Laws of Kiddush on Shabbos - Rabbi Uri Lemberg shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to the “Lema’an Yishme’u” podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:10 Speaker 2 We’ll talk about Kiddush, which involves several issues. I’ll start with the main issue and then move on to other matters that come before Kiddush: the laws of the wine and the cup. First, with Kiddush on Friday night, there is a difference between Shabbos night and Yom Tov night. On Shabbos night, you may sometimes need someone who can fulfill another person’s Torah-level obligation. For example, if people have not davened Maariv, then according to the Alter Rebbe, the Torah-level obligation of Kiddush can also be fulfilled through davening. So someone who has davened is now obligated in Kiddush only on a rabbinic level. But someone who has not davened—often a woman who hasn’t had a chance to daven—may hear Kiddush from someone who has already davened Maariv. He is now obligated only on a rabbinic level, while she is obligated on a Torah level because she hasn’t davened. Now, after the fact, even someone who is currently obligated only on a rabbinic level can fulfill the obligation of someone who is obligated on a Torah level, provided he could have been obligated on a Torah level himself. After all, before davening, he too was obligated on a Torah level. But someone we cannot establish as obligated on a Torah level is different. Take a boy who has reached bar mitzvah age, but we do not know whether he has developed the physical signs of maturity. If his beard has begun to grow, that’s fine; we can rely on that as evidence that he has developed the signs. But before then, it’s not so simple. This comes up often when a husband travels to the Rebbe and the mother asks her son—a bar mitzvah boy in his first year of yeshiva ketanah—to make Kiddush for her. His beard has not yet begun to grow, and it’s uncertain whether he has developed the signs. She should daven Maariv. She needs to daven Maariv to fulfill her Torah-level obligation, because we don’t know whether this son

03:11 Speaker 2 has developed the signs of maturity. We don’t know whether he can be obligated on a Torah level. If he has developed the signs, then he has reached the age of mitzvos and is obligated on a Torah level, and he can indeed fulfill her obligation. If not, he cannot. So she should daven Maariv. Incidentally, we said that her husband can always fulfill her obligation after the fact. But since that is only after the fact, it’s better for her to daven; it’s always better for her to daven. If there are guests or some other situation, that’s fine. Otherwise, she should daven Maariv and fulfill her Torah-level obligation, and then her husband, who is obligated on a rabbinic level, can fulfill her obligation too. Now let’s explain the reason. How can even someone whose own obligation is only rabbinic—meaning he has already fulfilled his Torah-level obligation—fulfill hers? Because all Jews are responsible for one another, he is considered obligated on a Torah level through his responsibility to help the woman fulfill her obligation. So I ask: Is her husband obligated in Kiddush? He already fulfilled his Torah-level obligation of Kiddush through davening. Not the obligation to say Kiddush over wine—that is rabbinic—but he mentioned the sanctity of Shabbos in davening, and the Gemara says he has fulfilled his Torah-level obligation. Yet he is still obligated in Kiddush on a Torah level because of his responsibility for her. The responsibility Jews bear for one another is a Torah-level obligation, so he can fulfill hers. But with a guarantor, we first turn to the person who owes the debt, and only if that person cannot pay do we turn to the guarantor. So this responsibility applies only if the person who is obligated cannot do it. If the woman does not know how or cannot do it—[unclear]—or after the fact, the guarantor steps in.

05:50 Speaker 2 After the fact, the guarantor pays. So here too, only if the woman cannot do it, or after the fact, can her husband fulfill her obligation. But with a boy who has reached bar mitzvah age and may or may not have developed the signs of maturity—we don’t know—when it comes to rabbinic laws, there is a rabbinic presumption that he has developed the signs. So for rabbinic Kiddush, he can fulfill her obligation. But for Torah-level laws, we do not rely on a rabbinic presumption, as with the recitation of Shema or hearing the shofar, and so on. For any Torah-level obligation, we would not rely on a boy whose beard has not begun to grow, when we have no certainty that he has developed the signs. Nor is this boy bound by that Torah-level responsibility to others, since we have not established that he is obligated in mitzvos on a Torah level. Both age and signs that appeared after he reached bar mitzvah age are required. So the mother needs to daven first and then fulfill her obligation through him, or the father should daven first so that her obligation will no longer be on a Torah level. Yes, that’s the first point concerning the obligation of Kiddush. Now, on Yom Tov night, Kiddush is rabbinic, both at night and during the day of Yom Tov. On Shabbos night, the first Kiddush is a Torah-level obligation. On Shabbos day, it’s just Borei Pri Hagafen, which is certainly rabbinic. On Shabbos day, he can certainly fulfill her rabbinic obligation. Even with a boy, for rabbinic laws we apply the presumption that he has developed the signs of maturity. “You shall call Shabbos a delight.” Now, you need to know that sometimes—let me tell you about an actual case—it was possible to permit it only because of the uncertainty. They made Kiddush on Friday night and drank, but had not yet had time to eat. Then there was an air-raid siren. They went into the safe room and stayed there for ten minutes. When they came back, they wanted to wash their hands. Did leaving for those ten minutes invalidate the Kiddush?

08:21 Speaker 2 The Gemara mentions, and the Shulchan Aruch says, that if people leave the place where they made Kiddush, the Kiddush is not valid unless they were gone only a short time. There are differing opinions about how short. Some say it must be immediate—no longer than the time it takes to walk eighteen cubits, really just about a minute. Others permit up to half an hour. So here we had to rely on that uncertainty. Rabbi Chaim would not have been in doubt if the time had been less than the time it takes to eat a pras—for our purposes, six or seven minutes in a rabbinic matter. But here it was more than six or seven minutes, and according to Rabbi Chaim that would really be a problem. Still, there are those who permit it. Rabbi Yaakov Emden [unclear], and there are responsa that permit up to half an hour. We cannot rule otherwise with certainty; this still counts as a short interval. So in this case, it’s hard to tell him to repeat Kiddush. If he can hear Kiddush from someone else, that’s better. But telling him to repeat Kiddush raises the problem of a blessing said in vain. Now, about leaving the place: let’s return to the rule. That was just an example. Leaving the place before eating is not permitted in the first instance, but it does not invalidate Kiddush if the absence was brief. One should try to keep it within the time it takes to walk eighteen cubits. Between the time it takes to eat a pras—six or seven minutes—and half an hour, we cannot require someone to make Kiddush again after the fact. He should hear Kiddush from someone else. He has fulfilled the Torah-level obligation of Kiddush, whether through davening or through the words of Kiddush themselves. He has also drunk the wine. The requirement to eat in the place where Kiddush was made is only rabbinic, and this is a doubt about a rabbinic law. We cannot require him to make Kiddush again and risk a blessing said in vain. There is a doubt concerning a blessing said in vain.

10:47 Speaker 2 In any case. Now, what is the definition of the place of the meal? Does it mean the exact spot where I made Kiddush? That is what this section says: it has to be the very same place. You want to eat somewhere else? Have that in mind when you make Kiddush. If you didn’t have it in mind, it has to be the exact same place. After the fact, it is all right as long as you can see the place where you made Kiddush, or you are in the same room. But if you move to another room, here is what happens. If you had not intended to do so and you move to another room—for example, someone made Kiddush in the women’s section and brought no food with him, nothing, and there isn’t another revi’is left in the cup he drank from. He drank a revi’is, and that was it. He has no more and cannot add any. So he goes over to the men’s section. He has to repeat Kiddush, and he also has not fulfilled the obligation for the people there. Why hasn’t he fulfilled their obligation? We said that someone has to actually drink a cheekful from the Kiddush wine. He has not fulfilled his own Kiddush obligation in practice. If they drank a cheekful, there is no problem. He can tell them, “You drink a cheekful now, and there will be no problem, because I have no place for a meal. I drank my cheekful, but I did not fulfill your obligation. You drink a cheekful now.” One of the women needs to drink a cheekful. That is perfectly fine. If he had intended it—he knew the situation and planned to continue his meal in another room—then after the fact it is all right. Not ideally, but after the fact it is all right, since it is under one roof. If it is not under one roof, his intention would not help either. Intention helps only on condition that there is one roof over us. The same applies if, from the place where he eats, he can see the place where he made Kiddush—

12:50 Speaker 2 he can see that place even if it is in another room. In that case, it helps even if they are not under one roof. So let’s sum up. The place of the meal: if you did not have another place in mind, ideally you should not move away. That is, you can go to the bathroom and come back to eat. All right? Yes, but you must eat in the very place where you made Kiddush. We said that leaving does not invalidate it if you are not gone for a long time. Five or six minutes certainly would not be a problem, but beyond that it would be acceptable only after the fact. You can go to the bathroom and come back, fine, but you must return to the exact same place. If you had the move in mind, staying in the same room is no problem. Going to another room under the same roof is acceptable only after the fact. If it is not under the same roof—say you planned to eat at home—that does not help even after the fact, unless you can see the place where you made Kiddush; and that, too, is only after the fact. There is a Chabad custom, based on the Rebbe’s practice, of covering wine bottles with a paper bag, and accordingly Chabad chassidim are careful about a non-Jew seeing the wine. This is based on Midrash Talpiyos, cited by the Darchei Teshuvah in the laws of wine touched by a non-Jew, which says that wine seen by a non-Jew is impaired for a blessing. It is not forbidden—it does not become forbidden in any way. It is simply not of the finest quality; it is not ideal. So first of all, we need to know that if necessary, and there is nothing else, we will use such wine too. Now, regarding a non-Jew seeing the wine, it makes no difference; we have not accepted a distinction between cooked and uncooked wine. From what we saw of the Rebbe, the Rebbe covered cooked wines as well. And the same applies—nowhere does it say that wine with a double seal is not impaired by a non-Jew seeing it. We will explain that in a moment. The double seal is only to make sure that the non-Jew did not open the bottle. But it gives no certainty, no assurance, that the non-Jew did not see the wine. So this is something to be careful about only ideally. After the fact, there is no concern at all. That is regarding a non-Jew seeing the wine. As for wine that was open, wine that a non-Jew touched or picked up, let’s put it briefly, because this comes up very often in practice. Many times, household helpers either do not keep Shabbos and publicly violate it, or they are actually non-Jews. You need to know that if the wine was closed without any seal, but it was closed and the non-Jew picked it up, the non-Jew did not make it forbidden. It is closed; even if the non-Jew picked it up, it has not become forbidden. If it is open and the non-Jew picked it up, the non-Jew has made it forbidden. The whole point of a double seal is to provide assurance when there was no supervision—when I did not see whether the non-Jew opened the wine or not. Then we need a double seal to make sure the bottle was not opened. But this happens many times. For me, it is a fact: a non-Jewish taxi driver brings the whole crate of my Pesach wines to my home. There is no problem with that. And often, unfortunately, even the Pesach bottles do not have seals, but there is still no problem. I saw with my own eyes that he did not open them; there is no problem. Now the problem begins when the non-Jew is in my home and, as is often the case, can lock the house so that no one outside can open it. It may be possible to use a key, or to lock it from the inside; there are certain bolts—

15:20 Speaker 2 A seal within a seal does not address the issue of a non-Jew seeing the wine. We’ll explain that shortly. It is only to make sure the non-Jew did not open the bottle. But it gives no assurance that the non-Jew did not see the wine. So we are careful about that only lechatchilah, from the outset. After the fact, there is no concern at all. That is regarding a non-Jew seeing wine. As for wine that was open, wine that a non-Jew touched or lifted, let’s put it briefly, because this is very relevant in practice. Often, the household help either do not keep Shabbos and publicly desecrate it, or they are actually non-Jews. You need to know that if a bottle of wine was closed, without any seal, but it was closed and a non-Jew lifted it, the non-Jew did not make it forbidden. It is closed; even if the non-Jew lifted it, he did not make it forbidden. If it is open and the non-Jew lifts it, he makes it forbidden. The whole point of a seal within a seal is to ensure, when there was no supervision and I did not see whether the non-Jew opened the wine or not, that the bottle was not opened. But this happens often. For me, it’s a common occurrence: I have wines for Pesach, or a non-Jewish taxi driver brings the whole crate of wine to my home. There is no problem with that. And unfortunately, often even the Pesach wine bottles are not sealed, but there is no problem: I saw with my own eyes that he did not open them. Now the problem begins when the non-Jew is in my home, and often he can lock the house so that no one outside can open it. He can put a key in the lock or lock it from the inside; there are bolts.

18:06 Speaker 2 In such a case, you have to make sure the wine has a double seal. Otherwise, if it was in the refrigerator, we do not know what happened to it, and it becomes forbidden. If the non-Jew could not lock the house from the inside and did not know whether I might come in—whether I had gone away or not—he would be concerned that I might come in, and the wine does not become forbidden. This is called “a Jew going out and coming in.” But if the non-Jew can lock the house from the inside, the wine is permitted only if it has a double seal. There is another possibility: cooked wine. Even if a non-Jew picked it up, and even if it was open, it does not become forbidden, because it is wine that is not fit for use as an offering to an idol. And although there is discussion of this among the poskim, it also seems possible to be lenient with pasteurized wine. I do not want to get into it, because that is not our topic, but particularly when it comes to people who publicly violate Shabbos, one can certainly be lenient with pasteurized wine. Even the status of someone who publicly violates Shabbos is treated as a matter of doubt in the Pischei Teshuvah, and if the wine is pasteurized, it is like a double doubt, so one can be lenient. In the responsa Ba’ei Chayei, written by Rabbi Chaim Benveniste, author of Knesses Hagedolah and Shiyurei Knesses Hagedolah, he writes that in his time they made grape juice by pressing grapes and putting ashes into the juice. That stopped it from fermenting, so it remained unfermented wine—what we call grape juice. Our grape juice is made in a similar way. They heat the juice, thereby stopping the natural process of fermentation. It will no longer ferment. The author of Ba’ei Chayei says its blessing is “shehakol nihyeh bidvaro.” It is not wine; it is wine that has been spoiled. All right, we like its taste this way, but—

20:47 Speaker 2 it is not wine. He says: True, our Sages said that freshly pressed wine, before it has fermented, is fit for Kiddush. It is not the preferred choice for Kiddush, but it is fit for Kiddush; that is what our Sages say. A person can squeeze a cluster of grapes and make Kiddush over the juice that very day, immediately, before three days have passed. But that is when it is going to ferment. No outside action has been taken to stop the fermentation. Nothing external has interfered. Here, though, something external has stopped the fermentation, and this wine is not going to ferment. It is spoiled wine, and therefore its blessing is “shehakol nihyeh bidvaro.” That is his opinion. It remains a minority opinion. There is also an explicit instruction from the Rebbe: he wrote to someone who was ill and could not drink the four cups on Seder night that he should use grape juice. So the Rebbe, too, writes accordingly. But ideally we should take this opinion into account. The Rebbe also wrote this only for someone who was ill. Ideally, then, we should take this opinion into account and try to make Kiddush over wine that is capable of fermenting. You should know that according to this view, low-alcohol wine has the same status. We stopped the wine from fermenting. Wine with over ten percent alcohol—eleven percent—is fine. That is wine that has not been spoiled. There may be finer wines, but it is not wine whose fermentation was stopped. At four percent, its status is certainly that of grape juice. Calling it something else, “low-alcohol wine,” does not change the fact that according to the responsa Ba’ei Chayei it is exactly the same thing. In summary: when necessary, yes. When it is not necessary, seek out wine with more than ten percent alcohol. Let’s talk a little about the color of the wine. The Ramban’s view that white wine is unfit for Kiddush is well known, and it is brought in the Shulchan Aruch, where it says that this is not the custom. It is not

23:27 Speaker 2 The custom, according to his view, is to say that white wine is invalid, but the Alter Rebbe omitted his view. It seems that one need not take it into account, although the Alter Rebbe also says it is preferable to use red wine. The Alter Rebbe says that too, but one need not be concerned with the view that it is not... wine, sweet wine. The Rambam cites an opinion that it is invalid. Wine—cooked wine and so on—but that is not the halachah. If someone wants to be stringent, he can be, but that is not the halachah. It is known that toward the end of his life, the Alter Rebbe retracted the measurements he had written in the Shulchan Aruch after measuring the size of a gris and giving new measurements. But even with those, there is some uncertainty about what he meant. As is known, Rabbi Chaim Naeh writes eighty-six, but he too writes that it may be—he writes that it is eighty-six, and it may be a hundred and twenty. In any event, since it was found that the Frierdiker Rebbe’s goblet held a hundred milliliters, a hundred cubic centimeters, one can certainly rely on a hundred cubic centimeters. Although I myself measured a goblet that is an exact replica of the Rebbe’s goblet, and it holds exactly a hundred and fifty, in accordance with the Chazon Ish’s view. The Chazon Ish’s ruling is well known: [unclear] the amount of a revi’is is larger—it is a hundred and fifty. That is the capacity of the Rebbe’s cup. Now, it is hard to believe that the Rebbe was concerned with that view, because if the goblet holds exactly a hundred and fifty and even a drop of wine is missing, it no longer contains a hundred and fifty. Why choose exactly a hundred and fifty? But that is the size of the... Now, it is important to know that the revi’is is relevant only to Kiddush, not to the amount one drinks. After Kiddush, it is enough to drink melo lugmav. Melo lugmav means that we puff out half—puff out one cheek,

26:28 Speaker 2 and the wine that fits there is the amount called melo lugmav. There is no requirement to drink a revi’is, nor most of the cup. “Most of the cup” is a mistake. It means most of a revi’is; that is the Gemara’s wording: most of a revi’is. Nowhere does it say that one must drink most of the cup. True, there is a story about the Alter Rebbe, but I do not know who took responsibility for it. It is not a story about the Rebbeim. The Alter Rebbe once made Kiddush over liquor in a bowl and drank most of the cup—he drank most of the bowl. But that is not a ruling. It is not written in the Shulchan Aruch or anywhere else, and we cannot be responsible for stories whose origins we do not know. So melo lugmav is clearly enough. There is no need to drink more. And this often matters in practice. If someone does not have, or cannot eat, a kezayis of food for a meal in the place where he makes Kiddush, he needs to drink an additional revi’is besides melo lugmav. After the fact, even a single revi’is suffices, but certainly a revi’is. So that person must make sure he really drinks a revi’is: a revi’is besides melo lugmav, or, after the fact, even including melo lugmav. But he must drink a revi’is. Now the Alter Rebbe, following the Magen Avraham, goes further: not only must the goblet hold a revi’is, and not only must there be a revi’is of wine in it during Kiddush, but there must also be a revi’is of wine in it when one drinks. As we said, one need not actually drink a revi’is; melo lugmav is enough. But one must drink that melo lugmav from a vessel that holds a revi’is and from a revi’is of wine. This matters in practice when we pour wine for the people listening to Kiddush. It is not obligatory, but it is an enhancement of the mitzvah to let them drink from the Kiddush wine too. Suppose he gave them some—we will shortly discuss

28:54 Speaker 2 whether he should give it to them before or after the person making Kiddush drinks—but suppose he gave it to them beforehand, and now he is short. He has enough for melo lugmav, but less than a revi’is remains. That is a very serious question. What do I mean, a question? If less than a revi’is remains, that is not a proper way to drink. He should refill the cup to a revi’is and drink. So, first, the cup must hold a revi’is, and there must be a revi’is of wine both during Kiddush and when one drinks, even though one need only drink melo lugmav. As for measuring melo lugmav, we said that Rabbi Shimon Mizrachi of [unclear] says the best way is to fill one’s entire mouth, then empty it into a cup and measure half of that. Half of that is the person’s melo lugmav. We said that, strictly speaking, the listeners do not need to drink, but it is an enhancement of the mitzvah for them to drink wine that has not become pagum. So several ways have been suggested for them to drink wine that is not pagum after I have drunk from it. One is for them to drink from my goblet. That is what the Alter Rebbe seems to imply in the laws of Seder night: wine does not become pagum while it remains in the goblet itself; that applies only when it is in another vessel. If I drank from the goblet over which I made Kiddush, its wine does not become pagum. If someone drank from it before Kiddush, I cannot make Kiddush over it, because it has become pagum. But if I made Kiddush over it and drank, it does not become pagum while it remains in that same cup. If I transfer it to another cup, that wine is pagum. That is one option. A second option is to add wine. A third is to give them wine before I drink. But the Alter Rebbe says in section 195 that if I give them wine before I drink, I must not give them just a little. If I pour out a little for them, it looks as though there was something dirty in the cup and I poured it out, which is unbecoming for the cup. I should give them a generous amount. So I must make sure that a revi’is still remains in the cup afterward, and then the melo lugmav I drink is taken from a revi’is, and therefore...

31:10 Speaker 2 Now, regarding the quality of the vessel: it is true that the sources say the cup used for a blessing should be a fine cup. So one should try not to use a disposable cup and so on. But it is important to know that this is not indispensable. A vessel is indispensable; one must use a vessel. But a disposable cup is a vessel. It is certainly a vessel. It does not contract ritual impurity and is not an important vessel, but it is a vessel. Earthenware vessels do not contract ritual impurity either, but they are vessels. Some people have decided to place a disposable cup inside another vessel, simply so it will hold the wine better. Fine. Otherwise it might crumple when held or something like that. That is fine. But if not, it is a misguided stringency, and there is no need to introduce practices that have no basis or foundation. One should know that here, too, there is a difference between Kiddush and Havdalah. We said there is no obligation to drink a revi’is for Kiddush. With Havdalah, it is true that there is no obligation to drink a revi’is for Havdalah either, but for another reason it may sometimes be necessary. As is known, the Shulchan Aruch raises a doubt about what amount of an important beverage such as wine obligates one to recite an after-blessing: a kezayis or a revi’is? So if I drink a kezayis but not a revi’is at Havdalah, I enter into a situation of doubt. It is best to drink a revi’is and recite an after-blessing after Havdalah. With Kiddush, however, one will in any case recite Birchas Hamazon, and that is the... Actually, if the same situation arises with Kiddush and there is no more wine to drink afterward during the [unclear], then the same issue arises about whether one needs to recite an after-blessing.

33:55 Speaker 2 But as far as Kiddush itself is concerned, there’s no question. The Shulchan Aruch mentions two other ways to make Kiddush: over chamar medinah, a beverage commonly served in that country—we’ll discuss the definitions—and another option is to make Kiddush over challah, over bread. First of all, among the early authorities there is a whole debate about both bread and chamar medinah. The Shulchan Aruch says very emphatically not to make Kiddush over chamar medinah unless there is no wine anywhere in the city. It goes that far. And the same applies to bread. That is the position regarding Kiddush. Havdalah is different; we’ll discuss Havdalah shortly. But regarding Kiddush, that is a very strong statement. There is another major problem with chamar medinah. The Alter Rebbe says, both in the laws of Kiddush and in the laws of Birchas Hamazon, that there is no such thing as chamar medinah as long as wine is available in the country. Chamar medinah applies only if wine is not the country’s beverage. If people customarily bring wine to the table at celebrations and so on, there is no such thing as chamar medinah. Or, more precisely, chamar medinah applies only in the absence of wine—not because there is no wine this Shabbos or another Shabbos, or because I personally have no wine. It means wine is absent from that country; wine does not serve as its beverage. True, the Alter Rebbe cites two opinions: whether there must be no wine at all in the country, or whether there may be no wine in certain years or at certain times. But the condition is that there is no wine. Otherwise, the category does not apply. True, people cite other halachic authorities and so on. Some also cite a response from the Rebbe to a soldier stationed far away who asked what he should use for Kiddush. The Rebbe told him to use beer. But again, that was a soldier in a place with no wine—there was no wine there in Alaska,

37:10 Speaker 2 or in various other places. You cannot have both wine and chamar medinah apply at the same time. I’ll give a very practical example. Often, Tisha B’Av falls on a Sunday, either because it was postponed or because it falls on Sunday to begin with. People who need to break the fast for certain reasons—because they are ill and the like—must make Havdalah. So they assume that, since Havdalah can be made over chamar medinah, unlike Kiddush—there is a dispute among the early authorities about Kiddush, but everyone agrees about Havdalah—they’ll use chamar medinah and thus avoid drinking wine on Tisha B’Av, which would seem to contradict the spirit of the day. That sounds good, but according to the Alter Rebbe, there is no such thing as chamar medinah as long as wine is available. As for bread, apart from the dispute among the early authorities, there is another point to know: it is less suitable for the daytime Kiddush. At night it is somewhat better, because at least the nighttime Kiddush has a full Kiddush blessing. But for daytime Kiddush, where there is only the blessing of Hamotzi, the Kiddush consists solely of Hamotzi. So there is nothing to indicate that Kiddush was made, rather than simply beginning a meal. That makes it even less suitable. So if we have no choice—if we have only one cup of wine and must decide whether to use it at night or during the day—we should save it for the day and make Kiddush over bread at night. Sometimes a few words are said by mistake between Kiddush and the person making Kiddush drinking the wine. People commonly think that in that case they have not fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush. That is both true and not true. If the talking meant that I had stopped expecting the person making Kiddush to drink—for example, I thought he had already drunk—then the talking does indeed invalidate it. But if I spoke by mistake while knowing he was still going to drink, that is fine. I had not stopped expecting him to drink. What’s more, even if the person making Kiddush himself spoke, as long as he still intended to drink, it is fine, and he fulfills his obligation of Kiddush.

40:05 Speaker 2 Let’s add: what about things that are not indispensable for those listening to Kiddush? We discussed talking, which sometimes invalidates it and sometimes does not, depending on whether one stopped expecting the wine to be drunk. As for the blessing over wine, during the day it is indispensable—that is the Kiddush. On Friday night, the blessing over wine is not indispensable. If the listeners did not hear it, they have still fulfilled their obligation; the same applies to Havdalah at night. The person making Kiddush must recite the main blessing, but the listeners fulfill their obligation even [unclear].