Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 39 - Part 4

00:00 Here, the Alter Rebbe... Up to this point, the Alter Rebbe has discussed two kinds of intent in mitzvos: intent stemming from natural love and fear, and intent stemming from intellectual love and fear. These correspond to the worlds of Yetzirah and Beriah, and, in terms of levels, to the difference between an animal and a human being. That is what he has discussed so far, explaining at length the differences between the levels. From here onward, in the next section of the chapter—from this colon to the next colon on page 53—the Alter Rebbe turns to the world of Atzilus. In other words, we have discussed four categories: two levels in performing a mitzvah and two levels in the intent behind it, corresponding to the inanimate, the growing, the animal, and the human. In performing a mitzvah, there are the inanimate and the growing: two forms of action, mitzvos dependent on doing something and mitzvos dependent on speech. Then there are two levels of intent: intent connected with natural love and fear, and intent arising from intellectual love and fear. And to which worlds do all these ascend? To the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. The performance of a mitzvah is connected with Asiyah. Intent behind a mitzvah—but what kind of intent? Natural intent. Natural love and fear ascend to Yetzirah, and intellectual love and fear ascend to Beriah. But he has not discussed what happens with Atzilus: what kind of love brings us there? After all, Atzilus is also one of the four worlds. So there must also be some kind of love through which a person can have a connection with the world of Atzilus. The Alter Rebbe said at the beginning of Tanya chapter 2, when discussing the soul, that all souls are rooted in Atzilus. That is how the Alter Rebbe began his discussion

02:29 of the soul of every person: the soul of a Jew is “truly a part of G-d above.” The Alter Rebbe explained that all souls are rooted in the Chochmah of Atzilus, just as a son is rooted in his father’s mind, and afterward the soul descends. He then gave the whole analogy of a baby in its mother’s womb for nine months: it develops into all sorts of parts—limbs and sinews—and grows fingernails, down to the lowest part. The Alter Rebbe explained there that, similarly, all souls are rooted in the Chochmah of Atzilus. That is the root of all souls. Afterward, they descend from world to world. There are souls in Atzilus; there are souls that descend further, to Beriah, souls that descend to Yetzirah, souls of Asiyah, down to souls at the level of fingernails. This accounts for the many differences among the levels of souls. There are souls whose love is expressed in action. There are souls whose love takes the form of natural love and fear, and souls whose love takes an intellectual form, intellectual love and fear. And there is the level of a soul of Atzilus. So far, the Alter Rebbe has discussed Asiyah, Yetzirah, and Beriah. Here he comes to explain the way to reach the world of Atzilus. Although the Alter Rebbe will go on to say that this is not so relevant to the beinoni. The beinoni’s task is not, essentially, to reach Atzilus. The beinoni reaches only the world of Beriah. That is the beinoni; the level of Atzilus is not demanded of him. Still, there is a connection. The Alter Rebbe includes this subject just as, in the earlier chapters, he discussed the tzaddik in order to help us better understand the beinoni. The Alter Rebbe also discussed the levels of a tzaddik who has good and a tzaddik who has evil, even though that is not

04:12 the main subject of Tanya. Likewise here, the Alter Rebbe includes this subject, especially since in certain respects the beinoni does have a connection to it. After all, our soul comes from Atzilus. So a Jew does have a connection, at least from time to time, with Atzilus too, as the Alter Rebbe will explain later in the chapter. That is just to understand how this follows from the preceding discussion in the chapter. Now we will learn the text. Look inside. Let’s go back and see how he presents it. It says ... in Tanya ... “The world of Atzilus is beyond the grasp and comprehension of a created intellect.” What is the world of Atzilus? It is entirely beyond a created being’s capacity to understand or grasp. “For the Chochmah, Binah, and Daas of the blessed Ein Sof are united with Him there in perfect unity, an immense and wondrous unity.” Chochmah, Binah, and Daas as they exist in the world of Atzilus are united with the Ein Sof in an immense and wondrous unity, infinitely more so than in the world of Beriah. It is incomparably greater than the wondrous unity of the Chochmah, Binah, and Daas of the world of Beriah. “For there they descended to shine in a limited manner.” “There” means the world of Beriah. There they descended to shine in a limited manner, in the world of Beriah. Chochmah, Binah, and Daas descended there to shine in a limited way so that created intellects could receive from them—so that a created being could know, understand, and grasp something of the blessed Ein Sof, could understand and grasp G-dliness according to the capacity of created intellects, which are finite and limited. To the extent that finite, limited beings can grasp it. What is the Alter Rebbe saying here? He is explaining the difference between the world of Atzilus and the world of Beriah. In Atzilus, the Chochmah, Binah, and Daas of the Ein Sof, of Hakadosh Boruch Hu, are present. But there they are completely united with the Ein Sof.

06:27 In Beriah, by contrast, Chochmah, Binah, and Daas have descended and become limited; they are no longer in that wondrous unity. They have descended and become limited to fit the parameters of created beings. The world of Beriah relates to created beings so that a created being can grasp something. It is therefore on the created being’s level, so that he will not cease to exist as a distinct entity, so that created beings will not cease to exist as distinct entities and no longer be created beings at all, but instead return to their source and root, and so on. Because without this limitation, a created being would cease to exist as a distinct entity entirely. He would become something G-dly; he would no longer have the form of a created being. So what is the Alter Rebbe coming to explain here? What is his point? The difference between Atzilus and Beriah. At first glance, we might say that there is no great difference between Atzilus and Beriah. Why? Because we see that the Chochmah, Binah, and Daas of Hakadosh Boruch Hu shine in the world of Atzilus. We said the same thing about the world of Beriah: the Chochmah, Binah, and Daas of the blessed Ein Sof shine there too. So what has changed? Earlier, when the Alter Rebbe reached the world of Beriah, he said that Chochmah, Binah, and Daas shine there. On the previous page, at the top of page 52a, the Alter Rebbe also said that the Chochmah, Binah, and Daas of the blessed Ein Sof shine in the world of Beriah. And here he says that Chochmah, Binah, and Daas shine in Atzilus too. So what is the difference? The Alter Rebbe explains that the difference

08:20 Is that in Atzilus, chochmah, binah, and daas are utterly united with the Ein Sof, blessed be He. In the world of Beriah, by contrast, they are not utterly united. Why? Because there, chochmah, binah, and daas have descended and been contracted to suit the parameters of a created being. That is a difference from one extreme to the other. Although we say that chochmah, binah, and daas shine in both Atzilus and Beriah, the way they are revealed is entirely different. In the world of Atzilus, they shine in a state of unity, utterly united with the Ein Sof, blessed be He. In other words, what is felt there is not how chochmah, binah, and daas are grasped by the recipient, by the created being. Quite the opposite: there, chochmah, binah, and daas are felt as they are from the perspective of the Ein Sof, utterly united with the Ein Sof. In the world of Beriah, by contrast, chochmah, binah, and daas are already expressed in relation to a created being. That is something entirely different. To put this in the terms explained in other maamarim of Chassidus, where the subject is developed in greater detail, it is like the distinction Chassidus draws between a garment that is united with what it clothes and a separate garment. How does Chassidus explain that distinction? It is the difference between a body and clothing. Chassidus explains that neither the body nor clothing is the thing itself. Both are only garments for the soul; the body, too, is a garment for the soul. Nevertheless, there is an enormous difference: the body is a garment that is united with what it clothes. That means that when you look at the body, you see life in it. You do not have to look elsewhere for it. The body’s entire existence expresses life. When the soul joins the body, you have a living person. The soul is revealed in the body. So

10:23 you do not have to search for where the life is. The body reveals life; the body itself reveals it. Why? Because the body’s whole purpose has become life. It has no independent purpose. You cannot say that a body is a piece of flesh that also has something additional—life. Its whole purpose is life. Clothing, by contrast, has another purpose. Clothing, too, reveals the person to a certain extent. You can get to know a person through their clothing, to know what kind of person they are. There are aspects of a person you can see through their clothing. It does not conceal completely. Nevertheless, you cannot say that a garment’s whole purpose is to reveal. It has a purpose of its own, an aspect of its own, while also revealing something else. That, in general, is the distinction Chassidus explains between a garment that is united with what it clothes and a separate garment. A garment that is united with what it clothes—its whole purpose is to reveal. More generally, this is the distinction between vessels and garments. As Chassidus explains, there are vessels and there are garments. A vessel means that its whole purpose is to receive the light; it has no purpose of its own. A garment, by contrast, conceals as well as reveals. Revealing is not its sole purpose; it has another purpose too. That is the general distinction. There are several examples, such as bodies and garments. With the soul’s faculties, this is the distinction between the vessels of the soul’s faculties and the soul’s garments. The vessels of the soul’s faculties—intellect and emotions—are also not the soul itself. They are faculties of the soul, not its essence. Nevertheless, the vessels of the soul’s faculties are united with the soul. In other words, they reveal the soul. The whole purpose of intellect is to reveal the soul; the emotions reveal the soul. Their whole purpose is for the soul to be revealed

12:00 through them. Thought and speech, by contrast, consist of letters. Letters are something separate. A person can think about things that have no content, thoughts that express nothing at all of the soul. He can think letters that have no content. He can talk nonsense that expresses nothing at all. In other words, letters themselves do not reveal the person. If you use letters to convey something, then letters reveal as well. But can you say that is their whole purpose? Certainly not. Along these lines, the Alter Rebbe says here—in somewhat different language, but this is the point—that this is how to understand the difference between the world of Atzilus and the world of Beriah. In both, His chochmah, binah, and daas shine. The difference is that in Atzilus, His chochmah, binah, and daas are united in a wondrous and profound unity with the Ein Sof. In other words, you look at chochmah, binah, and daas. What do you see? You do not see them as an independent existence. What do you see? The Ein Sof—His chochmah, binah, and daas. That is what shines here. What is felt here is G-dliness. By contrast, when His chochmah, binah, and daas reach the world of Beriah, they become chochmah, binah, and daas that relate to created beings. There, the aim is not for the Ein Sof to shine. The aim is for a created being to be able to grasp them, and consequently they take on a form suited to the created being. That itself makes the difference between the world of Atzilus and the world of Beriah: the created being can receive them. If, by contrast, His chochmah, binah, and daas were revealed without contraction, as he says, the created being would be completely nullified in its existence. It could not receive them. On this very point, the Alter Rebbe gives two details here. The Alter Rebbe says that they should not

13:46 “be nullified in their existence and cease to be in the category of created beings altogether.” Why the extended wording here? The Rebbe says that in the world of Beriah, Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s chochmah, binah, and daas undergo contraction. They do not shine in a state of wondrous unity; they come through contraction so that the created being can receive them without being nullified in its existence. But you see that the Alter Rebbe uses extended wording. He says that the contraction of His chochmah, binah, and daas in the world of Beriah enables the created being to grasp G-dliness “and not be nullified in their existence and cease to be in the category of created beings altogether.” Why the extended wording? The Rebbe says that these are actually two separate points. “Not be nullified in their existence” is one point; “and cease to be in the category of created beings altogether” is another. As we explained, bittul b’metzius does not mean that it ceases to be a created being. Bittul means that it exists, but it is in a state of self-nullification. Bittul b’metzius means that it has no independent existence; its entire existence is utterly nullified to G-dliness. So that is one point: if what shines in Atzilus were revealed, if His chochmah, binah, and daas were revealed without contraction, what effect would that have on the created being? Bittul b’metzius. In the world of Beriah, even with all the understanding and comprehension found there—when a soul understands and grasps G-dliness—that also brings about self-nullification. When a soul is in Gan Eden, in the world of Beriah, and understands and grasps G-dliness, that too brings about self-nullification. So does the radiance of the Shechinah. But the self-nullification is not such that the soul is completely nullified in its existence. Ultimately, because the G-dliness is clothed in something suited to a created being, however much the created being nullifies itself, it is bittul hayesh, not bittul b’metzius. When what shines in Atzilus is revealed, by contrast, there is bittul b’metzius. But the Alter Rebbe goes further and says that if the light were to shine

15:40 Of Atzilus as it is, he says: they would not be in the category of created beings at all. It is not just that there would be bittul; they would not be considered created beings in the first place. It would no longer be a created being that is nullified to G-dliness. It would not be a created being; it would be G-dliness. It would be a different kind of existence. The difference between Atzilus and Beriah is not merely a difference in how nullified something is—that in the world of Beriah it is somewhat nullified, while in the world of Atzilus it is more nullified. Rather, the difference between Atzilus and Beriah is that if the wisdom, understanding, and knowledge of the Ein Sof were to shine as they are, then, he says, not only would there be bittul: it would not be in the category of a created being at all. It would be on the side of the Creator, not a created being. Atzilus is not in the category of a created being; it is in the category of the Creator. That is the idea of [unclear]. It is G-dliness. It would be actual G-dliness, within G-dliness, and not in the category of a created being at all. This is essentially the wording in Tanya as well, in Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah. The Alter Rebbe says there that if the word of Hashem were to depart for a moment—what is the Alter Rebbe’s wording? If the word of Hashem were to depart from the created being for a moment and return to its source, then the created being would become absolute nothingness. What is the wording there? Hm? Everyone learns it that way. But the wording is “return to its source,” isn’t it? “If the letters were to depart for a moment and return to their source, all the heavens would become absolute nothingness.” What does that mean? According to what we are learning here, it means that the letters of the word of Hashem, Malchus of Atzilus, become enclothed in Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. Through this, a created being comes into existence: a created being of Beriah, a created being of Yetzirah, a created being of Asiyah. If the letters depart, what does “depart” mean? That there are

17:26 no more letters? No. He says they “return to their source,” return to their source. The point is that the letters themselves never cease to exist. The letters are eternal. The letters that bring the created being into existence are letters of G-dliness. It is not that they cease to exist. It does not mean that “Let there be a firmament” is no longer there. It means that “Let there be a firmament” returns to its source. The letters return to Atzilus, and they are still there in Atzilus. This is what we say in davening: “He endures, His name endures, and His kingship endures forever.” In other words, Malchus is the very concept of letters. Malchus is the word of Hashem; it is letters. The letters themselves always exist in Atzilus. But what is the difference? There, it is not a created being. So there are the letters “Let there be a firmament” as they exist in Atzilus. “Let there be a firmament” as it exists in Atzilus is not a created being. It is a firmament in Atzilus; it is G-dliness, something within G-dliness. It is a level within G-dliness, not a created being. Rather, Hakadosh Boruch Hu said, “Let there be a firmament,” so that there would be a firmament in Beriah, so that a firmament would come into being in Asiyah. In Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah—that is where a firmament comes into being. This is why we say that at every moment Hakadosh Boruch Hu must renew this: that “Let there be a firmament” should be present in Beriah, in Asiyah. The moment He stops saying “Let there be a firmament” in Asiyah and the letters return to “Let there be a firmament” as it is in Atzilus, then it becomes absolute nothingness. The firmament in Beriah becomes absolute nothingness. The Rebbe points out that this is the meaning. This is a fundamental idea. In the teachings of the Baal Hamaor, too, it says several times: “Let there be a firmament,” “and it was so,” “and it was so.” Again and again. The verse says, “And it was so.” Why does it say, “And it was so”? Surely, if Hakadosh Boruch Hu said it, it came to be. Why does the Torah need to add, “And it was so”? “Let there be a firmament, and it was so.” So I explain that the letters themselves—“Let there be a firmament”—since “Let there be

19:28 a firmament” consists of letters in Atzilus, do not necessarily mean there will be a firmament in a physical world. It is a firmament in Atzilus. It is not a created being; it is part of G-dliness. It is a level within G-dliness. There is the concept of a firmament in Atzilus as well, but there it is not a created being. “And it was so,” however, tells us that it came to be that way in Asiyah too. That is something entirely new. In other words, His saying “Let there be a firmament” does not yet mean there must be a firmament in Asiyah. “And it was so” means that this came about in Asiyah as well: the reality of a firmament in physical Asiyah. If Hakadosh Boruch Hu stops saying “Let there be a firmament,” the reality of “Let there be a firmament” in physical Asiyah will cease to exist. But the letters themselves, the concept of a firmament, will still exist. It just will not be a created being; it will be something within G-dliness. So this is what the Alter Rebbe is saying here about the difference between the world of Atzilus and the world of Beriah. It is true that we say Chochmah, Binah, and Daas shine in both, but there is a difference between Chochmah, Binah, and Daas as they shine in Atzilus and as they shine in Beriah. In Atzilus, Chochmah, Binah, and Daas are in a state of wondrous unity within themselves, without tzimtzum, not relating to a created being. By contrast, as Chochmah, Binah, and Daas shine in Beriah, they are no longer in that wondrous unity within themselves. They undergo tzimtzum, and that enables a created being to comprehend. This tzimtzum, through which Chochmah, Binah, and Daas are no longer as they are in their essence but are instead suited to the parameters of created beings, is what enables a created being in the world of Beriah to comprehend G-dliness. Elsewhere, in many discussions of Atzilus, this is explained more fully. I am not sure why, but you can see that he does not say it explicitly here. Elsewhere, the difference between the world of Atzilus and the world

21:21 of Beriah is explained at greater length: in the world of Atzilus it is Chochmah, and in the world of Beriah it is Binah. For some reason, the Alter Rebbe does not emphasize that here. Here the Alter Rebbe speaks of Chochmah, Binah, and Daas together. He says that Chochmah, Binah, and Daas shine in the world of Atzilus, but in a way that is united within itself, while in the world of Beriah they shine in a way that involves tzimtzum. But in many places in Chassidus, the difference is brought out and explained. To better understand the difference between Atzilus and Beriah: in Atzilus, the sefirah of Chochmah shines. It is true that Chochmah, Binah, and Daas shine there, but what is primary? What is the main point that shines in the world of Atzilus? It is Chochmah. And in the world of Beriah, it is primarily the sefirah of Binah. There is Chochmah there too, but the central feature of Beriah is the sefirah of Binah. The central feature of Atzilus is the sefirah of Chochmah. Everything we have just been discussing, the whole difference, is essentially the difference between Chochmah and Binah. It is the same point. What is the difference between Chochmah and Binah? On the one hand, both Chochmah and Binah are forms of intellect. They both have the quality of intellect, which is bittul and unity. That is the great quality of intellect, its advantage over the emotions. Emotions involve a sense of self; intellect involves bittul. The whole point of intellect is that it seeks the truth. A person is willing to set aside his own sense of self in order to know the truth. So both Chochmah and Binah involve bittul. But the difference between them is that Chochmah is koach mah—the capacity to ask, “What?” In other words, in Chochmah the light of intellect shines without any imprint of the person. It is not about what I understand, but about the thing as it truly is. Koach mah: what is the matter in itself? That is why the sefirah of Chochmah entails complete bittul. Binah, by contrast, is how I grasp the matter. Now, it is true that Binah seeks the truth. It is not looking for something it happens to like. It is looking for the

23:12 The truth. But the whole idea of binah, the very nature of binah—binah means understanding, comprehension. In other words, how does the matter become clothed in my own words? How does it reach me? That is why Kabbalah explains the difference between chochmah and binah: in chochmah, there is light without vessels, while the existence of vessels begins with binah. What does it mean that chochmah is without vessels? It does not simply mean there are no vessels there; every level has vessels. Rather, the vessels are in a state of complete bittul. They are not felt as an independent existence. The entire existence of the vessels is united with the light; it is not an existence in its own right. With binah, an existence of vessels begins. This also gives rise to the difference between Atzilus and Beriah. In the world of Atzilus, where chochmah of Atzilus shines, everything is therefore in a state of complete bittul. In the world of Beriah, by contrast, it is already binah. Binah already involves a sense of self, an existence. That is the essential difference. What the Alter Rebbe says here, in different words, is that there, it is chochmah, binah, and daas as they are on the side of the Higher One, and therefore a created being cannot receive them. In Beriah, by contrast, chochmah, binah, and daas come in a form suited to a created being, so the created being can benefit from them and receive the light of Ein Sof through them. In Atzilus, by contrast, where they are not contracted to such an extent, created intellects cannot receive from them. In Atzilus, the chochmah, binah, and daas are not so contracted. That means they shine there in a more revealed way, so created beings cannot receive from them. He says, “There is not such a great contraction,” implying that even in Atzilus there is some contraction. He does not say there is no contraction there at all. His wording is, “There is not such a great contraction.” That is readily understood, because the world of Atzilus is, after all, a world. The world of Atzilus

24:51 is not... They are speaking here about Atzilus, which is also a world, so even in Atzilus there are already vessels, and consequently there is contraction there too. It is like what we said earlier: the body and clothing are both coverings. Even the body is no longer the soul itself. There is already some contraction of the soul. The difference is that in the body it is a matter of unity, right? In the body, the soul is present in a state of unity and harmony. Clothing, by contrast, is something separate. So Atzilus, too, is after all a world, and since the world of Atzilus also involves the existence of vessels, it too involves some contraction. But it is not such a great contraction. What does “not such a great contraction” mean? It is not merely a matter of degree—less contraction or more contraction. It is a different kind of contraction. The contraction in Atzilus is, as we said, a contraction in a state of unity: the light really is contracted according to the vessels, but the vessels are in harmony with the light, so the existence of a created being is not felt there. That is why a created being cannot grasp it. In Beriah, by contrast, the contraction is completely different. It is another kind of contraction, one that comes about through separateness. Consequently, it can be received by a created being. This is what he means when he says that there is, so to speak, “not such a great contraction,” and created intellects cannot receive from them. Created beings, then, cannot receive from the world of Atzilus. And therefore, “their thought cannot grasp Him at all.” Thus, with regard to the level of the world of Atzilus, we say that the souls of created beings cannot grasp anything there. In the world of Atzilus, there is no grasp of it whatsoever. Therefore, it is the abode of the great tzaddikim. The world of Atzilus is the place where

26:23 the great tzaddikim are, whose avodah is far, far beyond even the level of fear and love that flow from binah and daas in contemplating His greatness, may He be blessed. Which souls can grasp and receive the revelation of the world of Atzilus? Those souls whose avodah is even higher than fear and love and intellectual understanding. One cannot reach Atzilus through serving Hashem by way of comprehension. This avodah is far beyond even the binah and daas of a created being. Rather, it is an avodah of being literally a chariot. What is their avodah? To be literally like a chariot—a chariot for Hashem, may He be blessed; to be utterly nullified and included in His light. Here too, he uses two expressions, right? “To be nullified”—the idea of bittul. Then he says “to be included,” along the lines of what we said earlier about the two expressions, complete nullification and... created beings. So these tzaddikim, the souls of tzaddikim whose avodah is like a chariot, have both of these qualities: “to be nullified,” the matter of bittul, right? And they also have “to be included”: they are truly one, and are not at all in the category of a created being, the category of creation. “And these are the tzaddikim who were a chariot for Hashem all their lives”—that was their avodah. That defines the level of their service: they were like a chariot. In other words, the Arizal says something quite remarkable. There is no time now to elaborate on it, but briefly, the point the Arizal makes here is fundamental. In a certain sense, it gives us some understanding of the distinction people raise between a Rebbe and a chossid—even though a Rebbe may be higher than what is described here. But to understand

28:04 it a little, to some extent: according to what he explains here, the difference between the great tzaddikim, whose avodah is on the level of Atzilus, right, and all the other souls who serve Hashem with natural love and fear, with intellectual love and fear—all these things, all these levels—is a difference from one extreme to the other. What is the difference? What is its essential point? All the levels of serving Hashem with natural love and fear or with intellectual love and fear are within the category of a created being. The moment you reach Atzilus, you become a chariot. That is no longer the category of a created being; it is the category of the Creator. And this is what the Rebbe says: “They will not be in the category of created beings at all.” The moment a person rises to the level of Atzilus, it means that he is utterly nullified. And what does that mean? Not only is he utterly nullified, he says; rather, he becomes—he is no longer in the category of a created being, but in the category of the Creator. Accordingly, we can understand all the expressions cited in this connection. Regarding Rashbi, it says: “Who is the face of the Master, Hashem? This is Rashbi.” Rashbi is described with the expression “the face of the Master, Hashem.” Or the Gemara—the Rebbe also cites a passage in the Yerushalmi about Rabbi Eliezer, where they said of him as well: “Rabbi, ... [unclear] ... Rabbi Eliezer on the chair.” And likewise, various expressions in the sichos about a tzaddik, about the Rebbe, that he is Atzmus u’Mahus clothed in a body. The intent of all these expressions is to explain that such a Jew, such a tzaddik, whose avodah is like a chariot—not through natural love and fear, not even through intellectual love and fear, but like a chariot—is, ultimately, G-dliness. So he is on the level of Atzilus, and Atzilus is no longer a created being; it is in the category of the Creator. In other words, he becomes nothing and naught. This is what it means that his entire existence, his very existence, is only

29:41 G-dliness. That is his entire existence. He has no existence of his own, and then his entire existence is only G-dliness. That is no longer the category of a created being, and this is what is written. There are various Midrashim, and quite a few matters explained on this basis, including the whole subject of the avodah of tzaddikim. There is a maamar for this week—by coincidence, in the private class we are discussing the chariot here. So there is a maamar for this week, for Behaaloscha. Some of the bachurim have learned it, or will learn it. It is a very beautiful maamar, Behaaloscha 5729. There the Rebbe discusses the whole subject of the chariot. What is it? What is the bittul of a chariot? The Rebbe explains it at length. The Rebbe’s whole explanation is very interesting.