Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 32 - Part 6

00:01 He explains here: [unclear]. Until now, we have learned the two points discussed above. You saw that what the Rabbi explained here comes down to two points. First, he explained “Love your fellow as yourself.” What does “as yourself” mean? The way a person loves himself. A person’s love for himself does not come from his yetzer, his emotions, or his intellect. Those are not the real reason he loves himself. He loves himself because it is himself—because of his very essence. He does not think about it in terms of emotions or intellect. It is an intrinsic love, not an intellectual one. That is the meaning of “as yourself”: love for a Jew must be an intrinsic love, not a love based on emotions. That is why it can extend to every Jew, from the greatest to the smallest. If love depended so much on emotions or intellect, on the other person’s qualities, then two things would follow: it could not be “as yourself,” and it could not extend from the greatest to the smallest. But here we are speaking of intrinsic love. Intrinsic love is “as yourself,” precisely because the other person is like you. It can extend from the greatest to the smallest. Why? Because every Jew is like you. Every Jew is one in essence with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. This recalls the idea that “they are all equal, and they all have one Father.” Good. That was the first point: the Rabbi explained the true root of the mitzvah of Ahavas Yisroel. Then he explains another point, concerning what Hillel the Elder said. Hillel said, “This is the entire Torah.” Why, seemingly, do we say that Ahavas Yisroel is the entire Torah? After all, loving

02:12 your fellow Jew concerns only another person, a friend. How can we say it is the entire Torah? He explains the meaning of “the entire Torah” through two points. First, because it is the touchstone. There’s room inside. Why sit outside the circle? Sometimes you can find a better place to sit. You can come in here, join the discussion, and find a spot. You can move the table. Really, you’re not bothering me, and so on. So the Rabbi gives two explanations here for why Ahavas Yisroel is the entire Torah. The first concerns the foundation of all Torah and mitzvos: “the soul is primary and the body secondary.” For a Jew to observe Torah and mitzvos, the soul must take precedence over the body, with attention directed to the soul itself and its root and source. The soul must shine within a person; for him, it must be what matters most. And not just the soul, but the soul as it is “a part of G-d above.” He feels that Yiddishkeit, his connection and focus, are what matter most to him. That is why he seeks Torah and mitzvos. And what is the touchstone that shows the soul is primary for a person? Ahavas Yisroel. As we said before, to attain Ahavas Yisroel, “the soul must be primary and the body secondary.” Otherwise, true Ahavas Yisroel is impossible. That is one reason Ahavas Yisroel is the entire Torah: it is the foundation of the entire Torah. In the second explanation, the Alter Rebbe explains that Ahavas Yisroel is also connected to the result, the ultimate purpose, of Torah and mitzvos. What is the purpose of all Torah and mitzvos? To draw the light of Ein Sof into the world, for the sake of the union of the Holy One, blessed be He, and His Shechinah. The whole purpose of a Jew’s observance of Torah and mitzvos is to draw the light of the blessed Ein Sof down below. And for that light to be drawn down below, it is specifically when the Jewish people are

04:49 united. Why? So that the One may dwell within the one. The oneness of Hakadosh Boruch Hu is found only where there is oneness among the Jewish people. When the Jewish people are united, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is revealed there. When they are not united, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is not present there. So a person must have Ahavas Yisroel—“this is the entire Torah”—because the purpose of Torah and mitzvos is for the light of Ein Sof to be drawn down below. What is the vessel for that? Unity. Without unity, the light of Ein Sof is not drawn down below. That is what we mean when we say in davening, “Bless us, our Father, all of us as one, with the light of Your countenance.” For there to be “Bless us, our Father,” there must be “all of us as one.” For Hakadosh Boruch Hu to be drawn down and revealed to us, there must be unity among Jews. That was the point the Rabbi explained so far—the two points about how this is accomplished down here. This is really the foundation of the whole subject of Ahavas Yisroel, a fundamental principle in Chassidus and in Yiddishkeit generally, and in Chassidus particularly. The whole matter of Jewish unity, of loving a fellow Jew “as yourself,” is also in the Torah and in Tanya. It is a very fundamental point in the path of Chassidus. Now, look: here he explained the point briefly. As we said in the previous classes, it is explained at greater length in Derech Mitzvosecha, in the mitzvah of Ahavas Yisroel. Some of the bochurim studied it there. There is also a maamar of the Tzemach Tzedek along these lines. [unclear] in Kuntres Ahavas Yisroel. There the subject is explained at length. Likewise, there are maamarim of the Rebbe Rashab—a well-known maamar, [unclear]—where the matter of Jewish unity is also explained. Beyond that, there is an abundance of the Rebbe’s teachings, particularly his sichos in Likkutei Sichos, where the Rebbe explains the subject at length in a remarkable way.

06:48 In many different ways—the whole subject of Ahavas Yisroel. The Rebbe explained it in a remarkable and distinctive way. We see something interesting, to this extent: Ahavas Yisroel is so fundamental that, with the Rebbe, we see it right at the beginning of his leadership. The first farbrengen the Rebbe held on the day he accepted the leadership was on Yud Shvat 5711, and throughout that farbrengen the Rebbe spoke about Ahavas Yisroel and Jewish unity. There was also an entire sicha in which the Rebbe said that in America there is something called a “slogan.” I don’t know what you call it—when a new leader takes office, a new president, he has to make some kind of statement. I don’t know exactly what you call that statement, a proclamation or something. Huh? A declaration. A declaration. Some sort of statement that expresses what this president’s motto will be. There’s such a custom in America, a statement. So the Rebbe said at the farbrengen of Yud Shvat 5711 that his statement was the matter of the three loves: Ahavas Yisroel, love of Hashem, and love of the Torah. Three loves for everyone. That was—that is what the Rebbe said was his foundation as Rebbe, as nasi, as the leader of the Jewish people, as nasi of the seventh generation. So what were the loves the Rebbe called fundamental? The three loves: love of Hashem, Ahavas Yisroel, and love of the Torah, for everyone. Yes, and the Rebbe explained there how one leads to the next: from Ahavas Yisroel one comes to love of Hashem, and from love of Hashem to love of the Torah. Yes, the Rebbe explained it at length. So here they saw that this was a fundamental point for the Rebbe. And then, too, in the maamar Basi Legani 5711. Everyone knows that the first maamar the Rebbe

08:58 He said “Basi Legani,” and there is a whole section there in which the Rebbe tells stories about Ahavas Yisroel—stories about the Alter Rebbe, the Mitteler Rebbe, the Tzemach Tzedek, the Baal Shem Tov, each of the Rebbeim. The Rebbe tells an incident that expresses their Ahavas Yisroel: how the Alter Rebbe went on Yom Kippur to bring food to a woman who had just given birth, and so on. These are all well-known stories, and from these incidents we see that the Rebbeim had Ahavas Yisroel. Not just Ahavas Yisroel, but, as he says here, Ahavas Yisroel on a grand scale and with full force, without limits. They set aside their entire existence, to the point that, as the Rebbe says in that maamar, they put aside not only their physical needs but even their spiritual needs in order to do a physical favor for another Jew. Another Jew’s physical needs were more important even than their own spiritual needs—the spiritual needs of the Rebbeim. The Rebbe explains this in his first maamar. And we saw this with the Rebbe in his last sicha. The Rebbe’s last farbrengen for the time being was the farbrengen at which he explained Parshas Vayakhel 5752, as everyone knows. And what was the point of that entire farbrengen on Vayakhel 5752? It was the very point we have just learned here in Tanya. There the Rebbe explained that Vayakhel is about gathering everyone together; it is about unity. Vayakhel-Pekudei: Pekudei means the individual details, while Vayakhel means everyone together, one great whole. It is as though all the Jewish people are one point, one soul. All the forms of love we learn about here in Tanya, the two levels of Ahavas Yisroel: Ahavas Yisroel based on each individual, because each person has his own particular role; and Ahavas Yisroel based on the common point that makes everyone one. The Rebbe explained that this is Vayakhel-Pekudei: Vayakhel emphasizes that all Jews are one point, one soul, while Pekudei emphasizes that each

10:47 person has his own distinct role. Yes, each person has his own role, and there must therefore be unity as well, but it is a different kind of unity. The Rebbe then devoted an entire sicha to the need for Ahavas Yisroel with true unity, without calculations. The Rebbe also connected this to the half-shekel—it was Shabbos Shekalim, with the theme of the shekel, the half-shekel. That is the whole point of a half: every Jew is a half and needs to join with another. So what do we see? From the beginning—that is, from the Rebbe’s first sicha and first maamar—to the last farbrengen, everything opened with the theme of unity. This also tells us that, for the Rebbe, this was the foundation, the main thing on which our efforts must especially focus. Yes, and this is what Tanya and the Rebbe teach here in chapter 32. Here, too, the Rebbe explains the foundation: what Ahavas Yisroel is, and why it is so important that we say it is the entire Torah. We spoke about Rabbi Akiva, who also makes a statement of our Sages on this subject, but says it differently. Rabbi Akiva says of “Love your fellow as yourself,” “This is a great principle in the Torah.” We asked why the Rebbe quotes Hillel specifically, rather than Rabbi Akiva. In general, we explained the point the Rebbe makes: Rabbi Akiva says, “This is a great principle in the Torah.” He does not say it is the entire Torah; he says it is a great principle in the Torah. There are other things too. It is a principle, and not just any principle but a great one—yet he does not say it is the entire Torah. Hillel emphasizes that it is the entire Torah. That is why the Rebbe prefers to cite Hillel’s statement, which places greater emphasis on Ahavas Yisroel being truly the entire Torah. But the question arises: What, then, does Rabbi Akiva mean? If Hillel had already said it is the entire Torah,

12:30 then what is Rabbi Akiva saying? Rabbi Akiva came after Hillel. Hillel lived at the beginning of the era of the Tannaim, while Rabbi Akiva came later, closer to the end of that era. So why? What does Rabbi Akiva add to Hillel’s teaching? On the contrary, Rabbi Akiva spoke later, yet said it is only a great principle in the Torah. What is Rabbi Akiva’s new point? We see that in the Twelve Pesukim, the Rebbe chose this particular verse. When Jewish children recite the Twelve Pesukim, they say Rabbi Akiva’s statement. What does Rabbi Akiva add? The Rebbe makes a very strong point: Rabbi Akiva’s statement, “This is a great principle in the Torah,” teaches us that Ahavas Yisroel is part of the Torah. What does it mean that it is part of the Torah? That it must be practiced according to the Torah’s rules. G-d forbid that Ahavas Yisroel should mean setting the Torah aside. There are Jews who do that, particularly in our generation. For some Jews, Ahavas Yisroel comes at the expense of love of Hashem. Because they have Ahavas Yisroel, they think they can, G-d forbid, give up various aspects of Torah and mitzvos, as Reform or Conservative groups do, so that they can reach a larger percentage of Jews. So they give up various things in Torah and mitzvos. Why make Yiddishkeit so difficult? Why? We can be lenient here, lenient there, introduce a few leniencies. The main thing is that a Jew should have Ahavas Yisroel, that we should be together. This was one of the major issues in the battles the Rebbe fought in America. Take, for example, the mechitzah in shul: people wanted to give up the mechitzah, and other things like that. They wanted to be lenient. Why be so strict and so stringent? Better to have Ahavas Yisroel. This is why the Rebbe would always

14:25 quote the teaching in Pirkei Avos: “Love the created beings and draw them close to the Torah.” Ahavas Yisroel has a condition: it must draw the Jew close to the Torah, not, G-d forbid, the other way around—not that Ahavas Yisroel means bringing the Torah down to the Jew. In other words, you lower the Torah. That is what Rabbi Akiva is saying. Rabbi Akiva says, “This is a great principle in the Torah”—a principle within the Torah. In other words, it has the boundaries of Torah. You cannot turn Ahavas Yisroel into a game, into a bargain at the Torah’s expense. The whole thing has to be based on the Torah’s rules, on Shulchan Aruch, not on changing the Torah and so on. This is very important in practical matters. Sometimes bochurim go on mivtzoim, and they too need to know that Shulchan Aruch sets boundaries. Going on mivtzoim does not mean that everything is permitted. There are things bochurim need to know as well. Sometimes, if there is a doubt, you have to ask. But there are stores, places, and situations where Shulchan Aruch sets a boundary and something is forbidden. Going on mivtzoim and practicing Ahavas Yisroel with self-sacrifice does not mean that the boundaries of Shulchan Aruch disappear and everything is permitted—that you may enter any place and do anything. There are things that, quite simply, require care according to Shulchan Aruch. That is the point we need to understand: it is a great principle, but a great principle in the Torah. It follows the Torah’s rules and interpretations, and so on. That is why, for example, when going on mivtzoim, the Rebbe always wanted two bochurim to go together. This is very important. Some bochurim are not careful about it; sometimes they go alone. The Rebbe was very particular that bochurim going on mivtzoim should always go together as a pair. That is important too.

16:11 When you have a study partner, each one looks out for the other. That’s the kind of partnership it should be. Right? But even so, we have to be careful that Ahavas Yisroel follows the rules of the Torah and mitzvos. That is what Rabbi Akiva adds to what Hillel said. Let’s continue in chapter 32, below the two dots. Until now, the Alter Rebbe has explained what ideal Ahavas Yisroel is and how it should be. Here the Alter Rebbe begins to raise difficulties. What he has said until now is a remarkable innovation—a revolution in the whole concept of Ahavas Yisroel. It would seem that there is no limit to Ahavas Yisroel: you have to love every Jew, whoever he may be, from the greatest to the least. Even if he is not behaving properly in spiritual matters, Ahavas Yisroel applies to him, because the souls of the Jewish people have their source in one Father. All Jewish souls are one, so we must have Ahavas Yisroel for all of them alike. Now the Alter Rebbe brings up several questions. According to the revealed teachings of Torah, according to halachah, this does not seem to fit so easily. We find places where halachah explicitly says that one person must hate another. That does not seem to fit what the Alter Rebbe has been explaining. And in this part of the chapter too, although it may look as though the Alter Rebbe is simply resolving various halachic questions, we also see—as is pointed out in Chassidus—the depth of the Alter Rebbe’s Ahavas Yisroel. See how carefully the Alter Rebbe tries to find merit in

18:16 every kind of Jew, even Jews who do not observe Torah and mitzvos. We can learn from the way the Alter Rebbe relates to them how we, too, are expected to practice Ahavas Yisroel today. The Alter Rebbe says: “As for what is stated in the Gemara.” The Gemara says that if someone sees his fellow commit a sin, it is a mitzvah to hate him. The Gemara seems to say the exact opposite! It says that if a person sees his friend commit a transgression, there is a mitzvah to hate him. In other words, according to the Torah there is such a thing as hatred. Before the Alter Rebbe’s explanation—before his innovation that Ahavas Yisroel applies to everyone, from the greatest to the least, just as it applies to oneself—you could have said: Fine, Ahavas Yisroel has limits set by halachah. “Love your fellow as yourself” means someone who is your fellow in Torah and mitzvos, a Jew who behaves properly, but not every Jew. But the Alter Rebbe has explained that “your fellow” includes every Jew, because the souls of the Jewish people have their source in one Father. At that level, every Jew is truly my brother. There are no such limits. So how do we understand this Gemara? The Gemara is discussing the mitzvah of helping with a fallen load. What does the verse say? “You shall surely help him”—“the donkey of one who hates you.” Right? There is a mitzvah to help unload and load the donkey. But the Gemara asks: How can there be someone who hates you? How can a Jew hate another Jew? The Torah speaks of “one who hates you,” but how is that possible according to Torah? Aren’t Jews obligated to love one another? How, then, does the Torah allow for a situation in which someone is hated? That

20:16 is, what place is there for hatred according to Torah? Isn’t it forbidden to hate? The Gemara answers that it is speaking about someone whom you have seen commit a transgression. That is why it is a mitzvah to hate him. Now, there is a dispute in the Gemara as to whether one is permitted to hate him or is obligated to hate him. In halachah, as it says here, it is also a mitzvah to hate him. If you see someone commit a transgression, you are permitted—indeed, obligated—to hate him. That is the case meant by “If you see the donkey of one who hates you.” So here we see the Torah’s two-sided approach. On the one hand, the Torah says it is a mitzvah to hate him because he committed a transgression. At the same time, what else does the Torah say? Even though you must hate him because of the transgression he commits, that does not exempt you from helping him. If you see his donkey fall, you may not pass by. In fact, helping him takes precedence, in order to subdue the yetzer hara. It is precisely the person I hate—and why do I hate him? Not over material matters, but over spiritual matters—whom I am obligated to help when I see that his donkey has fallen. But that is a point in passing. It shows us how the Torah regards a Jew: even a Jew whom one must hate must still be helped in other matters. Here, though, the Alter Rebbe focuses on the question itself. What about this statement that it is a mitzvah to hate someone? Doesn’t that contradict everything we have explained? It seems to be

21:52 the very opposite. Moreover, the Gemara says: “And he may also tell his teacher to hate him.” The Gemara goes further: a person may even approach that man’s teacher—the teacher of the sinner—and tell him that his student committed a transgression, so that the teacher will hate him too. So the Alter Rebbe answers: “This refers to someone who is his fellow in Torah and mitzvos.” What case is the Gemara discussing? A particular kind of person: someone who is your fellow in Torah and mitzvos. Now he is going to set out several rules and conditions. When is it permitted? When is it required? When must you hate someone, and when must you not? When does the Torah say it is a mitzvah to hate a person? There are several conditions. The first condition, says the Alter Rebbe, is that this person must be someone who lives with Torah and mitzvos just as you do—your fellow in Torah and mitzvos. What does that mean? It means someone who knows, feels, and understands the significance of Torah and mitzvos. It does not mean just anyone. There are people—ultra-zealous Orthodox people in Jerusalem, for example—who throw stones at anyone driving on Shabbos, and things like that. They rely on this Gemara: you have to hate that person because he is committing a transgression. They fulfill that supposed obligation with every possible stringency. The Alter Rebbe says: No. That is a very serious mistake. When does this obligation to hate someone who commits a transgression apply? When the person is aware that he is committing a transgression. He knows what a transgression is and what it means to commit one. He knows the terrible punishments it carries, and nevertheless

24:04 he commits it. Then there is something wrong in that person’s attitude. That really is a problem: a person knows the truth and recognizes it, and still acts that way. In a moment we will see another condition; this is not the whole list. It is only the first condition. It shows that this person actually wants to rebel against Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That is a different matter. But an ordinary person who does not know—an unlearned person who cannot study, or even someone who has learned but does not grasp what it means in life—does not necessarily understand the depth of the matter. He is like a child taken captive, a tinok shenishba. As the Rambam explains, a tinok shenishba is not only the sort of person people usually imagine: someone born and raised among non-Jews who never knew anything about Judaism. Some think the term applies only to someone born in an entirely non-Jewish place, who was never among Jews and knew nothing at all. But no. The Rambam explains that a person can grow up and later learn and hear about Torah and mitzvos, yet because he was not brought up with them and was accustomed to a different way of life, he still does not truly understand. Even after he learns of Torah and mitzvos, he has not grown up within that world; he has not lived it, and he does not grasp its depth. He, too, is still considered a tinok shenishba, and chas veshalom, one cannot hate him. So when does this obligation to hate someone apply? Specifically

25:37 Since he is involved in Torah and mitzvos, he doesn’t know what a sin is. He knows Torah and mitzvos, but he doesn’t know what a sin is, as the Rabbi said earlier in chapter 31, chapter 30. So the Alter Rebbe brings the idea that for a Torah scholar, unintentional sins are treated like deliberate ones. A person who is learned and knows proper conduct knows what it means to be connected to G-dliness and what it means to be separated from G-dliness. So for him, even an unintentional sin is considered deliberate: you should have learned. But for an unlearned person, it’s the opposite. Even a deliberate sin is considered unintentional, because he doesn’t grasp the depth of the matter. That is what the Alter Rebbe says. In other words, he must be committed to Torah and mitzvos—that’s one condition. The second condition, the Rabbi says, is that you have already fulfilled the mitzvah of “You shall surely rebuke your fellow” with him—a fellow who is with you in Torah and mitzvos. You have already fulfilled the obligation to rebuke him. That’s another condition. It isn’t enough that he is on the level of a fellow in Torah and mitzvos; there is the further condition that you have already fulfilled the mitzvah of rebuke with him. That means you have actually tried to correct this person and fulfill the mitzvah of rebuke. The Alter Rebbe states another condition here, which is a major innovation in halachah. This is what the Alter Rebbe introduces here. How does that fit with its name? But here the Rabbi says that even for the mitzvah of rebuke, the person you rebuked must be someone connected to Torah and mitzvos, because then he understands what you’re talking about. If a person doesn’t grasp Torah and mitzvos, he won’t grasp the rebuke either. So all these conditions must be met. And despite all that, he has not turned away from his sin, as it says in Sefer Chareidim—then there must be an element of hatred. All these conditions must be met. But if not, then, as the Rabbi continues, it is forbidden to hate him. On the contrary, we must

27:21 love him and try to draw him close, as we’ll see later on.