Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 37 - Part 2

00:01 The Alter Rebbe explains here, at the beginning of chapter 37, that all the perfection of the days of Moshiach—Moshiach Tzidkeinu—depends on this. What are the days of Moshiach about? As we said in chapter 36, there will then be a revelation of the Infinite here below, in this physical world. On the one hand, the loftiest light, the Infinite as it is without any garment, will be revealed. And on the other hand, where will it be revealed? Precisely here below, in this physical world. What does that depend on? It depends on our deeds and our service throughout the time of galus. We spoke in the previous class about what “our deeds and our service” means, and also about the Alter Rebbe’s emphasis here on the entire time of galus. We spoke about it briefly, at least. The emphasis on the time of galus is because of what the Alter Rebbe says here about the special quality of our service through Torah and mitzvos. In chapter 36, the Alter Rebbe said that the special quality of our service in this physical world is the transformation of darkness into light—because this is what He desired. The Alter Rebbe explains in chapter 36 that Hashem desired a dwelling for Himself in the lower realms, through the transformation of darkness into light and the superiority of light that comes from darkness: that darkness itself should be transformed into light. Since that is what the Alter Rebbe emphasizes about Torah and mitzvos—that they transform darkness into light—he also emphasizes here that this takes place specifically during the time of galus. For this aspect of mitzvos, transforming darkness into light, applies primarily during galus. Now, I don’t want to go into this at length here, but in general, the Rebbe explains that mitzvos have several aspects. There is the refinement of the physical through mitzvos, and there is the resting of the Shechinah in a mitzvah, because it is His will. There are several aspects to mitzvos. Since the emphasis here

02:12 is on the transformation brought about by a mitzvah—that a mitzvah transforms darkness into light, which is the intent of making a dwelling in the lower realms, as the Alter Rebbe explains here: transforming the darkness of the kelipos and making it into a dwelling for Him, blessed be He—this takes place primarily during galus. In the time of the Beis Hamikdash, the world was more refined, there was a greater revelation of G-dliness, and so on. The darkness in the world was therefore not as great, and the service of transforming darkness into light was not as pronounced. It is specifically during galus that our deeds and our service involve transforming darkness into light. That is why the Alter Rebbe emphasizes here that the revelations of the days of Moshiach Tzidkeinu—the revelation of His very Self here below, in this physical world—come primarily through which deeds and service of ours? Specifically our deeds and our service during galus. That is one explanation. There is certainly another explanation from the Rebbe as to why the Alter Rebbe emphasizes the time of galus specifically: because of the bittul present during galus—not because of the transformation, but because of the bittul. Service during galus involves more bittul than service in the time of the Beis Hamikdash. But in any event, this explanation is enough for now. The Alter Rebbe continues—and I’ll start his words again here—“For what brings about…” on the fourth line of chapter 37. Why is it specifically through our deeds and our service in galus? Because what brings about the reward of a mitzvah is the mitzvah itself. The mitzvah itself brings about its reward. What does that mean? It means the following. As is well known, the Rishonim already discuss a major dispute concerning the reward for mitzvos. What is the nature of that reward? One approach says that the reward for a mitzvah is a reward granted by decree, while another says it is a natural reward. What does that mean? There are, after all,

04:08 two kinds of reward. For example, a person works and receives a salary. Say he works in a yeshivah and is paid a salary—money. Now, the money does not come from the work itself. His work is giving classes, teaching. The money does not come from the teaching; it comes from elsewhere. So the reward does not come from what he does. The reward is something separate: he does one thing and is paid from another source. It is as though the reward does not arise from the act itself. It is something separate that comes from elsewhere. Other people earn money and give it to this person so that he can do his work. That is what we mean here by a reward granted by decree: the reward itself has no direct connection to the action the person performs. But there is another kind, called a natural reward. A natural reward is, for example, the arrangement discussed in the Gemara concerning someone who works the land—what is he called? An aris, a sharecropper. He receives a share of what he has worked on. He works the land, and of what grows, he receives a half, a third, or a quarter—a share of the fruits of his labor. There, his reward comes out of what he himself does. Similarly, Yaakov Avinu received part of the flock he had worked with and labored over. In any case, these are two kinds of reward that exist in our world too. So when we say that we receive a reward for our service in fulfilling mitzvos, what is the nature of that reward? Some say—and there are Rishonim who explain this—that the whole concept of reward is completely beyond comparison to the mitzvah. A Jew puts on tefillin: he takes a piece of animal hide, makes it into something he binds on his arm, and for that he receives the reward of enjoying the radiance of the Shechinah. What connection is there between a physical action you do with animal hide—putting on tefillin, wearing tzitzis—and receiving such a wondrous, immense reward?

06:01 So some of the Rishonim argued that reward is something granted by decree. In other words, there is no real connection between the reward and the action. Rather, Hashem wants to give us a reward, one that is utterly beyond comparison to the action, and Hashem decreed that if you do a particular action, you will receive that reward. That is one approach. The second approach says no: the reward is the result of our action itself. And that is the approach—and what the Alter Rebbe says here in the words of the Tanya: “For even the reward of a mitzvah is the mitzvah itself.” In other words, the reward is the result of the action itself. What is a mitzvah? As I am about to explain, a mitzvah means taking a physical thing and connecting it with Atzmus, Hashem’s very Essence. That is the nature of a mitzvah: taking a physical thing and connecting it with Hashem. And the reward is precisely that. What is the reward? It is that, in the future, what was accomplished will be revealed: Atzmus will be revealed in the physical thing. So the future reward is the revelation of what a person did; it is not something else. What does a person do? He takes a physical thing and connects it with Hashem. And in the future, what he did will be revealed. The result of his action will be revealed; the Infinite Light that he drew into the physical thing will be revealed. Now let’s look at the words inside the Tanya:

07:37 The Alter Rebbe says: “For by doing it, he draws down a revelation of the light of the blessed Ein Sof from above to below.” When a person fulfills a mitzvah, while he is doing it, he is—what is the nature of a mitzvah? He draws down the revelation of the Infinite Light from above to here below, so that it becomes invested in the physical. And what does fulfilling a mitzvah mean? Mitzvah means tzavsa vechibur, joining and connection—with the Supernal Will, the will of the Infinite Light, of Hashem, of Atzmus. When I fulfill a mitzvah, I take the Infinite and the Supernal Will and draw them down here below into a physical thing. A moment earlier, before I performed the mitzvah, that thing belonged to kelipah, to this physical world. Now I make it into something joined and connected with Atzmus. So what will happen when Moshiach comes? This will be revealed. When Moshiach comes, the Infinite will be revealed in this physical world. Right now we are doing this, accomplishing it, but we do not see it openly. We perform the action. When a Jew today takes tefillin and puts them on, fulfilling the mitzvah, he actually takes this physical thing that belongs to kelipah, turns it into an object of mitzvah, and connects it with Atzmus. He has connected the Infinite with a physical thing, but right now we do not see that revealed. It is concealed. As the Rebbe illustrates in the maamarim, it is like something placed inside a box: it is there, fully there, but something conceals it so that we cannot see it. When Moshiach comes, it will be revealed, and we will see plainly how, through every physical act we performed, we drew Hashem into this world. That is the meaning of what we said. So he says that at first there was more

09:25 Under the dominion of kelipas nogah. Before I performed the mitzvah, this physical thing was under the dominion of kelipas nogah and received its life-force from it. It belonged to the realm of kelipah and received its life-force from kelipah. “These are all things that are kosher and permitted.” All things that are kosher and permitted. “Kosher” means they are not nonkosher animals; they are kosher animals. “Permitted” means they are permitted to eat. Something can come from a kosher animal but still not be permitted to eat: perhaps it was not slaughtered properly. If you do not slaughter a kosher animal properly according to halachah, it is neveilah, and it is forbidden to eat. So the Alter Rebbe specifies “kosher and permitted” in describing the things with which a practical mitzvah is performed. Something kosher and permitted belongs to kelipas nogah. So before I performed the mitzvah, it was kelipah, right? Kelipas nogah. But ultimately, kelipas nogah is still kelipah. That means it is something of the lower realm. As the Rebbe said in Tanya, chapter 36, this physical world in itself is a lower world, with none lower than it. It belongs to the realm of kelipah. Kelipah is not... it is something that is not nullified to G-dliness. If only it were nullified to G-dliness, even kelipas nogah. So now I have taken something that belongs to kelipah, and through the mitzvah I have brought it out of kelipah and connected it to the Ein Sof, to the Divine Essence. The Alter Rebbe continues, “For example.” He gives several examples. Let me give you a concrete example: the parchment for tefillin, a mezuzah, and a Sefer Torah. For example, you take parchment—the parchment for tefillin, a mezuzah, or a Sefer Torah. What do our Sages say? “Only that which comes from animals that are kosher and permitted to your mouth is fit for sacred use,” so that it can be made into parchment. So the parchment has to be something that

11:26 “Only that which comes from animals that are kosher and permitted to your mouth is fit for sacred use.” What is fit for sacred use? In other words, what may parchment be made from? It must specifically be parchment from kosher animals. You cannot make parchment from nonkosher animals. The parchment for tefillin, a mezuzah, or a Sefer Torah must come specifically from an animal that is kosher and permitted to eat—“kosher and permitted to your mouth.” There are many discussions among leading Torah scholars who studied this passage in Tanya. Seemingly, according to halachah, it must come from a kosher animal, but it does not have to be “permitted to your mouth.” There are nuances in the Alter Rebbe’s wording here: his wording seems to imply that the parchment for tefillin must be both kosher and permitted to eat. But that is not the practical ruling in the Shulchan Aruch. The Alter Rebbe rules in his Shulchan Aruch, and the halachic ruling generally is, that tefillin, mezuzos, and Sifrei Torah must be made from kosher animals, but the animals do not have to be permitted to eat. They can even be neveilah. In other words, according to halachah, one may use kosher animals that were not slaughtered properly. Using parchment from properly slaughtered kosher animals for Sifrei Torah, tefillin, and mezuzos is a hiddur, an enhancement of the mitzvah. But halachah does not require that they be slaughtered. Yet the Alter Rebbe’s wording here, “but only those that are kosher and permitted to your mouth,” implies that they must also be permitted to eat—that is, properly slaughtered. So... there are several ways to understand it. One could say that the Alter Rebbe means the enhanced way of doing the mitzvah. But better, some say that perhaps the words “and permitted to your mouth” should not be read as a continuation of what came before. It is as though we should read, “Only those that are kosher are fit for sacred use.” Yes, that is the law: parchment for tefillin must come from kosher animals. And then the Alter Rebbe also says, “permitted

13:22 to your mouth.” That is another point: there are cases where the animal must be permitted to eat. In other words, there are mitzvos performed specifically with an animal that is permitted to eat—not necessarily parchment, but other mitzvos performed with something from the animal kingdom that must specifically be permitted to eat. In any case, this is the first example the Alter Rebbe gives from the animal kingdom: practical mitzvos performed with something from the animal kingdom. “And an esrog that is not orlah.” The Alter Rebbe’s second example comes from the plant kingdom: an esrog. When an esrog is orlah, then it is kelipas nogah. Before a person uses the esrog for a mitzvah, that esrog belongs to kelipas nogah. If it is orlah—the Alter Rebbe will address that in a moment—but an esrog that is not orlah is kelipas nogah. So before I perform the mitzvah, it belongs to kelipas nogah, and now, when I take it and perform the mitzvah of lulav with it, the esrog becomes part of holiness. We will come back to orlah shortly. And here is a third example the Alter Rebbe gives, from the inanimate category: “And charity money that is not stolen.” The same applies to money as an example. Money is inanimate. You take money that is not stolen—that is, something permitted, because money is permitted, because it... So all these things belong to kelipas nogah. The Alter Rebbe gives three examples: one from the animal kingdom, one from the plant kingdom, and one from the inanimate category. In each case, before a person performed a mitzvah with it, it belonged to kelipas nogah. Now the person has taken it and performed a mitzvah with it, transforming it from kelipas nogah into something holy and connecting it to the Ein Sof. The Alter Rebbe says—the point in the wording here... the Alter

15:19 Rebbe gives an example from the Rebbe’s father. Rabbi Levi Yitzchak says that the Alter Rebbe gives three examples: one from an animal, one from a plant, and one from the inanimate category, but he does not give an example from the speaking category, the human being. Why? Because there is no such example from the speaking category. All the examples of things with which one can perform a mitzvah come only from the inanimate and animal categories. We have no example of a speaking being that belongs to kelipas nogah. What is left? If he is a non-Jew, then you cannot perform such a mitzvah with him. Yes, you cannot elevate that. You cannot; there is a bit of a spark there. And if he is a Jew, the Alter Rebbe is about to discuss what happens with a Jew’s animal soul. So we will soon talk about the Jewish animal soul and what happens to it. But there is no mitzvah involving the speaking category. So these are the inanimate and plant categories. What does the Alter Rebbe say? The point in the wording: why “an esrog that is not orlah”? What is the question—what is wrong with an esrog that is orlah? The Alter Rebbe says that orlah belongs to the three completely impure kelipos. Orlah is something that belongs to the three completely impure kelipos, which cannot be elevated, like nonkosher creatures and creeping things. Yes, and therefore orlah cannot be elevated. What is the Alter Rebbe trying to say here? What new point is he making? Of course orlah is forbidden. So what is the Alter Rebbe emphasizing with this explanation? Obviously, anything that is orlah is forbidden. What is the Alter Rebbe emphasizing here? There is an explanation from the Rebbe. The Rebbe explains that, seemingly, orlah differs from all other things. During those first three years, the fruit is forbidden. But fruit from that same tree is permitted to eat after three years have passed. Yes, in other words, it is a matter

17:06 Temporary. So there is reason to say that something temporary might not belong to the three impure kelipos. After all, the three impure kelipos are something that has a place—they receive life in this world. As the Alter Rebbe said earlier in Tanya, the three impure kelipos have no ascent or descent. So something that has always been that way is called the three impure kelipos. But something that is forbidden only for a time, and once that time passes is permitted, might not seem to fall under the category of the three impure kelipos. So the Alter Rebbe brings the example of orlah, where the prohibition is also temporary. During the three years when the fruit may not be eaten, that fruit falls under the category of the three impure kelipos. Why may the fruit not be eaten during those three years? Because then it draws its life from the three impure kelipos. As a matter of halachah, if a person picks the fruit before the period of orlah ends—before the three years are over—that fruit remains forbidden forever. That is what “permanently forbidden” means: even after the three years have passed, he cannot use it. If he picked the fruit before the three years were over and then the three years passed, the fruit had already finished drawing its life from a tree that was still subject to orlah. So the life it drew from the three impure kelipos remains in it forever. Only when the three years pass while it is still on the tree does the source from which it draws its life change, and then it becomes kelipas nogah. The Kabbalah texts explain that the three years of orlah are connected

18:48 with the three impure kelipos. In other words, the reason we may not eat the fruit during the first three years is, according to Kabbalah, that the three-year period of this mitzvah is connected with the three impure kelipos. During those first three years, the life of the fruit is connected with those three kelipos. There is even a story about the Rebbe in this connection... What exactly was the story? Someone once asked the Rebbe: In chapter 1 of Tanya, the Alter Rebbe writes that the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil—the Tree of Knowledge is good and evil—is kelipas nogah. But what does it mean to call the Tree of Knowledge “good and evil”? Eating from it was forbidden, so it was entirely evil. What does it mean that the Tree of Knowledge was good and evil? That is how it is described in Tanya. So the Rebbe told him that it says in the Midrash that the Tree of Knowledge was a grapevine. And it says that if Adam had waited until Shabbos, he could have eaten from it; he would have made Kiddush. So the Tree of Knowledge was not inherently entirely evil, because if he had waited until Shabbos, he could have eaten from it. Only at that particular time was it entirely evil. But if he had waited until Shabbos, a short time later, it follows that the Tree of Knowledge’s source of life was, in essence, good and evil. For those six hours, it was entirely evil. Now, I vaguely recall something about the three hours it says he needed to wait being connected with orlah as well, with the reason we

21:04 do not eat the fruit during its first three years—the orlah. I do not remember clearly. All right, let’s finish the passage. “And likewise, any mitzvah that comes about through a transgression, G-d forbid.” The Alter Rebbe says the same applies to any mitzvah that comes about through a transgression. If the mitzvah is accompanied by a transgression, one cannot fulfill a mitzvah that comes about through a transgression. Why? Because one cannot elevate it. The physical thing used for a mitzvah has to be something a person can elevate. Since he is doing the mitzvah through a transgression, with something that belongs to the three impure kelipos, it remains there, I think; it cannot be elevated. That is why a mitzvah that comes about through a transgression is not a mitzvah—one cannot fulfill it that way. So what has the Alter Rebbe explained up to this point? He has explained what a mitzvah does and what it means. A mitzvah means that a person takes a physical thing in this world and makes it a dwelling place for Him, may He be blessed. He takes that thing and connects it with G-dliness. The Alter Rebbe continues: “And now, when he uses it to fulfill Hashem’s mitzvah and His will.” Now the person takes the physical thing, which had belonged to kelipah, and uses it to fulfill a mitzvah of Hakadosh Boruch Hu and His will. Then the life within it—the life within the physical thing, which just a moment ago was the life of kelipah—rises out of the kelipah, is nullified, and is incorporated into the light of the Ein Sof, blessed be He. It rises out of the kelipah and is nullified and incorporated into the light of the Ein Sof, blessed be He. It becomes part of the light of Hakadosh Boruch Hu, which is His will. You see, it emerges from the kelipah and is nullified and incorporated into the light of the Ein Sof, blessed be

22:56 He, which is His will clothed within it. “Since there is no concealment of the Divine countenance there at all to hide His light.” A mitzvah is the supernal will, and within a mitzvah there is no concealment of the Divine countenance to hide His light. That is what a mitzvah is: the supernal will. The point of the mitzvah is that Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants this physical object, this action. So there is no concealment of the Divine countenance there. This is the difference between the will clothed in the 613 mitzvos and the will outside the 613 mitzvos—the difference between the will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu in all created things and His will in a mitzvah. His will in all created things comes through concealment of the Divine countenance, through the will passing through various garments. That is concealment. But the will in a mitzvah is the inner aspect of the will, so there is no concealment there. In other words, the will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present in this physical object, in this mitzvah, in this action. Through that, the physical thing becomes connected with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. So that is the first point the Alter Rebbe explains here in chapter 37: What is the connection between a mitzvah a person performs in this world and the days of Moshiach and the resurrection of the dead? This is the first part of the answer. The days of Moshiach and the resurrection of the dead mean drawing the light of the Ein Sof into this physical world, and that happens through a mitzvah, because that is what a mitzvah does. It takes an object, a physical thing from this physical world, and connects it with the Ein Sof. It takes something that belonged to kelipas nogah and, through the mitzvah, connects it with the Ein Sof. That is the first stage, concerning the object. Now the Alter Rebbe will go on to explain the person who performs the mitzvah. That is another aspect. Broadly speaking, we learn three things in this chapter. I want to explain a little about how the

24:41 subjects in this chapter are arranged. There are three things the Alter Rebbe comes to explain. First is the object used for the mitzvah. Where do we see the idea of a dwelling place in the lower realms? We take a physical object, and by performing a mitzvah with it, that object, which had been in kelipah, becomes one with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That concerns the particular object used for the mitzvah: the money given for tzedakah, the parchment of the tefillin. Then there is the person performing the mitzvah. A person also has a body and an animal soul, and since a mitzvah is performed through the body and the animal soul, the mitzvah also transforms the person’s body and animal soul, which likewise belong to kelipah. By performing a mitzvah, a person connects his body and animal soul with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That is what the Alter Rebbe is about to explain. We will get to that shortly. Then there is a third question, which he will discuss at length later in the chapter: What happens to the rest of the world? After all, a person is only one person, and the mitzvah he performs involves only one thing. A person puts on tefillin. Usually, he buys tefillin once, at his bar mitzvah, and uses the same tefillin his whole life. So what happens to the rest of the world? There are so very many things, and we do not elevate them all. Many animals are born in some distant country, in Africa or Argentina, and nobody ever touches them. So what happens to the things a person does not use? He will explain later in the chapter how the whole world becomes a dwelling place in the lower realms, even the objects that

26:16 Doing mitzvos. So far, what we’ve learned concerns the object used for a mitzvah—how that object becomes what it is. And right now, in fact, we’re studying this in the Rebbe’s sichos on the weekly parsha. We’ve been up to Parshas Lech Lecha. There are several sichos of the Rebbe on this subject: bris milah, which is in this week’s parsha. The Rebbe explains this point at length: the innovation of Matan Torah was that a physical object could become a vessel for G-dliness. That is why the first mitzvah given to Avraham Avinu, bris milah, was connected to Matan Torah. It was the only one. All the mitzvos of the Patriarchs were spiritual mitzvos; they did not have this quality of making a dwelling place in the lower realms. The exception was milah, the one mitzvah whose effect was already established in physical flesh. Now we’ll study the sicha and see how the Rebbe explains it.