, and so on; she paid double. “He deserves to be punished for not informing the husband. Why? Because he should have understood that she did not increase the price of the keys for nothing, but intended to steal from her husband’s property.” A wife is someone entrusted with another person’s property, right? In those days, all the property belonged to the husband. Nowadays, that’s already a matter of discussion. There’s a joint account, there’s—it’s completely different now. But in those days everything belonged to the husband. So she was dealing with her husband’s property, and there were warning signs here. That’s a problem; it’s forbidden. “And in this he assisted her; it is not the mouse that steals, but the hole that steals.” Once he buys—once he copies the keys for her, he enables her, even more than a hole does. He causes her to fall into theft. The Rivash continues: “And likewise, the witnesses who bought merchandise from her cheaply, for less than a third of its value”—right? Less than thirty-three percent—“and she would tell them, ‘Keep it hidden from her husband.’” There were two warning signs here: the very low price, and her telling them, “Keep it hidden from her husband.” They, too, committed a prohibition by buying from her. “Even though she conducted business within the household.” She was a woman whose husband agreed

35:50 Speaker 2 …to deal with household matters. So perhaps you might say, “Well, her husband probably agreed to sell the merchandise.” He says: “It was not for nothing that she sold it to them cheaply, as is the way of thieves. And our Sages already said in the chapter HaGozel Basra that even with things one may buy from shepherds, fruit watchmen, and women, if any of them says, ‘Hide it,’ it is forbidden.” Even something that would ordinarily be permissible to buy becomes forbidden if they tell you to hide it. Now, his wording seems to address both someone telling you to hide the item as a suspicious sign, and someone selling it very, very cheaply. According to this, if someone is entrusted with other people’s property and tells you to hide it, it is certainly forbidden. If he sells it very cheaply, that too would be forbidden. Now let’s look at number four, then we’ll return to our story and finish. Reuven was robbed: a chest full of silverware and jewelry was emptied, and he had not yet given up hope of recovering it. He was still investigating and searching for the thieves. This was a case that became known at the time. He had a full chest, and everything was taken. He was looking for the thieves, and one of them was a known thief, an established pickpocket. This is the wording of the Chavos Yair: Apparently, that thief brought a large silver belt to Levi, ten parasangs away from where Reuven lived and where the theft had occurred. He offered to sell it to him for less than half its value, and Levi, who was learned, was unsure whether he was allowed to buy it. That was the question put to the Chavos Yair. He answered that, in principle, it was forbidden, though there were various considerations concerning a non-Jew. But his discussion there does not follow the Alter Rebbe; the Alter Rebbe ruled differently in that case. Still, we see this point too: he included the fact that the man sold it cheaply. He was both a known thief and selling it cheaply, and together those factors should make it forbidden.

37:45 Speaker 2 According to this, if it is just an ordinary stall and a person comes along, everything looks fine, and he is selling cheaply, there are many possible reasons for the low price. Sometimes a shipping container got held up and was sold off, or someone closed a store. There are many possibilities. You should not immediately suspect theft. But if the person himself is already somewhat suspicious, or he is selling in a suspicious way—he tells you to hide it, or he is entrusted with other people’s property—that changes things. That Arab you see seems a little suspicious; he does not seem trustworthy. You see him dropping the price very, very quickly. At first he asks for a lot, and then… So these factors add up. There is not just one suspicious sign here, not just the low price on its own, but other signs as well. So it would seem that, according to these responsa, buying it would already be forbidden. To sum up: If someone earns his entire living from theft, everything he has is forbidden. If someone is a known thief, then strictly speaking, if he has some property of his own, you may buy from him. But the Alter Rebbe says in Kuntres Acharon that there may be grounds to be stringent and not buy from him at all. If someone is entrusted with other people’s property, then once there are suspicious signs, you may not buy from him. And if an ordinary person is selling something, you do not know it belongs to someone else, and the only suspicious thing is the low price, then apparently that alone does not make it forbidden, and buying it is permitted. With Hashem’s help, next week I hope to discuss debt enforcement and receivership, all those matters. When is it permitted, and when is it forbidden? I hope we will reach a clear conclusion, because there are many opinions on this, and we will try to distill what the Alter Rebbe holds on each of the details.