Likkutei Amarim Chapter 8 · 5781

00:00 Speaker 1 Take a son, for example. A son himself is an example. A father has children; he has a son. The son is of the same essence as the father. He’s a human being too, but he isn’t the father himself. He looks like his father: he too has intellect, eyes, and feelings. He has the same outward form, physically, and the same spiritual form. He’s a human being, like his father, of the same essence as his father—but he’s someone else. He isn’t the same person. The G-dly soul, too, is of a G-dly essence. It is like Hakadosh Boruch Hu, but it isn’t Him Himself; it is something created. By contrast, the garments of the G-dly soul are Him Himself. The garments—what are the garments of the G-dly soul? They are Torah and mitzvos. And what are Torah and mitzvos? Torah is His wisdom, and the mitzvos are His will. What are the mitzvos? He wanted this, and He wanted that, and He wanted that. Right? Now, with a person, a person’s will and wisdom—the person’s wisdom and will are the person himself, his very essence. Yes, there’s the body, and within the body there’s a soul. The person himself isn’t the body; the person himself is the soul, the life within the body. What is the essence of that soul’s life? Intellect and feeling. So, as it were, it is the same with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. The essence of Hakadosh Boruch Hu is Torah and mitzvos; His wisdom and His will are He Himself. And that wisdom and will of His came down to us as Torah and mitzvos. So when the soul clothes itself in Torah and mitzvos, in the garments, it becomes united with Hakadosh Boruch Hu Himself. In other words, the garments are Hakadosh Boruch Hu Himself, His very essence and being, while the soul is G-dliness that has descended and is, to some extent, a created being, already somewhat separate. It is

01:59 Speaker 1 not G-dliness itself. And when the soul... its garments, it descends. That’s what he explained in chapters 6 and 7, the previous chapters. What are those impure garments of the animal soul? Wait—let’s look at it more specifically. What is the difference between the animal soul and its garments? The animal soul is from kelipas nogah. What is kelipas nogah? Kelipas nogah is an intermediary between holiness and impurity. What does “intermediary” mean? It doesn’t mean neutral; nothing in the world is neutral. There’s no such thing. Either something is holy, connected to G-dliness, or it is separate from G-dliness. So what does “intermediary” mean? How can there be an intermediary? Let me explain: it doesn’t mean something in the middle. The animal soul, which comes from kelipas nogah, is an intermediary between holiness and impurity, but “intermediary” doesn’t mean that it’s halfway between them. It means it belongs to the kelipos. It is sitra achra. Why, then, is it called an intermediary? Because it doesn’t oppose G-dliness. What does the animal soul want? It wants to keep the body alive. Since the body is physical and lives in this world, it needs to eat and drink. The body needs to sleep. That’s what the animal soul wants. It wants to sleep well, eat well, feel good, and have things be tasty and pleasant. That’s what it wants. It isn’t looking to oppose Hakadosh Boruch Hu. As long as Hakadosh Boruch Hu doesn’t interfere with its eating, drinking, and enjoying the world, it has no objection to Him. It doesn’t look upward. That’s the animal soul. What are the garments of the animal soul? The garments of the animal soul are no longer neutral; these already stand against Hakadosh Boruch Hu. We’re talking here about forbidden foods, various transgressions. When a person begins to desire forbidden things, wants to eat something forbidden—matters

04:24 Speaker 1 of forbidden relations, or matters involving other negative commandments—those are already garments of the animal soul. And when the soul... that already belongs to the three impure kelipos; it no longer belongs to kelipas nogah. And when the animal soul, when a person begins... That isn’t so clear, so easy to picture. But here, in chapter 8, the Alter Rebbe gives examples from action, speech, and thought. The three garments of the soul are action, speech, and thought. Right? We learned that. So he gives examples of action, examples of speech, and examples of thought. What happens to us, to our soul—what happens to a person when he defiles his soul through actions, speech, and thoughts of this world? He wants to make that clear to us. So he begins like this. Chapter 8: “Furthermore,” in addition to what was explained earlier about forbidden foods, “that is why they are called issur,” meaning “bound.” So what is he adding? What did he already explain? Why are they called issur? Earlier, in chapter 6, he explained what forbidden foods are. Why are they called “bound”? Because they are bound to the kelipos. What does it mean that they are bound to the kelipos? When a person commits a transgression, the vitality descends into the kelipos and can never rise from there. Even if the person does teshuvah, the vitality he brought down into the kelipos continues to give life to the kelipos. It continues to give the kelipos vitality. Yes, a person, G-d forbid—say he failed to fulfill a positive commandment or violated a negative commandment. I don’t want to give random examples here, but when a person commits a transgression, even a small one, the physical thing with which he committed it descends into the kelipos. The vitality of that physical thing descends into impurity and adds vitality there. The very fact that a person committed the transgression is what gives vitality to the kelipos. So we spoke about exile. There is evil in the world,

06:54 Speaker 1 wars, illnesses, and all kinds of bad things. Where does that come from? It comes from transgressions committed by Jews. When a Jew commits a transgression, it gives vitality to those things. And even when he does teshuvah, that vitality remains there. He is forgiven. He did teshuvah, he is forgiven, everything is fine. But the vitality he gave to impurity, to the kelipos, remains there until Moshiach comes.

07:20 Speaker 2 All transgressions?

07:21 Speaker 1 All transgressions, without exception.

07:24 Speaker 2 That seems strange, because if the transgressions give them life, then he’s stopped and done teshuvah. So it’s like...

07:32 Speaker 1 That’s exactly what he explained about the word issur. Issur means “bound”: bound to the kelipos, belonging there. You can’t—its very essence is impurity. You can’t take it out of there. It belongs there. If a person takes something permitted, coffee, right, and drinks it now not in order to have the strength to teach Tanya, but because it tastes good—right? He’s drinking it out of desire. So because he did that, because it was out of desire, he has now brought the vitality of the coffee down into the kelipos, and it is in the three impure kelipos, just like something actually forbidden. It is an actual transgression. But here’s the difference: if he later does teshuvah, he can bring the vitality back out of there. Why can he? Because the coffee is permitted. The object, the physical substance itself, is not forbidden. It is something permitted. So even after it has descended into the kelipos, it can be brought out of there. Fine. But if the thing itself is forbidden—say it was meat and milk that he ate, right? It’s as if he took in that vitality for a moment; he committed a transgression and gave vitality to the kelipos, and that’s it. So we have to distinguish between the person’s transgression and what he caused to happen to the thing itself. When a person does teshuvah, he comes back; he gets out of there. A person can do teshuvah. But the physical thing itself has descended into the kelipos, and here there is a difference between something permitted and something forbidden. If it is permitted, it can be brought out of there. It isn’t simple; further teshuvah is needed, but it is possible. If it is forbidden, nothing helps. A person ate non-kosher meat, ate meat and milk. The vitality descended into the kelipos, and it does not come out of there. His doing teshuvah will not change that. It

09:21 Speaker 1 It won’t help if they forgive him. They forgive him, fine. The life-force remains there. That was explained in chapter 6. We learned that. And what could be worse than that? Besides what we explained—that the life-force of forbidden things remains there in the kelipos—there is something even worse. That is why they are called “forbidden.” What is it? Even if someone ate forbidden food without knowing it was forbidden. There was something here from which tithes hadn’t been taken. He thought they had been taken, but they hadn’t. He didn’t know. And more than that, not only did he not know, he ate it for the sake of Heaven. He ate it with the genuine intention of serving Hashem, so that he would have the strength to fortify himself and study Torah. That is why, as he ate, he explicitly thought about it and intended with all his heart to do it for the sake of Heaven, and he didn’t know it was forbidden. So what, seemingly, is the problem? If he ate it for the sake of Heaven, and that food he ate has now been digested in his body like any other food, and it now gives him the... the life-force he lives on. Right? The food. And now, with that life-force, he does holy things; he goes and davens. How does he daven? He davens with the strength of the food he ate that morning. If that food was treif, then he is davening with its strength—but davening is a holy thing. So what? Where is the problem? The problem is that the object itself is forbidden. If he ate something forbidden, there is now something forbidden inside his body, something connected to the kelipos. It won’t help that he davens. It won’t help that he studies Torah; his intention won’t help; it won’t help that he does teshuvah; it

11:24 Speaker 1 won’t help at all. He ate something forbidden. His body is built from, and receives its life-force from, something forbidden. That’s it; you can’t change that. Even though he didn’t know and did it for the sake of Heaven, to serve Hashem with the strength he got from eating. And more than that, he actually did so: he studied and davened with the strength he got from eating. “The life-force within it does not ascend and become clothed in the words of Torah and prayer as permitted food does.” It can’t. Why? Because it is bound to the sitra achra, to the three impure kelipos. More than that, even if it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because “the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah,” and so on. Our Sages had the power in their hands—that is how the Alter Rebbe explains it here, and it is explained elsewhere too—to take things that are permitted, that the Torah permitted, and bind them to the kelipos. And they did this in many instances.

12:36 Speaker 4 Give an example.

12:38 Speaker 1 Um, the example we gave earlier—tithes.

12:42 Speaker 4 Ah, okay.

12:42 Speaker 1 According to most opinions, tithes are only a rabbinic prohibition. But the question is, what can they prohibit? If a person eats meat and milk together, that is written in the Torah. Okay? Yes, but if he eats something from which tithes weren’t taken and the Sages prohibited it, then fine, it isn’t so severe. It isn’t really bound to the kelipos. But the Sages bound it, and the Sages changed the reality of the thing they addressed, the thing they spoke about and ruled on, turning it into something forbidden.

13:14 Speaker 4 Why did they do that?

13:16 Speaker 1 To keep a person away from transgression. By the way, even meat and milk, which we always use as an example, isn’t entirely prohibited by Torah law. True that—

13:27 Speaker 4 Only a kid.

13:27 Speaker 1 Only a kid, only that, yes. The Torah did not prohibit poultry with milk. But the Sages prohibited it, and the moment the Sages prohibited it, it became forbidden; it became part of the three impure kelipos. So, says the Alter Rebbe, that is a very clear point, right? I just won’t move on—sorry. Blessed is our G-d forever, for we have eaten from what is His, and through His goodness we live.

14:00 Speaker 4 Have some cookies for a moment.

14:03 Speaker 1 I’m working on—working on a belly. Do you know how much coffee I drink a day?

14:10 Speaker 4 No.

14:13 Speaker 1 Probably my sixth, seventh cup, or maybe more. So this is a novel point. I don’t know if it’s written elsewhere; maybe it is. In any case, it’s certainly an enormous insight. “The yetzer hara and the power of desire for forbidden things is a demon from among the foreign demons.” And that demon is, in our words, a non-Jew’s yetzer hara. “A demon from among the foreign demons”—translated into Hebrew, that means a non-Jew’s yetzer hara. We’ll explain shortly. It is “the yetzer hara of the idolatrous nations.” And in Tanya it says—or rather, because of censorship, wherever Tanya says “idolatrous nations,” and in the words of our Sages too, it is explained that this was written because of censorship; what it should say here is “non-Jews.” “Idolatrous nations” means all non-Jews. Maybe that doesn’t need explaining—the nations of the world. I don’t know, but—

15:08 Speaker 4 The nations of the world?

15:10 Speaker 1 The nations of the world.

15:13 Speaker 4 But “non-Jew” isn’t an insult either. So why don’t they just use the word “non-Jews”? Now there’s no one who...

15:20 Speaker 1 I think I explained this once. No, that was about printing a dalet after a samech. Well, another time.

15:26 Speaker 4 No, but I mean, the thing about “non-Jews” is that it isn’t a derogatory word. They wouldn’t be saying that they are this or that. So “idolatrous nations” doesn’t necessarily mean that.

15:36 Speaker 1 It isn’t about being derogatory. One more line and I’ll explain the meaning. “For the souls of non-Jews derive from the three impure kelipos.” He already said that in chapter 1 of Tanya, and we discussed it there at length. “Whereas the yetzer hara and the power of desire for permitted things, to satisfy one’s appetite, is a demon from among the Jewish demons”—meaning a Jew’s yetzer hara—“since it can return to holiness, as explained above.” So here the Alter Rebbe makes a point. There are very few points in Tanya. What is he saying? One more little thing. What did we say? We said there is an essential difference between forbidden things and permitted things. Right? Forbidden things belong to the three impure kelipos, and permitted things belong to kelipas nogah. True, both are from the sitra achra, but the three impure kelipos oppose Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Hakadosh Boruch Hu said to do one thing, and they want to do the opposite—that is the three impure kelipos. Kelipas nogah isn’t against Hakadosh Boruch Hu; it is for this world. It isn’t against anything; it is for this world. It isn’t for Hakadosh Boruch Hu. So fine, it is sitra achra. It isn’t on the side of holiness, but it isn’t against it.

16:59 Speaker 5 But everything that isn’t Hakadosh Boruch Hu is, basically, against Him, isn’t it?

17:02 Speaker 1 It is sitra achra. It isn’t against Him, it isn’t against Him. It doesn’t mind that Hakadosh Boruch Hu exists. It doesn’t bother it if someone else keeps mitzvos. Why should it care? A non-Jew—it bothers him that a Jew keeps mitzvos. It bothers him that there is holiness in the world. He is against it. The existence of holiness bothers him. Yes? He sees something holy, and it bothers him. A cow isn’t bothered that there are human beings in the world. Right? The yetzer... the animal soul isn’t bothered. As long as you want to keep mitzvos and it doesn’t come at my expense, and you give me food and drink. You want to eat kosher? Fine, no problem. If the kosher food is tasty, I’m happy to let you. I have no problem with it. Everything’s fine. Right? As long as you don’t bother me, you don’t harm me, you don’t step on me. You don’t take my place, my life, my pleasures—then you’re fine. It isn’t specifically against holiness; it has no principled objection to holiness. It wants to enjoy the world. That is the difference between the animal soul—between kelipas nogah and the impure kelipos. And we also said in chapter 1 that there is a difference between a Jew’s animal soul and a non-Jew’s animal soul. A Jew’s animal soul comes from kelipas nogah. A non-Jew’s animal soul—not just the animal soul; a non-Jew’s soul—comes from the three impure kelipos. And so, since the animal soul that... the soul that gives a non-Jew life comes from the impure kelipos, what does he desire? What are a non-Jew’s desires? A non-Jew desires forbidden things. There are all sorts of very interesting halachos connected with this. For example, you have a non-Jewish friend, a good friend. You work with him, he is your partner, and you spend time with him day to day. You

19:09 Speaker 1 stand in front of him—don’t lower your head in front of him. Why? So he won’t crush your head with a hammer. It’s a halachah in Shulchan Aruch.

19:16 Speaker 6 So a child with, like, a Jewish mother and, like, a non-Jewish father, then, like...

19:21 Speaker 1 That child is Jewish.

19:22 Speaker 6 R-right, but then that’s a complicated soul. Isn’t it?

19:25 Speaker 1 I don’t know. You’re asking hard questions. I don’t know how to answer. A non-Jew’s soul desires forbidden things. The whole essence of the animal soul is middos, emotion, and desire for... But the difference between a Jew’s animal soul and a non-Jew’s animal soul is that the non-Jew’s animal soul desires forbidden things. A Jew’s soul... A Jew’s animal soul never desires something forbidden. That’s what he said here. Since our soul, the soul of Jews, comes from kelipas nogah, a Jew’s yetzer hara will never, on its own, want to do something forbidden. That’s what he wrote. We read it, right? Let’s go over the words again. And therefore—that is, since a Jew’s soul does not come from the impure kelipos but from kelipas nogah—the yetzer hara, the force that desires forbidden things, is “a demon from among the non-Jewish demons,” the yetzer hara of non-Jews, which comes from the three impure kelipos, because they do not have a yetzer hara and a force that desires permitted things. Unlike “a demon from among the Jewish demons,” which can return to holiness. A Jew cannot desire something forbidden. Well, don’t we see that this is the reality? Seemingly, right? It happens... I might desire things that I shouldn’t... that it’s forbidden to desire. Sometimes a desire for lashon hara can arise.

21:05 Speaker 7 How does... how does a non-Jew’s yetzer hara become clothed in you?

21:10 Speaker 1 Ah. How does a non-Jew’s yetzer hara enter a Jew? A Jew is born without a non-Jew’s yetzer hara. He is born with a yetzer hara—“sin crouches at the door.” But he is born with a Jewish yetzer hara, not a non-Jewish one. At what point does a desire for forbidden things enter me? The explanation is very simple. When I allow myself to become immersed in desires for permitted things—we said, these are permitted things. If it’s permitted, why shouldn’t I do it, right? That’s what the yetzer hara tells me. But it’s tasty and it’s kosher. It has a hechsher from Rabbi Landau and the Eidah Hachareidis, and it’s also Lubavitch shechitah. So what’s the problem? It’s kosher and mehadrin in every respect. Yes, but if he eats it out of desire, then, despite all the finest hechsherim, at that moment he descends into the three impure kelipos. Despite the fine hechsherim—because the food is permitted. Later he can do teshuvah. He can learn. If he hasn’t done teshuvah, or until he does teshuvah, in the meantime he has descended into the three impure kelipos. Or, more simply, when a person allows himself to become immersed in desires, the desires of the world make him coarse. That coarseness of mind and heart, that crudeness, draws the non-Jewish yetzer hara onto him. Suddenly he begins to desire things that, on his own, he could not desire. It’s also written in... King Shlomo said it in Koheles: “I created man upright, but they sought many schemes.” When Jews go looking for all sorts of forbidden things, that isn’t... I didn’t make them that way. I made them upright. We also say this in the Yom

23:21 Speaker 1 Kippur prayers. In the long Al Chet of Yom Kippur. Among other things, it says there, “For the sin we committed before You with the yetzer hara.” You remember, right? What kind of sin is that? Is there a sin that isn’t committed with the yetzer hara? The confession says, “For the sin we committed before You with the yetzer hara”—meaning that I sinned by drawing a non-Jewish yetzer hara onto myself. My own yetzer hara would not, on its own, have desired such things. But because I threw myself into the desires of the world and allowed myself to enjoy the world not for the sake of holiness, not for Hakadosh Boruch Hu, not for Torah and mitzvos, but only for my own enjoyment, that caused me to descend into the three kelipos. A non-Jewish soul—yetzer hara—became clothed in me, and I began to desire forbidden things as well.

24:13 Speaker 7 Does that show itself only in eating meat, or...?

24:15 Speaker 1 No, that’s just a more pleasant subject to talk about. It applies to all 365 negative commandments, without exception.

24:23 Speaker 7 What, in desires too?

24:27 Speaker 1 Once there is desire, desire knows no bounds. It doesn’t confine itself to eating and drinking. It extends to forbidden relations, to theft, and to speech.

24:39 Speaker 7 No, I mean permitted things.

24:42 Speaker 1 Hmm?

24:42 Speaker 7 Desire for things that are—

24:43 Speaker 1 Desire for permitted things brings a person down into the three impure kelipos, and if he doesn’t do teshuvah and keeps on with it, he begins to be drawn to forbidden things too.

24:54 Speaker 7 I mean, usually desire for permitted things means desire for food and drink.

24:58 Speaker 1 Yes.

24:59 Speaker 7 My question is whether this desire shows itself in other things too.

25:01 Speaker 1 Of course.

25:03 Speaker 7 Like what?

25:06 Speaker 1 Oh, I know plenty of chareidim who make a point of taking a trip abroad every year. They really make a point of it, even though that’s no longer a permitted thing. It’s an actual Torah prohibition—the prohibition against leaving the Land. There is no permission whatsoever to go abroad for a vacation. It’s truly forbidden. Taking a trip within the Land, on the other hand, is permitted. But why do you need to travel? What do you have there that you don’t have here?

25:37 Speaker 7 Not motives.

25:38 Speaker 1 What?

25:38 Speaker 7 Not motives.

25:40 Speaker 1 So yes, all right, that’s an alternative, fine. True, but even going to 770—what are you going to 770 for? It’s the same thing. You can go to 770 because “everyone’s going,” or for the show, or so you can say, “I went too,” or for all sorts of other reasons. And you can go to 770 because you want to go to the Rebbe. Even a trip to 770 can be driven by desire. Even 770. There is no place, no point in the world, where desire cannot take hold. No such thing. You can study Torah out of desire; you can perform mitzvos out of desire. Anything is possible. Desire has no bounds. And if desire can take hold in matters of holiness, then all the more so it can take hold more easily in worldly matters—all worldly matters. Now, you need to wash to get clean. Who says you need a bath? You can wash in a shower. Who says the water has to be forty-two degrees? It can be forty. There’s no limit to it, no end. Every action—the point is, am I doing this now for Hakadosh Boruch Hu or for my own enjoyment? That’s the point. Everywhere. All right? Am I frightening you?

27:12 Speaker 7 No, they need to travel to Jerusalem now.

27:17 Speaker 1 Okay. I said I expected this to be a difficult chapter.

27:19 Speaker 7 Mm-hmm.

27:21 Speaker 1 It isn’t difficult to understand, but this chapter does hold a mirror up before us.

27:30 Speaker 7 Mm-hmm.

27:30 Speaker 1 Mm-hmm. It simply holds one up. It doesn’t really teach us so many new things here; it just holds a mirror up before our eyes. Look at who you are. Look at where you see yourself, where your thoughts are, where your desires are, where... Come on, let’s admit the truth.

27:45 Speaker 7 Is Kuntres U’Maayan sort of a continuation of this?

27:48 Speaker 1 No.

27:48 Speaker 7 Does it discuss this more?

27:50 Speaker 1 No. Kuntres U’Maayan does discuss these matters: how a person gradually falls into the kelipos. That is really the overall subject of the whole Kuntres U’Maayan. But here it comes in only as part of the discussion. It isn’t an explanation of that process. It’s part of the explanation of what the animal soul is. We want to understand what the G-dly soul is and what the animal soul is. What is the G-dly soul? We’ve understood that. What is the animal soul? Until now, we thought the animal soul was, I don’t know, some monster with black horns, some bull pulling us along. So he explains that the animal soul is you yourself. Yes? It isn’t someone else. And who are you yourself? Here, take a look. All right, let’s look a little further inside. “Nevertheless, before it has returned”—so this is called the yetzer hara of the “Jewish demon,” a Jew’s yetzer hara, which can return to holiness. “Nevertheless, before it has returned to holiness, it is sitra achra and kelipah. And even afterward”—this is more severe still—“a trace of it remains attached, attached to the body, because every food and drink immediately becomes blood and flesh of his flesh.” When a person eats, we’re not talking here about something forbidden. He ate something permitted. Remember? We’re talking about food he is allowed to eat: kosher, with a mehadrin hechsher. Yes? But he ate it out of desire, simply because it tasted good to him. That food became flesh of his flesh, and we said that because he ate it out of desire, that flesh now belongs to the three impure kelipos. So now his body, the very flesh of his flesh, belongs to the three impure kelipos. “Therefore the body requires chibut hakever to cleanse and purify it of the impurity it acquired through the pleasures and enjoyments of this world, from the impurity of the kelipah of”

30:00 Speaker 1 Nogah and Jewish demons. So pay attention: we’re talking here about a Jew who ate food with the most stringent kosher certification. He ate it out of desire. He did teshuvah—complete teshuvah, teshuvah out of great love. He studied Tanya, studied Chassidus, and prays, and he regrets it; with his whole being, he will never do it again. The vitality from that food he ate remains attached to his body, and after 120 years, his body will have to undergo chibut hakever, the buffeting of the grave. To that extent. The only person exempt from chibut hakever is someone who never took pleasure in this world all his life, like Rabbeinu HaKadosh. Not even once in his life did he take pleasure. Radishes and lettuce never disappeared from his table, summer or winter. He was wealthy and knew how to enjoy the world, but everything he enjoyed in the world was for the sake of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. So up to this point, that’s the garment of action. For the garment of action, he took the example of eating and explained how eating something forbidden, or eating something permitted out of desire, affects the body and the soul. That’s the garment of action. How does the garment of speech affect the soul when it comes to idle talk? The same applies if it’s permitted idle talk. How can idle talk be permitted? For example, an unlearned person who cannot study, who lacks the understanding. He lacks the knowledge or the ability, so you don’t tell him, “You’re forbidden to talk.” If... all right, yes, okay. So he talks. What does he talk about? Nonsense. He isn’t studying Torah or anything else. He chatters—idle talk. He must cleanse his soul of this impurity of kelipah by having it tossed about in the kaf hakela. So, okay, say he caught himself doing it and did teshuvah. He did teshuvah, fine, but that idle talk comes from the animal soul

32:21 Speaker 1 It comes from desires. It brought the soul down into the three completely impure kelipos. Fine, you did teshuvah. Impurity became attached to your G-dly soul.

32:33 Speaker 8 But you can’t speak, because...

32:35 Speaker 1 Hmm?

32:35 Speaker 8 Only G-d-fearing people can do that...

32:39 Speaker 1 So later, starting in chapter 17, the Alter Rebbe will explain this. Yes, not only is it possible, it’s close at hand—even very close at hand—for every single person. Because that’s what the Torah says. First we have to understand where we are and where we need to get to, and afterward he’ll explain how to get there. But that is definitely what’s demanded: that a Jew should never, ever stumble in action, speech, or thought, even in permitted matters. Just as he didn’t explain there what the kaf hakela is. There’s limited time, and there are also matters we don’t clarify fully here, even though they are discussed in a number of places. As it says in the Zohar, Parshas Beshalach, page 59. So that was permitted speech. But forbidden speech—he’s talking about things one is actually forbidden to say, like mockery, right? It says that a person is forbidden to gain honor at someone else’s expense. That’s very common on WhatsApp. Very, very common on WhatsApp, right? One person puts another down like that, and... right? Or is it less common among the girls?

33:55 Speaker 9 Among everyone.

33:56 Speaker 1 Huh?

33:56 Speaker 9 Among everyone, I think.

33:58 Speaker 1 These things drive me crazy. Gaining honor at someone else’s expense is mockery. It’s a rabbinic prohibition. This isn’t permitted talk. It’s not something permitted under certain circumstances, either. It’s forbidden speech. Why are you laughing at the other person? Why are you—what makes you better than him? Who are you? It’s forbidden. You’re forbidden to laugh at your friend, forbidden to mock him. That’s lashon hara: you know something bad about him, and you want everyone to know it. So you want to. Does that make it okay? It’s forbidden. And if a person stumbles not in permitted speech but in speech that is actually forbidden, that belongs entirely to the three completely impure kelipos, it no longer comes from kelipas nogah. It isn’t permitted speech. So here the kaf hakela alone cannot cleanse the soul and remove its impurity. It also needs the kaf hakela, but that isn’t enough. It must also descend to Gehinnom. Right, so that was all... He spoke about the effect of forbidden and permitted actions. Remember forbidden actions? They require chibut hakever, and permitted actions require afterward... Sorry. For forbidden actions, nothing helps, and a permitted action requires chibut hakever after the person has done teshuvah. Then, with idle talk, if it’s simply permitted idle talk, then...

35:39 Speaker 8 Nothing helps.

35:39 Speaker 1 Then that’s enough. What? What did you hear?

35:41 Speaker 8 He says that nothing helps.

35:44 Speaker 1 The vitality remains in the kelipah?

35:46 Speaker 8 No, but if he underwent chibut hakever, so to speak, that draws the vitality out of the kelipah.

35:49 Speaker 9 No, but that’s forbidden.

35:51 Speaker 8 No, all right, but this is permitted.

35:53 Speaker 9 It’s permitted.

35:53 Speaker 1 No, that doesn’t draw the vitality out of the kelipah—the vitality that it draws out from among the kelipos... Those are two different things. Sorry. When a person stumbles with permitted things, when he stumbles because it’s something he desires and it descends into the three completely impure kelipos, then after he does teshuvah, the vitality of that thing returns to holiness. It’s something permitted, and it can return to holiness. Even though—although when a person does teshuvah the vitality returns to holiness, he said that food has a particular severity: “And furthermore, with regard to forbidden foods.” What is the particular severity with foods? That although the vitality rose to holiness, an imprint remains in the body, and the body needs chibut hakever.

36:48 Speaker 10 Specifically for that.

36:49 Speaker 1 Specifically for that. Not forbidden foods—even permitted foods. Sorry. As for other things, I don’t know; I’m not giving examples. It may apply to other things too. Speech, then: ordinary idle talk requires the kaf hakela, while more serious speech, actually forbidden speech—the kaf hakela alone isn’t enough; the soul must also descend to Gehinnom. I’ll say a few more words about that. So up to this point, it’s been about action and speech. Here he moves more into thought. Speech and thought are somewhat intertwined here. “And likewise, someone who is able to engage in Torah study”—Torah study is more a matter of learning, more a matter of thought. But on the other hand, when a person studies Torah, he needs to say the words aloud. So it involves both speech and thought. Now, someone who is able to engage in Torah study but engages in idle talk: we’re no longer talking about an unlearned person. No, this is a Jew who knows how to learn, who can open a page of Gemara and study, but he holds back. It’s hard; it’s easier for him not to study. The kaf hakela alone cannot cleanse and refine his soul. Why? All he did was engage in idle talk. True, he only engaged in idle talk, but during that time he could have studied Torah. An unlearned person who couldn’t study Torah at that time—well, the kaf hakela alone removes him from that situation. But a Torah scholar who can study...

38:26 Speaker 10 Are there unlearned people in our generation? I mean, people... I don’t know, I think people are much more... aside from those who were raised without a Jewish education.

38:38 Speaker 1 I planned to talk about that later in the chapter. All right? We’ll get to it soon. We’ll talk about secular wisdom and about this too. So because this involves both idle talk and neglecting Torah study, the kaf hakela alone cannot cleanse and refine his soul. Rather, he also needs the severe punishments specifically imposed for neglecting Torah study, because Torah study is equal to all the mitzvos. Neglecting—

39:11 Speaker 10 Finishing a cup of coffee?

39:12 Speaker 1 What?

39:12 Speaker 10 Finishing a cup of coffee?

39:13 Speaker 1 No, no.

39:16 Speaker 10 Oh, okay.

39:16 Speaker 1 Neglecting Torah study is one of the most serious matters. Torah study is equal to all of them. So neglecting Torah study requires, in addition to the kaf hakela, severe punishments specifically for neglecting Torah study, and he doesn’t spell out what they are. “Apart from the general punishment for every failure to fulfill a positive mitzvah out of laziness, in a Gehinnom of snow, as explained elsewhere.” The sefarim that explain these matters offer a wonderful explanation. There are two kinds of Gehinnom. We always picture Gehinnom as fire, but the truth is that there’s a Gehinnom of fire, and in that same source it also speaks of a Gehinnom of snow. What’s the difference between them? Some transgressions...

40:01 Speaker 10 I pictured it here.

40:02 Speaker 1 Hmm?

40:03 Speaker 10 Siberia, huh? I said I pictured it here.

40:05 Speaker 1 Yes. There are transgressions that stem from—what part of the soul do they stem from? Desire, fire. A person gets stirred up and excited; he feels he needs it. So the correction for that is a Gehinnom of fire. There are transgressions that stem from...

40:26 Speaker 10 Coldness.

40:26 Speaker 1 From coldness, from sluggishness, from...

40:29 Speaker 10 Indifference, no?

40:29 Speaker 1 Huh?

40:30 Speaker 10 Indifference.

40:30 Speaker 1 Indifference, yes; from laziness, from sadness. So, okay, for that there’s the opposite Gehinnom, one of snow. It’s like...

40:39 Speaker 10 Depression—what do you call it? Is that also, like...

40:42 Speaker 1 I don’t know about depression. It depends.

40:44 Speaker 10 It’s like... something spiritual, isn’t it?

40:46 Speaker 1 It depends, it depends on whether it comes from a choice or not. Some people put it there by choice, and for others it’s just some kind of external flaw. I don’t understand it at that level. I don’t know. They compare it to the way things work physically. Some things you clean with hot water, like laundry, but you don’t wash a floor with hot water. You wash it specifically with cold water, right? There are different ways, depending on what you want to clean. So there are different kinds of Gehinnom too. When there’s an actual transgression, some things are cleansed through a Gehinnom of fire, while what comes from neglecting a mitzvah is coldness. The distinction is between prohibitions and positive mitzvos. When does a person transgress a prohibition? What causes him to transgress a prohibition?

41:41 Speaker 10 He does something.

41:42 Speaker 1 He does something. He wants to do it. So that’s fire, right? And what causes him to neglect a positive mitzvah?

41:50 Speaker 10 …

41:51 Speaker 1 Laziness. Right? So for transgressing a prohibition there’s a Gehinnom of fire, and for neglecting a positive mitzvah there’s a Gehinnom of snow. All right, we’ve spent too long on that. As explained elsewhere. “And likewise, one who engages in the wisdoms…” Up to this point we were talking about neglecting Torah study. For neglecting Torah study, then, there are also idle talk and laziness, as well as the neglect of Torah study itself. Yes, so for this he needs the slingshot punishment, a Gehinnom of snow, and severe punishments specifically for neglecting Torah study. He goes down another level. “And likewise, one who engages in the wisdoms of idol worshippers.” What does “the wisdoms of idol worshippers” mean in today’s language?

42:44 Speaker 10 Secular studies.

42:45 Speaker 1 Secular studies. What they call “science” in school.

42:50 Speaker 10 Mathematics.

42:51 Speaker 1 Yes. Mathematics, chemistry, physics, English, history—all the fields of study, philosophy.

43:00 Speaker 10 Whenever you tell them, “How manifold are Your works, Hashem,” and so on—the wonders of creation. So…

43:05 Speaker 1 Exactly.

43:06 Speaker 10 Okay.

43:09 Speaker 1 Any field of study, anything that isn’t idle talk—it isn’t nonsense. It doesn’t come from a person’s feelings. It’s already an intellectual pursuit. He’s studying something, right? If it isn’t Torah wisdom, then it’s in a different category. It’s wisdom, but external wisdom, not the inner wisdom of Torah. So a person can easily find a justification for himself: “I’m not engaging in idle talk, I’m not sitting around doing nothing, I’m not lazy. I’m sitting and doing important things.”

43:39 Speaker 10 It’s worse.

43:40 Speaker 1 Huh?

43:40 Speaker 10 It’s worse.

43:40 Speaker 1 So it seems that it really is worse. “And likewise, one who engages in the wisdoms of the idol-worshipping nations is considered to be engaging in idle matters with regard to the sin of neglecting Torah study.” If you have the intellectual ability to study a subject, why aren’t you studying Torah? So first of all, it’s idle activity. Second, it’s neglecting Torah study, as stated in the laws of Torah study. And beyond that, secular studies aren’t merely idle activity or merely neglect of Torah study; they go much further. “The impurity of the wisdom of the idol-worshipping nations exceeds the impurity of idle talk.” Why? With idle talk, he clothes and contaminates only the middos that stem from the holy element of air in his G-dly soul with the impurity of kelipas nogah that is in idle talk. For idle talk comes from the evil element of air in that kelipah. When does a person talk like that, just making conversation? When he has a lot on his mind. Right? When does a person talk like that? You see someone talking and talking and talking.

44:52 Speaker 11 He’s bored.

44:53 Speaker 1 Huh?

44:54 Speaker 11 He’s bored.

44:55 Speaker 1 But a person expresses himself through that. Why does he talk?

45:02 Speaker 11 So people will pay attention to him.

45:04 Speaker 1 Huh?

45:04 Speaker 11 So people will pay attention to him.

45:04 Speaker 1 So people will pay attention to him. He wants to express himself. Right? That’s what it’s called.

45:08 Speaker 11 But not all speech is… I think.

45:16 Speaker 1 Speech can have two sources. It can come from wisdom, from the intellect—speech that expresses an idea. Or it can be speech that expresses emotion. Speech is a garment, a garment of the soul. The soul has intellect and emotion. So either the intellect clothes itself in speech, and then he speaks words of wisdom, or emotion clothes itself in speech, and then he says things that express what he’s feeling at that moment.

45:46 Speaker 11 And for the emotion to be G-dly, that’s…

45:49 Speaker 1 And clearly, when the G-dly soul clothes itself in speech…

45:54 Speaker 11 No, because conceptually, the intellect is where the G-dly soul is, while emotion is…

46:00 Speaker 1 Unless the animal soul has taken control of the intellect as well. Right? So when the G-dly soul uses the power of speech, either its intellect clothes itself in speech, and then he speaks about Torah study, or its emotions clothe themselves in speech, and then he speaks about mitzvos, about fulfilling mitzvos. I think we’ve already explained why mitzvos are connected to emotion. We discussed that at length in chapter 2. And when the animal soul clothes itself in speech, again, if the intellect of the animal soul clothes itself in speech, he talks about secular studies. And if it’s the emotions, he talks about worldly matters, about what he feels. Sometimes he’s happy, sometimes sad, sometimes excited, sometimes impressed, sometimes enjoying himself. So he talks about what he feels; that’s what he talks about. It follows that when a person engages in idle talk, what is clothed in his speech? The element of air—the emotions of the animal soul. But when he talks about the wisdom of the nations, what is clothed in his speech? The soul’s intellect. So when he engages in idle talk, what becomes impure? What becomes bound to impurity? The soul’s middos. But when he talks about matters of wisdom, what descends into impurity? The soul’s intellect. And since the G-dly soul is clothed within the animal soul—in other words, we keep speaking about a G-dly soul and an animal soul, and they really are distinct, but Hakadosh Boruch Hu joined them together. It’s like a lamp: you put oil inside a lamp. What is a lamp? A lamp has a vessel, and you put oil or paraffin inside it—it doesn’t matter—and there’s a wick inside. Right? And the wick is always braided from several threads. So what are the threads the wick is braided from? They are…

48:10 Speaker 1 The oil and the mitzvos. What the wick is braided from—the threads, the fibers—are the G-dly soul and the animal soul, intertwined together into one wick. In a person as we know him, the animal soul and the G-dly soul are joined together. They are one; you can’t separate them. So when the animal soul becomes excited and moved by worldly matters, the G-dly soul is with it. It too descends into the kelipos. When the animal soul thinks about and contemplates the wisdom of the nations, the G-dly soul is with it. Yet idle talk contaminates only the middos in the heart of the G-dly soul, while these fields of study also contaminate the intellect of the G-dly soul—the G-dly soul itself. “With the kelipas nogah of the middos, but not with the Chabad faculties of his soul, since these are foolish and ignorant words that even fools and unlearned people can speak. This is not so with the wisdom of the idol-worshipping nations.” There, he clothes and contaminates the Chabad faculties of his G-dly soul with the impurity of kelipas nogah found in these fields of study. And here he adds a few more words about just how distant and impure the wisdoms of the nations are: they fell there through the shattering of the vessels, from the “back” of holy wisdom, of holy wisdom. Right, everything in the world came from Hakadosh Boruch Hu. It came from Chochmah—what’s called supernal Chochmah, the Chochmah of the world of Atzilus. Everything in the world came from there, but it arrived in two ways. The pages were scattered, and then it rained and the pages were torn up, until now every letter is on its own. The letters of the entire book have been scattered completely. How much of the book’s idea is there in a single letter? Can you reconstruct the book from one letter? Can you see any connection? There’s no connection at all. That’s called shattering. The descent isn’t a process in which some diminished measure of the content remains, one way or another. Rather, yes, it came from there, but the result is so distant that it’s as though it was shattered and has no connection to its source. All the fields of study

50:57 Speaker 1 The external wisdoms—all the wisdoms of nature and science—come from G-dliness, but in a broken form. They were shattered and fell into impurity, as is known to those familiar with the hidden wisdom. Unless—here at the end of the chapter there’s a qualification we’ve already discussed. Someone mentioned it here. “Unless he makes them an axe with which to chop,” meaning what? To earn a comfortable living from them in order to serve Hashem, or if he knows how to use them for serving Hashem or for his Torah study. “And this is why the Rambam and Ramban, of blessed memory, and those who followed them, engaged in them.” So there is an exception. There are circumstances in which a person may study the wisdom of the nations, the wisdom of nature, the sciences. When? When it helps him earn a living. A person might say, “Wait, wait, wait. This is something terrible. Now that I’ve learned what the wisdom of the nations is, I understand how much it contaminates me and how much I’ll suffer from it afterward. I don’t want to go near it. Forget it—I’ll study only Torah. All right, I’ll study in kollel and make a meager living, but at least I’ll know. I’ll suffer a little in this world, but at least I’ll know I’m attached to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. I don’t want to go near something so terrible.” Yes, seemingly, after a person studies this chapter, that’s the thought that should go through his mind. The Alter Rebbe adds one word, and the Rebbe focuses on it: “comfortably.” Why? Why does the Alter Rebbe add the word here: “that is, to earn a comfortable living from them”? The Alter Rebbe could have said, “Unless he makes them an axe with which to chop and earns a living from them in order to serve Hashem.” Why “comfortably”? And the Rebbe says this: The Alter Rebbe wants to tell us, don’t take it too far. If studying an external wisdom will enable you to earn more money,

53:20 Speaker 1 and you’ll have more peace of mind in life, more breathing room—that’s fine. That’s fine; don’t take it so hard. You don’t have to. As an ordinary Jew, that isn’t what’s demanded of me. A general intention is enough. I’ll give an example, a clearer example. Say someone wants to work in a particular field—let’s take photography. I do some of that myself now and then. I think we talked about it once. He wants to be a photographer, to photograph weddings. So he needs to know how to hold the camera. He needs to know how the camera works. He needs to know how to operate the equipment he works with, right? There are two ways to approach this. One is practical: I need this now to earn a living so I can serve Hashem comfortably. I need to do it well, so I need to know how the camera works. I need to know what every button does and how to get the shot. So I’ll take a photography course. I want to be organized; I want the results to be good. I’ll take a photography course—no problem. That’s perfectly fine. But suppose he’s paid for the course and started it, and while taking it he suddenly realizes there are interesting things here. “How does this thing work? I have to learn the electronics behind it. I have to learn how the programming works. I have to understand how the gears inside the camera move.” What do you need that for? The wisdom of the nations draws you in; it’s contagious. As long as a person studies it on a temporary basis,

55:28 Speaker 1 studying it because he needs it in order to serve Hashem, excellent. No problem; everything is fine. There’s no need to avoid it—on the contrary. That’s how he sanctifies these things, turning them toward holiness. The moment he starts studying it out of desire and commits himself to studying it, he starts getting involved in it because it interests him, not because he needs it—that’s where the kelipos come in. So that’s one way in which studying these wisdoms is permitted. A second way is if he knows how to use them in serving Hashem. That’s a completely different approach. Anyone who has studied the wisdoms of the world in some depth—mathematics, physics, astronomy, whatever it may be—is very aware of this. There are highly respected professors and doctors who are believing Jews, and there are others who are complete atheists. How can that be? They study the same things; they understand the same things. How can that happen? The difference is their perspective. If a person studies a field of knowledge in order to see within it the wisdom of Hakadosh Boruch Hu, he is awed by his Creator—and there’s plenty to be awed by. Then, on the contrary, by studying it he sanctifies nature, sanctifies that wisdom. But if he studies it only because it interests him and he wants to immerse himself in it, then there are the three impure kelipos. So let’s sum up chapter 8. Chapter 8 was the third and final chapter dealing with the animal soul. After discussing the animal soul itself and its garments in the previous two chapters—how it comes from kelipas nogah, while its garments are the three impure kelipos, and how through action, speech, and thought a person descends into the kelipos—he gave examples in this chapter involving thought, speech, and action. Simple examples involving eating, drinking, speech, thought, and other matters. He

57:51 Speaker 1 mentions things a person tramples underfoot—things that, unfortunately, all of us stumble over day to day. How strongly they draw us in, and how much these simple things, which seem permissible to us, contaminate the soul and body; and how hard it is to purify ourselves and get clean of them afterward. Later, in chapters 27 through 29, he’ll explain how deeply this harms the soul and how to get out of it, out of the dullness of the mind and the dullness of the heart. From what it says there, it’s not simple. Now we’ve learned what the G-dly soul wants: it wants G-dliness. What does the animal soul want? It wants to enjoy this world. They have nothing in common; they’re exact opposites. And we already understand and know that they’re both inside us, intertwined with each other. How do they get along in there? How does that work? That’s what the next section—chapters 9, 10, 11, and 12, four chapters—is about. The Alter Rebbe will devote it to explaining how the two souls function together in the same place, in the same body.

59:18 Speaker 3 Thank you very much.