Insisting on Mehudar Kashrus - Rabbi Moshe Kornowicz shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast from the Chabad Halacha Institute.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today, with Hashem’s help, we’ll talk about kashrus in the home. We’ll focus mainly on the laws of meat and milk that come up at home, and related matters. As an introduction, we’ll speak a little about the importance of observing the laws of kashrus and being especially careful with them. The Torah says: “Do not make yourselves repulsive through any creeping thing that creeps upon the earth; do not defile yourselves with them, lest you become defiled through them.” The Gemara in Yoma asks: What does “lest you become defiled through them” mean? Don’t read it as “defiled,” but as “dulled”—from the word timtum, a dulling of the mind and heart. When a person eats forbidden foods, his mind and heart become dulled, closed off, thick and coarse. This points to a fundamental reason for the particular severity of forbidden foods, which distinguishes them from other prohibitions in the Torah. With most Torah prohibitions, the basis of the prohibition is the mitzvah, the Divine command: Hakadosh Boruch Hu commands us not to do something. Forbidden foods are different. Beyond the prohibition and the commandment, there is also a natural effect. It is built into the nature of creation. Food that is not pure, that is not kosher, has qualities that naturally harm a person. That is why our Sages say, “Lest you become dulled through them.” In his commentary on the Torah there, the Ramban gives the straightforward, natural principle: When a person eats pure, refined foods, his mind becomes pure and refined. When a person eats thick, coarse foods, his mind becomes thick and coarse. It is a natural effect. Since Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants us to be refined and pure rather than coarse—and in the Torah’s words, “You shall be holy people to Me”—the Ramban says that He asks us to eat kosher, pure foods, so that we do not become dulled or impaired. The Or Hachayim brings up an interesting point. Our Sages say in Pesachim that unlearned people who are not careful about forbidden foods “are creeping things, and their daughters are repulsive things.” The Or Hachayim says this is not just a sharp turn of phrase. Our Sages use those words, “They are creeping things, and their daughters are repulsive things,” to tell you that when a person eats food that is not kosher, his very body, his natural essence, becomes unfit,

02:54 Speaker 2 becomes repulsive, like a creeping thing. Moreover, our Sages say of the nations of the world, “Their bodies are different.” Their bodies are physically different from Jewish bodies. Something that endangers a non-Jew does not necessarily endanger a Jew. Why? Because their bodies are different. Why are their bodies different? Because they eat foods that are not kosher. Eating non-kosher foods affects their bodies, making them less refined and less pure. This leads to a novel point: the Rebbe explains in one of his sichos that if a non-Jew were to eat kosher foods, he really would become more refined and pure. The Recanati, one of the early Kabbalists in Spain, writes that besides the way impure food dulls a person, there is a great virtue in kosher, pure foods. The Recanati says: “Whoever eats in holiness resembles the ministering angels.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants us to be refined, and therefore asks us to eat those refined, pure foods. In Igeres Hakodesh by the Ramban, the Ramban discusses this subject at great length and explains a wonderful principle about how to view creation—how to view it truly and correctly. All of creation is made up of levels: inanimate matter, plants, animals, human beings, and Jews. Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants every part of creation to merit ascent, rising higher and higher. An animal eats grass; the grass draws nourishment from the earth and water, from the inanimate; the animal eats the plant; and the person eats the animal. The Divine desire, the Divine intent in creation, is for everything to rise higher and higher. When an animal is slaughtered through kosher shechitah, it is a tremendous merit and an immense benefit for the animal, because now it can be elevated to the level of a human being. And the person who eats it in holiness is elevated as well. The Ramban says that this chain does not stop there. When a Jew is careful to eat pure, kosher foods, not only does he elevate and refine all the levels of creation beneath him—inanimate matter, plants, animals, and human beings—he also merits to carry that chain forward

05:15 Speaker 2 and have holy, pure children who will continue to do the same. Conversely, G-d forbid, when a person causes harm by eating foods that are not pure, the damage affects the whole order of creation. G-d forbid that a person should eat an animal that was not slaughtered properly, that is not properly kosher. The elevation of that entire Divine order—from inanimate matter to plants, to animals, to human beings—is impaired. And of course, as we said, the person who eats it is himself impaired and dulled. G-d forbid, it also affects his children, imprinting on them a nature that is undesirable and impure. It is interesting to note that this principle may sound like it belongs to the homiletic side of Torah, rather than to its plain meaning or to halacha. Nevertheless, it has practical halachic significance in the Shulchan Aruch. I want to read you one paragraph from the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, section 81. It says: “The milk of a non-Jewish woman is like the milk of a Jewish woman.” Strictly speaking, it is permissible for a baby to nurse from a non-Jewish woman. “Nevertheless, a baby should not be nursed by a non-Jewish woman if a Jewish woman is available, because the milk of a non-Jewish woman dulls the heart.” In the name of the Rashba, the Shulchan Aruch tells us something remarkable. In terms of halacha, just as a baby may nurse from a Jewish woman, so too there is no difference with the milk of a non-Jewish woman. In terms of halacha, milk from a woman is kosher and permitted to consume regardless of which woman it comes from. Nevertheless, even though it is permitted and kosher under halacha, one must be very careful that the baby not nurse from a non-Jewish woman. Why? Because her milk dulls the heart. This non-Jewish woman is not careful to eat kosher foods; the food she eats is not kosher. Her milk is produced from non-kosher foods, so that dulling of the mind and heart is present in the milk, even though the milk is kosher according to halacha. The Rema continues immediately: “Likewise, a nursing woman, even a Jewish woman, should not eat forbidden foods.” A nursing woman, too, must be very careful not to eat anything forbidden. And even with a small baby, who has no understanding and does not know what is going on, one must take great care that the baby not eat forbidden foods, because all of this harms the child at a young age. The Shach asks: What does the Shulchan Aruch mean when it says that even a Jewish nursing woman should not eat forbidden foods?

07:44 Speaker 2 A Jewish woman is forbidden to eat such foods anyway, whether or not she is nursing. The Shach gives a very interesting explanation. This is talking about a situation where the woman is ill; she does not feel well. She goes to a rabbi, and the rabbi tells her, “You must eat this food that is not kosher. You must take this nutritional supplement that is not kosher. You have to take this vitamin that is not kosher.” The Shach says that if the woman needs to eat non-kosher food, the baby’s father must find another nursing woman for the child. Even though this Jewish woman ate the forbidden food with halachic permission, the adverse effect is still there, and one must be careful about it. This is ruled as practical halacha in the Shulchan Aruch. Moreover, even in situations where a non-Jewish nursing woman is needed, the halachic authorities write that it is proper for her to eat kosher foods. So that is our first example of how, in practical halacha, the halachic authorities took into account the fact that forbidden foods cause a dulling of the mind and heart—a natural effect. Therefore, even where the Shulchan Aruch permits something less than kosher, one must be careful. Although the milk of a non-Jewish nursing woman is permitted to consume, it is proper not to give it to a baby. If a Jewish nursing woman is ill and needs to eat non-kosher food, the father should find another nursing woman for the child. A truly remarkable principle. And the Shulchan Aruch concludes: “Therefore, even with a small child who seemingly has no understanding and does not know what is going on, one must be very careful about forbidden foods, because”

09:45 Speaker 2 “It will affect him in his old age.” That is one example. We find another indication in a section of the Shulchan Aruch, in siman 122. The Shulchan Aruch also gives a similar principle: because forbidden foods have an added severity by their very nature, we find another detail in halachah where greater stringency is called for. This is a very broad principle that relates to all the kashrus certifications in factories. I’ll read the wording of the Shulchan Aruch again. The Shulchan Aruch says, “It is possible that when made by confectioners or other craftsmen, it is permitted.” In plain language, when I have a factory with professionals producing a particular product, strictly speaking I may be able to rely on the fact that this factory makes only that food and no other food. I come to a candy factory, ask them for the list of ingredients, and see that they are kosher. Strictly speaking, says the Shulchan Aruch, it may be that I need nothing beyond that. I don’t need to kasher their equipment; I don’t need anything else. “A craftsman does not undermine his craft.” Presumably, he is careful about cleanliness. As the Aruch Hashulchan explains, by the standards of the nations of the world, craftsmen take care to keep things clean and set aside clean utensils for their work so that they do not spoil their craft. So, strictly speaking—and there are certain kashrus certifications, what you might call more of a basic rabbinate standard around the world, that build on this principle—there is a basic level of reliability. If I receive a list, I can rely on it. But the Shulchan Aruch concludes there in siman 122, “Nevertheless, a conscientious person should be concerned, for these things lead to impurity and frivolity.” Although by the standards of halachah and the revealed Torah there is no prohibition here, nevertheless, since these things lead to impurity and frivolity, one should be stringent and seek a higher standard. Here we find the concept stated explicitly in the Shulchan Aruch: one should seek a higher standard of kashrus even where, according to halachah,

11:47 Speaker 2 there is no prohibition. A third example, which we will discuss at greater length later, concerns the prohibition against eating meat after hard cheese. The early authorities record, in the responsa of Maharam of Rothenburg, that he had heard of people who did not eat meat after cheese, and he used to make light of it—until, on one occasion, he himself had a mishap. He says, “In my youth, when I was young, I would mock people who did that.” It seemed to him: Why are you being stringent? According to the Gemara, according to the Shulchan Aruch, according to Chazal, there is no prohibition here. Why are you imposing a stringency on yourselves? Until one time he himself stumbled—some cheese remained in his mouth—and then he understood that in these matters, as I read the words attributed to Maharam of Rothenburg, “Each person may be stringent with himself.” Everyone may be stringent and add a safeguard to a safeguard, even in matters explicitly permitted by the Shulchan Aruch or the Gemara. To conclude this section, I want to read a fascinating letter from the Rebbe about a remarkable question. What is the actual ruling in the case we mentioned earlier in the words of the Shach? A woman needs to eat non-kosher food for health reasons. The Shach says that the Shulchan Aruch is telling the father: Dear father, please find someone else to nurse the baby. It dulls the baby’s mind and heart. But the poor mother is ill; she isn’t healthy. Even so, says the Shach, that is what the Shulchan Aruch means. It dulls; it causes harm. The Rebbe discusses this in a letter in Igros Kodesh, vol. 1, p. 238. The Rebbe goes into this issue and says, in the Rebbe’s words, that the quality of food affects the quality of the body as a whole and the entire connection between the soul and the body. As Chazal say, “Every living vegetable makes one pale, every small thing makes one small, and anything with life restores life, and anything close to life restores life.” Everything connected with food concerns the connection between the soul and the body. Everything

14:08 Speaker 2 connected with the joining of the soul and the body affects that entire mechanism. That is why it gives rise to cruelty and bad traits. So even though a person eats the food in a permitted way, it is dangerous for him. It still causes dullness of the mind and heart. In the Rebbe’s words, there is also a natural aspect to this: forbidden food produces particular traits in the person who eats it. If so, the question arises: Why were we permitted to eat forbidden foods in a situation of danger to life? Since this is a natural effect, it harms me even when the Torah permits me to eat it. Why was it permitted? The Rebbe gives a very, very stark answer. The Rebbe says it is like a person who has a diseased organ in his body: to save the whole body, the organ is removed. So here, too, although the forbidden food one eats harms the person spiritually, Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded us to eat it to be saved from something worse, G-d forbid—the loss of life. But that does not mean, G-d forbid, that it becomes harmless. It truly harms and impairs a person even in that situation. Many times in these halachos we will see that the basic ruling permits something, but every G-d-fearing person was stringent with himself. The authorities disagree, and the primary ruling is to be lenient. What does that tell us? What is the principle here? Am I allowed to be stringent, or am I not allowed to be stringent? After all, if Chazal established that something is permitted and told me that, after the fact, it is kosher, then it is kosher. I don’t want to go on at length about this very broad subject, but let’s mention just one concept. Tractate Chullin twice cites the words of the prophet Yechezkel, who said, “No piggul meat has entered my mouth.” That is something the prophet Yechezkel said in praise of himself. The Gemara asks: Was Yechezkel the only one who did not eat piggul meat? Every Jew refrains from eating non-kosher meat. What was special about the prophet Yechezkel? The Gemara answers: “I did not eat from an animal about which a sage had ruled.” What does that mean? There was an animal whose kosher status was in question. They asked the rabbi, and the rabbi said it was kosher. Yechezkel said, “I still won’t eat from it.” That is what he meant by saying that no piggul had entered his mouth. Later in that discussion, the Gemara continues and asks: How can that be? The Gemara answers: “A matter that depends on reasoning.” What does that mean? There are things that the Shulchan Aruch explicitly permits. The shochet—or an ordinary person—went and asked the rabbi, and the rabbi told him it was kosher. We see that it’s kosher, kosher. There is no doubt about it. But sometimes there are matters that depend on reasoning, where judgment is needed. I won’t go into it now, because this is a very, very extensive halachic subject: what exactly defines a matter that depends on reasoning? In any event, there can be a situation where the rabbi says something is kosher, and yet the prophet Yechezkel says, “I won’t eat from it.” That is what he meant when he said no piggul had entered his mouth. Tosafos HaRosh asks, in his words: Does that mean everyone is forbidden to eat from an animal about which a sage has ruled? What is going on here? Did Yechezkel just invent stringencies? Either there really is a problem with it, or it is permitted. What is this situation in which Yechezkel praises himself for not eating it? Is there something forbidden, something permitted, and something in between that is neither forbidden nor permitted? G-d forbid we should say that. Rather, the Rosh says, “It is not fitting or proper for a Torah scholar to eat from such a thing.” It can be permitted, but it is not fitting or proper. It is not fitting or proper. And the Rosh continues: It is likewise appropriate for every Torah scholar who follows in the path of the earlier authorities to be careful and not breach their boundaries. This is a broad principle in halachah. From here we learn that there is room to be stringent and to seek a higher standard regarding prohibitions, even where it has been ruled permissible. In the words

16:29 Speaker 2 “I did not eat from an animal about which a sage had ruled.” What does that mean? There was an animal, and a halachic question arose as to whether it was kosher. They asked the rabbi, and the rabbi said it was kosher. Yechezkel said, “I still won’t eat from it.” This is what he meant when he said, “No pigul entered my mouth.” The Gemara continues there and asks: How can that be? The Gemara answers: “A matter that depends on judgment.” What does that mean? There are things the Shulchan Aruch explicitly says are permitted. The shochet, the ordinary person, went and asked the rabbi, and the rabbi told him it was kosher. So it’s kosher, kosher—there’s no doubt about it. But sometimes a matter depends on judgment. It calls for discretion, and I won’t go into it now, because it’s a very, very broad halachic discussion: what exactly constitutes “a matter that depends on judgment”? In any event, there are cases where the rabbi says something is kosher, and yet Yechezkel the prophet says, “I won’t eat from it.” That is what he meant by “No pigul entered my mouth.” The Tosafos HaRosh asks, in his words: “I wonder—is everyone forbidden to eat from an animal about which a sage has ruled?” What’s going on here? Did Yechezkel simply invent stringencies? Either way: either there really is a problem with it, or it’s permitted. Why would Yechezkel take pride in not having eaten from it? Is there something between forbidden and permitted—something neither forbidden nor permitted? Heaven forbid that we should say such a thing. Rather, the Rosh says, “It is not fitting or proper for any Torah scholar to eat from such a thing.” It may be permitted, but it is not fitting or proper. It is not fitting or proper. The Rosh continues: “And so it is proper for every Torah scholar who follows the boundaries set by earlier sages to be careful and not breach a fence.” This is a broad principle in halachah. From here we learn that there is room to be stringent, to take extra care regarding prohibitions. Even when something has been ruled permissible, there is room to take extra care. In the words of

18:36 Speaker 2 The Rosh says it is not proper or fitting, and many, many early authorities make this point. The Maharsha—we’ll mention just one point from the Maharsha there. The Maharsha asks why this is called “pigul meat.” It sounds very harsh. He says that pigul is a term borrowed from the laws of offerings. Pigul is a halachic concept in those laws: when a person has an improper intention regarding an offering, such as intending to eat it outside its proper place or time, it is called pigul. Even when the act itself is valid, if the thought was not right, it is called pigul. The Maharsha says that, similarly, if a food raises some halachic doubt, an undesirable issue has already arisen regarding it, and it is fitting to be meticulous and stringent about it. The Shelah cites the Reishis Chochmah, who says that every person should therefore be stringent with himself about food, so that there is no possibility of prohibition in it at all. After all, the prophet Yechezkel praised himself, saying that he had not eaten the meat of an animal about which a sage had ruled. As our Sages said, all the more so if there is a possibility of prohibition in the food itself. The Shelah says that a person must therefore be as careful as possible. On this, the commentators cite the Reishis Chochmah, who wrote that the chassidim of earlier times guarded fifty gates of what is permitted so as not to stumble through one gate of prohibition. He connects this with the verse, “Of Shimron, the family of the Shimronites.” This is a fundamental principle in the laws of kashrus: a person must be careful with fifty gates of what is permitted so as not to stumble through one gate of prohibition. It is a major principle in keeping one’s distance from forbidden foods. In the words of one of the great chassidim, meticulous observance of mitzvos—going beyond what the law requires—illuminates the 248 limbs of the soul with boundless, encompassing light. Being meticulous enables the soul to shine more brightly within a person. Forbidden foods dull the spirit; kosher foods refine it. Being meticulous about the kashrus of food enables the soul to shine more and more, without limit. To conclude this part, we’ll note

21:02 Speaker 2 the great challenge facing someone who provides kosher certification. Although that is not our subject—we want to talk about kashrus at home—there is a very great challenge facing a certifier, someone who comes to certify a product. On the one hand, the Torah is concerned for a Jew’s money. A rabbi needs to know what is permitted and what is forbidden, and not simply impose stringencies. On the other hand, we learned earlier that a person may, and indeed should, be meticulous and careful for himself in many areas. So what does it mean when I provide kosher certification? What am I saying? One of the Tzemach Tzedek’s students, the author of Shivim Temarim, a wonderful commentary on the Testament of Rabbi Yehudah HaChassid, writes: “If the halachic authorities mention that a baal nefesh should be stringent with himself, one must certainly inform the person asking, so that he knows his options. If he wishes, he can be a baal nefesh. And even if it is not mentioned by the halachic authorities, but only the rabbi giving the ruling is stringent for himself, he should certainly inform him.” The author of Shivim Temarim is stating a major principle: a rabbi asked for a ruling may not simply say, “It’s kosher,” when halachah says there is room to be meticulous and stringent, and that a baal nefesh should be stringent. The rabbi must tell the person asking: “It’s kosher, but there is room to be more meticulous, because you too may choose to be a baal nefesh.” The rabbi has no right to take away a person’s opportunity to be a baal nefesh and to be more meticulous. Of course, we are speaking about stringencies grounded in the halachic authorities and our Sages, not stringencies someone invents for himself. This is a major principle. We are speaking about kashrus in our own homes, of course, and everything we have discussed makes it very clear that we seek to be meticulous and careful, guarding fifty gates of what is permitted. All the more so when a person provides kosher certification: as the rabbi issuing a ruling, he must be careful to give the public the opportunity to be baalei nefesh and to be more meticulous. So, as we’ve said, it is fitting for every person, and there is ample reason, to be careful and meticulous,

23:21 Speaker 2 taking precautions with fifty gates of what is permitted so as not to come to one gate of prohibition. These points carry even greater weight and importance when granting kosher certification. When certifying food as kosher, one must give the public the opportunity to be more meticulous. One must give the public the opportunity to be baalei nefesh. And this is even more important in the present-day, everyday reality of kashrus, with its many challenges. If we do not remain vigilant and meticulous, we may indeed reach the gates of prohibition. This is a fundamental principle for everyone who provides kosher certification: they must be especially meticulous and careful, so that the public can truly take care, become purified and sanctified, and be baalei nefesh.