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Lichyos Chassidus – Rabbi Farkash · Episode 99 · 19 Menachem Av 5783 · 43:31

From the Teachings of Rabbi Levi Yitzchok n"e - A Declaration of Intent in a Get

Episode description

The Dispute Between Abaye and Rava, and the Halacha Follows Abaye

Machine translation into English of the automatic Hebrew transcript.

00:01 Speaker 1 So the Gemara says here, on page 34a of Gittin: Gidal bar Re’ilai. Yes, there was a man named Gidal bar Re’ilai. He sent a get to his wife. He sent a get to his wife through a shliach. The shliach went and found her sitting and weaving. He met Gidal bar Re’ilai’s wife, who was sitting and weaving. Weaving—with an “a,” right? What do you call it? She was sewing, as it were, making fabric—doing the work of weaving, as women traditionally did. How does it say it there? In Eishes Chayil, right? With the spindle and the distaff: “She puts her hands to the distaff, and her palms hold the spindle.” How does it go? “She puts her hands to the distaff, and her palms hold the spindle.” That’s the plain meaning of what the women did. The spindle is the thing—the metal implement they used to weave clothing. So that’s what she was doing. She was sitting and weaving. What did he say? How does it go? She said to him—Gidal bar Re’ilai’s wife said to the shliach: “Go now, and come back tomorrow.” Yes, that’s it. Come back tomorrow. Go now and come back tomorrow. All right, so he did not give her the get. She did not want to receive it just then. She sent him back. He went back to the sender—the shliach returned to Gidal bar Re’ilai—and told him what had happened. He told him that his wife had not accepted the get and had asked him to come back tomorrow. He opened his mouth and said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good.” So when the husband heard this, he said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good.” That wording implies that he was happy, that he was pleased—happy that he had not divorced her. The Gemara has a dispute about the ruling in this case. Abaye said: Yes, he said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good,” and it’s very nice that he is happy and delighted, but the get was not canceled.

02:33 Speaker 1 That does not mean he canceled the get. Saying “Blessed is He Who is good and does good” is all well and good, but it does not cancel the get. Tomorrow the shliach can go and deliver the get, and it will be a valid get. The get is not canceled. Rava said: He said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good,” and the get was canceled. He says the get is indeed canceled. When he said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good”—even though he did not say that the get was canceled—the shliach can no longer go the next day and effect the divorce. “And what do they disagree about?” the Gemara asks. What is the reasoning behind the dispute between Abaye and Rava? The Gemara says: “They disagree about a disclosure of intent concerning a get.” The dispute concerns disclosure of intent. When there is a disclosure of intent—that is, here there was no clear statement. He did not explicitly say, “I am canceling the get”; he was simply happy that the get had not been delivered. He said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good.” That is called a disclosure of intent. There is no clear statement here that he is canceling the get. On the other hand, his words, “good and does good,” do suggest that he was happy the shliach’s mission had not been carried out. So there is an implication here, a disclosure of intent. That is what they disagree about. Abaye holds that a disclosure of intent concerning a get has no effect. Abaye holds that if you merely disclose what you have in mind but do not state it explicitly, it does not count for anything. A disclosure of intent concerning a get has no effect; it means nothing. Therefore, the get is valid, the shliach’s mission continues, and he can return tomorrow and deliver the get. It has no effect. There are no clear words here. Rava holds that a disclosure of intent concerning a get does have effect. If he disclosed his intent and we understand from his words that he is happy, that disclosure of intent has effect. Therefore, the get is canceled, the shliach’s mission is canceled, and he cannot effect the divorce. That is the dispute between Abaye and Rava. What is the basis of their dispute? First I’ll say a few words

04:34 Speaker 1 on the halachic side. As for the basis of the dispute between Abaye and Rava, there is the explanation of Tosafos Rid and the explanation of the Chasam Sofer. What exactly is the basis of their dispute? Tosafos Rid explains that their dispute is connected to the principle that “unspoken thoughts have no effect”—it is as though they were never said. We have a rule that unspoken thoughts have no effect. We learned about this on page 32 as well, right? Or not. Unspoken thoughts have no effect. If a person only thinks something in his heart and does not say it, it has no significance. It has no effect. Rava also accepts that unspoken thoughts have no effect. He does not disagree with that. For example, if you remember, we learned an example in the Gemara in Kiddushin: A man sold his property because he wanted to move to Eretz Yisroel, but he did not say so explicitly. He sold it, but in his heart he intended to move to Eretz Yisroel. Afterward he changed his mind. He decided not to go and wanted to get his property back. Unspoken thoughts have no effect. Rava also agrees that unspoken thoughts have no effect in that case. According to Tosafos Rid, the dispute between Abaye and Rava is about this case, where he did not state his intention explicitly but only disclosed it. Does that count as unspoken thoughts, or not? That is their dispute. Rava holds that a disclosure of intent concerning a get has effect. Even though he did not state it explicitly, he did disclose his intent, so it no longer counts as an unspoken thought. He disclosed his intent; he said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good.” True, he did not say, “I am canceling the get,” but saying “good and does good” is enough for it not to be considered an unspoken thought. Therefore, the get is canceled. Abaye holds that no, it is still considered an unspoken thought. Since it was not explicit, he only

06:35 Speaker 1 said, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good,” and did not explicitly say that the get was canceled, it is still considered an unspoken thought. And unspoken thoughts have no effect, so his words have no effect. That is how Tosafos Rid explains the dispute. Clear? The Chasam Sofer, and similarly other commentators, say no, it is a different dispute. It is not connected to the principle of unspoken thoughts. It has to do with another principle: Can speech cancel speech? The point here is that the man appointed a shliach by speaking. He told the shliach, “I appoint you as my shliach to divorce my wife.” He expressed his intent in words; he told the shliach, “Go and divorce my wife.” So there was speech here. The second statement was not explicit. The second statement was only, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good.” So the dispute is this: To cancel the first statement, do you need a clear statement, or is an unclear one enough? It is not connected to the principle of unspoken thoughts. There is another principle: speech cancels speech. For the second statement to cancel the first, the second statement must be forceful, strong, clear and explicit. Here there was no explicit statement, and that is the dispute. Abaye holds that since he did not state it explicitly, this statement does not cancel the first. Rava says that even a statement like “good and does good” is enough. An explicit statement is not necessary. That’s it. That is how the Chasam Sofer explains it. What is the practical difference? What difference would there be between the two approaches? The practical difference would be this: Is the dispute about a law specific to gittin, or about a law that applies throughout the Torah? That would seem to be the practical difference between the Tashbatz and the Chasam Sofer. In other words, when Abaye and Rava disagree about whether a disclosure

08:46 Speaker 1 of intent concerning a get has effect, if that is connected to the principle of unspoken thoughts—meaning, whether a disclosure of intent counts as an unspoken thought—then the question is not limited to gittin. It arises in every case involving the law of unspoken thoughts, including, for example, the story of the man who sold his property. That man wanted to move to Eretz Yisroel and sold his property. What do we do? What would the ruling be if, when he sold his property, he did not say so explicitly but did disclose his intent? He said something; he told people, “I’m going to Eretz Yisroel.” He did not say, “I’m selling this on condition that I go,” but he told people, “I’m going to Eretz Yisroel.” At the same time, he disclosed his intent to sell the property in order to move there. There was a disclosure of intent. So if we say that the dispute concerns unspoken thoughts, as the Tashbatz says, then there would be a dispute in that case too. The dispute between Abaye and Rava would apply throughout the Talmud. Wherever we say that unspoken thoughts have no effect, what would the ruling be if there were no clear statement but there was a disclosure of intent? Is a disclosure of intent like an unspoken thought, or is it not considered an unspoken thought? That would be a general dispute. But if we say, as the Chasam Sofer explains, that the dispute is about whether speech cancels speech, then this is a specific law. It is not connected to every other case. There is a particular issue here: there was the verbal appointment of the shliach to effect the divorce, and those words have to be canceled. Strong words are needed to cancel them. So this is not a law concerning unspoken thoughts. It is a law specific to this case, not one that applies everywhere. That

10:29 Speaker 1 She asks: What would the ruling be? If so, perhaps Abaye and Rava do not actually disagree about unspoken intentions. Perhaps they both hold that this is not a case of an unspoken intention. As for the whole rule that unspoken intentions have no standing, while making one’s intention known does have standing—perhaps Abaye and Rava do not disagree there either. They both hold that it has standing. So, in the story of the man who went up to Eretz Yisroel, if he had made it known that he was selling his property because he wanted to try moving to Eretz Yisroel, both Abaye and Rava would hold that his statement counts. Do you understand what I’m saying? In other words, this would be one practical difference, at least, between the two approaches. So far, that’s part of explaining what is going on in the Gemara. The Gemara then brings several stories about a certain man, and from those stories it brings a proof for Rava and a proof for Abaye, showing how each explained the stories according to his approach. Okay? In its conclusion, the Gemara says something very striking: the halachah follows Abaye. That is striking. Why? Because we know that whenever Abaye and Rava disagree, the halachah follows Rava. Here, the ruling is “the halachah follows Nachmani”—that is the wording of our Gemara. Nachmani is Abaye; the halachah follows Abaye. Rashi says this is one of the six cases everyone knows. Those who studied the laws of finding lost property will remember it from the disagreement over whether giving up hope of recovering an object without yet knowing it is lost counts as giving up hope or not. Abaye and Rava disagreed there, and the Gemara said: “The halachah follows Abaye in Ya’al Kegam.” After that, he also asks: Why does it matter to tell us that she was sitting and weaving garments? What does that detail have to do with our subject? Why is it important? It seems completely unrelated. But every detail in the Gemara is precise, especially for Reb Levi, so certainly every detail must be precise. But on the inner level—

14:09 Speaker 1 Levi asks: Why does the Gemara tell us that she was weaving garments, making clothes? What is the connection? And then, based on these points—oh, and afterward, what was the story with his reply, “Who is good and does good”? He could have answered in all sorts of ways. Why did he use precisely those words, “Who is good and does good”? Incidentally, the Chasam Sofer gives an explanation according to the revealed dimension of Torah for why he said “Who is good and does good.” The Chasam Sofer says that this is the opposite of [unclear]. Earlier, we said that the Gemara is concerned that the husband wants to cause his wife distress. Now that he said “Who is good and does good,” it means that he himself is happy—“Who is good”—and that he is also doing good for his wife. In other words, he wants to say that he is happy and is making his wife happy by not divorcing her. That is what the Chasam Sofer says. But Reb Levi asks on the inner level: Why did he answer specifically this way, “Who is good and does good”? And his final question is: Why did she tell him, “Go now and come back tomorrow”? Why did she say it in precisely that way? “Go now and come back tomorrow.” Why? She could have said something else too: “Never come back.” I don’t know what else. But she said, “Go now and come back tomorrow.” So Reb Levi begins with this point. Listen carefully, everyone, for a moment. This is tremendous—to see how the inner dimension of Torah makes all of this so wondrous. Who were Abaye and Rava? Abaye and Rava were two great Tannaim—two great Amoraim, sorry—who were also on a very high level in their service of Hashem. The way Abaye and Rava studied the revealed dimension of Torah was connected to the nature of their souls and to their level in serving Hashem. What was the difference between Abaye and Rava in their service of Hashem? He brings the Gemara in Berachos—

16:10 Speaker 1 The Gemara relates that when Abaye and Rava were small children, they studied with Rabbah. They were still very young, really little children. Rabbah taught them the simple basics of Judaism and then asked them, “To whom do we make a blessing?” They answered, “To Hakadosh Boruch Hu, the Merciful One.” So he asked them, “Where is Hakadosh Boruch Hu?” The Gemara says that Rava pointed to the ceiling of the house, to the roof, while Abaye went outside and pointed to the sky. That is how the Gemara tells it. Rabbah said, “A pumpkin can be recognized by its stem”—you can see when they are small what they will be like when they grow up. When you learn the Gemara at face value, you don’t understand. What does it mean? Yes? What?

17:07 Speaker 2 Rava’s chair.

17:09 Speaker 1 Rava pointed to the ceiling.

17:11 Speaker 2 …

17:12 Speaker 1 … And Abaye pointed to the sky, to the heavens. Rabbah said, “A pumpkin can be recognized by its stem”—from their childhood, you can see what they will be like when they grow up. What is the connection? Where do we see anything special here? What did he see in them? What did he see here? Reb Levi Yitzchak says that the difference between Abaye and Rava is very deep. Torah in general is beyond intellect. Torah, its wisdom, is the will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. It is the wondrous wisdom of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. We study the wisdom of Torah, yes? [Unclear] is Torah. Essentially, Torah is beyond intellect. But Torah descends and becomes clothed in the intellect. There are two levels. In the language of Chassidus, one is called a “near encompassing level,” and the other a “distant encompassing level.” That means there are things beyond intellect that nevertheless have some connection to intellect. That is called a near encompassing level. And there is a distant encompassing level: things that are entirely beyond intellect. Abaye’s approach was that Torah, in essence, is completely beyond intellect—a distant encompassing level. Rava’s approach, by contrast, was that even those aspects of Torah that are beyond intellect are not entirely beyond it. They have some connection to intellect; they are not completely detached from it. What is the difference? It is precisely the difference between a house and the sky. A house encompasses you, but a house is generally square. In Kabbalah and Chassidus, in discussing the letters, they speak about the difference between the samech and the final mem. A samech is round; a final mem is square. Both encompass, both are like—yes? Both encompass. But the difference is that a final mem is square. You can set it down; you can make it sit. It has stability. This is called a near encompassing level: something encompassing that can relate to what is internal, that can be clothed in it, that can be brought down. A round ball, by contrast—a samech—does not stand still; it rolls. It has no, it has no—

19:24 Speaker 1 It has no settled position, no stability. That is a distant encompassing level, beyond intellect. And this is the difference between Abaye and Rava. The Gemara compares Abaye’s way of learning to bones and Rava’s way of learning to meat. There is an expression in the Gemara: “While you are gnawing bones in Abaye’s house, come eat rich meat in Rava’s house.” Instead of eating bones with Abaye, let’s eat meat with Rava. The Gemara means that Abaye’s way of learning was more a matter of faith, more abstract; his lines of reasoning were more abstract. Rava’s reasoning, by contrast, was more intellectual, more a matter of intellect, understanding and analysis. So we can understand why Rava pointed to the ceiling. He pointed to the house because, according to his approach, Torah is a near encompassing level, and it can therefore be explained. Abaye’s approach, by contrast, was a distant encompassing level, for he saw Hakadosh Boruch Hu in the round heavens. The heavens are round, circles. Circles have no beginning or end; they are beyond reason and understanding, an encompassing level beyond intellect. This is what Rabbah meant. I can already see now what they will be like when they grow up. The way Abaye and Rava learn throughout the Talmud is connected to their approach, to how they perceive Hakadosh Boruch Hu. One sees Hakadosh Boruch Hu in the form of a square, a near encompassing level; the other sees Hakadosh Boruch Hu as a distant encompassing level. Reb Levi says this is also hinted at in their names. Rava’s name is related to ribui, multiplicity. Multiplicity is connected with comprehension and understanding, with being clothed in something, with understanding and explanation. Abaye’s name is related to av chochmah, the source of chochmah. That is the difference between chochmah and binah. Rava corresponds to the sefirah of binah, which is connected with understanding. Abaye corresponds to the sefirah of chochmah. Chochmah is koach mah; binah...

21:18 Speaker 1 Beyond understanding. So that is also connected with their names. Abaye was also an orphan. There are all kinds of things we see about Abaye that relate to his being on a higher, more spiritual plane, but lacking an ability to bring things down into concrete terms. Rava was more grounded in concrete terms. That is the point. And therefore, we generally rule like Rava. Since Rava was associated with binah, Rava was associated with a square, Rava was more grounded in concrete terms, Rava’s reasoning is more solid, more understandable. So in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halachah follows Rava. Where do we not rule like Rava? In laws that concern things beyond reason and understanding. In laws that are beyond reason and understanding, that are not about things taking concrete form, there we look to Abaye’s reasoning. For example, despair without knowledge. Despair without knowledge. Here there is an element of not knowing. The person still does not know whether he has lost the item or not. We are only saying that presumably, when he finds out about it, he will despair of recovering it. But in practice, the despair is despair without knowledge. There was no awareness here. So Rava, who looks at things more concretely, more in terms of what is apparent, says: But it does count as despair. Since he will certainly despair, what difference does it make what the person is thinking? He says that, in practice, people despair of recovering things like this; it counts as despair. Abaye says that despair without knowledge does not count as despair. Since, from the person’s perspective, he has not yet learned of the loss, the item is still considered his, and you cannot take it away from him. So in matters like this, without knowledge, beyond knowledge, Abaye understands more than Rava. That is Abaye. Abaye, in laws like this that are beyond knowledge, such as despair without knowledge. So

23:24 Speaker 1 we say that Abaye has deeper insight; he understands these things better than Rava, and therefore we rule like Abaye. What happens in our sugya? Gidal bar Re’ilai. Now let’s hear how Rabbi Levi Yitzchak learns our sugya. Our sugya says: There was a story involving a get, a bill of divorce. The story of a get. Gidal bar Re’ilai. Listen closely: in a few words, let’s explain who Gidal bar Re’ilai was, what the get is doing here, and what the idea is on the spiritual level and in the account itself. The whole concept of a get is connected with the world of Tohu. In the world of Tikkun there is no get; on the contrary, the world of Tikkun is a world of unity. The world of Tohu is a world of separation. In the world of Tohu there is the shattering of the vessels, and that is the idea of a get. After all, the word get, if you remember, we learned at the beginning of the tractate that the word get comes from a term meaning “breaking.” One of the commentators explained the word get as meaning “breaking,” yes? Because a get breaks the union between a husband and wife. So the whole concept of a get is connected with the world of Tohu, the shattering of the vessels. And in terms of the sefiros, it is connected with gevuros. A get is gevurah, of course. Gevuros involve division; gevuros involve separation. The world of Tohu is a world of gevuros. Because there was an abundance of gevuros, that brought about the shattering of the vessels. Empty vessels—all the things mentioned in Chassidus concerning the world of Tohu. And therefore the idea of a get is connected with gevuros. Rabbi Levi Yitzchak also explains—just an interesting point—that Chassidus says the name associated with gevuros is Ana Bekoach. Ana Bekoach is a name associated with gevuros; that is why we say it during the Counting of the Omer. It is associated with gevuros because it is an ascent from below upward, and Ana Bekoach has forty-two letters, the forty-two-letter Name. The forty-two-letter Name is the name associated with gevuros. So this is what he says: gimel, tes. Work out the letters of get: gimel, tes. From gimel to tes you have gimel,

25:42 Speaker 1 daled, hei, vav, zayin, ches, tes, yes? From gimel to tes: three and four and five and six and seven and eight and nine. What does that add up to? Three plus four plus five plus six plus seven plus eight plus nine equals forty-two, which is the forty-two-letter Name, the name associated with gevuros. That is a Kabbalistic explanation of why a get is connected with gevuros. In any case, a get is gevuros, and it belongs to the world of Tohu, where gevuros and the shattering have their place. Gidal bar Re’ilai also comes from the world of gevuros. Why? Rabbi Levi Yitzchak says this: Gidal—why is Gidal connected with gevuros? About whom is the word “vayigdal” written? About Yitzchak. After all, of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, Yitzchak is associated with gevuros, right? What does it say about Yitzchak? “And the man grew great, and continued to grow until he became exceedingly great.” That is written about Yitzchak: vayigdal. And vayigdal has the same letters as Gidal. They are actually the same letters. Gidal and vayigdal, with a change in the... They have the same meaning too, but the letters are also the same. So Gidal and vayigdal point to Yitzchak, to gevurah. Bar Re’ilai. What does Re’ilai mean? In Aramaic, Re’ilai is related to re’ulos, veiled faces. Arabs who put on a keffiyeh and cover their—cover their heads: in the language of the Gemara, they are called re’ulos. In the Gemara in Shabbos, yes? The word is used in Hebrew today too, yes? People with their faces covered. That is, people who cover and conceal, because gevuros involve concealment, covering. So Gidal bar Re’ilai: both his name Gidal, which points to Yitzchak and gevuros, and Re’ilai, which means covering, concealment and hiddenness, are connected with gevuros and concealment and hiddenness. So Gidal bar Re’ilai wants to send a get to his wife, because this is a matter of gevuros, a place of divorce, and he wants to divorce her. Why does he want to divorce

27:54 Speaker 1 his wife? Rabbi Levi says: because apparently she was—not doing what she needed to do. She was not carrying out the tikkun. The world of Tohu seeks to rectify itself. The woman comes to bring about that rectification. That is, she was supposed to bring about a tikkun, but instead she is not doing so. He cites a Gemara in Sanhedrin. The Gemara in Sanhedrin says there is a woman who has a spindle, who has the tools for weaving, but she falls asleep because she is lazy. She does not do the work. Instead of doing the work, she drops—as it says in the Gemara in Sanhedrin—she falls asleep, and her tools fall. That is a kind of laziness, and laziness is a reason for divorce. He wants a wife who will work, who will have energy, who will be lively; instead, she does nothing. That is why Gidal bar Re’ilai wants to divorce his wife: because she is not helping him repair the shattering of the vessels, to rectify the worlds and the concealments of the world of Tohu. What does he do? Bar Re’ilai, from re’ulos, veiled faces. Covering the face, an idea of concealment, the opposite of revelation. What did he do? He sent a shliach. Reb Levik says: Who is the shliach? The shliach sent to deliver the divorce is, is, is yesod. The sefirah of yesod is called a shliach. Why a shliach? Why is the sefirah of yesod a shliach? Because yesod is generally the connecting link; it brings all the flow from above down below. So it also brings the divorce. That is why shliach has the same numerical value, he says, as Shaddai and dal. Shaddai is the name of the sefirah of yesod. Dal also relates to the sefirah of yesod. “He gives him wealth and does not let the poor man die”—the Siddur says this refers to the sefirah of yesod. So shliach has the numerical value of Shaddai and dal: together they equal shliach.

30:00 Speaker 1 That is, the sefirah of yesod is the shliach who brings the divorce to Gidal bar Re’ilai’s wife because she is not fulfilling the role she is supposed to fulfill. Yes?

30:12 Speaker 3 At the beginning, when you said there was some shliach, what did you say at the beginning?

30:18 Speaker 1 That Gidal sent a shliach. A shliach corresponds to the sefirah of Yesod. The sefirah of Yesod is called a shliach because Yesod is what connects. The shliach is the one who connects the sender with the recipient, with the person who— that is the role of Yesod: it connects. Yes. So he sends a shliach to divorce his wife. Now, when the shliach reaches the woman, what does he see? The opposite. What is she doing? She is sitting and... weaving. In other words, the opposite. She is making a tikkun. This is the—this is the wording of the Gemara. She is sitting: “He did not create it to be desolate; He formed it to be inhabited”—the opposite of the world of Tohu. In the world of Tohu there is no sitting; the world of Tohu is chaos, the breaking of the vessels. And here he sees her sitting, in a state of “He formed it to be inhabited,” and weaving—she is making garments. In other words, she is making garments, a tikkun for the breaking of the vessels of the world of Tohu. That is the idea of weaving garments: to clothe the world of Tohu in garments. He says even more. He says the problem is being corrected to such an extent that, besides the word for weaving, the Gemara also calls it gidul, uh, gedilah. There is gedilah and there is weaving—godeles. The woman is godeles and weaving. Godeles is also like gedilim, fringes. “You shall make fringes for yourself” refers to tzitzis, which are called gedilim in the Chumash. Yes. So his very name, Gidal—Gidal bar Re’ilai—also has a root connected with weaving. It is another word in Lashon Hakodesh for the work of sewing. So when the shliach tells him that his wife is sewing and doing her job, she really is correcting the problem. Just the opposite. He thought he wanted to divorce her because she was—lazy, not doing the sewing. On the contrary, she is sitting and weaving; she is doing her job, doing what she needs to do. He adds another point based on

32:24 Speaker 1 Kabbalah: the word nuvala, which is the Aramaic word for weaving—he says nuvala has the gematria of three times the name El. How much is three times the name El? Thirty-one times three.

32:39 Speaker 4 Ninety-three.

32:41 Speaker 1 Ninety-three. Nuvala: nun and lamed make eighty. Right? Two vavs make ninety-two. The alef in nuvala makes ninety-three. So that is three times the name El. How?

33:00 Speaker 4 Alef.

33:00 Speaker 1 Here it is written with a hei. Oh dear. Okay, he writes it with an alef, so I don’t know. We need to check. In any case, what does he say? He says that... interesting. He writes it with an alef. Anyway, what else does he say here? Wait, let me check. Look at its name and see whether he addresses that. Nuvala. Yes, he writes it with an alef. In any case, that is—so he cites Kabbalah that the three instances of El are El Havayah, El Shaddai, El Elokim. Those three are connected with the world of Tikkun. These names are names of chessed, names of tikkun. Be that as it may, there is therefore no reason to divorce her. The whole reason he wanted to divorce her was that she was not doing the work, not making the tikkun. But now he sees that she is making the tikkun: sitting and weaving. She is weaving, making garments, clothing the lights of Tohu in garments, giving them vessels. So there is no longer any reason to divorce her. That is why she tells him, “Go now and come back tomorrow.” What does “Go now and come back tomorrow” mean? “Now” means this present time. All the problems of Tohu and Tikkun are only now. The work of birurim takes place in this present time. There is the world of Tohu, there is the breaking of the vessels, there is the work with the sparks. We need to make garments, to repair the garments, so that there can be a revelation of G-dliness. That is only in this present time. “Tomorrow”—what is tomorrow? The future to come. “Tomorrow, to receive their reward”: the World to Come. What is written about the World to Come? It says, “Your Teacher shall no longer be concealed.” The Alter Rebbe writes in Tanya that in the future to come, Hashem’s Essence will be revealed without garments. Garments will no longer be needed. And since garments will no longer be needed, there will no longer be any problem

35:12 Speaker 1 at all. That is what she meant to tell him. Go today, because, baruch Hashem, I am doing what needs to be done. I am making garments because this is the time for it. In this present time, we need to make garments, not light. Right? To connect Tohu and Tikkun and so on, we need the garments. So I am making the garments. You can go now. Come back tomorrow: tomorrow will be the future to come, and then, even if I do not make the garments, garments will no longer be needed. Everything will be good, so there will be no get at all; everything will be fine. That is what she meant: go today and come back tomorrow. What happened when she returned to him? When she returned, he said, “Blessed is the One Who is good and does good.” Listen to what Rabbi Levi says: what is the source of “Blessed is the One Who is good and does good”? Why did he respond that way? Rabbi Levi says: we said earlier that Gidal bar Re’ilai was a man of gevurah. Right? That is why he was dealing with all this turmoil. He was a man of gevurah. When she returned—the recipient—the shliach returned from the recipient and said, “She is making a tikkun. On the contrary, don’t divorce her. The work is being done, things are being repaired; it’s good. She is doing what is needed to set things right. She is doing a good job; everything is fine.” So there was a sweetening of the judgments. That is what is called the sweetening of the judgments: Gidal bar Re’ilai’s gevurah turned into chessed, and that is why he said, “The One Who is good and does good”—the opposite of divorce. Until now there was “the One Who is good,” yet there was divorce: he was characterized by gevurah and wanted to send a get to divorce his wife. Now it became “the One Who is good and does good.” He himself turned toward chessed. Gidal bar Re’ilai turned toward chessed. And not only that: now he also wanted to do good to his wife. The opposite of divorce—“the One Who is good and does good.” This is all about the sweetening of the gevurah. Rabbi Levi says that this is also hinted at in his name.

37:06 Speaker 1 The sweetening of the gevurah. Now the meaning of Gidal bar Re’ilai changes to the side of chessed. Gidal is related to “Yours, Hashem, is greatness”; greatness is chessed. Here Gidal does not mean the greatness associated with Yitzchak. On the contrary, it is the greatness spoken of in connection with Avraham—chessed. It is El Hagadol, which is the idea of chessed, goodness. And not only that: bar Re’ilai. How can bar Re’ilai be understood in terms of chessed? He says that Re’ilai contains two parts: rei, reish-ayin-yud, which is related to desire. In Chassidus, re’usa deliba—the heart’s desire—is an expression of love, of desire, of chessed. Besides that, the last letters spell the name El: lamed and alef, the letters of El. El is chessed. So when the woman told him—when she showed him that she was making the tikkun—she brought about the sweetening of the gevurah in Gidal bar Re’ilai. His whole name turned toward chessed. Gidal, from greatness and chessed: that is “the One Who is good.” And not only that: bar Re’ilai, the rest of his name, also turns toward good, and everything becomes goodness and chessed—“the One Who is good and does good.” So now the question is: well, if the tikkun has already taken place, what is the dispute in the Gemara now? Abaye says, “Blessed is the One Who is good and does good,” but the get is not canceled. Rava says, “Blessed is the One Who is good and does good,” and the get is canceled. So what is the dispute here? Rabbi Levi says: regarding the future to come, “tomorrow,” right? And why? Rava’s level, as we said, was the near makif. Rava’s level is connected with lower levels—the near makif, binah, intellectual comprehension. So once everything is in order, for him that settles it: there is no longer any need for a get. And tomorrow there certainly will be no need for a get, because tomorrow will already be the future to come, Moshiach will arrive, and it will no longer be needed. But Abaye is on a higher level.

39:33 Speaker 1 Abaye, after all, is on the level of the more distant makif. Abaye says that even tomorrow, even in the future, there will still be things that need to be corrected. Because Abaye is on the level of the more distant makif, for him the work takes place on higher levels. He says: Don’t think that when Moshiach comes, we’ll go to sleep. Even then we’ll need to work; even then there will still be matters that need correction. So it could be that tomorrow, too, there will be a need for a get. That is why he says, “Blessed is He Who is good and does good”: what has been done was enough for now, on the lower levels. Daas Tachton—what does that mean? Yes, she is working, she is making corrections. That is a correction that belongs to this level, but in the future we will still need to carry out refinements. This is an interesting point. He doesn’t write it here; I’m saying that perhaps we can connect it. It says that when there will be... the seven nations and the Kenites, Kenizzites, and Kadmonites. At present, the refinements concern the seven nations, which are the refinements of the middos, and that is the main challenge in our time: the seven nations. But in the future there will be ten nations, including the Kenites, Kenizzites, and Kadmonites, which represent the refinement of the intellectual faculties. It says that in our time we do not have the strength to refine the intellectual faculties, because that is very lofty. We are not on that level. But in the future, when there will be a higher Geulah, we will begin to correct even the subtler matters, the refinements of the intellectual faculties. So perhaps that is what Rabbi Levi means here. According to this, the disagreement between Abaye and Rava is understandable. Rava says: I am on the level under discussion, the closer makif. Here, once she is working, doing the work and making the correction, the correction is accomplished. That’s it; by tomorrow it’s over. Tomorrow there will no longer be refinements, because he has corrected his world, so there is nothing left to correct. That is already the utmost. Abaye, who is on the level of the more distant makif, says: No, there is still correction to be done. That is why he says that even in the future,

41:31 Speaker 1 it is possible; therefore the get is not yet nullified. Even tomorrow, they can still take the get and give it. We say that the halachah follows Rava. As we said, though, in matters connected with what is above reason, with higher levels, we rule like Abaye, because Abaye knows what is happening above. Rabbi Levi says that this is also the connection to another dispute in which we rule like Abaye: kiddushin that cannot lead to marital relations. That is one of the initials too—the kuf stands for kiddushin that cannot lead to marital relations. The Gemara in Kiddushin discusses a man who betrothed a woman but cannot marry her. For example, he betrothed a sister; he would be liable for relations with her and cannot marry her. Does the betrothal take effect or not? Rava says it does not; Abaye says it does. So he says it is the same reasoning; it all comes from the same place. Kiddushin that cannot lead to marital relations means a makif that cannot become internal. Marital relations are internal, right? Kiddushin is makif; kiddushin involves a ring. It is a surrounding bond. Kiddushin that cannot lead to marital relations is a makif that cannot become internal. So Rava says that a makif that cannot become internal has no relevance, is worth nothing; it is not kiddushin at all. The makif has to become internal, because that is Rava’s level. Abaye is on the level of a makif that is above what is internal, where kiddushin can still apply. Rabbi Levi Yitzchak says: Just as Abaye holds that kiddushin can apply on the level of the more distant makif, because that is his level, he recognizes kiddushin even when it cannot lead to marital relations—even a makif that cannot become internal is kiddushin. So he sees the same thing with divorce: there can be divorce on the level of the more distant makif. That is why he says there can be a get even tomorrow, and why Abaye holds that the get is not nullified; the get remains, and so on. As the saying goes: “A disclosure of intent concerning a get is of no consequence.”

43:21 Speaker 1 Well, that brings us to the end of Rabbi Levi’s explanation, showing us how to study the revealed dimension of Torah and Chassidus.