Chapter 6 - Part Three

00:01 In the previous class, we discussed the middle of chapter 6. Here the Alter Rebbe explains the difference between holiness and kelipah. He explains the definition of sitra achra. The plain meaning of sitra achra—the translation of the words—is “the other side.” Why is kelipah called sitra achra, “the other side”? To emphasize that it is not holiness. But what is the deeper meaning of that name? There is something deeper here than simply saying it is not holiness. Calling it “the other side,” a side other than the side of holiness, highlights the very essence of kelipah and sitra achra. What does that mean? This is what the Alter Rebbe explains. To understand why anything that is not holiness is called kelipah, we first have to understand what holiness is. And the Alter Rebbe explains it here in two lines that are absolutely fundamental to the whole Tanya: the definition of holiness is the oneness of Hashem. The definition of holiness is bittul, self-nullification. That is the essence of holiness. In the Alter Rebbe’s words: “The side of holiness is nothing other than the presence and extension of the holiness of Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and Hakadosh Boruch Hu rests only upon something that is nullified before Him.” I want to explain this a little, because essentially the whole Tanya is built on this point. All of Chabad Chassidus is built on it. By way of introduction, it is well known that the Alter Rebbe originally wanted to print the Tanya with Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah before Likkutei Amarim. Everyone knows the story. The Alter Rebbe first wrote Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, then Likkutei Amarim, and he also wanted to print them in that order: Shaar Hayichud first, followed by Likkutei Amarim. And at the last

02:13 moment, he changed the order and printed Likkutei Amarim before Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah. Even though he changed the order, the wording remained. You can see in Likkutei Amarim that when he refers to something in Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, he uses the past tense, as though he has already explained it. And when he mentions something in Shaar Hayichud, he writes that he will explain it. The other way around: in Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, he writes that he will explain it in Likkutei Amarim, and in Likkutei Amarim, that it was explained in Shaar Hayichud. In short, the point is that the wording remained that way. The Rebbe spoke about this several times. One of those times was, if I remember correctly, at a farbrengen I attended. It was around this time, Tammuz 5747, possibly Parshas Korach. I think I was at that farbrengen. In any case, I need to look it up, but I remember the Rebbe speaking about it several times. What is the point here? It is a very fundamental point. Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah is the foundation of all faith in Hashem: the oneness of Hashem. In Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, the Alter Rebbe reveals the Baal Shem Tov’s teaching that the entire world is G-dliness, that all of existence is—yes—“Know this day and take it to heart that Hashem is G-d in the heavens above and on the earth below; there is nothing else.” This means exactly what it says: there is no existence apart from G-dliness. The word of Hashem brings everything into being, gives it life and sustains it at every moment, and that is the world’s true reality. This premise changes your entire way of looking at everything. You see the world through completely different eyes. The very definition of the world changes. The world is, in the familiar expression, a yesh made from ayin. Without Chassidus, the world is defined as an entity in its own right. Hakadosh Boruch Hu creates the world, brings it into being. But there are two things: there is the world, and there is

04:19 Hakadosh Boruch Hu, who brings the world into being. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is the Master of the world. But according to the teachings of Chassidus, the whole foundation is that the world and G-dliness are not two separate things. In the familiar expression, the entire world is G-dliness. It is not that the world and G-dliness are two things, one ruling over the other; rather, everything is one. That is the foundation of Chassidus, and the foundation of all of Likkutei Amarim. That is what the Alter Rebbe is telling us here in chapter 6 of Tanya. Kelipah is not defined as evil. If I see the world as an entity in its own right—like someone who has not learned Chassidus and does not have the understanding of Hashem’s oneness that Chassidus teaches us—then Hakadosh Boruch Hu created the world as something separate. There is a world. The world has its own existence. He governs it, influences it, is its Master and its Ruler. This person says Shema Yisroel, but what he means is that Hashem is the Master of the world. So the world must conduct itself according to Hashem’s will. What does that mean in practice? Don’t commit aveiros, and do perform mitzvos. “Turn away from evil and do good.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu is the Master of the world, and He said He loves these things, so I should do them. He hates those things, so I won’t do them. But the world itself is neutral. Some things in the world are neither good nor bad. They are neutral; that is the world. What is the problem? After all, Hakadosh Boruch Hu created the world, and the world is a reality that exists. He created it; it exists. So there is an area, a domain, that is neither forbidden nor a mitzvah. It is the domain of what is permitted. What do you do with

06:06 permitted things? Whatever you want. Hashem left that to our discretion. I can do what I want: eat, drink, do business, enjoy life. There is no problem. Why? That is the world. Hakadosh Boruch Hu created it for that; that is why He created it. But Chassidus says no. Chassidus comes and says: the world is G-dliness. There is no reality that is not G-dliness. There are not two things here at all. There are not two domains. The whole reality of the world is G-dliness. What is holiness? It is where the truth of G-dliness, the oneness of Hashem, shines openly. The moment we do not feel that truth of Hashem’s oneness, the moment we do not feel the truth that “there is nothing besides Him,” that itself is what sitra achra and kelipah mean. So the thing itself may not be forbidden. It may be something permitted. That is what we discussed, and that is precisely what the Alter Rebbe says: “And these are all the deeds done under the sun.” We are not talking about an aveirah here. It can specifically be thoughts, speech and actions involving permitted things. But they are deeds “done under the sun.” In other words, when you do something not for the sake of Heaven, when there is no service of Hashem in it, then it is self-assertion. And if it is self-assertion, it is the opposite of G-dliness. In G-dliness there is no room for something that is not G-dliness. The world’s entire existence is only through its connection to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and all of a person’s avodah must be to reveal Hashem’s oneness in the world—both in matters of mitzvos and in ordinary, permitted matters. How do you reveal it? By eating for the sake of Heaven. This is what the Alter Rebbe goes on to explain in the following chapters: even with something permitted, if it is part of serving Hashem, you reveal Hashem’s oneness within reality. The moment you use something, even though it is permitted, but not for the sake of serving Hashem, then it is

07:58 separate. And if it is separate, it is the opposite of Hashem’s oneness; it is a subtle form of idol worship. And so, according to the Alter Rebbe, this is what it means that there are not two domains. That is the meaning of sitra achra. We can now understand the depth of calling it sitra achra: it is not on the side of holiness. Holiness means something nullified before Hashem, something in which His oneness is felt, in which “there is nothing besides Him” is felt. The moment that feeling is missing, it is kelipah and sitra achra. On this basis, we understand that serving Hashem is not only a matter of turning away from evil and doing good; it also applies to permitted things. That is why the Alter Rebbe explains throughout the following chapters, and repeats several times, that even when a person does something permitted, if he does it not for the sake of Heaven, it is kelipah and sitra achra. It separates him from Hakadosh Boruch Hu—to the point that it is a subtle form of idol worship, as the Alter Rebbe explains in the chapters that follow. This is also the point about serving Hashem through thought, speech and action, and about the avodah of the beinoni: his thought, speech and action are devoted to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Not only in matters of mitzvos, but also in permitted things. His avodah is to do them for the sake of Heaven, to fulfill “Know Him in all your ways.” That is the whole point the Alter Rebbe explains. So that is the point. It is the straightforward way to understand the foundation here. The Alter Rebbe says here in chapter 6 of Tanya—let’s read it again, after the period. The Alter Rebbe said here—or wait, we are talking about bittul. There is a point here that we read quickly. We are talking about bittul. We are saying that the whole reality of holiness means something that is nullified before Hakadosh Boruch Hu. For “Hakadosh Boruch Hu rests only upon something that is nullified before Him.” The Alter Rebbe adds here and says: with bittul, too

09:57 Because there are two kinds of bittul. There is bittul in actual practice, and there is bittul in potential. The Alter Rebbe wants to explain the special quality of a Jew. We speak of the oneness of Hashem. Again, the world is an expression of the oneness of Hashem, of bittul, of “there is nothing besides Him.” There is nothing besides Him, but then there are the higher creations, where “there is nothing besides Him” is felt in actuality. The supernal angels actually feel it. That is their life. They cry out, “Holy, holy”; the oneness of Hashem shines for them, and so on. Bittul in actual practice. So the angels are called holy, beings of holiness. That is what it says there. Down here, in this physical world, what can we call holy? Something drawn into the holiness of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. There are objects of holiness: tefillin, a Torah scroll, a mezuzah—objects of holiness. In other words, an object entirely devoted to a mitzvah, entirely G-dliness, entirely bittul. A Torah scroll. What is a Torah scroll? Something in the world whose entire purpose is to reveal the wisdom and will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That is what tefillin are, what a mezuzah is, what tzitzis are—an object of a mitzvah. But these are things that are actually nullified. The Alter Rebbe adds that there is another kind of bittul: bittul in potential. What does that mean? A Jew? The soul, after all—a Jew is a soul in a body. Now, the soul is literally a part of G-d above. So the soul is certainly holy. The soul is, is, is literally a part of G-d above. The soul’s entire essence is bittul in actual practice. But the soul descends into the world and is clothed in a body. From the body’s perspective, it would seem that we have no bittul, and therefore the body belongs to kelipah—to kelipas nogah, at any rate. The animal soul is kelipas nogah. So where, where is the bittul here? The Alter Rebbe says: Because a Jew is always prepared to give up his life. Even though right now he is actually living his life, eating, sleeping, a Jew has

12:12 this potential. “Potential” does not mean theoretical; it means ready. A Jew is always ready to go so far as to give up his life. Of course, when there is no test, one may not even know it, but that is the reality. As the Alter Rebbe explains in the following chapters, a Jew always has this readiness. The moment some test arises, the moment some matter of G-dliness comes up, or whatever it may be—some test—it becomes apparent that he does not want to and cannot be separated from G-dliness. In other words, this bittul actually exists within him. That is why he is also a vessel for G-dliness. True, he is not standing there all day crying, “Holy, holy.” He is a person living in the world, doing all kinds of things. But because he has this potential in his soul—meaning that he is ready for it, and Tanya attests to this, that a Jew is ready, that “he neither wants to nor can”—this is not a theory. It is something that exists within him. And because it exists within him, he has bittul in his soul; that bittul is the vessel for the Infinite Light, the vessel for G-dliness. Therefore, a Jew is holy by his very nature as well. That is what the Rebbe adds here: “whether in actuality or in potential.” He has the capacity to be utterly nullified before Hakadosh Boruch Hu and to give up his life for the sanctification of Hashem’s name. What the Alter Rebbe means, as the Rebbe explains the plain meaning—and this is relevant to our avodah here—is that “he has the capacity” means that this is actually present within him. This capacity, this disposition, this readi... this readiness a Jew has, this disposition to be ready to give up his life, is actually present within him. Therefore, the Shechinah rests upon a Jew even as he is down here below. And that is why the Alter Rebbe goes on to say: “Our Sages said that even when one person sits and studies Torah, the Shechinah rests upon him,” and so on. According to

14:13 this, says the Alter Rebbe, we can understand what our Sages say. What do our Sages say? When a Jew sits and learns Torah, the Shechinah rests upon him. What, does it say he has to be a tzaddik? It does not say this is a Jew in whom the Infinite Light shines. A Jew learns Torah. We have to understand: Why does the Shechinah rest upon him? We said that for the Shechinah to rest, there has to be bittul to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Perhaps he is just learning Torah. He might be someone who is not such a great or holy person in his life, an ordinary person. And yet, Torah study. What is the explanation? The explanation is that a Jew inherently has the capacity for bittul. Because he inherently has it, he has it in his soul; he has it down here as well. A Jew is ready to give up his life, so he has that disposition, that bittul in his soul. When he actually learns Torah, he combines that potential with actual practice: he is now actually learning Torah. That itself makes him a vessel, a vessel for the resting of the Shechinah. In fact, by virtue of his soul, he is already a vessel for the resting of the Shechinah; only the actual deed is missing. Therefore, any Jew, whoever he may be, who sits and learns Torah has the Shechinah resting upon him in a revealed way as well. “And wherever ten are gathered, the Shechinah always rests.” There is another point here; we will get to it later. There has to be Torah study. That is the condition. If you want the Shechinah to rest, there has to be Torah study. By virtue of his soul, he is a vessel for it, ready for it. But for it to happen in actuality, there has to be—what is the actual deed? Torah study. When there are ten people, the Alter Rebbe says “always.” What does “always” mean? The Alter Rebbe explains in Igeres Hakodesh that it applies even if they are not learning. After all, the Alter Rebbe writes in Igeres Hakodesh, section 23, that when there are ten

16:04 people sitting together, even if there are no words of Torah among them—they are not learning—because there are ten people there, the Shechinah always rests. The Shechinah rests there. There is something special when ten Jews come together. What is the reasoning? The Alter Rebbe does not explain, but elsewhere it is explained that when ten Jews come together, there is a certain revelation of yechidah. There is a revelation in their unity; when ten Jews join together, something higher is revealed. The Rebbe explains this in a sicha. This is the concept of a community, the power of a community. A community is not merely ten people added together. The Rebbe cites a principle from the Rogatchover. A community is something different, a different category, which comes into being when ten people join together. There is the sicha, and in the parshiyos we are reading now, too, there is a discussion concerning the condemned city. He explains this in several sichos. In any case, in Parshas Balak, regarding the story of Zimri. The point is that the status of a community transforms it into a different entity. It is a different category, a different entity. Something else is revealed here: yechidah. And that yechidah is the oneness of Hashem. There, it is revealed always, even if they are not learning Torah. So chassidim would say: What does it mean that ten Jews gather and do not learn Torah? How could that be? They said it can happen: it is a farbrengen. Yes, at a farbrengen they do not always learn; sometimes it does not happen. But the Shechinah rests there by virtue of the gathering itself, at any rate. “But anything that is not nullified before Him, may He be blessed, but is instead a separate entity in its own right,” the Alter Rebbe goes on to say. Something that does not have this bittul but is a separate entity in its own right “does not receive its vitality from the holiness of Hakadosh Boruch Hu, from the inner aspect of holiness, its very essence in all its glory, but rather from the aspect of achorayim.” Something that does not have this bittul—there, the oneness of Hashem is not present when there is no

18:28 The oneness of Hashem does not shine there. So it is called the “other side,” a side that is not holiness. And he adds something more here. It is not only “other” because it lacks bittul; “other” here also refers to achorayim, the “back,” because it receives its life-force from the aspect of achorayim. What does achorayim mean? The Alter Rebbe does not explain it at length here. Later in Tanya, in chapter 22, the Alter Rebbe explains what defines achorayim. It is like a person giving something to someone from behind. You toss something to someone you don’t want to give it to. You do give it to him, but from behind. Chassidus explains that there are two ways of giving life: from the aspect of the face and from the aspect of the back. When you love someone and give to him, that comes from the aspect of the face—from your innermost will, your pleasure and your desire. But if you have to give to someone and don’t really want to, and you give only for some particular reason, while in truth you have no interest in it, then you give as though tossing something over your shoulder. The same applies to kelipah and holiness. Hakadosh Boruch Hu does not want kelipah. Why does it exist? To make choice possible, because there is a purpose in there being a reality of the sitra achra. So it is remarkable: Hakadosh Boruch Hu gives it life, but He does not truly want it. Its life-force therefore comes from the aspect of achorayim. It is also the “other side,” because the inner dimension is not there; His innermost will is not there, since it does not have bittul. Where is His innermost will found? Only where the oneness of Hashem shines, in a place of bittul. Where there is no bittul, the oneness of Hashem...

20:17 ...then G-dliness does not shine there. In fact, all the maamarim—the bochurim are familiar with this—the whole avodah comes down to what you are looking for. What are you looking for? Are you looking for the King? Or are you looking for: Where am I in this? What do I get? What do I feel? You are looking for yourself: more influence for me, more of this, less work. That is the whole basis of the difference between holiness and kelipah. In holiness, what a person seeks is the innermost will: Where is there more G-dliness, more truth, more of the oneness of Hashem? In kelipah, by contrast, he seeks self-importance, [unclear]. That is the very reason G-dliness is not found there. Rather, it is present in the aspect of achorayim, which descends from level to level, through myriads of levels in the unfolding of the worlds, by way of cause and effect and many tzimtzumim, until the light and life-force have been so diminished, reduction after reduction, that they can be contracted and enclothed in a state of exile within that separate thing, to give it life and sustain it from nothing into existence, so that it does not revert to nothingness as it was before it was created. That is what the Rebbe is saying here: this life-force that comes from the aspect of achorayim undergoes many tzimtzumim. The Alter Rebbe uses many different expressions here. They need to be explained. With Hashem’s help, we will explain them another time. But there are many expressions here, and each one describes another kind of tzimtzum. It is not just more words, words, words. In Tanya, every word is very precise. The Rebbe describes different kinds of tzimtzum here—the different ways the G-dly life-force descends from level to level, until it can be enclothed in a way that gives life even to things in this world, including forbidden things. What is the purpose of this? As the Rebbe says, without it there can be no life. If there is no G-dliness, there is no...

22:04 ...existence. Without it, a thing cannot exist. So kelipah too has G-dly life-force within it, as does the sitra achra. But the question is whether it is there from the aspect of the face or from the aspect of achorayim. That must also be the distinction in a person’s service of Hashem. Again, what am I looking for? Am I looking for the truth? Am I looking for Hakadosh Boruch Hu? Am I looking for bittul? Is that my focus? Or am I looking for where I can gain more self-importance, a greater sense of myself? That is the entire difference between holiness and kelipah. It is also the basis of the difference between the G-dly soul and the animal soul: the animal soul is, in essence, a self, while the G-dly soul is, in essence, bittul.