Tanya Igeres Hateshuvah - Chapter 1 - Part 3

00:01 Okay, before we continue in Igeres Hateshuvah, I wanted to add one more point about the beraisa the Alter Rebbe cites here—an interesting explanation from the Rebbe. It isn’t in the usual explanations of Igeres Hateshuvah, or in the Lessons in Tanya. It’s in a letter the Rebbe sent in 5710, and it lends some further support to several of the questions we asked—and didn’t ask—about the first page of Igeres Hateshuvah. Someone wrote to the Rebbe in 5710 with an interesting question: What is the Alter Rebbe trying to do here? One of the students asked the same thing: What is the Alter Rebbe trying to accomplish with the discussion in parentheses? What exactly is his point? The Rebbe’s explanation is very interesting. We’ve already discussed several explanations, but there’s another one here that also bears on the basic premise of Igeres Hateshuvah as a whole. Here’s what I mean: We said that the Alter Rebbe cites the beraisa primarily to show two things. First, there is such a thing as teshuvah. The work of teshuvah is necessary, and it is a form of avodah in its own right. Second, there must also be atonement. Teshuvah alone isn’t enough; atonement is needed too. And in atonement there are distinctions—different forms of atonement. Teshuvah accompanies each one. From this we see that the work of teshuvah is something distinct, something in its own right, independent of atonement. That is teshuvah itself. On the other hand, atonement is also necessary, and therefore there are different forms of atonement, depending on whether the transgression involves a positive mitzvah,

02:19 a negative mitzvah, kareis, or a court-imposed death penalty—the three categories of atonement the beraisa explains. That’s what we’ve discussed so far. But the Rebbe adds another reason the Alter Rebbe cites this beraisa. Now, we also explained in an earlier class that the Alter Rebbe uses this beraisa to show that teshuvah must bring atonement, and that this atonement takes place in this physical world. The reason the Alter Rebbe doesn’t include desecration of Hashem’s name, citing only positive mitzvos, negative mitzvos, and kareis, is that he wants to speak about atonement connected to the work of teshuvah. The aim of teshuvah is for a person to go on serving Hakadosh Boruch Hu, to become a different person, and so on. In practical terms, teshuvah is work done down here. So he cites atonement that concerns the soul while it is in a body. By contrast, atonement for desecrating Hashem’s name concerns the soul above and its punishment; it is not connected to the person’s avodah. We discussed that in earlier classes. The Rebbe adds another very interesting point that the Alter Rebbe wants to emphasize through this beraisa. Besides teaching us that there is teshuvah and there is atonement, the beraisa shows that there is such a thing as teshuvah in its pure form—that the work of teshuvah does not necessarily require other things. Particularly at the beginning, we repeatedly see the Alter Rebbe setting aside the idea that teshuvah depends on fasts, self-mortification, or even confession and asking forgiveness. He wants to explain the basic teshuvah that is within everyone’s reach. We’re about to learn what the mitzvah of teshuvah is according to the Torah, which is essentially the point of teshuvah tata’ah. After that,

04:16 there are higher levels, teshuvah ila’ah, and several other aspects. But the Alter Rebbe wants to prove from this beraisa that there is such a thing as teshuvah at its most basic level, within everyone’s reach. And not only teshuvah, but atonement as well. There is a simple form of teshuvah that applies to each and every person—the first, basic level, the foundation of teshuvah. And there is also atonement. Not just teshuvah: there is also a lower level of atonement, and we learn that from this beraisa. The beraisa doesn’t bring up fasting or confession. It doesn’t mention asking forgiveness, offerings, or any of those details. It speaks only about teshuvah, saying that teshuvah accompanies each one. It speaks of teshuvah and atonement without mentioning any further details. From this we understand that the beraisa teaches us about teshuvah that does not require all sorts of other things. There is a most basic form of teshuvah that does not depend on them. How does it put it? “If he repents, he is forgiven immediately”—as soon as he repents, he is forgiven. Then there is the further matter of atonement. We’ll get to atonement too. From this beraisa we learn that it is speaking about a lower level of atonement, and we learn this through the discussion the Alter Rebbe places in parentheses. He demonstrates that the atonement under discussion here is at a lower level. What’s his proof? This is very, very interesting. It gives us a very good understanding of the whole chapter. The Alter Rebbe begins by saying: “There are distinctions in atonement, but teshuvah accompanies

06:19 each one.” The beraisa then says that someone who neglects a positive mitzvah and repents is forgiven as soon as he does teshuvah—“he does not move from there until he is forgiven.” But wait a moment: How can that be? A positive mitzvah is much more serious. Why does the beraisa say he is forgiven immediately? If it is more serious, the teshuvah should be harder. That is the Alter Rebbe’s point when he says that performing a positive mitzvah overrides a negative mitzvah. We see that a positive mitzvah has something loftier, something more powerful about it. So teshuvah for neglecting a positive mitzvah should have been harder. Why is the beraisa lenient and says that teshuvah brings immediate forgiveness? What does the Alter Rebbe explain? A positive mitzvah draws down light and Divine flow, and that is its special quality. If a person fails to perform it, he loses that light and Divine flow. Once he has lost it, that loss is all there is to it; it cannot be repaired, as the Alter Rebbe explains with the verse, “What is crooked cannot be made straight.” So teshuvah brings immediate forgiveness. The Rebbe says that the Alter Rebbe wants to emphasize something in the very fact that the beraisa says one is forgiven immediately for neglecting a positive mitzvah. Why? Because the effect he should have brought about—the drawing down of light—has been lost. He cannot repair it: “What is crooked cannot be made straight.” That itself proves that the beraisa is speaking about teshuvah at a lower level. Incidentally, this answers the familiar question people always ask: How can the Alter Rebbe say that when someone neglects a positive mitzvah, he cannot make up what he lost, because the light is absent—the light of

08:24 The positive mitzvah whose light he should have drawn down yesterday—he can no longer make that up; he can only begin from now on. Yet in many places in Chassidus, it seems that one can also rectify matters involving positive mitzvos. When a person does teshuvah, and especially a very great teshuvah, he not only sets things right from now on; the light he lost in the past can also be drawn down through teshuvah. This is written in several places in Chassidus. The Alter Rebbe explains it in Likkutei Torah, Parshas Balak, in the maamar “Mah Tovu”: through the avodah of teshuvah, you not only rectify things from now on with regard to positive mitzvos; the light you did not draw down is drawn down as well. So how can the Alter Rebbe say here that the light is missing? Chassidus explains—for example, the Alter Rebbe explains in Torah Or, in Parshas Mishpatim, the verse “I will fill the number of your days.” The Alter Rebbe explains what “I will fill the number of your days” means: through the avodah of teshuvah, even the days a person lost, and the various mitzvos he did not fulfill in the past, are given to him. How, then, can the Alter Rebbe say here that the light is missing? The answer is that here the Alter Rebbe is explaining the plain meaning of the beraisa. He is not saying that a positive mitzvah can never be rectified. He is explaining this beraisa in Tractate Yoma, which is speaking about a lower level of teshuvah. The proof is that it says that for a positive mitzvah, he is forgiven immediately. That is because the beraisa is speaking about teshuvah tata’ah, simple teshuvah. It is not speaking about a higher teshuvah, teshuvah ila’ah. It is speaking about very simple, basic teshuvah—the beginning of the Torah’s mitzvah of teshuvah, as the Alter Rebbe will soon explain. That is why, at this level of teshuvah, it says that a positive

10:12 mitzvah cannot be rectified. Simple teshuvah only rectifies the rebellion, and for rebellion, simple teshuvah helps. From the moment a person does teshuvah, he is no longer rebelling against the King. Hakadosh Boruch Hu forgives him for the rebellion; that happens immediately through teshuvah. But as for the light he lost, this level of teshuvah cannot restore it, because we are speaking about a lower level of teshuvah. With prohibitions, however, it is not only that he lost the light. As the Alter Rebbe says, evil has also attached itself to his soul. There is something more here besides the rebellion: evil has attached itself to his soul; a blemish and a stain have been created. So here he needs both teshuvah to rectify the rebellion and something to cleanse the stain. Again, although we are speaking here about a lower level—not teshuvah ila’ah or lofty levels of teshuvah—the purpose of teshuvah is to bring about atonement, even at the lowest level. So with prohibitions, because there is a stain, the stain must be cleansed. That cleansing takes place on Yom Kippur, and therefore one must wait until Yom Kippur. With transgressions punishable by kares or by a court-imposed death penalty, something much more serious has happened. The cleansing of Yom Kippur is not enough; suffering and blows are also needed to cleanse it. The stain is deeper, more internal, so suffering is needed as well. But what do we learn from this? The Alter Rebbe wants to bring this beraisa. According to this explanation, the reason the Alter Rebbe brings the

12:00 beraisa is to show that this beraisa in Tractate Yoma teaches us that there are many levels of teshuvah. There is the simplest, most basic level of teshuvah tata’ah, and it brings atonement too. But with a positive mitzvah, this level of teshuvah cannot make up what is missing, so he is forgiven immediately. With a prohibition, there is also a stain and guilt in their own right, so Yom Kippur is needed. With transgressions punishable by kares or by a court-imposed death penalty, the stain is more severe, and suffering is needed to cleanse it. This explains what the Alter Rebbe goes on to do in the entire second half of the chapter: he explains that the Torah’s mitzvah of teshuvah is simply to abandon the sin. That is the explanation. In light of this beraisa, we understand why the Torah’s mitzvah of teshuvah is only to abandon the sin, without requiring the other things. It is all a continuation of chapter 1. Then, when the Alter Rebbe reaches chapter 2, he says: all this concerns atonement and forgiveness of the sin, so that he is completely forgiven. All this is about teshuvah tata’ah, simple teshuvah, and about atonement—being forgiven, and so on. But for him to be pleasing and beloved, there is a higher level of teshuvah. There are other matters too, which he will explain afterward: offerings, fasts, mortification and tzedakah. Then he goes on to teshuvah ila’ah, and so on and so forth. There are further levels. That is the direction of this explanation: to understand what the Alter Rebbe wants to accomplish here with the beraisa, and with everything he explains about it in parentheses. That brings us up to this point. Now we will continue in the chapter, at the top of page 91a. Here the Alter Rebbe begins to explain: “The mitzvah of teshuvah according to the Torah is simply to abandon the sin.” The Alter Rebbe begins to explain here

13:59 that the Torah’s mitzvah of teshuvah is simply to abandon the sin. So the Alter Rebbe is establishing a basic principle here, with two points. First, there is a Torah mitzvah of teshuvah—and that is not so straightforward. As is well known, there are several views. The Rambam, in his enumeration of the mitzvos—which we are studying now—writes that the mitzvah connected with teshuvah is confession. The Rambam’s enumeration does not list a mitzvah of teshuvah. For the Rambam, the mitzvah is confession: when a person returns from his sin, he must confess. The mitzvah the Rambam lists is the mitzvah of confession. The verse he cites is “They shall confess their sin,” a verse from Parshas Naso. So according to the Rambam, it would seem at first glance that there is no such thing as a Torah mitzvah of teshuvah. But there are other Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam. The Ramban holds that teshuvah is indeed a Torah mitzvah. And which verse does the Ramban cite? He cites the verse from Parshas Nitzavim that the Alter Rebbe will bring later: “And Hashem your G-d will return,” “And you shall return to Hashem your G-d,” and so on—“And you shall return to Hashem your G-d.” The Rambam says—that is, the Ramban says—that this is the Torah mitzvah of teshuvah. Here, then, the Alter Rebbe simply writes, “The mitzvah of teshuvah according to the Torah.” On a straightforward reading, one might think that the Alter Rebbe is following the Ramban’s view, that teshuvah is a Torah mitzvah, rather than the Rambam’s view. But the Rebbe has a sicha on this in Likkutei Sichos, volume 38, Parshas Naso, and there the Rebbe does not accept that reading. The Rebbe offers several ways to explain it. One of them is that the Rambam, too, actually holds that teshuvah is a Torah mitzvah, contrary to the way the Minchas Chinuch understood him, and so on. There is an extensive discussion of the arguments on both sides. There are—there were those who

16:07 That’s how they understood it. According to the Rebbe’s explanation, even the Ramban, who disagrees with the Rambam, explains that the Rambam actually also holds that teshuvah is a mitzvah from the Torah. The point is that, according to the Rambam’s approach, when a mitzvah has a spiritual component and a physical component, we count the physical component as the mitzvah. Take a simple example: prayer. There is a mitzvah to pray, and the Rambam holds that prayer is a Torah obligation. Now, prayer has two aspects: praying, which is done through speech, and the service of the heart. What is the service of the heart? Prayer. But the Rambam does not list two mitzvos. For the Rambam, there is one mitzvah: to pray. In other words, the mitzvah is expressed through speech. Mitzvos require an action, a physical act. So when one mitzvah has a spiritual component—an intention, a thought—and a practical component, we count its practical component. The same applies here, as we come to teshuvah. This is what the Rebbe explains: the Rambam certainly also holds that teshuvah is a mitzvah from the Torah. But teshuvah itself is spiritual, while confession is the physical component: speech. That is why the Rambam lists confession in his enumeration of the mitzvos. Teshuvah, though, is also a mitzvah from the Torah. There is another approach, which the Rebbe cites: that according to the Rambam, teshuvah is not a mitzvah from the Torah, because one cannot command a person to do teshuvah. The command is that if you want to do teshuvah, if you regret what you did, then you must confess. That is the mitzvah. But teshuvah itself does not fall within the definition of a mitzvah. You cannot command a person to do teshuvah; the Torah does not command it. You committed a transgression, you sinned.

18:12 That’s that. If you want to do teshuvah, the mitzvah is that you must confess. That is the approach of the Minchas Chinuch. The Rebbe presents three ways of understanding the Rambam’s approach, and explains them in a very interesting sequence, in a wonderful sicha in Likkutei Sichos, volume 38, Parshas Naso. In any case, all this concerns the words “the mitzvah of teshuvah from the Torah.” You can see how every word in Tanya calls for careful attention. But that is one point. The author of Tanya then tells us what the mitzvah of teshuvah from the Torah is. The Alter Rebbe says: “It is simply abandoning sin.” Three words: “simply abandoning sin.” The Alter Rebbe wants to explain the Torah’s definition of teshuvah. That is one point. The essential point of teshuvah from the Torah is abandoning sin: a person must decide that from now on, he will not do it again. In other words, what is the question here, and what is novel about this? At first glance, several things are involved when a person commits a transgression. First, there must be regret for the past; he must regret the wrong thing he did. There is a commitment for the future. There is confession, and there is asking forgiveness. All these things are involved. The Alter Rebbe says: No, none of those is the essential point. There is one point: What is the essence of teshuvah from the Torah? In a moment he will bring proofs from the verses, from the Torah. The definition of teshuvah is not about the past, and that really is a great innovation. If you simply asked someone on the street—or even a Torah scholar who knows what the word teshuvah means—he would say that teshuvah means regretting what you did. Teshuvah is regret. As the Rebbe points out in his sichos, in other languages,

20:12 in English and Spanish, when people speak of teshuvah they use a word meaning regret—“repentimiento.” Regret concerns the past. The Alter Rebbe says that this is a very great mistake. The mitzvah of teshuvah from the Torah is not about the past. Teshuvah means abandoning sin, and abandoning sin is about what happens from now on. That is the foundation. We will soon see where the Alter Rebbe derives it from. “As stated in the Gemara, in chapter 3 of Sanhedrin, and in Choshen Mishpat, at the end of section 34, concerning testimony.” The Alter Rebbe gives his source: the Gemara in Sanhedrin and Choshen Mishpat, on the laws of testimony. What does it say there? There is a halachah in the laws of testimony, also cited by the Rambam in his Laws of Testimony, that a wicked person is disqualified as a witness. There are many details in halachah about when a person is considered wicked and disqualified from testifying. Among the examples are gambling with dice and lending with interest—various transgressions that people recognize as harmful to society, and a number of others. Not every transgression makes someone “wicked” with regard to testimony; there are several rules governing this. In any case, the Gemara in Sanhedrin discusses when such a person ceases to be a disqualified witness, and when he can be trusted. It says that the moment he decides not to do it again, he is no longer considered a wicked witness. The moment someone decides and says that from today onward he will no longer lend with interest or gamble with dice, he ceases to be a wicked witness. It does not say that he needs to fast, or undergo acts of self-denial, or

22:09 confess. It does not mention all those details, all those things. It mentions only the decision that from today onward he will not do it again. According to halachah, he is then considered fit to testify. The Rebbe points out that, yes, the Rema writes that he must break the cards: if he used to play cards, he must break the cards or the dice. But that is only so the beis din can be sure that he has done teshuvah. The beis din cannot see what has happened within him. As for the definition of teshuvah itself, the halachah implies that the decision about the future is teshuvah. He then ceases to be considered wicked according to halachah. So we see in halachah that the Torah’s definition of teshuvah is abandoning sin. The Rebbe also points out in his sichos that it is interesting that the Alter Rebbe specifically brings proof from the laws of testimony. He could also have brought proof from the laws of marriage. There, too, the halachah is that if a man betroths a woman on the condition that he is completely righteous, she is betrothed even if, up to that point, he had been completely wicked. In practice, her betrothal is considered uncertain. Why? Because we do not know whether he truly meant it. But in principle, if we could read his mind and know that he sincerely meant it, it would be a valid betrothal. That is why she is considered betrothed in a case of doubt. In any event, some degree of betrothal takes effect. But wait—just a moment earlier, he was completely wicked! Yet he now says, “On condition that I am completely righteous.” His decision that, from this moment onward, he will no longer be wicked itself makes him completely righteous. That is why, at the very least, she is considered betrothed in a case of doubt.

23:56 There are many sichos discussing why the Alter Rebbe chose the halachah about testimony specifically, rather than the halachah about betrothal. The discussion there is extensive. In any case, one of the explanations the Rebbe gives is that testimony is connected to the entire service of teshuvah. “You are My witnesses”: a Jew bears witness to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. As is known, the Rambam writes about the significance and gravity of testimony. Through giving testimony, you become a witness to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That is why it must be treated so seriously, and why a witness is given all kinds of stern warnings when he comes to testify: a Jew is a witness to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. This shows the tremendous power of teshuvah. The moment a person commits to abandoning sin, he becomes a witness who can be relied upon. In any case, that is the essential point. Now the Alter Rebbe will go on to explain what “abandoning sin” means. One might think it is very easy: abandon the sin, and that’s it. So in a moment, the Alter Rebbe will explain its definition in greater detail.