Torah Convention - month of Nissan 5773 - Kfar Chabad

00:00 Speaker 1 Yes, yes.

00:02 Speaker 2 Very good. Put it down for a moment. Put the book over there.

00:11 Speaker 1 We’ll explain shortly why—what the connection to Shabbos means. But first I want to go over a few questions about our wording, and perhaps we’ll try to explain them. When we count the Omer, we say, “Today is day one”—ah, “Today is one day of the Omer.” When writing a kesubah or a get, we write “on day one toward Shabbos.” But yesterday, when we said the Song of the Day, what did we say? “Today is the first day toward Shabbos.” We didn’t say “Today is day one toward Shabbos,” but “the first day toward Shabbos.” What is the difference? If we say that the first day should always be called “one,” not “first,” because the verse says, “And there was evening and there was morning, one day,” then in the Song of the Day we should also say, “Today is day one toward Shabbos,” not “the first day toward Shabbos.” So why is our wording “the first day toward Shabbos” rather than “day one toward Shabbos”? Many, many people ask this question. And indeed, in many versions the wording is “day one toward Shabbos,” not “the first day toward Shabbos.” But in our siddur, the wording is “first”: “Today is the first day toward Shabbos, on which the Levites would say in the Beis Hamikdash...” There is another question: Why do we say “day one toward Shabbos”? As we said, because it is written, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” The way Jews count days, the Torah’s way of counting, is not like that of the nations of the world. The count is in relation to Shabbos, and so we count “day one toward Shabbos,” “the first day toward Shabbos.” But then, right after davening, after putting on Rabbeinu Tam tefillin, we recite the Six Remembrances, including “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” Why the repetition? If we say “day one toward Shabbos,” or “the first day toward Shabbos”—we won’t get into that distinction right now—why do we say it? Because we need to remember Shabbos, to mention Shabbos, to remember Shabbos every

02:29 Speaker 1 day. And in this connection, people say the following: Beis Shammai’s view is well known—everything Shammai ate, he ate in honor of Shabbos. Hillel, however, would say, “Blessed be Hashem, day by day.” It also says in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch that Beis Hillel did not disagree with Beis Shammai, and that according to Beis Hillel too, there is this idea of remembering Shabbos. So why mention it twice? If we say, “Today is day one toward Shabbos,” why must we then say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”? You have already mentioned Shabbos. And if you say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it,” why do you need “day one toward Shabbos”? At first glance, this seems very puzzling. What is the meaning of the repetition? The third point. The third thing we need to explain about our wording is that in the Song of the Day on Shabbos, we say, “Today is the holy Shabbos day, on which the Levites would say in the Beis Hamikdash...” During the week, fine, you say “the first day toward Shabbos,” “the second day toward Shabbos.” But why do we say on Shabbos, “Today is the holy Shabbos day”? You have already said the entire Shabbos davening. Why mention it? Does one need to remember Shabbos on Shabbos itself, too? Moreover, if we need to remember Shabbos, what does it mean that after davening, even on Shabbos, we say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”? Why repeat “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” yet again? You have already said, “Today is the holy Shabbos day.” Why repeat it? At first glance, these things seem very puzzling. The third—the fourth puzzling point: On Shabbos, after davening, we say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” Then we make Kiddush, the daytime Kiddush. What do we say before Kiddush? Once again, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it. Six days you shall work and do all your labor.” So why

04:31 Speaker 1 do we say it so many times? Hakadosh Boruch Hu remembers after hearing it once. And if remembering is important, why remember it twice and three times? It comes out that we say it once in davening, once after davening, and then at Kiddush. What is the point of all three? We don’t need to go into the whole subject at length right now, but perhaps we can explain it. There are simply two aspects to remembering Shabbos. One has to pay very close attention in davening: sometimes Shabbos is mentioned as the Shabbos of Creation, and sometimes we mention the present Shabbos—the Shabbos that will come upon us and our children for a blessing, the Shabbos of Parshas Tazria, the approaching Shabbos that we must observe. In Kiddush, too, we say “in remembrance of Creation”: we mention the Shabbos of Creation. Then we also mention the Shabbos that we are sanctifying now, this present Shabbos. It begins with “in remembrance of Creation.” Why? What is the significance of that? Rashi writes—there is an explanation here—that Shabbos is not only a command from Hakadosh Boruch Hu to observe Shabbos. “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it. Six days you shall work and do all your labor”: we must observe Shabbos because Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded us to, not to do work, to rest from work. But beyond that, Shabbos is one of the foundations of faith. Someone who observes Shabbos shows that he believes in Creation: that Hakadosh Boruch Hu created the world and rested on the seventh day. That is one of the fundamental principles of the Shabbos of Creation—that Hakadosh Boruch Hu observed that first Shabbos, and that you believe the world was created. This is the foundation of observing Shabbos, of remembering Shabbos. That is in addition. And this is the difference

06:46 Speaker 1 between Shabbos and Yom Tov. With Yom Tov, there is no such idea that you must observe it because Hakadosh Boruch Hu observed the Festival of Matzos or the Festival of Sukkos, or another festival. We have not found that Hakadosh Boruch Hu did so. It says that everything He commands the Jewish people to do, He does Himself. But we have not found this particular aspect of Yom Tov with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. With Shabbos, we have. As it says, “And the heavens and the earth and all their hosts were completed”: He worked for six days, and on the seventh day He rested. This is called the Shabbos of Creation. We mention it many, many times in davening. One must always consider what is meant, what each mention is intended to convey, and why it is repeated, but we won’t go into all of that at length right now. In any event, when it comes to remembering Shabbos, one can ask: what does it mean that Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded us, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”? What is its plain meaning? Does it mean to remember the approaching Shabbos, may it come upon us for good and for blessing? Or does “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” mean to remember the Shabbos of Creation? Once you remember the Shabbos of Creation, you will not come to do work. But the main point is to remember the Shabbos of Creation. And on this subject, apparently there is a dispute between the Ramban and Ibn Ezra. From the Ramban it appears that “Remember the Shabbos day”... Ibn Ezra says explicitly that remembering Shabbos during the weekdays means remembering it so that, G-d forbid, Shabbos will not arrive and you might forget that it is Shabbos and consequently do work. So Hakadosh Boruch Hu commanded us to remember Shabbos starting on Sunday, to keep in mind that on the seventh day work is forbidden.

08:29 Speaker 1 work, and one must cease from work and rest, observe the mitzvos of honoring and delighting in Shabbos, and uphold the sanctity of Shabbos. So for this, Hakadosh Boruch Hu said, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”—meaning that already from Sunday, one must remember Shabbos, so that, G-d forbid, one does not make a mistake and confuse it with another day. When you look at the Ramban, he explains it along these lines, but his wording is different. I don’t have the Ramban here in front of me, but in any case, it seems from the Ramban that “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” does not mean only the coming Shabbos. It means the Shabbos of Creation. That is what Hakadosh Boruch Hu meant when He said, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”: so that every single day you will believe in Shabbos, which is a foundation of faith. After all, when you believe in Shabbos, you will believe in all six days of Creation; you will arrive at the whole foundation of faith. That is the idea of “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” According to this, there are several practical halachic differences between one kind of remembrance and the other. One difference is very simple, and it relates to our discussion. According to the Ibn Ezra, when you say that “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” means the coming Shabbos, so that you don’t come to do work, what does it mean that on Sunday I have to remember Shabbos? Which Shabbos do I have to remember? The coming Shabbos, so that I don’t come to do work. But there is no reason to remember the Shabbos that has passed. Today is Sunday—what does remembering last Shabbos have to do with anything? That Shabbos has already passed. Let’s move on. You observed Shabbos, fine; if, G-d forbid, you slipped up, then you slipped up. But what is the point of remembering last Shabbos now? According to the Ramban, though, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” means remembering the Shabbos of Creation. So when it comes to remembering the Shabbos of Creation, on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, it is enough that you remember that two days ago it was Shabbos. You don’t have to

10:19 Speaker 1 remember the coming Shabbos; remembering the Shabbos that has passed is also a remembrance of Shabbos. You know that every six days there is a Shabbos: there was last Shabbos, and there will be the coming Shabbos. So it would seem, according to this approach, that there are two aspects to “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” The practical difference is whether you can also remember the Shabbos that has passed, or whether the intention is to remember only the coming Shabbos. According to this, perhaps we can explain the difference in our wording. What does it mean that we mention Shabbos twice in the prayers? Every day we say, “Today is the first day of the week.” Then, as we asked, we say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” But you have already mentioned Shabbos. Why mention both? Why the repetition? Rather, let’s say that the first remembrance—“Today is the first day of the week, on which the Levi’im would say in the Beis Hamikdash”—is not intended to recall the coming Shabbos, but to recall the Shabbos of Creation. And “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” follows the Ibn Ezra’s interpretation: it refers to the coming Shabbos. “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” means so that, G-d forbid, you do not violate the prohibition against work. In other words, here we are speaking about one Shabbos, and there about another. They are both Shabbos, but here it is a remembrance of the Shabbos of Creation, and there it is a remembrance of the coming Shabbos. According to this, perhaps we can explain something else. I’m not entirely sure this principle is correct, but perhaps it can help make sense of a few things. We asked why, in the daily prayers, we say “Today is the first day of the week,” while in a kesubah or in counting we say “Today is day one of the week.” What accounts for the difference? If we say that it’s because the Torah says, “And there was evening and there was morning, one day,” then here too

12:39 Speaker 1 we should say “day one of the week.” Why do we say “the first day of the week”? According to this, perhaps we can say that the difference between “one” and “first” is that “one” means you are beginning an entirely new count. In other words, during the six days of Creation, Hakadosh Boruch Hu created the first day. It says, “And there was evening and there was morning, one day.” There had been no week before it, no days before it; this was the first day. So that is the wording the Torah uses: “day one of the week.” But when there has been an earlier count and you now begin a new one, it seems that the wording is not “one” but “first.” For instance, we say, “the first day—the first in the reckoning of sins.” In other words, until now there was one reckoning, and that reckoning has ended. Now a new reckoning begins, but it relates to the one that came before. This counting of each week—“day one of the week,” “the first day of the week”—is a count that repeats itself. Every week we again say “day one of the week,” and the following week we again say “day one of the week.” As we said according to the Ramban, the meaning is a counting of the six days of Creation, which also refers to the Shabbos that has passed. So each week there is a reference both to the previous week and to a new week. In other words, we finished one week and are beginning a new one. This is not the case, however, with a get or a kesubah. What happened last week is not relevant. We are now beginning the wording of the get on Sunday, just as, at Creation, that day was the first day, with no days before it. So there the wording is “one” and not... Why, then, is this connected specifically to the Levi’im? I’ll explain. The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah, page 31, asks: What is the reason for the song of the day that is said each

14:43 Speaker 1 day? It corresponds to the six days of Creation. In other words, the song the Levi’im would sing each day in the Beis Hamikdash after the passage of the daily offering was a song of praise for the work of Creation. And the Gemara explains how each chapter of the song of the day is connected in some way to the first day of Creation, the second day of Creation, the third day of Creation. So it follows—and this is indeed the case—that the song of the Levi’im was about the six days of Creation. Consequently, the Shabbos being spoken of there is the Shabbos of Creation. In other words, it is praise of the Shabbos of Creation. So the wording really is “the first day of the week,” not “day one of the week.” According to this, we can see that it fits exactly. So here we say “the first day of the week,” and we also say “on day one of the week,” and... That’s it. Now, according to this, we have explained the repetition here. What do we say? “Today is the first day of the week.” Then we say again, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” This depends on whether we follow the Ramban’s approach or the Ibn Ezra’s. According to the Ramban, there is a point in recalling the days of the week in relation to the Shabbos of Creation, because this is a foundation of faith: you believe that Hakadosh Boruch Hu created the heavens and the earth. And this was the song of the Levi’im, a song of praise for the six days of Creation. That is how all six chapters we say, one each day, relate to the work of Creation. So when we say, “Today is the holy Shabbos day,” the intention is the Shabbos of Creation. Afterward, following the prayers, we say again, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it,” in accordance with the Ibn Ezra’s view: the intention is to sanctify it so that one does not

16:35 Speaker 1 You might come to do work on the coming Shabbos, the Shabbos that is approaching. So that has nothing to do with last Shabbos. If that is correct, we can also explain—we asked another question: if so, why? On Shabbos itself we say, “Today is the holy Shabbos, on which the Levi’im would recite in the Beis Hamikdash,” and afterward we say again, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” But you have already said the entire davening. What is the point of saying it today? Well, again, the first passage is about commemorating the Shabbos of Creation, while after davening we mention “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” according to Ibn Ezra’s interpretation: that you should not come to do work. Then the question arises: we have already made Kiddush. Why say “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” again? We made Kiddush at night. That is the answer, perhaps. Kiddush is only at night. By day there is no Kiddush in which we explicitly mention the holiness of Shabbos. We do say it in the davening itself. So in this... And likewise in the wording of the Tanna at the beginning of [unclear]. It follows, then, that perhaps at night you mentioned the holiness of Shabbos in Kiddush, while by day the Sages instituted mentioning the holiness of Shabbos at the end of davening: “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” We asked the fourth question: if so, why repeat that verse in Kiddush? We said it here just a few minutes ago. We finished davening and return once again to “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” Again, in Kiddush, before “Therefore He blessed,” we see “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” once more. Why repeat it? Apparently it is a repetition because, when you look closely at the Ramban, you see that these are two different things. From “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it,” we learn in connection with Kiddush that we must sanctify Shabbos. They also connected it to the idea that we must sanctify Shabbos not only by refraining from work or through honoring and enjoying it, but also by making Kiddush—

18:44 Speaker 1 by making Kiddush over a cup. So it turns out that everything really is precise. First we say, “Today is the holy Shabbos,” recalling the Shabbos of Creation and the praise of that Shabbos recited by the Levi’im. Then we say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it,” referring to the sanctification of Shabbos according to Ibn Ezra’s view. After that we give the third interpretation of “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”—the Ramban’s second interpretation, concerning making Kiddush over a cup. There is more to say about this, but right now I don’t have the energy.

19:19 Speaker 10 Thank you very much. A great yasher koach to Rabbi Ashkenazi. I would now like to ask Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Belinov, rabbi of central Bnei Brak, to share some of his Torah teachings with us.

20:01 Speaker 11 With the permission of [unclear]. Of course we will speak about the Alter Rebbe—how could we not? The laws of Pesach. We know that the Shulchan Aruch of the author of Tanya is not merely a book of halachic rulings. In many areas of halachah there are differing opinions, and a decision has to be made. The Alter Rebbe does not merely collect or present the views; he also rules. He rules on halachah in the revealed dimension of Torah. The work is also, and above all, a presentation of the laws together with their reasons, as is well known—the reasons for the laws and their precise definitions. There is something else, too: matters of practical halachah, not just the conceptual analysis or definitions, that a person would not know without the Alter Rebbe and his Shulchan Aruch, even if he studied halachah from its roots in the Gemara and traced all the sources. I am not saying this applies to everyone. Some people, through the depth of their understanding and with help from Heaven, can already see it in the original source, in the Gemara and so on. Whoever has that gift has it. But for people like us, even after studying the Gemara, Tosafos and the Rishonim, and then the Shulchan Aruch and its commentaries—on Orach Chayim, the Magen Avraham, the Chok Yaakov and all the others—and even looking at later works, the Mishnah Berurah and the Kaf Hachayim, studying and studying until exhausted in an effort to clarify every detail of the halachah, there are still things we would not know. We are not making fine distinctions here to produce some novel insight; we are simply trying to learn halachah. Open the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch and you will see laws there that someone who does not study it will not know. He could study the subject almost from beginning to end and still not see where the Alter Rebbe derived—

23:18 Speaker 11 that from. Of course, one should then look for where he derived it. If one finds the source in full, one finds it; if not, that is a further stage. But first, the fact itself: we see practical rulings that are not stated explicitly, from the Gemara through to the very latest authorities. Of course they are well founded, G-d forbid to suggest otherwise, but they are not stated explicitly. And those who do not examine the Shulchan Aruch closely do not always include these rulings in their compilations either. Why? Because people generally read it as they do other books, going through it quickly. Let us take one very clear example. In section 451, paragraph 1, the Alter Rebbe writes as follows—I will quote the relevant wording. This concerns kashering utensils for Pesach, of course: “Any utensils that he does not wish to kasher for Pesach through hagalah or libun...” To kasher a utensil that was used for chametz so it can be used on Pesach, one must remove not only the chametz on its surface but also what has been absorbed within it. Some utensils require hagalah, immersion in boiling water, while others specifically require libun, heating by fire; there is a lighter and a more stringent form of libun, and so on. But he does not want to kasher them through hagalah or libun. The same applies to earthenware utensils, which cannot be kashered through hagalah or ordinary libun. If he wants to keep them until after Pesach—keep them in his home rather than remove or sell them, so they remain in the Jewish owner’s possession—what must he do? He must scrub them thoroughly before the sixth hour, when the obligation to eliminate chametz and the prohibitions on eating it begin on Erev Pesach, and rinse them lightly. I repeat: scrub them thoroughly before the sixth hour and rinse them lightly. Think of the order of operations. When you want to remove dirt from a utensil at home, there are two steps; one without the other is not enough. First, I am speaking of a utensil with things stuck to it, sticky or greasy substances and the like. You must scrub it by hand, with a brush or with something else, so that the brush removes what was stuck to it. Now, after scrubbing, if you have no running water or other water in which to immerse and rinse the utensil, it will not help: pieces of dough, couscous, noodles that are not kosher for Pesach and the like will still remain. So after scrubbing thoroughly, you must rinse with water. The initial scrubbing also has to be done with water; you do not do it dry, as the earlier source says. Scrubbing is done with water, and then you rinse it again. Today we use a faucet; in the past they would put it into a vessel of water or pour water over it. The idea is to remove the things that were stuck to it and, after the scrubbing, are no longer so firmly attached. So the Alter Rebbe tells us which step must be done thoroughly and which need only be done a little: one must scrub thoroughly before the sixth hour, in one’s home.

25:41 Speaker 11 To remove dirt from a utensil, you need two steps; one without the other is not enough. First, I’m talking about a utensil with things stuck to it—sticky or greasy things and the like. You first have to scrub it by hand, with a brush, or with some other implement, to remove what has stuck to it. Now, if you’ve scrubbed it but there’s no water tap, or no other vessel of water in which to immerse and rinse the utensil, it won’t help. After all, pieces of dough, couscous, non-kosher noodles, or the like will still be there. So after scrubbing it well, you have to rinse it with water. The initial scrubbing must also be done with water; you don’t do it dry. As written in the first section, the scrubbing is done with water, and afterward you rinse it again. Today we do that with a tap. In the past, people would put the utensil into a vessel of water or pour water over it. The point is to wash away the things that were stuck to it and have been loosened by the scrubbing. So the Alter Rebbe tells us which step must be done thoroughly and which can be done more lightly. Here it is: They must scrub thoroughly before the sixth hour, in their homes.

27:05 Speaker 12 But there it says they used a pressure washer, just spraying water without scrubbing. How did all the grease come off?

27:12 Speaker 11 That was enough there. In that case it is enough.

27:15 Speaker 12 Because the grease is absorbed.

27:17 Speaker 11 There the issue is not the prohibition of possessing chametz. There it is only so that we can use it.

27:22 Speaker 12 You can see there that, yes, there were many things [unclear].

27:26 Speaker 11 Yes, and not only that. You are not dealing there with the prohibitions of seeing or possessing chametz. There we need to be able to [unclear].

27:31 Speaker 12 Cleaning—it says there is no cleaning, and there is no problem.

27:34 Speaker 13 Without cleaning, that does not hold up. They did not even use a cleaning agent, not even on the floor.

27:43 Speaker 11 So it says what to do next: after scrubbing thoroughly, rinse it lightly. Take the utensil and rinse it a little with water, and the rinsing removes what remains. As for the chametz on them afterward, one must make sure not to use the utensils. “And he should put them away in an out-of-the-way place where he does not ordinarily go throughout Pesach, so that he will not forget and use them on Pesach.”

28:14 Speaker 12 He said only to rinse lightly. He did not say to rinse a lot.

28:19 Speaker 11 All right, that is what it says. In other words, a little is enough. It does not say that a lot is forbidden; a little is enough. Go on. That is the first point. If he wants to keep the utensil at home, he can. He cannot use it, but he can keep it at home. He is no longer violating bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei, the prohibitions against possessing chametz. And as for rinsing it—another few lines down, in the continuation of section 12: he should put it in a private room, and then the key, and so on. That is how to keep himself from using it otherwise. Section 12: “Occasionally, by chance, it is permissible to take it out of the place where it was put away and use it for something cold.” Using this utensil regularly throughout the festival, even for something cold, is forbidden, just as he must not use it for chametz. But if, once in a while, guests arrive and he wants a plate on which to serve them fruit or vegetables—something cold, whether cool, cold, or moist—and he realizes he needs such a utensil, a serving dish, and the utensil is relatively clean: he scrubbed it thoroughly and rinsed it a little, so the utensil is more or less clean. Not merely more or less. You should know that he is not violating bal yeira’eh or bal yimatzei by keeping it at home. But now he wants to use it. That is another level. He must just be careful to rinse the utensil thoroughly. Earlier you scrubbed it—a very good scrubbing, thoroughly—but the rinsing was only a partial rinse, what you might call a little less than a full... rinse. Now you want to use it, so be careful to rinse the utensil thoroughly before using it, so that no trace of actual chametz remains stuck to it, nothing at all. That is it. After that, even an earthenware utensil—which is remarkable; the custom is not to use one, and so on—and a knife, and so on. I am translating exactly what is written. There are two cases: if you want the utensil

30:34 Speaker 11 only so that it can remain at home and you will not have to sell it or throw it away, and it can be in your possession without your violating either tashbisu, the obligation to remove chametz, or bal yeira’eh, thorough scrubbing is essential, and a little rinsing is enough. If you also want the utensil in order to use it, then there is a concern that you might come to eat chametz. “Eat” means that if you use it and something remains stuck to it, you might end up eating it. So you need to rinse it thoroughly. That means the earlier rinsing did not definitely remove everything. And in the Alter Rebbe’s particularly precise language, he also defines what the earlier rinsing accomplished and what the rinsing now accomplishes. The earlier rinsing, “rinsed it a little,” only ensures that “no chametz is discernible on them.” There may be chametz, but it is no longer discernible. “Discernible” does not mean there is no chametz. I cannot say there is no chametz; I cannot say that. I can say it is not discernible. I try to look at the utensil—not just try; I look at it. I scrubbed and rinsed it. Things had stuck to it. We look, and the utensil is clean. Can I say with certainty that there is not the tiniest crumb? The eye does not see one, but there could be one. That is called “not discernible.” So much so that, as the Alter Rebbe defines “not discernible” in section 442, even when a crumb of chametz is mixed into a thousand times its quantity of other things, the chametz is there; it is just not discernible. It is not absent. It is present, but not discernible. So to remove what is discernible, thorough scrubbing and a little rinsing are enough. If you want to remove the chametz so that it is not merely no longer discernible, but no longer present as actual substance—what does that mean? Only what is absorbed remains. “Actual substance” means that it is present; it does not mean I can see it with my eyes. Actual substance is the opposite

32:38 Speaker 11 of what is absorbed. There is absorbed chametz, and there is actual chametz. If you want to be sure that only the absorbed chametz remains—and what is absorbed can only be removed through kashering by hagalah or libun—but you want to know, conversely, that no actual chametz remains: it is not there, it is gone. Not just indiscernible, but gone. For that you have to add a thorough rinsing. That is what it means to rinse again, to rinse the utensil thoroughly. The explanation is also understandable; we will not go into it at length now. It is quite understandable. When we are dealing with the prohibition against eating, we do not need to reach the law concerning even a trace of chametz, because that law concerns mixtures. This can happen without a mixture, too. Even a trace of chametz can mean a crumb of chametz in one’s mouth; that is connected with the law concerning less than the minimum measure, even the tiniest amount. And if—especially if it is in a mixture, where on Pesach it is not nullified. But if I am talking here about being careful with chametz, particularly given all the laws concerning chametz, where I see that it is not nullified even in a mixture, and even when it imparts a detrimental taste—that is already a stringency. But if I want to be careful about even a trace of chametz, not because of mixtures but because of the rule that, Heaven forbid, no actual chametz should remain and enter one’s mouth when eating, which is connected with a Torah prohibition—at any rate, it concerns the prohibition against eating. Therefore, one has to check and be certain that no actual chametz remains. As for what is absorbed, I am using it for something cold, so the absorbed matter does not come out. If that were not so, incidentally, he could not use it at all. When it comes to tashbisu and bal yeira’eh, however, he has already searched, checked, looked, and nullified all the chametz as one is supposed to do. And we all know the wording the Rebbe often used about nullification and so on: fine crumbs are nullified of their own accord. A person has to do everything required. The fact that they are nullified of their own accord does not mean he need not do anything at all, even about the tiniest amount,

34:33 Speaker 11 as the Alter Rebbe also writes in section 451. But in any case, he has done his part properly. He scrubbed, rinsed, searched, and nullified. Well, that is all right. All right, says the Alter Rebbe: it is not that I know something remains. It may well be that nothing remains at all. It is not that he knows it is there, hidden away, and does not want to deal with it. So the rinsing is enough. That is how the Alter Rebbe explains it. And if you look closely, you see that this wording of the Alter Rebbe’s on this matter appears many times in the Shulchan Aruch, not just here, where it appears in one section after another. But in section 49 it appears again. When the Alter Rebbe wants to stress that something should be cleaned well, he says: all the utensils used to knead flour throughout the year—used with flour throughout the year—even initially, according to the basic law, are treated like utensils used with vinegar and radishes, which may be used on Pesach even for hot food without hagalah; afterward, one may knead in them and use them for other cold uses. Utensils used with flour. Since all their use is cold, they may be used in this way. “Only he must be careful to rinse and scrub them very, very well with water before using them.” And more than that, in section 72, the Alter Rebbe even adds the reason, as he writes there: “All drinking vessels, whether cups, small bowls, or pitchers, even earthenware ones,” and so on, “according to the basic law, rinsing suffices for them; that is, they should be rinsed and scrubbed thoroughly.” So “thoroughly” applies to the whole process together, “to remove any dirt actually stuck to them. Afterward, he should rinse them again with water, as explained in Yoreh De’ah, section 121.” Earlier, too, he wrote about rinsing thoroughly. Apparently, this is why: it is all because he wants to use the utensil and wants no actual substance to remain. He does not write the word “a little”; he writes “thoroughly” about the scrubbing and the rinsing, everything. When the Alter Rebbe wants

36:41 Speaker 11 to speak only about keeping them at home, then he emphasizes—at least here he explicitly emphasizes—this point. So, what we have said until now is understood, and so on. The question is different: where does this come from? There are two questions. First, here in the Shulchan Aruch, the law is stated that one must scrub thoroughly when one wants to keep the utensils at home. Then the Rema says about this: if one wants to use them, see Yoreh De’ah, section 121. That is roughly what it says. The Turei Zahav, the Taz, writes this there, and the Chok Yaakov writes it there too. And of course, if one wants to use them, then as it says there in the Shulchan Aruch, one must always scrub and rinse; I mean, thoroughly. It does not say once and twice, once a little and once a lot. It does not say that. The later works certainly—I do not know if “certainly” is right—did not write about this; they did not notice this point. They made no distinction. They wrote that to use a utensil, one must see that it has been scrubbed and rinsed. Here the Alter Rebbe emphasizes that there are two kinds of rinsing: the rinsing that accompanies scrubbing, and the rinsing needed to use it. Where does that come from? And second, where does the very idea of “a little rinsing” come from? What is the basis for this halachah? So, briefly, let us get to the point. It appears that the Alter Rebbe saw this in the Shulchan Aruch itself, and it is quite straightforward. Here in the Shulchan Aruch, in the laws of Pesach, there is the law concerning a utensil that one wants to take from chametz use to Pesach use. The same law also exists with regard to the rest of the year, concerning a non-Jew’s utensil, in Yoreh De’ah, section 121, which the Alter Rebbe also cites. And we see a difference in the Shulchan Aruch between the law in the laws of Pesach and the law in the laws of kashering utensils in Yoreh De’ah—and it is exactly the reverse. I want to explain what I mean by “exactly the reverse.” We know that the laws of Pesach, of chametz on Pesach, are far more stringent than all the other laws, with all the stringencies concerning even a trace of chametz and a detrimental taste according to the Rema, and so on. With other prohibitions, by contrast, the prohibited substance is generally nullified in sixty times its quantity, and a detrimental taste is permitted.

39:05 Speaker 11 At any rate, after the fact, and so on. That is how we understand it: chametz on Pesach is much more severe. Let’s look at siman 451 in the Shulchan Aruch, and I’ll quote it from memory. It says that if someone wants to keep a chametz utensil in his home over Pesach, he must scrub it thoroughly. Scrub the utensil—that’s all it says. In Yoreh De’ah, siman 121, it discusses someone who bought utensils from a non-Jew. That has nothing to do with Pesach; he wants to use those utensils throughout the year. There the Shulchan Aruch says he must rinse the utensil while scrubbing it, and after scrubbing and rinsing it, he must rinse it again. Then he can use it. Anyone can immediately see an apparent question here. In both cases, you want to move from a state of prohibition to a state of permission. With chametz on Pesach, you are also dealing with prohibition and permission. Yet in the laws of Pesach, when you want to make that transition, it says “scrub.” It does not even mention rinsing afterward—rinsing thoroughly with water, and so on. It just says to scrub. But when it discusses a utensil that was prohibited during the year, which you bought from a non-Jew and want to use, the Shulchan Aruch spells out thorough scrubbing, followed by thorough rinsing with water, with all the details. Why? If anything, you would expect more detail in the laws of Pesach. If “scrubbing” is a general expression, you could understand it generally here too. Why spell it out? No: in the laws of utensils, it details exactly how to scrub and then rinse with water, while in the laws of Pesach it just says “scrub,” and perhaps everyone is meant to work out for himself how. The Alter Rebbe understood it simply: each passage is speaking about something different, and they should not be conflated. Siman 451 of the Shulchan Aruch is about keeping the utensil in the home. If you want to keep the utensil in the home,

41:21 Speaker 11 then it says to scrub it. Everyone understands that if you scrub it, you also need to rinse it; you cannot scrub it and leave it like that. That is what the Meiri says in Beis Habechirah. The Rashba, in section four, also explains that scrubbing alone, without rinsing, accomplishes nothing—it merely moves the substance from one place to another. Not everyone knows that. So afterward you put on a little water. But is there a requirement for a particular kind of rinsing? There is no such requirement. Accordingly, the author of the Shulchan Aruch indicates this by writing “scrub” without stating a law requiring rinsing. The question remains: what does “scrubbing” involve? Everyone will say: scrub it and rinse it a little. So what is required and what is not? Scrubbing is required; without any rinsing, it will not work. So why be brief? Because thorough rinsing is not required. He therefore writes “scrub,” and you will rinse it to remove what you have scrubbed off. When it comes to the laws of purging utensils, though, you want to buy a utensil a non-Jew has used and use it yourself. This is not about keeping it overnight; it is about using it throughout the year. So the Shulchan Aruch explicitly says to rinse it thoroughly after scrubbing, or to “rinse it very well.” Where does that come from? It explicitly calls for extensive rinsing there. Why? Because here we are concerned about a little of the prohibited substance remaining. As I said earlier, this is no longer a question of Pesach. During the rest of the year, [unclear], but because of the law concerning actual chametz, he must take care that nothing remains. So you can see this explicitly in the Shulchan Aruch. But where do we see a lesser rinsing? I see that there is one level and another, but where do I see this idea of rinsing a little? Where does it come from? It also comes from the Rema’s wording, in siman 444.

43:24 Speaker 11 We come to Erev Pesach that falls on Shabbos. People still eat on Shabbos morning. The Shulchan Aruch says to be careful not to cook foods that stick to the utensils, because afterward the time will come when chametz may no longer be eaten or kept. This is about cooking on Erev Shabbos itself, with the fourteenth of Nissan—Erev Pesach—falling on Shabbos. So by the prescribed time, it is prohibited. It really is Erev Pesach. He finishes eating in the morning, and then food is left stuck to the utensil. That is why he should not cook things that stick to it. If he did, he must wipe it off with his hand. No, we do not wash the utensils on Shabbos, since that is not needed for Shabbos, with all the discussion surrounding this halachah. Why? Even though it is needed for Shabbos—but we’ll get into that now. In any case, he wipes the food off with his finger and so on. What if wiping does not remove it? It does not come off. He tries to wipe it off: he made cholent with kneidlach, with a kugel, and it will not come off. He tried and it did not work. He thought it would, but it did not. Now he is thinking about the prohibitions of having chametz seen or found in his possession. What does he do? The Rema says to rinse it a little. That is how the Rema puts it. The Rema’s source is the Maharil, though it does not say that there, as we will see later. It says to rinse, and the Rema adds “a little.” What does “rinse it a little” mean? If you rinse it the way you rinse a utensil at home for Pesach, you rinse it thoroughly so that nothing remains. “Rinse it a little” means that nothing visible will remain. You could not get it off by wiping, but you can with a little rinsing. Apparently, a little rinsing removes everything visible, so the prohibitions of having chametz seen or found in your possession no longer apply, and you have no problem with the requirement to eliminate chametz. So there is a concept of rinsing a little. Even though the Alter Rebbe does not write “rinse a little” there—he writes “rinse,” without the word “a little.” That needs explanation:

45:37 Speaker 11 why does the Alter Rebbe not say “a little” in siman 444? But the Rema does use the word. So we see that there is such a thing as rinsing a little, and we also see that there are different cases: sometimes a particular rinsing is required, and sometimes it is not. The Alter Rebbe states this plainly here in siman 451. Someone who studies the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch can see the halachah here. But someone who does not know this distinction will not recognize it, because it is a distinction that—I searched and did not find it in other books. I have not seen it stated elsewhere that there are these two types here, and that one must rinse twice: once, and then again. So the Alter Rebbe’s wording is precise, and the source of this halachah is also clear and understandable. I just want to add something. When you study this Tur, the Taz, and the Chok Yaakov, you can see that the Alter Rebbe saw it there too. But you can find it there only after studying the Alter Rebbe, not the other way around. Not everyone will see it while studying the Alter Rebbe. Perhaps you can see it afterward, and I will explain why. There is no—if there is a copy of the laws of Pesach here, it is just one line. The Chok Yaakov or the Shulchan Aruch, the standard Shulchan Aruch. No? All right, it is a short line. Shulchan Aruch, Pesach, volume three, if that is the standard Shulchan Aruch.

47:07 Speaker 14 Right, right.

47:30 Speaker 11 Here it is. We already mentioned the Shulchan Aruch earlier. This is what the Rema writes: “Any utensil requiring heating until red-hot or hagalah may not be used, even for cold food, without first being made kosher.” That is what the Rema writes, and he says, “See Yoreh De’ah.” What does Yoreh De’ah say? The Taz says that occasional use is permitted after rinsing. The Chok Yaakov says the same thing. The statement that it may not be used even for cold food refers to regular use; for occasional use, rinsing makes it permissible. That is what it says. It does not say to rinse twice, nor does it say whether that rinsing must be thorough. But if you read carefully, you see that it is actually stated explicitly. What is the case? There was a utensil, and just before this, the author of the Shulchan Aruch wrote that if you want to keep a utensil that you have not made kosher in your home, you scrub it thoroughly so that no visible chametz remains. And what does “scrub it” mean? We said earlier that scrubbing without rinsing accomplishes nothing at all. What is scrubbing? You scrape it off. So you scrub it, understand? You scrub it, and afterward you rinse it a little. Then the Rema writes: if you want to use it, do not use it without making it kosher. The utensil is already in your home; we have already learned that. And the Taz says that if you want to use it for cold food, you may do so if you rinse it. Wait—if you have already rinsed it, otherwise you could not even keep it in your home, why rinse it again? We are not talking about someone who went out and bought a utensil from a non-Jew in the middle of the festival. This follows from the preceding passage. The author says that you have a chametz utensil in your home; you must scrub it and rinse it. Then, if you want to use it, the Taz says that cold use is permitted if you rinse it. What does “if you rinse it” mean? Without rinsing, you could not even keep it in your home. So you have already rinsed it. Why rinse it again? Apparently, this is how the Alter Rebbe understands it: the first time you rinsed it lightly; that was not a thorough rinsing. Now he

49:41 Speaker 11 says that if you want to use it, rinse it again. Why twice? What does the second rinsing add to the first? The first was a light rinsing; the second is a thorough rinsing. Here we see that in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, each paragraph does not merely present novel rulings and distinctions. It also gives straightforward, practical halachah, with distinctions one needs to know in order to understand the halachah plainly and put it into practice.

50:32 Speaker 15 Yasher koach, yasher koach to Rabbi Binyamin. I’d like to say something brief in the meantime, until Rabbi Amar comes in over the next few minutes. There is a responsum of the Rivash, in section 220, where he discusses the honor due to one’s teacher and to one’s father and mother, and the disgrace of one’s teacher or parents. The Rivash makes this distinction: although the Gemara says that a teacher who waives the honor due to him has waived it, and that a father who waives the honor due to him has waived it, a teacher and a father cannot waive an insult to them. In matters of honor, they can waive it. But they cannot waive an insult. The reason is that a father has no authority to waive something that constitutes an insult. The prohibition that the Torah imposed still applies. After all, the father’s honor is his because the Torah gave it to him. So he cannot waive that honor beyond what the Torah allowed: he was given the ability to waive certain forms of honor, but not to waive an insult. Where does the Rivash learn this from? There is a contradiction between two passages of Gemara. In Yoma, page 22, the Gemara says that a Torah scholar who does not bear a grudge like a snake—who does not take revenge and bear a grudge like a snake—is not a Torah scholar. The reason is that he causes people to treat his honor lightly. When he gives up his honor and lets things pass, he causes people to treat his honor lightly, and therefore he is not acting as a Torah scholar. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the Torah forbid this? It says, “You shall not take revenge, and you shall not bear a grudge.” The Gemara answers that this prohibition concerns monetary matters; in matters between one person and another, he can let things pass. The Gemara continues to ask: But isn’t it said that a person ought to overlook offenses against him?

53:26 Speaker 15 The Gemara concludes that he keeps it in his heart. In other words, he retains a small measure of resentment, but does not act on it. If someone else comes to avenge him, he will remain silent and will not stop him, but he himself may not get up and take revenge. So this passage implies that a person may not take revenge in practice, but he certainly may retain some resentment or grievance. If he is a Torah scholar, he may retain a certain measure of resentment; he is not yet required to forgive with all his heart. In another passage, in Megillah, Rabbi Nechunya ben Hakanah says that one reason he lived a long life was that a fellow’s curse never went up onto his bed with him. That is, when he went to sleep, he would forgive everyone, so he bore no resentment toward anyone. The Gemara says: Just as Mar Zutra, when he went to bed, would say, “I forgive anyone who has caused me pain.” He forgave wholeheartedly, releasing anyone who had caused him pain. This implies that a person may waive his honor completely. He may let go entirely of the hurt and the matter of his honor. But the Gemara in Yoma implies that he cannot waive it. A Torah scholar who does not take revenge and bear a grudge is not acting as a Torah scholar; he is even doing something forbidden by allowing the honor of the Torah he represents to be treated lightly. On the contrary, he must protect the Torah’s honor, and may take revenge and bear a grudge. So we seemingly have a contradiction between the two passages. The Ran, the Ritva, and several other Rishonim raise this question. The Ran gives

55:15 Speaker 15 two answers. In his first answer, he makes a distinction: the Gemara in Yoma is speaking about a Torah scholar who was insulted. In that case, he may not waive it. The Gemara in Megillah is not speaking about an insult; people simply failed to show him honor. Since it was only a failure to honor him, he may waive it, but he may not waive an insult. That is one way he resolves the two passages. His second answer is that Yoma is speaking about an insult in public, which is more serious, while Megillah is speaking about an insult in private. The Ran was not the only one to give this second answer. The Kesef Mishneh also reads the Rambam this way. At the end of Hilchos Talmud Torah, the Rambam writes that a Torah scholar who was insulted in private may waive it. If he was insulted in public, he may not. So he agrees that an insult can be waived—but only an insult in private. An insult in public is more serious, and he may not waive it. Ah, sorry: an insult in public he may not waive; one in private he may. According to the Ran’s answer distinguishing an insult from a mere failure to show honor, whenever there is an insult, whether in private or in public, he may not waive it. He may waive only a failure to show him honor, not an insult. The Rivash follows that first answer and understands that, whether in private or in public, an insult cannot be waived. The Terumas Hadeshen also says the same thing, and in his Pesakim Uchesavim he sent a letter to the students of Rabbi Yisrael Isserlin himself—

57:12 Speaker 15 Rabbi Yisrael of Bruna, sorry—wow, Isserlin. He tells them that they must not insult him. He asks them not to insult their rabbi, because if they do, he will have a problem: he cannot waive an insult to himself. He cannot waive it at all, and that would put him in a difficult position. An insult cannot be waived at all. He derives this from another source, the Gemara in Moed Katan. On page 17, the Gemara discusses a Torah scholar who was insulted and a ban of excommunication that was imposed and not lifted. From there he learns that an insult cannot be released in any case. Excuse me, I’m going to stop. Hello? Yes. Okay, I’m coming over. I’m coming out to you. Excuse me, Rabbi Amar is coming in now, so we’ll welcome him right away.

1:01:29 Speaker 16 What about the letter? Right. It took some time to get the letter. We have been greatly honored by the presence of the Rishon LeZion, the Chief Rabbi of Israel and President of the Supreme Rabbinical Court, at this special Torah gathering. We welcome him and offer a great yasher koach for making the considerable effort to come and give us his time and words of Torah. With the rabbis’ permission, I would first like to honor the gabbai of the shul, Grandpa Rabbi Asher Kadosh, with reading a special letter we received for this Torah gathering from Maran Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Grandpa, please. A letter of blessing: “My heart rejoices and my honor exults to hear of the bein hazmanim yeshiva taking place at the Shaarei Yehudah shul, alongside the holy community of Jews from Morocco in Kfar Chabad. I, too, join them in strengthening, encouraging and supporting them, and the one who heads them, the chossid and learned scholar, the Tamim Rabbi Moshe Chaim Chanush[?] shlita. Several years ago, they renewed and established a yeshiva that operates during bein hazmanim, where dozens of fine young men, devoted to spiritual growth, gather to continue applying themselves with diligence and effort in the tent of Torah, studying Gemara and halachah with willing hearts and strong desire, out of yiras Shamayim. They also increase their knowledge and wisdom through the special classes delivered by distinguished rabbis, shlita. Alongside this, the young men receive generous stipends and encouragement prizes of many holy books. Their work is faithful; may their strength in Torah increase. I bless them: May Hashem continue to grant you inner strength and fortitude to increase and glorify Torah. May your names be like those of the great people of the land, for distinction and glory. As our Sages said: ‘If you seek to give charity, give it to those who labor in Torah.’ Our Sages spoke at length in praise of those who support and assist Torah scholars. There is no greater merit than supporting and sustaining those who study Torah. It is a great mitzvah to assist them generously and with an open heart, and you shall receive a blessing from Hashem. And all who help

1:05:35 Speaker 16 and assist shall be blessed with long lives and years of life in goodness and pleasantness. May the merit of Torah protect them. A thousandfold protection, abundant happiness and every good thing.” Signed, Maran Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. On this occasion, on behalf of our shul as well, I welcome the Rishon LeZion, Rabbi Shlomo Amar. It is a great privilege for us and for the Moroccan community here that, with the help of the generous Gabriel Bouzaglo, we have been able to renovate, beautify and adorn our shul. Welcome, honored Rabbi. Rabbi, would you come over to the table?

1:06:33 Speaker 3 You can come over to the table.

1:06:35 Speaker 16 So I’ll just lower the… I’ll lower the… It can’t go any higher.

1:07:27 Speaker 3 With the permission of my teachers and esteemed rabbis, our honored friend, the distinguished scholar and local rabbi, the distinguished chossid Rabbi Ashkenazi—may he live long in robust health—[unclear].

1:07:44 Speaker 16 Blinov.

1:07:45 Speaker 3 Rabbi—

1:07:45 Speaker 16 Blinov.

1:07:46 Speaker 3 Oh, Rabbi Blinov of Bnei Brak—may he live long. The honored members of the shul, the gabbaim, and the entire holy congregation: you are all beloved, all blessed by Hashem. I want to say a few things in halachah concerning blessings. I dealt with them on Pesach because they relate to the blessing over bedikas chametz when a shliach performs it, but the question really applies across the board. Perhaps I’ll begin with something that happened. In one of the cities in Israel, the local rabbi invited me to perform the mitzvah of establishing an eruv—a shared eruv for the alleyways and courtyards of the city. It was an established community that already had an eruv, but a new neighborhood had been added, and they connected the two and made an eruv. He had worked very hard on it. When the time came to complete the mitzvah, he held a small gathering in his home, as is fitting upon completing a mitzvah. They wanted to recite the blessing, and had prepared matzos, as is customary nowadays. He wanted to honor me with the blessing. I told him I couldn’t say it, because I don’t live there or stay there. Granted, we are all obligated in the mitzvah of an eruv, but that mitzvah is very personal. For example, we are all obligated in the mitzvah of circumcising our sons, but when a man circumcises his son, he is the one obligated. Someone else cannot take his place. The rabbi there told me, “But you’re performing the act of the mitzvah, so you can say the blessing. It’s well known that the person performing the act of the mitzvah can do so.” At first he tried to explain it on the basis of mutual responsibility—that all Jews are responsible for one another. With all due respect, I explained to him that mutual responsibility is not relevant here. Then he suggested shlichus. Later, he wrote me a letter about it. In practice, he recited the blessing. He lives there. I told him, “He should say the blessing, not me. If I say it, it will be a blessing in vain.” Let’s explain these matters a little. According to the Rambam, the blessing over erusin is a blessing over a mitzvah. That is why the Rambam, of blessed memory, rules as he does.

1:10:52 Speaker 3 The Rambam rules that the blessing over erusin is recited before the man betroths his wife, because once he has betrothed her, the blessing can no longer be said. It must be recited before the act is performed. Rabbeinu Tam says—Rabbeinu Tam says—that it is recited afterward, and he has his reason. He says: the matter depends on someone else’s consent. A woman is betrothed only with her consent, so what if she does not agree? Therefore, the blessing is recited after the betrothal. But according to the Rambam, that is not relevant. Even if we are concerned that she might not agree, once he has betrothed her, the blessing can no longer be recited. That’s it—the blessing over the mitzvah has been missed. This is a very fundamental dispute: Is the blessing over erusin a blessing over a mitzvah or not? According to the Rambam, who holds that it is, the groom must recite it himself. To this day, there are some communities in which the groom recites the blessing himself. But most people, including Sephardim, honor a rabbi with the blessing. Although Maran rules like the Rambam in Even HaEzer, that is not the practice here. Nearly all of us, including the great majority of Sephardim, honor a rabbi or an older person, and so on, to recite the blessing over erusin. That is how the custom spread. Even in Egypt, the Rambam’s own place, Rabbi Aharon Shimon, of blessed memory, wrote in his book Nahar Mitzrayim, where he set out all the customs of Egypt, that in his day—three or four generations ago—they were already accustomed to having someone else recite the blessing over erusin. He wondered why: how could they follow a practice contrary to the Rambam? In Egypt they continued to rule according to the Rambam. He answers based on Rabbeinu Tam, who said that the custom is for someone else to recite the blessing so as not to embarrass a person who does not know how to say it. With all due respect to the rabbi of Egypt, Rabbeinu Tam’s answer works very well according to Rabbeinu Tam’s own view, that the blessing over erusin is a blessing of praise. Perhaps ideally the groom should recite it, so he says that ideally—

1:13:48 Speaker 3 There is another reason: to avoid embarrassment. Human dignity is of great importance; we should not embarrass someone who does not know how to recite the blessing. But if we are following the Rambam—and he is trying to explain the Rambam according to the Rambam—it is a blessing over a mitzvah, and it is not possible to give it to someone else to say. There is a responsum of the Rambam stating that even after the fact, if someone else recited it, the groom has not fulfilled his obligation. The person who recited it has said a blessing in vain, G-d forbid, and the groom has not fulfilled his obligation and must recite it again. So can we say here, too, that to avoid embarrassment we should let that person recite a blessing in vain, while the groom betroths the bride without a blessing or has to recite it again? Is that what we call avoiding embarrassment? Certainly that reasoning does not apply here. This answer cannot work. And yet, what do we do? How can we honor someone else with the blessing? According to the Rambam, when we honor a rabbi with the blessing over erusin, we are saying to him, “Please, with all due honor, recite a blessing in vain.” G-d forbid. That is a very serious matter. How do we do it? The truth is that most of the Rishonim disagree with the Rambam and hold that the blessing over erusin is a blessing of praise, not a blessing over a mitzvah. In fact, the wording of the blessing shows that it is not a blessing over a mitzvah. If it were, it would have to say, “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning betrothal,” or “to betroth a woman.” There are two forms of blessing over a mitzvah. The Ran discusses this at the beginning of Pesachim: when one form is used and when the other is used. For example, the blessing says “to affix a mezuzah,” not “concerning the affixing of a mezuzah”; “to hear the sound of the shofar.” And there are blessings “concerning circumcision,” “concerning taking the lulav,” and so on. Here, it uses neither “concerning” nor “to”; it does not say “to betroth.” What does it say? “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning forbidden relationships.” What does that have to do with this? As praise, it is very relevant: Hashem chose us and sanctified us with the holiness of the mitzvos. And forbade—what is that holiness? That He commanded us to guard against forbidden relationships and prohibited betrothed women to us. Even when a man betroths a woman, a bride without—

1:16:39 Speaker 3 a blessing is forbidden to her husband like a niddah. “And permitted to us those women married to us through chuppah and kiddushin.” “Blessed are You, Hashem”—at the end, too, we do not say “Who sanctifies us concerning betrothal,” but “Who sanctifies His people Israel through chuppah.” The wording shows that it truly is praise and thanks to Hashem. The Ritva discusses this at length, as do other Rishonim. Most of the Rishonim say it is a blessing of praise. If it is a blessing of praise, anyone can certainly recite it; there is no requirement preventing that. It follows that the Geonim, too, hold like most of the Rishonim. Most of the Geonim also hold that the blessing over erusin is a blessing of praise. And we know that there are practices we followed before the Rambam and before Maran. The established communities in—Morocco, for example, have been there since the days of King Shlomo. People around the world do not know this. There are communities in Morocco descended from the Jews expelled from Spain, and they had different customs—very different customs. In Fez, one of the major cities, there were shuls of the local Jews and shuls of the exiles. There were differences in weddings, in shechitah, in prayer—in every area of life. But the older communities date back to King Shlomo’s time. King Shlomo’s son mentioned in Divrei Hayamim, Baasha ben Shlomo, is buried in Morocco to this day. In Arabic they call him Sidi Bouissa or Sliman. “Sidi” means “my master.” “Bouissa” is Baasha; they always change the names. “Sliman” is Shlomo, as is well known. The Arabs also venerate all these people mentioned in Tanach, just as they venerate the Me’aras Hamachpelah, Kever Rachel, and many other places. That is their way. One could say this was from Hashem, to preserve the atmosphere and character of those places, for they really are there at Sidi Bouissa and Sliman. When we were children, we would hear about Jews going there to pray with awe and reverence. We were surprised, because the name sounded Arabic to us, but in fact it is simply Baasha, just as it sounds. And why did he get there? Because when

1:19:32 Speaker 3 When King Shlomo sent ships to bring the metals he brought to Jerusalem, he sent Jews to Morocco, where there were many metals. He had many workers there and wanted someone to oversee them. Apparently their numbers grew, and he needed a capable administrator to manage the whole operation, so he sent his son. In the end, his son passed away there and was buried there; in those days, people were not easily transported across the sea. So there are customs that predate Maran and even the Rambam. Maran himself writes in his introduction that customs practiced before his time should not be changed; people should continue them. Some scholars here thought that certain Moroccan customs—for example, we do not eat dried legumes on Pesach, though we do eat fresh green ones—came from somewhere else. We do not eat rice at all, nor most dried legumes. In Moroccan communities, rice and chickpeas are not eaten; in most of Morocco, no dried legumes are eaten at all. Fresh green fava beans, peas, and beans are a mainstay of the holiday meals. People eat plenty of them so they can eat less of foods about which there are doubts, but they do not eat the dried ones. Some thought this was because of the Rema. To my mind, that is not correct. They wanted to infer from this that Moroccan Jews did not follow Maran. That is a well-known mistake, even a serious one. All the sages of Morocco, throughout the generations, in all their books, early and later alike—ever since Maran, of blessed memory, composed his Shulchan Aruch—write: “We must not depart from Maran’s words.” We must not depart from Maran’s words. There is a famous saying that Maran Rabbi Ovadia Yosef z"l also uses; he always mentions it: even if a thousand halachic authorities disagree with Maran, we rule according to Maran. Who said that? It was a sage of Fez, Rabbi Yaakov Ibn Tzur, who sat on the beis din of Rabbi Yehuda Ben Attar. Rabbi Yehuda Ben Attar was called Harav Hakabir, “the great rabbi.” He was the leading sage of his generation. There, they never used the title “Gaon.” Since the time of the Rif, they no longer

1:21:59 Speaker 3 used “Gaon.” So the highest title was “the great rabbi,” Rabbeinu Kabir. Rabbi Yehuda Ben Attar and his beis din gave the Ohr Hachaim Hakadosh his first approbation. They were the ones who gave him that first approbation. He was the leading sage of his generation. As for Rabbi Yaakov Ibn Tzur, he is known as the Yaavetz. There are three sages known as Yaavetz. There was a Yaavetz from the time of the expulsion from Spain, who wrote a commentary of ethical teachings and wisdom on Pirkei Avos. There is this Yaavetz, Rabbi Yaakov Ibn Tzur, and there is the Ashkenazi Yaavetz, the son of the Chacham Tzvi, Rabbi Yaakov ben Tzvi. All three are called Yaavetz. This Yaavetz, Rabbi Yaakov Ibn Tzur, wrote: “Even if a thousand halachic authorities disagree with Maran, we have only Maran’s words to follow.” I once saw a responsum that shows how particular they were about Maran’s words. A great sage who served as a dayan in Tangier, Morocco, was asked about two partners who had made an agreement between themselves. They said, “If a dispute arises between us, we will abide by whatever a certain sage rules for us, even if it is against Maran.” Not against that sage—against Maran. They brought him the document. He became so angry and felt it was an insult. He said, “This document is an affront to Maran. If it comes into my hands, I will tear it up.” That is what he said. It must not be accepted. In one of my responsa, I commented on this. With all due respect to the eminent Rabbi Yaavetz, who said this, I wrote that his great love for Maran had led him too far. For we hold that in monetary matters, a condition is valid even if it goes against Torah law, all the more so if it goes against Maran. In matters concerning a person’s own money, he can accept such a condition upon himself. There is no problem with that. But we see how particular the sages throughout Morocco were about this, in every generation without exception. So we need to understand why, both here and even in Egypt, it is customary to honor someone else with the blessing. I suggested that apparently this was an old custom, a custom of earlier generations, to

1:24:18 Speaker 3 honor someone else. Why? Because they held that the blessing of erusin is a blessing of praise. If it is a blessing of praise, then on the contrary, it should be given to the most distinguished person present, so he can praise Hashem. His praise is greater than that of an ordinary person. In any event, we see that everyone agrees the whole debate is whether this blessing is a blessing of praise or a blessing over a mitzvah. But if it is a blessing over a mitzvah, it would never occur to anyone to say that one person should perform the mitzvah and another should recite the blessing. There is no such thing. The Rambam says in a responsum that it is a blessing in vain. Everyone agrees on this principle; no one disputes it. It is certainly a blessing in vain. One cannot recite this blessing that way. But someone might ask: What is the difference? After all, the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah 29 says that someone who is not obligated in a matter cannot fulfill the obligation for others, but someone who was obligated and has already fulfilled his own obligation can do so: one who has fulfilled his obligation can fulfill it for others. Rashi asks: How can he fulfill it for others? Through the principle that all Jews are responsible for one another in mitzvos. Someone might ask: What is the difference? The person who was obligated and has already fulfilled his obligation—can he recite the blessing again for himself? Certainly not; it would be another blessing in vain. According to the Rambam, he would transgress “You shall not take the name of Hashem your G-d in vain”; he cannot repeat it. Yet, because of that mutual responsibility, he can recite the blessing again for others. So why can someone who is not obligated not fulfill the obligation for others? Many have certainly discussed this. At the time, I offered an explanation. First, let us cite the well-known passage in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of Megillah. It says that a resident of a walled city cannot fulfill the obligation of a resident of an unwalled town. For example, in Jerusalem the Megillah is read on the 15th of Adar. Suppose someone from Kfar Chabad, or another place where it is read on the 14th, arrives in Jerusalem on the 15th to join his family for the Purim celebrations. They see him in shul, and he is known as a chazzan and an accurate, skilled reader. So they say to him, “Please, do us the honor

1:26:57 Speaker 3 of reading the Megillah for us.” What is the ruling? He cannot read it for them. It is not because he has already fulfilled his obligation—someone who has fulfilled his obligation can still fulfill it for others—but because his entire obligation was on the 14th. For him, the 15th is just an ordinary day. For a resident of an unwalled town, the 15th has no significance, so he cannot fulfill their obligation. That is stated explicitly, and all the halachic authorities rule accordingly. Wherever there is doubt, we follow the main practice, which is also the practice of the majority. In fact, a resident of a walled city can fulfill the obligation of a resident of an unwalled town, but a resident of an unwalled town cannot fulfill the obligation of a resident of a walled city. The resident of a walled city can fulfill the other’s obligation because most places read on the 14th, so that reading counts for both. But the resident of an unwalled town cannot fulfill the obligation of the resident of a walled city, because for him the 15th has no significance. Something happened to me many years ago, when I lived in Bnei Brak. I had a neighbor, a distinguished young Torah scholar. On Yom Tov, his mother came from France to spend the holiday in Eretz Yisroel. Since she had come only as a tourist, she was obligated to observe two days, including the second day of Yom Tov observed outside Eretz Yisroel. At the end of the first day of Yom Tov, he needed to make Havdalah, while she needed Kiddush for the second day of Yom Tov. She did not know how to recite it. In our community, women were not taught to do that. Our mothers had not studied and did not know how. This was intentional, not by chance. I remember that even the wife of [unclear]—he was among the very greatest—was a righteous woman, descended from holy people. She was known for her righteousness in the home of Rabbi Shmuel Amar. She did not know how to say the prayers from the siddur, only what she knew by heart. That woman did not know the Kiddush for Yom Tov. The mother said to him, “My son, recite Kiddush for me.” He came to ask me, and I told him he could not. It is like a resident of an unwalled town who comes on the 15th. For him, that day—since he is a resident of Eretz Yisroel and observes only one day—he must

1:29:08 Speaker 3 To make Havdalah now? It’s a weekday. On a weekday, he cannot make Kiddush. When we say that someone who has already fulfilled his obligation can fulfill it for someone else, we mean someone who was obligated on that day. Then he can fulfill the obligation for another person. For example, if on the first night of Yom Tov he has already made Kiddush for himself and wants to recite it for someone who does not know how, he can do so for one person, then another, and however many more come. There is no problem with that. But if it is a day on which he is not obligated, he cannot. Why? What is the explanation? I explained at the time that this obligation of mutual responsibility is not just some general principle that all Jews are responsible for one another. It is a specific obligation that takes effect when a person becomes obligated in a mitzvah himself. At that moment, he also becomes obligated through mutual responsibility for everyone else with regard to that mitzvah. When he performs the mitzvah, he fulfills only one part of the obligation—his own part. The part arising from mutual responsibility remains. So if a Jew comes along who has not yet performed the mitzvah and cannot do it himself, he can recite the blessing for him. A verse in Psalm 62 says, “One thing G-d has spoken; two have I heard.” And I said, accordingly, that in each thing G-d has spoken, in every mitzvah, there are two obligations. What are the two? There is the individual, personal obligation, and there is the general obligation he bears on behalf of all the Jewish people. “One thing G-d has spoken; two have I heard.” When he fulfills his own obligation, the general obligation still remains, and that is why he can perform the mitzvah for another person. But if on that day the personal obligation never took effect for him, because it is a weekday for him, then mutual responsibility for that mitzvah does not apply to him either. Today he is not subject to that mitzvah, so that responsibility does not take effect. Therefore he cannot make Kiddush for his mother. He can only say it to her word by word, and she can repeat it and fulfill her own obligation.

1:31:25 Speaker 3 Or someone else who is a resident of the Diaspora can make Kiddush for her, but as a resident of Eretz Yisroel, he cannot fulfill her obligation. There was an incident about three hundred—roughly three hundred and thirty or three hundred and forty—years ago. There was a great Torah scholar, Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz. The incident happened to his son, Rabbi Moshe Chagiz. Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz is well known as the author of the responsa Halachos Ketanos. He called them “minor rulings,” but they are major rulings—one of the foundational, important works. Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz was from the city of Fez in Morocco. He first went to Livorno, Italy, to print his books, because in those days there was not yet a printing press in Morocco. Italy had printing presses from early on. He stayed there for several months. In those days, unlike today, when printing is all automatic, it took a long time, ages and ages. While he was there, he decided not to make himself known. He kept his identity hidden and presented himself as a merchant. When people asked what he was doing, he said he had come to trade. He rented a room, kept to himself, and studied all day. A week passed, then two weeks, then a month. Gradually, people began to sense that he was not exactly a merchant. They saw how he, peace be upon him, conducted himself and how he davened. They saw that he was not engaged in any trade, until they began to realize that the book being printed was his own. They asked around and made inquiries. All the Torah scholars and dayanim of Livorno at the time came to him and asked him to become the rabbi over all of them. They said, “Come and be our leader. We will give you a generous salary, a fine house, and so on.” He told them, “Even if you give me all the wealth in the world, I will not leave Fez, a city of Torah scholars and scribes, to come to Livorno.” Mind you, Livorno also had great Torah scholars. Several generations later, the Chida spoke very highly of Livorno. It truly was renowned.

1:34:01 Speaker 3 All our books in Morocco came from Livorno—the Tefillas Hachodesh prayer books, the Chumashim, everything. There were great Torah scholars there. Look at the approbations to the books and you see that they were giants of Torah. But Fez had a special standing, and he would not agree to leave. They saw they could not persuade him. Then a very wealthy man who lived there at the time came to him. His name was Yaakov—his full name has slipped my mind for a moment; I’ll remember it shortly. He said to Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz, “I want you to open a yeshiva in Jerusalem.” He replied, “Open a yeshiva in Jerusalem? Listen, that takes a tremendous amount of money.” The man said, “I will cover everything. I will give and dedicate my entire fortune. I have the means, and this is what I want: for you, a great Torah scholar, to establish a yeshiva.” He could not refuse that. The man gave him money, and he went and opened a yeshiva in Jerusalem, calling it Beis Yaakov. Today people say “Beis Yaakov” for girls’ schools, but the name originally belonged to a yeshiva for boys. And who came out of it? You cannot imagine what great scholars Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz’s students were. The Pri Chadash, peace be upon him; the author of Get Pashut—the two of them were study partners. They were giants of Torah. You cannot imagine their greatness. The author of Ginas Veradim and many others, as well as his son Rabbi Moshe Chagiz, whom I’m telling you about. At that time, Jerusalem was desolate. There were not many Jews there, and the few who were there struggled under the burden of earning a living. There was almost no Torah study. He came and breathed new life into it, peace be upon him, thanks to the charity of the benefactor who supported him. From there came scholars who fulfilled the verse, “For Torah shall go forth from Zion, and the word of Hashem.” To this day, the teachings of great scholars like the Pri Chadash and the author of Get Pashut are found everywhere in the world. The same is true of Ginas Veradim and others. Now, back to Rabbi Moshe. After his father, Rabbi Yaakov, passed away, the yeshiva faced difficulties, so he traveled away.

1:36:29 Speaker 3 He went back to Italy—to Livorno, I think. This was about three hundred and thirty years ago. He went to seek benefactors who would help and strengthen the yeshiva, and he spent Shavuos there in Italy. On the first day of Shavuos he davened with everyone as usual, since for him too it was Yom Tov. But for him the second day was a weekday. So he davened early at home with his tallis and tefillin. After finishing his weekday prayers, he removed his tefillin and came to the shul out of respect for the congregation. He came with his tallis; they davened while he sat and studied in the shul. When they reached the Torah reading, the chazzan suddenly called out, “Let our teacher and rabbi, Rabbi Moshe son of Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz, come up!” Rabbi Moshe tells the story himself. He wrote it as a note in his father’s book. He has important notes on Halachos Ketanos, which he signs “Hamaniach”—like the chapter called Hamaniach es Hakad. “Hamaniach” is an acronym for “the humble Moshe son of Yaakov Chagiz.” That is where he wrote this whole story. In that note he says, “When he called me up, I was at a loss. I didn’t know how I could go up when I am a resident of Eretz Yisroel and it is a weekday for me.” He decided on the spot that he could go up out of respect for the congregation. But as he walked up, he concluded that the congregation would not fulfill its obligation through his reading, through his aliyah, and that, in effect, they would be short one person called up. So he went up and recited the blessings, but told the gabbai, “Look, I am a resident of Eretz Yisroel. For me, today is a weekday. Call up one more person as an additional aliyah.” The Rambam and Maran write in the Shulchan Aruch that additional people may be called up. That is what we do when there is a groom or some other occasion.

1:38:52 Speaker 4 We add aliyos even on Yom Tov.

1:38:53 Speaker 3 Yes, we add aliyos even on Yom Tov. Take Simchas Torah, for example.

1:38:59 Speaker 4 He was called up on the first day.

1:39:00 Speaker 3 He went up, but they called him down afterward. They give aliyos to Torah scholars—a scholar who has come from Jerusalem! You cannot imagine what it meant when an emissary from Jerusalem came, even an ordinary person, [unclear]. On such a holiday—yes, on any day he was there. So he, peace be upon him, told them, “Call up an additional person.” But the gabbai was a forceful man. He said, “Under no circumstances will I add anyone, because in Livorno the custom is never to add an aliyah.” Rabbi Moshe told him, “You are right on ordinary days, but here you are short one person called up.” He would not agree. Rabbi Moshe was very distressed, as he writes. When they came out after davening, he met the Torah scholar of Livorno, Rabbi Chananya Kazis—that was his name, peace be upon him. Chananya Kazis. One was Rabbi Moshe Chagiz; the other was Kazis. The Italian scholar greeted him and wished him a happy Yom Tov. Rabbi Moshe said to him, “Your gabbai is a man of principle, a fine judge! Here is what happened, and he refused to call up another person.” Rabbi Chananya Kazis told him, “He was right.” “How can you say he was right?” Rabbi Chananya answered, “I have a proof.” Where did he find his proof? In the laws of fast days, it says that only someone who is fasting may be called up to the Torah on a fast day; someone who is not fasting should not be called up. But what if they went ahead and called him up? He does not have to step down. It is valid; the congregation fulfills its obligation. Yet he is not fasting, and this is a fast-day reading, the reading for a public fast! So the same applies to you, even though today is not Yom Tov for you. That was Rabbi Chananya Kazis’s argument. Rabbi Moshe Chagiz, peace be upon him, replied, “With respect, that is no proof. What you have brought is not a valid comparison. Listen: that person, too, was subject to the fast; he simply could not fast because circumstances prevented him. But he was obligated in the fast like everyone else. For him, too, it was the Tenth of Teves.”

1:41:22 Speaker 3 It’s 17 Tammuz for him too. But here it’s a weekday. Here I have no connection to Yom Tov at all. How can I fulfill someone else’s obligation? And I’ll bring you a proof to the contrary. Here Rabbi Moshe brought a proof, a good proof, from Rabbeinu Tam, a"h. This is the story of Rabbeinu Tam. It appears in the Shulchan Aruch, not upon you, in the laws of mourning. Rabbeinu Tam always received the third aliyah. That continues to this day: among Ashkenazim—I think chassidim choose the sixth aliyah, like Sephardim, but Litvaks give the third aliyah, as with Rabbeinu Tam, because it’s an important aliyah after the Kohen and Levi. So they call up the rabbi. In short, Rabbeinu Tam used to receive the third aliyah. When his sister passed away, he was within the seven days of mourning on Shabbos. As is known, mourners are not called up. The chazzan, the gabbai, did not call him. Rabbeinu Tam stood up and went up. Everyone in the shul, including his students, was astonished. They knew who Rabbeinu Tam, a"h, was; surely he wouldn’t do something without a reason. One student thought: Perhaps he forgot. Perhaps, so engrossed in his learning and davening, he forgot about his sister’s passing. After davening they came and asked him, “Did you forget?” He said, “No, I didn’t forget.” Then why did you go up? Rabbeinu Tam told them, “It says that on Shabbos, mourning is observed privately, not in public. Since I go up every Shabbos, if people now see Rabbeinu Tam sitting and not going up, what will they say? ‘Ah, Rabbeinu Tam is a mourner.’ That would make it public mourning. That is why I went up.” And that is the ruling in the Shulchan Aruch: a scholar or someone similar who regularly receives an aliyah may go up even on a Shabbos during his mourning. So what does Rabbi Moshe Chagiz, a"h, say? He says, “You see, Rabbeinu Tam, a"h, went up despite being a mourner only because otherwise his mourning would be public.” He said, “So I too went up to avoid a public disgrace. But to say that I can fulfill someone else’s obligation…”

1:43:52 Speaker 3 That’s about an aliyah; that’s something else. But to fulfill someone else’s obligation—since I have no connection to that Yom Tov—Rabbeinu Tam did have a connection to the aliyah; only his mourning stood in the way. Even so, he went up so that it would not become public and people would not question it. I too can go up, but to fulfill others’ obligation through the aliyah? No.” Then he says that he searched his home among some writings he had and found a handwritten responsum by “the angel,” as he called him, “the angel Gabriel Esperanza.” He was one of the sages of Tzfas, from the generation before him, a great and holy scholar. Because of his holiness, they called him the angel Gabriel Esperanza. He found that the responsum supported his position. There is more to discuss about that. Later I wrote a great deal about Torah reading. Torah reading is different; it is not like other mitzvos. But that was his view, a"h. In any case, we see that a person cannot fulfill another’s obligation in something to which he himself has no connection. I told that scholar, regarding the eruv: yes, the eruv applies to us. True, we are all obligated in an eruv, but each person is obligated in his own city. Someone who lives in Kfar Chabad must participate in the Kfar Chabad eruv. Someone who lives in Jerusalem must participate in Jerusalem’s, and someone who lives in Haifa, in Haifa’s. Someone who does not live there cannot fulfill the residents’ obligation. He cannot make the blessing for them. How can he make the blessing? He has no connection to it. It says explicitly: “Even if he does not live in this city, he is doing nothing, since the eruv is already established as a matter of course.” But where, where? Ah: “Accordingly, another person who does not live in this city cannot recite this blessing, since he has no connection to this eruv. What would he be making a blessing over?”

1:45:58 Speaker 5 Here are the Shulchan Aruch and Tanya supporting this.

1:46:01 Speaker 3 What would he make a blessing over? This is not like other mitzvos.

1:46:04 Speaker 5 It looks like this settles it.

1:46:05 Speaker 3 Someone who performs a mitzvah for others can make the blessing over doing it, because he is doing it for them. But here he is doing nothing, since it is already established as a matter of course. In fact, this ruling is explicit—explicit in all the halachic authorities, in the Magen Avraham, and also in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. The Mishnah Berurah also says that he cannot make the blessing; only someone who lives there or has come to spend Shabbos there can.

1:46:30 Speaker 6 [unclear]. Someone for whom it is already permitted cannot.

1:46:33 Speaker 3 Now, what did he bring me afterward? The Biur Halachah says that if this shliach, the person they want to make the blessing, does not live there, but they have him collect the bread or the flour, then, since he is performing the mitzvah, he can make the blessing. He compares it to a mezuzah. The obligation of a mezuzah falls on the occupant, the occupant, and yet the common practice is to honor a scholar or a rabbi with making the blessing and affixing the mezuzah. Why, they ask, does he make the blessing? Because he performs the act. Here too, he performs the act. With all due respect to the great scholarship of the Mishnah Berurah in the Biur Halachah, it is not comparable. A mezuzah is indeed the occupant’s obligation, but what does that mean? That he must have a mezuzah on his doorway. What if someone bought a house that already had a beautiful mezuzah? He does not have to take it down. If he rented a house with a beautiful mezuzah, he does not have to take it down. His obligation as the occupant is to ensure that there is a mezuzah. Or say he bought a house without a mezuzah and someone else came and put one up: he does not have to take it down. Therefore, when he has someone else make the blessing and affix it, that person makes the blessing too. But here it is not a matter of his having an obligation; he has no connection to this mitzvah at all. So what if he performs the act of transferring ownership? I brought a proof for this from Kol Eliyahu. There is a collection of responsa called Kol Eliyahu, by one of the great later authorities. The Chida, a"h, cites him on an entirely different matter. There he discusses whether a person can appoint a shliach to make the blessing over an eruv tavshilin for him. Rabbi Kol Eliyahu says he cannot make the blessing because he has no connection to it. He lives in Eretz Yisroel, where there is one day of Yom Tov. He is visiting outside Eretz Yisroel, so he observes one day of Yom Tov. His host, who observes two days, needs to make an eruv tavshilin: Wednesday is followed by Thursday, and Thursday by Friday, so on Friday, the second day of Yom Tov in the Diaspora, he needs to cook for Shabbos. So on Wednesday he makes an eruv

1:48:51 Speaker 3 tavshilin, because Wednesday is followed by Thursday, and Thursday by Friday. He wants the man from Eretz Yisroel to make it. Rabbi Kol Eliyahu says he cannot, because it does not apply to him. What do we see? Even though he performs the act—he takes the bread, he takes the meat or the egg, whatever is used, and he says, “Through this eruv it shall be permitted for so-and-so”—he says he cannot. The Chida leaves the question there; it must be for other reasons. But in any event, we see Kol Eliyahu’s view. This is not different from making a blessing over an eruv: an eruv tavshilin and an eruv for alleyways are the same kind of thing. It is the same concept, the same underlying principle. What is an eruv? In one case, we join the days, linking them for cooking; here we join the homes and courtyards, the alleyways. In fact, the Shulchan Aruch says that if he needs to make a blessing over each of them, he can cover both with one blessing. That shows they are truly one kind of thing; otherwise, they could not be included in a single blessing. So, apparently, it is not comparable to… I brought other points about this too. Here we had a question on which there was disagreement only about how to rule regarding the search for chametz.

1:50:15 Speaker 3 After all, this is not a simple mitzvah. On the night of 14 Nissan, we search for chametz. It is not just about fulfilling the obligation. Many people make this mistake: they set out the crumbs and collect them. It is an important custom. The Arizal wrote about it in Shaar Hakavanos, and it is based on the holy Zohar, which speaks of the ten crowns of impurity. Corresponding to them, we collect and burn ten pieces of bread. That serves another purpose, but the mitzvah of searching means checking every place where there may be chametz. What do people think? They think: since we have already cleaned and moved things around and washed everything, what else is there for me to check? But that is not what the Shulchan Aruch says. It says explicitly, I think in section 432 or 433: Someone who swept his house on the morning of 13 Nissan, the day before the search, and took care that no more chametz would enter—meaning he really did everything properly—must still search on the night of the fourteenth and make the blessing. That is what the halachic authorities say here. We see that the cleaning does not suffice. He must search. The enactment of our Sages is to search by candlelight on the night of the fourteenth. So what if it is difficult for him? It is so much work. Sometimes a person does not have the strength. He may get people to help him—his sons, his grandsons, or simply people who want to do a mitzvah. And what does the Shulchan Aruch say? He makes the blessing and includes them, and they all search, each having been assigned a section beforehand: “You do the kitchen, you do the living room, you…” He makes the blessing, he searches, and they search. But what if he cannot search at all? He is in such a state of weakness, not upon you, or something else, that he simply cannot. Then the entire search is done by shluchim. Who makes the blessing? The Yam Shel Shlomo and the Magen Avraham say that the shliach is the one performing the mitzvah. So does the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. Oh, I see here, thank G-d, it’s full of material. The obligation to search is

1:52:37 Speaker 3 The obligation rests with the homeowner, but members of his household who eat at his expense have no obligation to search at all, since the chametz is not theirs. But if the homeowner wants to appoint members of his household as shluchim for the mitzvah, so that they search, he may do so, and they recite the blessing for removing chametz. The rabbi also says that they recite the blessing. In fact, that is the view of most poskim. Chazon Ovadia, too, examines the practical halachah and rules that when the homeowner does not search, the person searching recites the blessing. The Magen Avraham brings a proof from circumcision. Circumcision is the father’s mitzvah for his son: the father is obligated to circumcise him, but he entrusts it to a mohel. Who recites the blessing over the circumcision? The mohel does. The blessing the father recites, “to bring him into the covenant,” is not the blessing over the mitzvah; it is certainly a blessing of praise, which is something else. But the blessing over the circumcision, which is the blessing over the mitzvah, is recited by the mohel. That is no small point. Some have rejected the proof. I saw in a book by the gaon Rabbi Frank, quoting, I think, the Dagul Mervavah, who says circumcision is different. Why is it different? Because it says that if the father is absent, the beis din is responsible. So he says the mohel is acting in the capacity of beis din. It is an innovative, very sharp argument, but hard to accept as practical halachah. We see that the author of the Tanya, too, states this, as do all the great authorities, regarding all the mitzvos.

1:54:09 Speaker 7 That line of reasoning is here.

1:54:11 Speaker 3 Oh, he brings it? Whose is it?

1:54:13 Speaker 7 That is [unclear] of the rabbi. Because with circumcision, [unclear], and not [unclear].

1:54:18 Speaker 3 And not merely [unclear]. But really, that is hard to accept, because there is a... Shach in Choshen Mishpat who says you cannot appoint a shliach because he knows, but...

1:54:34 Speaker 7 That is clear.

1:54:35 Speaker 3 Huh?

1:54:35 Speaker 7 That is clear.

1:54:35 Speaker 3 Yes, but the straightforward understanding is that a person... I bring a proof from kiddushin. We said that according to the Rambam, it is a blessing over the mitzvah, and someone else cannot recite it. Even so, if a man appoints a shliach to betroth a woman for him, the shliach recites the blessing. That is clear. So we see that even with blessings over mitzvos, even according to the Rambam, who says it would be a blessing in vain, when the shliach betroths her, he recites it because he performs the act. I think that is a wonderful point. When a man appoints a shliach to betroth her, since the shliach performs the act, it follows that when he appoints a shliach to search, since it is the shliach, not the homeowner, who searches, the shliach should recite the blessing.

1:55:19 Speaker 7 The question is whether the homeowner... whether the shliach should recite the blessing, or the homeowner should recite it and the shliach hear it. He would answer amen.

1:55:26 Speaker 3 Yes, but—

1:55:27 Speaker 7 I did not write about what he could do.

1:55:30 Speaker 3 Right, that is the—

1:55:31 Speaker 7 The straightforward reading is that, ideally, he does everything, both the betrothal and the blessing.

1:55:36 Speaker 3 Yes, but we do not find an example of someone who is not performing the mitzvah reciting the blessing. We do not find that.

1:55:44 Speaker 7 To recite kiddush for someone else.

1:55:45 Speaker 3 There is one. I will bring an interesting discussion. I thought of skipping it so as not to make this too heavy, but I think Rabbi Kashish should... The Rambam writes in the laws of shechitah that someone who was proficient in shechitah and became unable to speak may slaughter. Everyone wondered: What about the blessing? Surely one may not omit it from the outset. True, the blessings do not prevent one from fulfilling a mitzvah. All blessings are rabbinic, apart from Birchas Hamazon. The Rambam says Birchas HaTorah too, but the halachah is that only Birchas Hamazon is a Torah obligation. How careful we must be with it! But with all the blessings, failure to recite one does not invalidate the mitzvah. If a man performed a mitzvah without a blessing—circumcised his son and did not recite the blessing—he fulfilled it. If he slaughtered without reciting the blessing, he fulfilled it. If he took a lulav without reciting the blessing, he fulfilled it. In every case he fulfilled the mitzvah, but one may not set out to perform a mitzvah without a blessing. They derive this from Terumos. The Mishnah at the beginning of Terumos says: “A naked person may not separate terumah.” Why? Because he cannot recite the blessing. So we see that although the blessing does not invalidate the mitzvah, that is only after the fact. From the outset, one cannot perform a mitzvah without reciting a blessing. How, then, can the Rambam say that someone who has become unable to speak may slaughter? What about the blessing? All the commentators say, including Maran, of blessed memory, in Kesef Mishneh, that someone else recites the blessing. What does “someone else recites the blessing” mean? The Bach and the Derishah discuss this at length: it is someone else who is also slaughtering. The mute person wants to slaughter an ox or a calf, and another person also has an ox, a sheep or a chicken that he wants to slaughter, so he recites the blessing over his own shechitah. Similarly with kiddushin, even according to the Rambam, if there are two grooms with two brides, each betrothing his own bride, one can recite the blessing on behalf of the other, because here that is fine. He has both in mind. But here the Taz, and the Chida’s view, say: No, someone else can recite the blessing even if he is not slaughtering. The Shach held [unclear]. Apparently the Taz holds that even because of someone else’s mitzvah... No, that is not the straightforward reading.

1:58:21 Speaker 3 The Taz proposes an idea unlike anything we have heard. He says the blessing over shechitah is a blessing of praise, not a blessing over a mitzvah. It is astonishing to say that about shechitah. Granted, the blessing says that Hakadosh Boruch Hu forbade us animals that died without shechitah and those that are treif, but to call the blessing “over shechitah” anything other than a blessing over a mitzvah? You could hardly have a clearer wording. In any case, everyone disagrees with him. So why, according to the Taz, can someone recite it even if he is not slaughtering? Because it is a blessing of praise. And even he agrees that where there is a blessing over a mitzvah, no one else can recite it—only the person performing the mitzvah—unless he, too, is performing that same mitzvah. Then he can recite it. So here too, it is true that the man is the homeowner. First, he has appointed a shliach, and by appointing a shliach he gives him the full authority. He cannot recite the blessing when he is not performing the act. Second, there is room to say that although the Torah obligates him to remove chametz, he fulfills that obligation through nullification. And what if people came now, on the night of the fourteenth, and cleaned the house? Angels came and cleaned it. Eliyahu Hanavi testifies to him that they searched and found nothing. He certainly would not... So there is no... This is more like a mezuzah. When he entrusts someone else here with performing the mitzvah of searching, it is indeed like a mezuzah: the shliach should recite the blessing, not the homeowner. Therefore, as most poskim hold, if there is no other option... If the homeowner really can do even a little, that is best. Let him search even a little, even take one corner and search it at his own pace. Then he can recite the blessing on their behalf, and they can continue. But if he cannot search at all, it is better that they recite the blessing, not he. That is the main halachah. That is also the ruling in Chazon Ovadia. And that is how I see it, thank G-d.

2:00:21 Speaker 8 We are accustomed, for example, when going out on mivtzoim to blow the shofar, to recite the blessing in the morning. We begin blowing the shofar early in the morning and recite the blessing for them, intending not to fulfill our own obligation. Later we fulfill it with the blessing in shul, following the usual order.

2:00:40 Speaker 3 Oh, when you go to blow for sick people.

2:00:41 Speaker 8 For sick people, yes. So it comes out that—

2:00:44 Speaker 3 All right, then you blow.

2:00:45 Speaker 8 The blessing, and then you begin.

2:00:46 Speaker 3 But on that day he himself is obligated in that same mitzvah, and so are they. Here he can always...

2:00:50 Speaker 8 With the blessing too.

2:00:50 Speaker 3 He always can. No, no—each person has the obligation in his own home. It is only through the law of agency, through the law of agency. Without agency, it is like kiddushin. If he appoints a shliach, the shliach recites the blessing. If he does not appoint a shliach, then according to the Rambam it is a blessing over a mitzvah, and he cannot recite it. So that is similar to our case. I just want to say something before we finish, without making this too long. I want to say a few words, especially to the young people who take time out of their day to learn Torah. It is a kiddush Hashem. There is the set schedule of learning required by the yeshivah, with a mashgiach and a rosh yeshivah, but a person does not always have that framework. There was a great rabbi who had the Slonim yeshivah in Ramat Gan, Rabbi Avraham Yagel, the son of Rabbi Shabsai Yagel, who had been the rosh yeshivah of Slonim abroad. He, too, was truly wise. He never became well known, but he was tremendously wise. How many times did we speak? He would say that the whole purpose of yeshivah study is to bring a person to the point where he gets used to learning—gets used to learning on his own initiative. Honestly, when he first said that, I did not quite understand. Is that the whole point of learning? But with time I reflected on it. It is a tremendous acquisition when a person starts learning of his own accord. He cannot bear not to learn. He begins to love learning and to find it engaging. As long as a person learns only because the framework requires it, that is very good, but he has not yet attained that achievement, that personal acquisition. Acquiring Torah is when a person already becomes someone who carries himself forward. My teacher, the gaon Rabbi Yaakov Nissim Rosenthal, may the memory of the righteous be a blessing—someone once told a story about him. An elderly man who had looked after him when he was little told it to me forty years ago, when I had just begun learning. He was an elderly man from Jerusalem. He told me that when Rabbi Rosenthal was a little boy, he had many siblings, and their mother sometimes...

2:03:10 Speaker 3 When she wanted to go out, she would ask him, as a neighbor, to watch him. He was already a young man and lived nearby. He told me what it was like during bein hazmanim in the Shaarei Chessed neighborhood. During bein hazmanim, he would come for Shacharis carrying a basket. At first, people couldn’t understand why a little boy, not yet bar mitzvah, was bringing a basket. In it were his breakfast, lunch, and dinner. He wouldn’t leave the shul from early Shacharis until midnight. He said there was almost a competition: Who could come to the shul and not find Yankele there? That was how he was in Jerusalem, so devoted and diligent in his learning. When a person gets used to learning, until his learning carries him along, that becomes something he has acquired. I think that is what one gains during bein hazmanim, when no one is forcing or obligating him. There is no framework, and a person goes of his own accord and takes on the yoke. It gets him used to carrying that yoke himself, and that yoke lifts him up. Someone who learns well during bein hazmanim and toils in Torah—I have no doubt that it gives him a love of Torah and makes Torah his own far more than all the learning we do when we are obligated to. That part sanctifies everything. It breathes life into all his learning. He changes for the better and rises in his love of Torah. So this initiative truly deserves a blessing. I also just came from Modi’in—what is the place called there, where we were just now? The Ben Porat Yosef beis midrash. It’s impossible to describe: hundreds upon hundreds of young men and married scholars sitting and immersed in Torah. I have been there before as well, and this is growing everywhere. It is a very great thing. Fortunate are you. Fortunate are those who initiated it, and fortunate are those who support it. And those who gain the most

2:05:37 Speaker 3 are the ones who come to learn. They are building their world; they are making it their own. “For his delight is in the Torah of Hashem, and in his Torah...” At first it is Hashem’s Torah. Afterward it is “his Torah”—his own Torah. He merits it, and it becomes his. And when does that happen? When “his delight is in the Torah of Hashem.” The Rebbe Rashab would say: What does “his delight” mean? It doesn’t say “his will.” A person’s will can go one way at one time and another way at another time. Something a person delights in is constant; it becomes his settled pursuit and is engraved within him. Then “he meditates on his Torah”—it becomes his lasting possession. May Hakadosh Boruch Hu rest His Shechinah upon the work of your hands and establish the work of your hands. That is what we read this Shabbos. Moshe went out and blessed the people. What did he say to them? “May the pleasantness of Hashem our G-d be upon us, and establish for us the work of our hands.” Even though they had already prepared and erected the entire Mishkan, with all the intentions involved, without prayer it was not enough. They needed prayer. Then fire descended, and fire came forth from heaven. “The people saw, sang out, and fell upon their faces.” May it be His will that we soon see the fire of the third Beis Hamikdash descend from heaven, with the revelation of Moshiach Tzidkeinu, in salvation and tranquility. Amen and amen.

2:07:10 Speaker 9 A special blessing for Rabbi Gavir Yosef.

2:07:13 Speaker 3 May He who blessed our forefathers Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, Moshe, Aharon, David, and Shlomo bless the distinguished benefactor Gavriel son of...

2:07:21 Speaker 9 Eliyahu.

2:07:22 Speaker 3 Lior.

2:07:23 Speaker 9 Eliyahu.

2:07:23 Speaker 3 Son of Eliyahu. And his mother?

2:07:25 Speaker 9 Sol.

2:07:26 Speaker 3 Sol. May Hashem protect him, grant him life, and save him from every trouble and distress.

2:07:31 Speaker 9 Amen.

2:07:31 Speaker 3 May He protect him from the evil eye and from harsh decrees, and may he continue to support those who toil in Torah, in robust health and with clear sight. And let us say amen.

2:07:40 Speaker 9 Amen.

2:07:40 Speaker 3 This is a book I published in my father’s merit. Thank you very much. His name appears on the title page. Beautiful. Or...

2:07:49 Speaker 9 There’s a little here about Morocco, and also about...

2:07:51 Speaker 3 “I will raise the cup of salvation and call upon the name of Hashem.” With your permission, gentlemen. Blessed are You, Hashem, our G-d, King of the universe, Creator of the fruit of the vine.

2:08:02 Speaker 9 Amen.

2:08:03 Speaker 3 L’chaim. L’chaim.

2:08:07 Speaker 9 L’chaim.

2:08:07 Speaker 3 L’chaim.

2:08:14 Speaker 9 In Chassidus it says that delight is the pleasure within the will.

2:08:19 Speaker 3 Huh?

2:08:19 Speaker 9 Delight is the pleasure within...

2:08:22 Speaker 3 The pleasure.

2:08:24 Speaker 9 The innermost part.

2:08:24 Speaker 3 The innermost part of the will, its core—so that fits. I didn’t know that. Today the rabbi is the student. During his shiva, I had the privilege of being there with the children. [unclear]

2:08:41 Speaker 9 Wait, wait, one moment.

2:08:42 Speaker 3 Among his papers, we found a box—one of those old-fashioned candy boxes. We were curious what was in it. We opened it and took out little pieces of paper. Judging by the dates, they were from when he was between fourteen and fifteen; we worked it out. They said, “Gittin, thirty-six; Kesubos, forty-two.” So I told this to the brothers. [unclear] He said, “What do you mean? I remember. He and Rabbi Yaakov Yisroel Fisher used to compete.” Their rabbi told them, “Let’s see how long...” Once, speaking about Gittin, one said he had reviewed it forty-one times—forty-one. I remember that: forty-one. Then he said, “So bring the Gemara.” Another had reviewed it eighty-one times—eighty-one. I no longer remember how long it took, but then we understood what was in that box: all those tractates. That is love of Torah. Rabbi Yaakov Edelstein, his brother-in-law, would always ask him questions in halachah. He said that when they were younger, on Purim, as a joke, they would test him with a needle. I didn’t know that. They would put a needle through a page and he would say which letters it passed through. He was also extraordinarily sharp. [unclear] Now a book has come out—he wrote on the entire Rambam. Which volume just came out? The last one, through the end of Hilchos Melachim. He wrote it. He told me then that a friend of his had said, “Whenever I have a new insight, I’ll [unclear].” He was that sharp. The volumes are coming out from beginning to end. The water. All right? Shh... Yes. Once again, we are very grateful to the rabbi for the... Shh... for this special visit and for the special words of Torah. And I would like to invite the gabbai, our devoted gabbai, and the benefactor Mr. Gabi Buzaglo to present

2:11:16 Speaker 3 this to the rabbi. Here is a set of Chassidus Mevueres. I think it is the only one of its kind in the world. Ah, [unclear]. If you open it, I imagine the rabbi is certainly familiar with it. There is... this is... There is something here that she wrote in her grandfather’s name. Wonderful. He says the initials of 5773 stand for [unclear]. May Hashem bless you. This, this is the gabbai. I’ll give it to the rabbi. May Hakadosh Boruch Hu give you blessing and a good life. May Hakadosh Boruch Hu grant you... [unclear]. May we merit to see—not only... Yes. Much good health. Will you take it? This too. This too.

00:01 Speaker 1 We welcome everyone. This is a central Torah gathering, you could say. As every year, the Torah gathering is meant to conclude the bein hazmanim yeshiva held here during the weekdays of Pesach. It is customary to hold this Torah gathering afterward, in keeping with the Rebbe’s request to hold Torah gatherings close to each Yom Tov. This gathering is close to Pesach; we are still in the weekdays of Nissan. This year—I’ll say this quickly—I can’t say the yeshiva doubled in size, because there were many students last year too, but we had more than fifty bochurim here regularly, you could say, and another ten or so who came and went, sometimes more and sometimes fewer. The sound of Torah study during learning hours could, I think, be heard outside. It was hard to pass the shul without noticing the yeshiva taking place here. So I’d like to welcome Mr. Gabi Buzaglo, Gabriel Buzaglo, to whom we all owe thanks for today and for the yeshiva as a whole. He founded the yeshiva and is its mainstay, and the merit of what happens here is really his. I’ll invite Rabbi Ashkenazi to open the gathering with his words of Torah.

03:20 Speaker 2 I usually say—I wanted to clarify a few things. What happens? People come to shul on a weekday, [unclear]. Perhaps we’ll go over them a little. I don’t understand much about it, even now. Let’s look at Sefiras HaOmer. On its first day, we begin counting: “Today is one day of the Omer.” We don’t say, “Today is the first day of the Omer,” but “one day of the Omer.” Why? Because it says, “And there was evening and there was morning, one day,” not “the first day.” Similarly, in halachah, when writing a kesubah—or, G-d forbid, a get. No, this is about a get. When a get is written on Sunday, its date is written not as “the first day of the week,” but as “one day of the week.” Because it says, “And there was evening and there was morning, one day.” So for Sunday we write “one day of the week.” Why do we say “of the week”? Why call Sunday “one day”? It says, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” The main point is [unclear]—this verse in the Ten Commandments, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it,” has several interpretations. First, on the straightforward level, [unclear] the distinction between the interpretations here. The beginning and the end concern a person counting the entire week in relation to Shabbos. It’s stated in halachah. We aren’t like the nations of the world, who call the days Sunday, Monday, Zuntik, Montik—as though each day stands on its own. For us, the count is toward Shabbos. So when we count the days of the week, we count them in relation to Shabbos. We’ll first explain what that connection to Shabbos means. But before that, I want to go over a few words in our wording and perhaps try again to explain things. We see that we count “one day of the week” [unclear]. In a kesubah—

06:10 Speaker 2 —or a get, the date is “one day of the week.” But when we say the daily Psalm, what do we say? “Today is the first day of the week.” We don’t say, “Today is one day of the week,” but “the first day of the week.” That raises a question: what’s the difference? If the day should be called “one,” not “first,” as with the other weekdays, then the wording of the daily Psalm should also be “Today is one day of the week,” not “the first day of the week.” Yet our wording is “the first day of the week,” not “one day of the week.” Many people ask this question, and it really calls for a great deal of thought. On the one hand, we do say “one day of the week,” not “the first day of the week” [unclear]. There’s another question: why do we call it “one day of the week”? Why do we say, “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it”? The Torah’s way of counting days isn’t like that of the nations of the world. It relates the count to Shabbos. That’s why we say “one day of the week,” “six days of the week.” That’s one connection. Now, with “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it,” we count six days and remember Shabbos. Here’s the question: what is the point of all this? If we say “one day of the week” and “six days of the week,” what’s the logic behind it? Because we must remember—“Remember the Shabbos day”—remember Shabbos every day. This is also reflected in the halachah. It’s well known that Shammai the Elder would set aside what he found to eat in honor of Shabbos, while Beis Hillel would say, “Blessed be Hashem, day by day.” The Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch also says that Beis Hillel did not disagree with Shammai the Elder, and that according to Beis Hillel too, there is this matter of remembering—

08:17 Speaker 2 —Shabbos. So what is the point of remembering it twice? We say, “Today is one day of the week.” How does that relate to “to sanctify it”? What does that mean? If “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it” refers to Shabbos itself, [unclear]. On the face of it, this is very puzzling. What does this remembering mean? A third point [unclear]. After all, throughout the week you can understand it: there are people who are thinking of Shabbos all the time. But on Shabbos itself, do you also have to remember Shabbos? [unclear] Shabbos is holy, and this remembering applies on Shabbos too. On the face of it, these things seem very puzzling. A third point: [unclear] after davening on Shabbos. In other words, there is also Kiddush afterward, and [unclear] before Kiddush. So what does “to sanctify it” mean here? Why do we say it so many times? It isn’t clear. Why am I saying there are multiple acts of remembering? It comes out to three times: once [unclear], once after davening, and then at Kiddush. What is the point of all three? We won’t go into this whole subject now. But we can say generally that there is a remembrance of Shabbos [unclear] during davening; there is remembering the Shabbos that is coming, which it is a mitzvah to enjoy; and at Kiddush we—

11:00 Speaker 2 —say “a remembrance of the work of Creation.” We recall the Shabbos of Creation, as though explaining the Shabbos we have now. We can relate to this Shabbos through the remembrance of Creation. Why remember Creation? It is written in Bereishis. Shabbos is not only about remembering and observing Shabbos [unclear]. Beyond that, Shabbos concerns one of the foundations of faith. Someone who observes Shabbos remembers that he believes in Creation: Hashem created the world and rested on the seventh day. That is one of the foundations of Shabbos. Remember what happened at Creation—that you believe the world was created. This is the foundation of observing and remembering Shabbos. [unclear] This is the difference between Shabbos and [unclear]. The distinctive point about Yom Kippur is [unclear]. Hashem made the world in six days, and then came what we call Shabbos Bereishis. [unclear] So here, too, we must always consider what is meant, why things are repeated, and how they relate to one another. In any case, I want to say this about the remembrance expressed in “Remember My holy Shabbos”—

13:00 Speaker 2 There is a point here. We can interpret what this answer means. There is a mitzvah to remember the holy Shabbos. What does that mean? Does it mean remembering the coming Shabbos, which should come upon us for good and for blessing? Or does it mean remembering the holy Shabbos—remembering the Shabbos of Creation? If you remember that, you certainly will not do melachah. But the main point is to remember the Shabbos of Creation. Of course, there is apparently a disagreement here between the Ramban and the Rashba. In the Ramban, it seems that remembering the holy Shabbos is very straightforward: the purpose of remembering Shabbos is to prevent us from forgetting it, G-d forbid, and consequently doing melachah. So already on Sunday, you need to remember that there is a day called Shabbos, on which melachah is forbidden and you must cease work and rest. The mitzvah to observe and remember the holy Shabbos thus means remembering it already on Sunday, so that, G-d forbid, it does not get confused with another day. That is how the Ramban explains this principle of remembering the holy Shabbos from Sunday. But the Ramban’s broader point seems to be that remembering Shabbos does not refer only to the Shabbos that is coming. Rather, Hakadosh Boruch Hu said to remember Shabbos so that every day you remain aware that there is a Shabbos. That is a foundation of faith. Once you believe in Shabbos, you believe in the six days [unclear]—the whole of our faith. That is the idea of remembering Shabbos. Accordingly, there are several practical distinctions concerning remembrance. Here is one distinction I mentioned once when we reached this subject. It follows from saying that remembering Shabbos—

15:05 Speaker 2 Remembering Shabbos means remembering the Shabbos that is coming, so that you will not do melachah. What does it mean to remember Shabbos on Sunday? Which Shabbos are you meant to remember? The one that is coming, so that you will not do melachah. But there would be no reason to remember the Shabbos that has passed. Remember the Shabbos that has passed? It has already passed. Did you observe it properly? Were you careful not to stumble, G-d forbid? You were. So what is the point of remembering last Shabbos? But according to the Ramban, remembering Shabbos means remembering the reality of Shabbos itself. On Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, then, it is enough to remember that two days ago it was Shabbos. You do not have to remember specifically the coming Shabbos; remembering the Shabbos that passed is also a remembrance of Shabbos. You know that in every seven-day cycle there is a Shabbos: there was one last week, and there will be one in the coming week. So apparently, according to this, and in light of the statement of our Sages that there are two instances where [unclear], if it is possible to remember the Shabbos that passed, the point is to remember Shabbos—not only the Shabbos that is coming. Accordingly, we might say that this accounts for the difference in our wording. What was it that the Maskilim objected to in our wording? That, in essence, our approach is—

16:50 Speaker 3 But there is also the additional question we asked.

16:54 Speaker 2 I have already mentioned Shabbos. What was the Maskilim’s objection that we raised? And what is the approach of the Baal Shem Tov’s disciples? Let us establish a basic point. The first form of remembrance [unclear] means not remembering the coming Shabbos, but remembering the Shabbos of Creation. And that is “remembering the Shabbos that is coming,” as the Rambam explains. “Remembering the Shabbos that is coming” refers to the coming Shabbos. [Unclear] involves remembrance, and this is the Shabbos associated with the Exodus from Egypt. In other words, here we are speaking about one Shabbos, and there about another—two aspects of Shabbos. Here we speak of remembering the Shabbos of Creation; there, of remembering the coming Shabbos. On this basis, perhaps we can clarify something. I am not entirely sure I can make it work, but perhaps it can be explained briefly. We asked why, in our daily wording, we say “today is the first day” and “the second day,” while in the counting we say “today is the fifth day.” If the Torah says, “And G-d called the light day,” why would we need to say “the first day of the week”? We say that this is necessary. That is the wording [unclear]. The idea is that a new count is beginning. In other words, at Creation, that day was the first. “And G-d said, ‘Let there be light.’” There was no week before it; there were no days before it. It was the first day. So you see that this is how the Torah speaks. But when there has been a previous count and you now begin a new one, the wording is apparently “first,” rather than “one.” [Unclear] counts it as the first day in the overall reckoning. In other words, until now there was one count, and that count ended. Now a new count begins,

19:13 Speaker 2 but it still relates to the count that came before. This counting—the counting of each week: first in what sense? It is a count that repeats itself every week. We say it: the fifth day, the first day, and then the fifth day again. According to what we learned from the Ramban, remembering the six days also refers to the Shabbos that follows. So each week there is a relationship both to the previous week and to the new week. One week has ended, and a new week begins. But in a get or in [unclear], one does not recall what happened the previous week. We are beginning now. We date the get “the first day,” just as, at Creation, that day was the first day. It was the first day; there had been no day before it. That is why it is called “first” [unclear]. So what does this have to do with our subject? I will explain. It also relates to Rosh Hashanah, and to... In other words, it also explains the reason for the daily song. The songs of the Levi’im in the Beis Hamikdash, sung each day after the daily offering, were songs of praise for the acts of Creation. And that is how the Gemara explains each passage of the song of the day: how it relates to the first day of Creation, the second day of Creation, and the third day of Creation. It follows, then, that if the Levi’im’s songs concerned the six days of Creation, the Shabbos in that context is the Shabbos of Creation. It is praise of the Shabbos of Creation. So the wording about the fifth and sixth days of the week follows that pattern [unclear]. According to this, one could indeed argue that this is exactly the point. And we say it too.

21:14 Speaker 2 There is Shabbos. We say “the fifth day,” but that is not the point. According to what we have explained here, what is the meaning of all this? Why do we say “the fifth day of the week,” and then refer again to the holy Shabbos? It depends on whether we follow the Ramban’s approach or the approach of the Manhig. According to the Ramban, the sequence of the seven days recalls the Shabbos of Creation, because it is the sequence of Creation. Through it, you recognize that Hakadosh Boruch Hu created heaven and earth. That was the Levi’im’s song, a song of praise for the six days of Creation. Each of the six passages said on its respective day relates to Creation. The reference to the days here is therefore a reference to the Shabbos of Creation. Later, after davening, we again speak of the holy Shabbos, in the sense brought by Rabbi Ibn Ezra: keeping the coming Shabbos in mind, so that you do not lose sight of it before Friday night arrives. If this is correct, it may also explain another question we asked: Why, on Shabbos itself, do we speak about the first day, the second day, and then again mention it in the words of holiness? We have already said the whole prayer. What is the point of repeating it? Because here the remembrance refers to what is said in the parsha [unclear], whereas after davening we again have the Zohar [unclear]. I am asking a serious question about Kiddush. This sounds to me like Kiddush at night again. We must not confuse the two. One could say that Kiddush is only at night; during the day there is no Kiddush. We do not mention the holiness of Shabbos at all. We say [unclear]. That is also what [unclear] the Baal Shem Tov did. But only—

23:17 Speaker 2 When it comes out this way, it may well be that at night the holiness of Shabbos is recalled. With Kiddush by day, we speak of mentioning the holiness of Shabbos in davening. We are at the end of our davening. We did so there. We asked a fourth question. It says—why? Why?