The Rambam and the Ramban - part 2

00:00 Speaker 1 We started talking about the Rambam and the Ramban and the differences between them. Today we’ll continue with that, both in nigleh and in—also in Chassidus. It’s a very interesting, fascinating subject. There’s a lot to say about it. Since you’re studying Tractate Kesubos, I’ll start with Kesubos and move on from there, with the rosh yeshiva’s permission. We’ll start with what you’re learning now and then move on to other matters that branch off from it. So, the Rambam wrote Sefer Hamitzvos. And the Ramban, as we discussed, belonged to the next generation. Their lives overlapped by about ten or eleven years, but the Ramban is generally considered to be of the generation after the Rambam. The Ramban had the Rambam’s books, studied them, and of course also took issue with them. One of the best-known is Sefer Hamitzvos. The Rambam wrote Sefer Hamitzvos in addition to his other work, the Yad, Mishneh Torah, which is all based on the enumeration of the mitzvos. The Rambam undertook the extraordinary task of organizing the 613 mitzvos. As we discussed, we know from the Gemara that there are 613 mitzvos. The Gemara in Makkos says there are 613 mitzvos, but it doesn’t say what those 613 mitzvos are. So there was considerable disagreement among the Rishonim about what counts and what doesn’t—what is included among the 613 mitzvos and what isn’t. There are many verses in the Torah that could be counted as a mitzvah, or could be considered a general mitzvah, and so on. That led to a great deal of disagreement. Before the Rambam there was Rav Saadiah Gaon. Earlier there was also Rav Yehudai Gaon, one of the Geonim, who wrote Sefer Halachos Gedolos, known as Behag. Tosafos cites it many times—Halachos Gedolos. He compiled an enumeration of the mitzvos. Rav Saadiah Gaon wrote a book enumerating the mitzvos. The Rambam compiled the best-known enumeration of the mitzvos,

02:55 Speaker 1 Sefer Hamitzvos. The Ramban received Sefer Hamitzvos and wrote objections to it. So if you look at editions of Sefer Hamitzvos that include the commentaries, you have Sefer Hamitzvos and the Ramban’s objections. As we discussed, one of the most striking differences between the Rambam and the Ramban—I don’t know if it’s one of the biggest, but it’s certainly a prominent difference—is that the Ramban always defends the great Torah scholars who came before him. In other words, he’s more conservative, more concerned about avoiding new approaches. So he defends the author of Halachos Gedolos and tries to answer all the questions the Rambam raises against him. As you may know, Sefer Hamitzvos opens with the Rambam’s principles. If you studied Sefer Hamitzvos as children—I, for example, when the Rebbe launched the campaign, we went straight to three chapters; we were committed. But I assume that in cheder they study Sefer Hamitzvos. So when you study Sefer Hamitzvos, you know that on the first few days you study the principles. In those principles the Rambam sets out his approach: what he chose to count as a mitzvah and what he didn’t. He disagrees a great deal with the author of Halachos Gedolos and also with Rav Saadiah Gaon. He has his own approach. As we said, the Rambam is generally very original. He doesn’t necessarily defer to what those before him thought. You see that all the time when you study nigleh. When we study the Rambam and Ramban on a sugya in the Gemara, we always see that the Rambam is very original. He’ll offer an explanation no one else thought of. Usually, of course, that’s not the order in yeshiva: you study Rashi, you study Tosafos, you study Ramban and Rashba, and then at the end you get to the Rambam. Some maggidei shiur will present the Rambam first; from the outset you see only the Rambam. But in any case, the Rambam

05:22 Speaker 1 is always very original. He always has a distinctive way of understanding the sugya, and you see that here too in his enumeration of the mitzvos. The Rambam has a very original approach to these matters. And when the Ramban, Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman, sought to restore the Torah to its earlier form, he continually tried to refute the Rambam and, so to speak, vindicate the earlier authorities who preceded him—the Geonim and others. All right, that’s the introduction. Tractate Kesubos—we said we’d begin with Kesubos. First of all, the tractate is called Kesubos. Now, there’s a very broad question in the laws of kesubos: Is the kesubah required by Torah law or by rabbinic law? Have you studied this already? Have there been classes on it? Hmm? Are you familiar with the sugya? Fine. Is the kesubah a Torah requirement or a rabbinic one? So we look at the Rambam. We mentioned Sefer Hamitzvos. In Sefer Hamitzvos, negative mitzvah 355, the Rambam writes that the prohibition is against being intimate with a woman without a kesubah and without kiddushin. In other words, one of the 613 mitzvos is a prohibition against living with a woman without a kesubah and kiddushin. So what does the Rambam hold? That the kesubah is required by Torah law. You see it even more clearly in Sefer Nashim. At the beginning of Sefer Nashim, where the Rambam lists the mitzvos in Hilchos Ishus, he writes: First, a positive mitzvah to be intimate with a woman through a kesubah and kiddushin. The positive mitzvah is to marry with a kesubah and kiddushin. And there is a prohibition against intimacy without a kesubah and kiddushin. It’s very interesting that in Sefer Hamitzvos, under the positive mitzvah, the Rambam mentions only kiddushin, not the kesubah. Under the prohibition, he writes not to be intimate without a kesubah and kiddushin. But in Mishneh Torah itself, when listing both the positive mitzvah and the prohibition, the Rambam mentions the kesubah. That implies that the Rambam holds the kesubah is required by Torah law. All

08:04 Speaker 1 the commentators discuss this, because the Rambam seems to contradict himself. In Hilchos Ishus, chapter 10, the Rambam writes, “The Sages instituted a kesubah for a woman so that it would not be easy in his eyes to divorce her”—something like that. In Hilchos Ishus, chapter 10, the Rambam says the Sages instituted the kesubah. That’s a contradiction within the Rambam himself. In Sefer Hamitzvos, the Rambam writes that the mitzvah involves a kesubah and kiddushin, while in Hilchos Ishus he writes that the Sages instituted it. The commentators ask about this. One of the classic answers is that the Rambam means the details of the kesubah. The kesubah itself is required by Torah law, but its details—the two hundred zuz and so on, that a widow receives one maneh and a virgin receives two hundred—those laws of the kesubah are rabbinic. But the kesubah itself is required by Torah law. There’s a reference to this in the text of the kesubah. If you’ve ever listened to the rabbis read the kesubah, or looked at its text, it says explicitly in the text we read today: “The bridal payment for your virginity is two hundred silver zuz, to which you are entitled by Torah law.” So today’s text of the kesubah does say that the kesubah is required by Torah law. That’s the wording used in all kesubos, and so on and so forth. So there’s a discussion about that... Now let’s go back. Sefer Hamitzvos, negative mitzvah 355: the Rambam writes that it’s forbidden to marry a woman without a kesubah and without kiddushin. That means the Rambam holds the kesubah is required by Torah law. Then the Ramban writes in his objections that the kesubah is a rabbinic requirement. In other words, he disagrees with the Rambam. So here we have a disagreement between the Rambam and the Ramban about the law of the kesubah: is it required by Torah law or by rabbinic law? Interesting. And here we come to another point worth knowing. Yes, what did you want to say? The Ramban. The objections are by the Ramban. Ramban. Did I say Raavad? When did I say Raavad? If I said Raavad, I was mistaken. We’re talking here about the Rambam and the Ramban. Not the Raavad. Yes. The Raavad is another story, another class. Today we’re talking about the Rambam and the Ramban. Yes. So the objections are by the Ramban.

10:25 Speaker 1 In his comments on Sefer Hamitzvos, he writes there—or says—what does the Rambam write? A kesubah, a kesubah is not from the Torah; a kesubah is rabbinic. He says, as the Rambam himself writes, that a kesubah is only an enactment of the Sages, as though he is disagreeing with the Rambam. Now, here’s another point that matters for the history. The Ramban wrote his Hasagos on Sefer Hamitzvos when he was young. He wrote it in his younger years, in Spain. One of the last books the Ramban wrote was his commentary on Chumash. The Ramban’s commentary on Chumash is a wonderful commentary. [unclear] There the Ramban also brings the plain meaning of the verses, disagrees with Rashi a great deal, disagrees with the Rambam a great deal, and discusses the mitzvos and their reasons. He disagrees with Ibn Ezra a great deal. He has, he has... The Ramban builds an approach to learning Chumash. Yes. He brings a lot of Kabbalah. As we discussed, yes, the Ramban on Chumash, besides pshat and drush, mainly brings a lot of Kabbalah and explains many matters in the Torah. Briefly, in hints, but it is full of Kabbalah. Now, the Ramban wrote his commentary on Chumash at the end of his life. He wrote it—some say he began writing it in Spain. In any case, he certainly wrote the main part of the book in Eretz Yisroel. And as we discussed, the Ramban was in Eretz Yisroel at the end of his life, during the last three years of his life. You can see that he was in Eretz Yisroel because he writes a great deal about where he was, where this place is, what he saw, and so on. So when we get to his commentary on Chumash, there are things where we see that the Ramban changes his position. In other words, what he wrote when he was young is not necessarily what he writes in his commentary on Chumash. So this is interesting—listen carefully. We’ll get to the kesubah. In Parshas Vayeira, I think—where does it say “to the sons of the concubines”? No,

12:39 Speaker 1 Chayei Sarah. Look, at the end of the parsha—where does it say, “And to the sons of the concubines, Avraham gave gifts”? Show me, no? Right? Let’s look inside. Stay with me, guys. What did I say? Chayei Sarah, yes? Here it is: “And to the sons of the concubines whom Avraham had, Avraham gave gifts.” Parshas Chayei Sarah, chapter 25, verse 6. Rashi says: What are concubines? Wives have a kesubah; concubines have no kesubah. Rashi says, what does “concubines” mean in the Torah? A woman who did not receive a kesubah is called a concubine. A woman with a kesubah is called a wife. The Ramban comes along and writes: Wait, a kesubah is rabbinic. How can you say concubines are women without a kesubah? A kesubah is rabbinic. So apparently the Ramban is following his own position, that a kesubah is rabbinic. So concubines are not... He says concubines are women without kiddushin, not women without a kesubah. But then the Ramban adds that perhaps one could say that the enactment of the kesubah, the laws of the kesubah, are rabbinic; but even before the giving of the Torah, if a man wanted to marry a woman, he would give her gifts to show that this was a serious marriage, and that was called a kesubah. If he did not give gifts, it was a sign that it was not serious, and he could send her away whenever he wanted. So the Ramban says a kesubah may be rabbinic. He offers a defense of Rashi and says that a kesubah may indeed be rabbinic, because the idea of a kesubah was part of the marriage customs described in the Torah. And likewise, later, in Parshas Vayishlach, when Dinah was in Shechem’s house, it says, “Ask me for a very large bride-price and gifts.” When Dinah was in Shechem’s house, he said: Ask me for a bride-price and gifts; whatever you ask for, I’ll give you gifts. Rashi says that the bride-price is a kesubah. Look, the Ramban says this is the kesubah: the point is that they undertook to make it a serious marriage, so they gave a kesubah. Look. So according to this,

15:28 Speaker 1 it turns out that the Ramban himself does leave room for the Rambam’s position. Because we haven’t said: What is actually the reason the Rambam holds that a kesubah is from the Torah? If we say the Rambam holds that a kesubah is from the Torah, as his enumeration of the mitzvos seems to imply—where in the Torah does it mention a kesubah? The Chumash does not mention a kesubah. Kiddushin is written in the Torah: “When a man takes a wife.” Where in the Torah does it mention a kesubah? So, simply put, it is from the fact that we see a bride-price and gifts. From the fact that we—even before the giving of the Torah, when a man wanted to marry a woman and wanted the marriage to be serious, he undertook an obligation through a kesubah. That is why Rashi also says in Parshas Vayechi, when Yaakov Avinu asked, “Who are these?” about Yosef’s sons—what does Rashi say? He showed him a document of betrothal and a kesubah. So here we see that there was a kesubah from ancient times, and that is what “from the Torah” means. “From the Torah” means that the things that make a marriage serious are stated plainly in the Torah: there was a bride-price and gifts, which are the laws of a kesubah. What am I seeing here? What do I want to bring out in connection with our subject? That the Ramban himself, it seems, at the end of his life, does leave room for this position. He did not state it explicitly; he does not rule that way. But at any rate, in his commentary on Chumash he leaves room for the Rambam’s position that a kesubah is from the Torah. That’s one point. A second point, in the sugya they are learning now. Look, there is a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban in the sugya they are learning now in the yeshiva, concerning... What are they learning now in the yeshiva, the second chapter? Daf 20, daf 20a, the sugya of testimony through a document. There is a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban concerning “from their mouths and not from their writing.” The Rambam... Are you listening, guys? The Rambam writes in Hilchos Edus. The Rambam writes concerning the law of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” This is the sugya the boys are learning here in the yeshiva now. So these are timely matters, timely matters for the yeshiva. Which chapter is it? Chapter... Huh? Reb Mendel, do you remember which chapter? Huh? Chapter five? Or...

17:57 Speaker 1 Which chapter is it? What chapter? Ah, chapter 3, halachah 4. The Rambam, Hilchos Edus, chapter 3, halachah 4: “By Torah law, testimony is accepted neither in monetary cases nor in capital cases except from the mouths of the witnesses, as it says, ‘By the testimony of two witnesses’—from their mouths and not from their handwriting.” The Rambam says that by Torah law, witnesses cannot give testimony through their handwriting. There is no such thing. By Torah law, it has to be from their mouths and not from their writing. That is, according to the Rambam, witnesses can testify only about what they saw; they cannot testify through their handwriting. “But by rabbinic law,” the Rambam says, “the Sages enacted that monetary cases may be decided on the basis of testimony in a document, even if the witnesses are no longer alive.” The Sages made an allowance, you see, and said that this could also be done on the basis of testimony in a document. Why? So that the door would not be closed to borrowers. So that people would be willing to borrow. The Sages therefore had to make things easier so that the door would not be closed to borrowers. They saw that people would not lend unless we made—made this easier, so they said that a document could also be validated through its signatories. Without... yes? These are the laws of validating documents. According to the Rambam, that is rabbinic. By Torah law, it is “from their mouths and not from their writing.” You remember Tosafos? Tosafos disagrees with this, right? Tosafos does not hold that way. What does the Ramban hold? We ought to know the dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban. The Ramban, in the principles of Sefer Hamitzvos, brings this ruling of the Rambam and says it is not correct. He does not agree with him, and he argues that it is from the Torah. The Ramban says that the law allowing a document to be validated through its signatories—that a beis din can validate a document on the basis of the witnesses’ handwriting—is Torah law, and we learn it

20:28 Speaker 1 This comes from the verse, “And write it in a scroll and seal it, and call witnesses.” So from there we see that it does indeed have a basis in the Torah. That leads him into his dispute with the Rambam over whether things written in the Prophets are considered Torah law or rabbinic law, and so on. So here we have another example of a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban on a fundamental issue in halachah. According to the Rambam, things not written explicitly in the Torah, even if they are written in the Prophets, are called divrei sofrim. According to the Ramban, that is not necessarily so. Many things stated by the Prophets are considered Torah law. He discusses this at length in the Ramban’s critique of the Rambam, in the second principle. All right, those are examples from the subject we’re studying. Now that we’re talking about the mitzvos, I want to give examples of major issues where we can see how deeply the Rambam and the Ramban disagree, even on the very foundations. Let’s take the first mitzvah in the Torah: “I am Hashem your G-d.” Did we talk about this in—no, we didn’t discuss it in the previous class, right? Anyone who has studied Derech Mitzvosecha, Mitzvas Haamanas Elokus, knows that the Tzemach Tzedek cites a dispute between the Rambam and the Baal Halachos Gedolos, and the Ramban follows the Baal Halachos Gedolos. The Rambam writes: “The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of all wisdom is to know that there is a Primary Being, and He brings all beings into existence.” Where do we learn this from? The positive mitzvah to know that there is a Primary Being—the mitzvah of knowing Hashem. A positive mitzvah, in the count of... Where does the Rambam learn it from?

22:27 Speaker 2 Devarim.

22:29 Speaker 1 Huh?

22:29 Speaker 2 Devarim.

22:30 Speaker 1 As it says, “I am Hashem your G-d.” Look at the first five halachos in the Rambam. So it’s a positive mitzvah, in the count of... “I am Hashem your G-d” is the first mitzvah. The Rambam writes: The first of the 613 mitzvos is to know that there is a G-d, as it says, “I am Hashem your G-d.” The Ramban disagrees with this. He disagrees even about that. Look, the Ramban points out that the Baal Halachos Gedolos did not include “I am” in his count of the mitzvos. Why? The Ramban says it’s simple: “I am” is not a mitzvah; it establishes that there is a G-d. Mitzvos come after there is a G-d. If you have no G-d, you have no mitzvos. How can there be a mitzvah if you have no G-d at all? What does “mitzvah” mean? A mitzvah means there is One who commands. So you have to believe in the One who commands before the commandment. If you don’t believe in Hakadosh Boruch Hu, how can there be a mitzvah? The Ramban therefore holds that “I am” is not a mitzvah. With “I am,” Hakadosh Boruch Hu makes Himself known to the Jewish people. Hakadosh Boruch Hu comes to them at the Giving of the Torah, descends to give them the Ten Commandments, and says: “Friends, I am Hashem your G-d.” In the words of the Midrash, the Ramban says: “Accept My kingship.” Accepting My kingship is—it is not a mitzvah. It comes before the mitzvos. After “Accept My kingship” comes “Accept My decrees.” My decrees are the mitzvos. The Ramban says that the first mitzvah is “You shall have no other gods.” Now there’s a question anyone learning the basics would ask: Wait, how can “I am” not be a mitzvah? After all, we all know what it says in that Gemara about the 613 mitzvos being given to Israel. What does the Gemara say there in Makkos? Except for two, because we received two directly from the Almighty. Right? “The Torah that Moshe commanded us.” Torah has a numerical value of 611, because Moshe commanded us 611; the first two came directly from the Almighty. The Tanna says: “I am” and “You shall not have

24:50 Speaker 1 other gods” we heard directly from the Almighty. That’s from the Gemara in Makkos. So what will the Ramban say to that? What will the Baal Halachos Gedolos say? How will he answer it? The Ramban says: Do you know which two mitzvos we heard directly from the Almighty? “You shall have no other gods” and “You shall not make yourself a graven image.” Those are the two mitzvos—not “I am.” Among the prohibitions at the beginning of the Ten Commandments, there are two separate prohibitions: not to have other gods, and not to make idols. Yes, not to worship other gods and not to make idols. Those are what we heard directly from the Almighty. Wow. That turns the whole world, our whole understanding, upside down, doesn’t it? But here we see an example of a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban. Now I’ll let you in on a secret: Just as before, here too a miracle happened. Although in his critiques of the Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvos the Ramban—Nachmanides—defends the Baal Halachos Gedolos and rules like him, the Ramban himself later changed his mind about this too. In his commentary on the Chumash, on Parshas Yisro, the Ramban writes about “I am Hashem your G-d”: “This is a positive mitzvah.” And the Tzemach Tzedek cites this in Derech Mitzvosecha. The Tzemach Tzedek says that elsewhere in Sefer Hamitzvos, too, it appears that he himself changed his mind. Then the Tzemach Tzedek answers the question. Because there is a question here: How can “I am” be a mitzvah? The Tzemach Tzedek gives the well-known answer: The mitzvah of “I am Hashem your G-d” is not to believe in Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Certainly, belief in Hakadosh Boruch Hu comes before the mitzvah. The mitzvah of “I am Hashem your G-d” is to know. And—yes, the whole idea he explains in that well-known passage of the Tzemach Tzedek: that Hakadosh Boruch Hu is perfect with the ultimate perfection, and that He is beyond perfection, and so on. That whole subject—but this is not the place to go into it at length. In any case,

27:08 Speaker 1 here we see another interesting example involving the Rambam and the Ramban. So what’s the point here? What’s interesting is that, if we go back to the history, on the one hand the Ramban critiques the Rambam. It’s as though his aim is to tell the Rambam, “What the earlier authorities said is true”—to vindicate the Baal Halachos Gedolos. Nevertheless, in the end he actually accepts the Rambam’s view. Both sides are interesting. On the one hand, he defends the earlier authorities and consistently safeguards their honor. At the same time, he can ultimately state his own opinion, and sometimes return to agree with the Rambam. That is one of the wonderful things we see in the relationship between the Rambam and the Ramban. They have a very interesting connection. They argue a great deal, but there is a great deal of respect. The Ramban has tremendous respect for the Rambam. The Rambam lived earlier, so we can’t speak of the Rambam respecting the Ramban. But that respect is very interesting, isn’t it? With the Raavad, for example, we don’t see it as much. The Raavad is sharper with the Rambam. Right? He really lets him have it, and writes very beautifully. He doesn’t hold back, as they say. With the Ramban, it’s a kind of “Respect him, but remain wary of him.” He disagrees with him a lot, but respects him greatly. We saw this when there were major objections during the great controversy over the Rambam, when people argued that the Rambam had written various things that were inappropriate. The Ramban defended him. The Ramban is very careful to uphold the Rambam’s honor, and he understands who the Rambam is. He treats him with great esteem and respect, and that is why we also see him later writing many things in agreement with him. Another point, on this very subject,

29:11 Speaker 1 By the way, this relates to the weekly parsha. It’s a very well-known point, and it also comes up in Chassidus, in Derech Mitzvosecha, in the mitzvah of prayer: Is prayer a Torah obligation or a rabbinic one? What do we know? It’s a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban. The Rambam rules that prayer is a Torah obligation. That’s what he writes in Sefer Hamitzvos, mitzvah five, if I’m not mistaken, and also in Mishneh Torah, in Hilchos Tefillah: It is a positive mitzvah to pray every day, as it says, “You shall serve Hashem your G-d.” That’s a verse in Parshas Mishpatim, right? That’s where we learn that there’s a mitzvah to pray. The Ramban disagrees. The Ramban says, “You shall serve Hashem your G-d” isn’t talking about prayer. Look at the verses there—it isn’t talking about prayer at all. It’s a general verse, not a specific mitzvah. “You shall serve Hashem your G-d” means serving Hashem in general. “And He will bless your bread and your water, and I will remove sickness from your midst,” and so on. The verse is talking about serving Hashem in general, not prayer specifically. Prayer is rabbinic; there is no Torah mitzvah to pray. Listen carefully, though. The Ramban writes that there is a mitzvah to pray in one particular circumstance. Praying every day is rabbinic. That’s also how the halachah is decided, as everyone knows. In the Shulchan Aruch, the Alter Rebbe also rules this way in his Shulchan Aruch. The halachic ruling follows the Ramban, not the Rambam: Prayer is rabbinic. Most of the Rishonim—the Rosh, the Ran—rule like the Ramban. Prayer is rabbinic. But the Ramban writes that there is a positive mitzvah to pray at a particular time: in a time of distress. When people are in a time of distress, there is a positive mitzvah to pray. Where do we learn that? Parshas Behaaloscha: “When you go to war in your land against an enemy who oppresses you, you shall sound the trumpets.” The passage there is discussing the trumpets. So the verse says that when there’s a war, “you shall sound the trumpets.” From there we learn the positive mitzvah to pray and plead, and to observe fasts

31:43 Speaker 1 and so on. But that’s prayer in a time of distress, and it’s a Torah obligation. So there’s an interesting dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban about prayer. According to the Rambam, everyday prayer—the ordinary prayer we’re used to—is a Torah obligation. The Ramban holds it’s rabbinic. When is it a Torah obligation? In a time of distress. There’s a very interesting insight from the Rebbe here. I’d need to look it up; maybe I’m not repeating it correctly. I haven’t looked at it now—it just came to mind while I was speaking. There’s a sicha of the Rebbe on this, [unclear]. It’s worth looking it up inside. One of the arguments the opponents of Chassidus made concerned this very point. It was one of the major arguments they wrote down when they issued the ban and wrote harsh things about Chassidus. They had a complaint about prayer: The Baal Shem Tov and his students made prayer a central matter. The opponents argued that Torah study is a Torah mitzvah, while prayer is rabbinic. So how could the chassidim turn things around and consider prayer more important than Torah study? That was one of their arguments. Now, the Alter Rebbe wrote a letter to Reb Alexander of Shklov, who was apparently one of the leading chassidim. Shklov was a city of opponents, and the chassidim there suffered terribly from the troubles the opponents caused them. So the Alter Rebbe wrote to Reb Alexander of Shklov, telling him not to respond on the Alter Rebbe’s behalf. It’s a very interesting letter, in which the Alter Rebbe addresses various claims made by the opponents. There’s a line there that’s hard to understand at face value. The Rambam—the Alter Rebbe writes: “And those who say prayer is rabbinic have never seen the light in their lives.” That’s what the Alter Rebbe writes. “Those who say prayer is rabbinic have never seen the light in their lives.” How can you say that about the Ramban? About the Ran? About the Rosh? What does it mean?

33:55 Speaker 1 “Those who say prayer is rabbinic have never seen the light in their lives”—as though they don’t know what they’re talking about. How could you say such a thing, even to defend yourself? What’s more, the Alter Rebbe himself rules in halachah that prayer is rabbinic. So what does he mean here? In that explanation, there’s a wonderful insight. What does the Rebbe say? Chas veshalom, the Alter Rebbe isn’t referring to the Rishonim. The Alter Rebbe means—listen carefully—the Ramban, who holds that prayer is rabbinic, also holds that in a time of distress it’s a Torah obligation, right? In other words, even the Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam hold that in a time of distress it’s a Torah obligation. If you know what prayer is, if you learn Chassidus, you know what prayer is. What is prayer? Prayer is the battle between the G-dly soul and the animal soul. So, in fact, every day you fulfill a Torah obligation when you pray. If, for you, prayer is just mumbling words—everything’s fine, I’m not lacking anything, but I have to pray because that’s the routine, to recite the set text—then certainly it’s rabbinic. But if you pray as Chassidus asks us to, then every day is a time of distress, and you fulfill a Torah obligation through prayer. And “those who say prayer is rabbinic have never seen the light in their lives”—they simply haven’t learned Chassidus. He means the opponents who use this as an excuse to be lax about prayer. They say prayer is rabbinic because they truly have never seen the light in their lives, so for them prayer is rabbinic. But if they learned Chassidus, they would understand that prayer is a Torah obligation. That’s the insight. We should look at the sicha inside to appreciate how delightful it is. So that’s one example of an interesting dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban. That’s in the revealed dimension of Torah, concerning the counting of the mitzvos. The counting of the mitzvos is a whole world in itself, with constant disputes between the Rambam and the Ramban. Let’s give a few examples. It’s really fascinating, but time is short,

36:10 Speaker 1 so I’ll touch on only a few important points. For example, the Rambam didn’t give reasons for the mitzvos in Mishneh Torah, as we all know. But there is Moreh Nevuchim. The Rambam wrote Moreh Nevuchim toward the end of his life, and of course it isn’t a book of halachah; it’s a book of philosophy. That book was at the center of the controversy. Sages in France came out against it, and in Spain too—Rabbeinu Yonah. The Ramban was the one who spoke in its defense. He explained that Moreh Nevuchim was written for a particular time and particular people, intended to answer those who had difficulties with faith. But he does treat it with respect. Now, in the third part of Moreh Nevuchim, the Rambam devotes an entire section to explaining the reasons for the mitzvos. He explains the reason for each mitzvah; he even gives reasons for the chukim. It’s very interesting. The reasons he gives there are fascinating, and you have to understand their depth. In practice, though, in his commentary on the Chumash, the Ramban cites a reason given in Moreh Nevuchim wherever he can and disagrees with it. Generally, he doesn’t like the Rambam’s reasons for the mitzvos. I’ll give you a few examples—some interesting ones, at least. The best-known one concerns korbanos. Everyone knows this: The Rambam writes in Moreh Nevuchim that the reason Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded korbanos is that the Jewish people were accustomed to offering sacrifices to idols. So Hakadosh Boruch Hu took that same practice and told them to do it for Hashem instead of for idols. In other words, they were used to offering sacrifices to idols, so Hakadosh Boruch Hu told them to use that practice in His service instead. That’s the Rambam’s view. The Rambam adds more details, but that’s the short version. In Parshas Vayikra, the Ramban writes very sharply: How can you say

38:17 Speaker 1 Such a thing? G-d forbid. On the contrary, if that were the reason, Hakadosh Boruch Hu should have said not to bring sacrifices. What does the Ramban write? This is the well-known Ramban, which the Rebbe cites in many sichos: the reason for the mitzvah of sacrifices is that a person should make a reckoning of his soul and realize that everything being done to the animal should have been done to him. In His great kindness, Hakadosh Boruch Hu gave us the possibility of bringing a sacrifice instead, so that we would be granted life, and so on. That is the Ramban’s explanation. So that is one example of a disagreement between the Rambam and the Ramban. Now, as is well known, the Rambam himself writes in the Mishneh Torah that this is one of the chukim. Again, this is where the fact comes in that the Rambam wrote his book for a very particular kind of person, so he explained things accordingly. Another interesting example of reasons for the mitzvos is the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents. The Rambam writes—do you know why you have to honor your parents? “Honor your father and your mother.” What reason is there to honor your parents? Can anyone think of a reason? Why do you have to honor your parents? Huh? Do you know what the Rambam writes? The Rambam writes, “Because if you don’t honor your parents, your children won’t honor you either.” Sounds good? A person who gets into the habit of honoring his parents will merit that his sons honor him when the time comes. But if he himself didn’t honor his parents, what can he ask of his children? The Sefer HaChinuch, as is well known, writes that it’s simple: they brought you into the world. That’s a somewhat more, more logical reason. Gratitude. There were years when you couldn’t manage on your own. Who, who changed your diapers? I mean, what? Just for that, you need to thank them. Fine, what does the Ramban write? The Ramban in Chumash, the famous Ramban. Why is it famous?

40:27 Speaker 1 Because bochurim who learn Likkutei Sichos know this Ramban. The Ramban holds that honoring one’s parents is not a mitzvah between one person and another; it’s a mitzvah between a person and G-d, because parents are partners with Hakadosh Boruch Hu in the creation of a child—there are three partners in a person’s creation. So just as Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded us not to associate any idol worship with His service, to serve only Hashem and not other gods, He Himself commanded us to honor the parents who are partners in creation. So the Ramban says that this is a mitzvah of honoring G-d. Honoring one’s parents is no ordinary mitzvah. So here you see two opposite extremes. According to the Rambam, it’s simply an entirely social mitzvah, as they say: if you show honor, you’ll be shown honor. According to the Ramban, it’s a mitzvah between a person and G-d. That’s why he writes that it’s among the five—yes, on the Tablets, there’s one side and the other side. Honoring one’s parents is on the side of mitzvos between a person and G-d, not the side of mitzvos between one person and another. It’s among the five mitzvos on the right-hand Tablet. Well, we’ve already spoken quite a bit, time is up, and we haven’t reached the Chassidus part. What are the well-known disagreements between the Rambam and the Ramban on matters of G-dliness that we know from Chassidus? As we said, the Rambam was a rational investigator, a philosopher: the discipline of rational inquiry, the discipline of philosophy. The Ramban was a kabbalist: the wisdom of Kabbalah. Those are two worlds. Both speak about Hakadosh Boruch Hu, but they are completely different worlds. Rational inquiry arrives at an understanding of Hakadosh Boruch Hu through the intellect. It investigates everything by reason. The wisdom of Kabbalah, as its name suggests, is something received. It was received from one person to another: Eliyahu Hanavi, Achiya HaShiloni, Moshe Rabbeinu, ruach hakodesh, revelations from Above—that is Kabbalah. These are two different worlds. How do you arrive at an understanding of G-dliness? There are well-known disagreements between the Rambam and the Ramban in all—rather, the other way around. In short: the resurrection of the dead, Gan Eden. Everyone knows Derech Mitzvosecha, the mitzvah of tzitzis.

42:40 Speaker 1 And the many sources cited in the discussion of this subject. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Teshuvah that the ultimate reward is Gan Eden. After Moshiach and after the resurrection of the dead, we will all die and ascend to Gan Eden, where souls will exist without bodies, and that is eternal life. That is what all the verses in the prophecies are referring to: “No eye has seen it, G-d, except You; He will do it for the one who waits for Him.” All of that refers to Gan Eden Above. That is the ultimate end. The Ramban wrote a book, Shaar HaGemul, in which he disagrees with the Rambam and explains that this is not so. The World to Come is here below, in this physical world: eternal life. We’re all fans of the Ramban, right? We all know that the Ramban is right here. The World to Come is the world of resurrection. “All Israel have a share in the World to Come”—the World to Come, the resurrection of the dead, and, according to Chassidus, souls in bodies. What does that mean? The entire purpose is souls in bodies. But this is an enormous disagreement. It even affects the famous sicha at the end of the Rambam, which every bochur who learns about Geulah and Moshiach knows, where the Rebbe explains that there are two periods in the days of Moshiach. Right? Who doesn’t know the sicha? Volume 27, Hilchos Melachim: there are two periods in the days of Moshiach. In the kuntres [unclear], that works only according to the Rambam’s view. According to the Ramban, you don’t need that whole explanation. So this idea we all know, that there are two periods in the days of Moshiach, applies only if you follow the Rambam. But if we rule like the Ramban, that the World to Come is the world of resurrection, what is the entire proof that there are two periods based on? On the resurrection of the dead. But if the resurrection of the dead is the World to Come, who says there have to be two periods? It’s not so simple. Yes, I don’t want to bring down all the—all the structures each person has built in his beliefs. It’s

44:42 Speaker 1 not simple. There is an explanation of this in [unclear], Parshas Vayechi, [unclear]. Does the Ramban also hold that there are two periods, or not? There is, in fact, a way to explain it. Another well-known disagreement concerns the presence of the Shechinah in the Beis Hamikdash. According to the Rambam, the presence of the Shechinah in the Beis Hamikdash was by way of enclothement. According to the Ramban—what did I say? Sorry, the reverse. According to the Rambam, the presence of the Shechinah in the Beis Hamikdash was by way of passage. According to the Ramban, the presence of the Shechinah in the Beis Hamikdash was by way of enclothement. Is the Beis Hamikdash like the hand that transfers an idea onto the page, though the hand itself is not a vessel for the idea? That is the Rambam’s view. He says that the Shechinah is not present in the physical substance of the Beis Hamikdash. Physical matter is not a vessel for the Shechinah. Rather, the Beis Hamikdash is a specially designated place through which the Shechinah passes and is revealed to the Jewish people—to a Jew who goes up for the festivals, to a Jew who brings a sacrifice and prays. But the Rambam does not agree that G-dliness becomes enclothed in the physical place. It is only a passage, like the hand that transfers something. The Ramban disagrees. The Ramban says, that’s not so. The Beis Hamikdash was [unclear]. “This is none other than the house of G-d.” This is the place where the Shechinah dwells. So that is enclothement. An enormous disagreement. What accounts for the difference between the Rambam and the Ramban? Each is consistent with his approach. It’s connected to the entire difference between rational inquiry and Kabbalah. The Rambam was a rational investigator. These scholars of rational inquiry could not understand how G-dliness could become enclothed in a physical place, and so he could not accept that this place itself could be a vessel for G-dliness. “Will G-d indeed dwell on earth? The heavens and the heavens of heavens cannot contain You, much less this house.” If the heavens are not a vessel for Hakadosh Boruch Hu, how could a physical place be a vessel for Hakadosh Boruch Hu? And so the rational investigators—the Rambam, the Radak, Rav Saadiah Gaon—the Rebbe notes in several of the references

47:06 Speaker 1 There, in the explanation in the Lamed Hei and the Melukat. All those who followed the philosophical approach hold that the Beis Hamikdash was only a place through which the Divine presence passed; there could not be an actual enclothing of G-dliness there. The Ramban was a kabbalist. Kabbalah revealed the concept of enclothing: because Hakadosh Boruch Hu is all-powerful and not limited, He can also become enclothed in a physical place. On the contrary, true oneness means that He can be present even within a place. So in the explanation of the Lamed Hei, the Rebbe explains that there is an advantage to the Rambam’s approach and an advantage to the Ramban’s approach. This depends on another disagreement between them: Is the main purpose of the Beis Hamikdash the offerings, or is it the Holy of Holies? That, too, is a well-known disagreement discussed in many of the Rebbe’s sichos. The Ramban holds that the central feature of the Beis Hamikdash is the Aron. The Rambam holds that its main purpose is to be a place for offering sacrifices, consistent with his approach. The Ramban holds that the Beis Hamikdash is a place where the Shechinah rests. Where? In the Aron. There, it had a vessel for G-dliness. The Rambam holds that it is for the sake of the Jewish people, who offer sacrifices, so for him, the main thing in the Beis Hamikdash is the offerings. That is why the Rambam does not call it the Beis Hamikdash; he calls it the Beis Habechirah. There is a famous sicha of the Rebbe about this. Why does the Rambam call it the Beis Habechirah? Why not the Beis Hamikdash? Because for the Rambam, the idea of holiness residing in a place is difficult to conceive. It is all a passage through the place, all a matter of choice from Above. There is an advantage in that, because passing through is higher from the perspective of what is Above, while enclothing reaches deeper into what is below. Okay, we’ve spoken quite a bit already. Have a good rest of the day. Hatzlacha.