Can I cause a car to stop for me on Shabbos?

00:01 Welcome to our first weekly installment of the Lemaan Yomedu Ask the Rav podcast. In this podcast, we'll be addressing regular Halacha Shilas questions that we've received over the last week or in general, and the relevant answers. This should be a very, very interesting program. We'll get right into it. So the first question I wanna address is something which was not very well known. It's a safers issue that could be relevant to Sifrei Torah, Tefillin, and Mezuzahs. There sometimes could be a problem with soifim will write a mezuzah and the letters are not exactly equal. Sorry, the lines are not exactly equal. This is referred to in the Gemara as kizonav or kakuba or ke'eigel. Ref-- Look where it's narrow on the top and wide on the bottom or vice versa. So this particular halacha is found in Shulchan Aruch in Halachas mezuzah, that the lines cannot be becoming wider or narrower one from another. It's not mentioned in Halachas Tefillin, which is why a lot of people are not aware of it. It's not mentioned in Halacha Sifrei Torah. There might even be sofrim that are not aware of this halacha, and some good magiyim who are checking a pair, a, a mezuzah or a Tefillin or a Sifrei Torah could pick up on that the lines are not exactly parallel one to another and it's becoming wider or narrower one line from the other. So although we mentioned this is an issue specifically with mezuzah, Poskim mention based on Rishonim that this is also

01:40 gonna be a problem with Tefillin and Sifrei Torah. And the logic why it's a problem because it's not called ktivat tam or chasaftam. Ktivat tam has to be a complete proper writing, and if it's because of a chasaftam, then it makes no difference Tefillin, mezuzah, or Sifrei Torah. It's strange that I got three questions on this topic this week. Usually, this is not a usual question. So as mentioned, it's a problem even in a pair of Tefillin and even if it's only on one side, meaning that one side of the lines, all the lines are parallel to each other starting from the same spot, but then on the other side, on the second side, there's one line is narrower or wider than the previous one. The question is: How many lines does this create a problem? While some wanna argue and there's evidence for this, that it's only if the entire mezuzah is written in such a way becoming gradually wider or narrower, the Poskim accept that even if there's three problematic lines, it's also an issue, and this seems to be proven from the words of the Taz. So if you have three lines, one becoming-- each one becoming gradually wider than the previous line, it's a problem. Now, how much should each line be sticking out from the previous one to create a problem? Although there are Poskim that say it's only if it's the size of a word, each line has one word bigger than the previous line. From the Rishonim, it

03:11 seems pretty clear that even one letter wider is-- wider or narrower is a problem. And we have it in the Nimuke Yosef on Halachas mezuzah where really it's the Rema Lavan on Halachas mezuzah. We're not gonna go into that right now. It gives an example that on the first line, it's-- on one line it says, "Becha Yu," on the second line it says, "Advarim Eila," and the third line it says the words, "Asher Lecha Metavcha." If you count up the letters of Advarim Eila, Asher Lecha Metavcha, clearly the third line is only slightly wider than the line before, one letter wider. The question which was not addressed, and it's quite strange that nobody addresses this until the cont- cont- temporary Poskim is: How do you count three lines? You have one line which is written normally, all within the sirkut 'cause mezuzahs have, uh... the lines are pretty straight and scraped. There's an area you could tell where each line begins and finishes. So one line was written, excuse the pun, within the line, and then you have another two lines, each one... The two consecutive lines are gradually wider than the previous line. Does that make it three lines? Or the first line is not included 'cause that's a normal line. It's only the other lines that are becoming bigger. You need another three lines besides for a regular line. So what's pretty fascinating about this is that the Shevet Halevi, Rav Wosner of Bnei Brak, has two tshuvos on this topic, and he

04:34 actually contradicts himself. Where it's in Chelek Ches, he writes that so long you have three lines, each one wider than the other, even if one of the lines, the top line, is a normal line, that top line is included in the problem. And in Chelek Tes, he has a tshuva where he says, "No, you don't count a normal line. It's only the lines that stick out. It's another three lines besides for the normal line." So which one did he write first? Which one did he write last? Funktsiyon Ramais, we have to work that out. So his son, Alav HaShalom, the Machshaves Halevi, wrote a tshuva where he writes that his father's Chelek Tes tshuva was the Mishnah Acharonah, where he said that you don't cl- include the normal line as part of the issue. Although there's no real evidence one way or another, he tries to bring evidence over there, but a lot of the evidence can be disproven easily. And Lhalakhah, it's-- there's a very strong case to argue that it makes no difference if there's a normal line, a not normal line. There's no such thing as normal lines and abnormal lines. The very fact that you have a tziur, an image that looks like kakuva or kizonav, where there's three lines, each one larger than the other, that itself creates a problem regardless of what the reason of the problem is, whether the problem is because this is not called ktivat tam, whether the reason is because it looks like you're making

05:48 a picture. You're not make-- writing a... You're supposed to write right, ktiva. You're not supposed to make tziurim, pictures, and each line becoming bigger looks like a picture. Whatever the reason is, the fact that you have three lines like that could create a problem. And indeed, Rav Elyashiv Clearly argue that it's not, that not unlike Rabbi Vosner's psak or more correctly, like Rabbi Vosner's original psak, that even if one line is a normal line, the next line is wider, and the third line is even wider. That creates this problem. This doesn't mean it cannot be fixed. It could be fixed. Most places can say this is perfectly fine to fix it. You could-- All you have to do is stretch out a line or make-- stretch out a letter, make the letter smaller, and it's-- there won't be a problem of shalo kesiddur that the mezuzah was not written in order. The-- In one of the cases that I got, in that particular case, it-- the issue was there was a lamed there. So then what happens is the lamed was sticking in the regular line, but the top of the lamed was going out of the line. And in this case, Rav Eliashiv says that it's not a problem, which makes a lot of sense. There's no full letter that's sticking out. The same thing would be also in the reverse, that if somebody... Another case that I got where somebody stretched out the lamed and therefore it doesn't look like the lines are

07:08 kukuva, are becoming wider and wider, because when one of the line, the lamed was stretched out to match with the next line, and therefore that also wouldn't be a problem. So this is, like I said, an interesting question, which we don't normally get, but in this case we actually got this question. Another question, moving on to another topic altogether, not related to safros, but, uh, ordinary question. There's a halacha in Shulchan Aruch that you're not supposed to give food to someone that's not going to make a bracha. Now, someone asked a question. Often there are siblings that are unfortunately not religious, and how do you do this halacha, deal with this halacha? You can't give them food. You have a sibling, you have a guest, and this can cause embarrassment, it can distance people. You're trying to make them a part of them. How do we deal with this halacha? So I will mention that there's a very interesting sefer from Shlomo Zalman. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach argued that the whole purpose of this halacha is because of lifnei iver lehitatch mimchon. You can't cause a stumbling block for someone else. Or in some cases it would be issur of misayei, which is an issur derabbanan. Derabbanan, even if they could get the food themselves, you can't-- it's still shomeneh system to do an avera. So Rav Shlomo Zalman argued creatively that by not-- by insisting they make a bracha, by not giving them food, you're causing even a bigger stumbling block. You're distancing them from

08:27 Yiddishkeit. So what's worse? Is this bracha what matters or it's the big picture where you want them to be mesorah to Yiddishkeit? Now that's a very creative argument, and some people want to even compare it to a surgery where sometimes the doctor will go and cut off a part of the body because he wants to save the entire body. From a, a clear halachic point of view, it's hard to argue that argument when you're clearly currently causing a mimchon. There's some evidence of this argument in the Rabbi Akiva again into Ferisher Shmuel. I don't want to go into that right now, but generally, poskim do not rely on that, and there's various solutions that can-- that are provided. One solution often is where you actually make a bracha out loud and you have them in mind. That doesn't always work, but sometimes that could work. So you're really sort of making a bracha. You make the brachos available and accessible for them. So if you talk with non-frum people, you give them a gift, include a card with a list of the brachos. So from your point of view, you're giving-- you're making them-- Now, they could be making the bracha. They could be-- They won't be making the bracha, but you're making that available. Similar to what people say by inviting people for Shabbos, where you're giving them a place where they can stay. So those are a, a number of different solutions, and each case needs to be judged individually to see what's

09:41 the best solution there. This week was Rosh Chodesh, and we often get this question about-- another question here, about going to the Ohel on Rosh Chodesh. The minhag is we don't go to kavarim on Rosh Chodesh. That's not a halacha, it's a minhag. And part of the reason for the minhag is that because on days, uh, like Rosh Chodesh, you're not supposed to be maspid, you're not supposed to eulogize. When people go to a kever, that causes crying, that causes a form of eulogy, and that might be a problem. There's also when it comes to kivre tzadikim and certain sefarim, it says that tzadikim are not there on their kavarim on the Shabbos Siyam Ha-Rosh Chodesh and things like that. So generally the meaning is not to go to kavarim on Rosh Chodesh. I will, however, say that the Rebbe went several times on Rosh Chodesh. He even went on Chol Hamoed, on Hoshana Rabbah. In fact, in relation to Chol Hamoed specifically, the Rebbe once told a Yid who asked if he can go to the oil of the Friediver Rebbe on Rosh-- on Chol Hamoed, and the Rebbe said, "Depends how you're going. Are you going like you're going to the kever of a tzadik, or are you going as if you're going to a living Rebbe who just moved a couple of blocks down? So he used to be living over here, and now he's living somewhere else. And if you're going in that manner, it's not a problem. You can even

10:56 go on Chol Hamoed." And like I said, the Rebbe did go on Chol Hamoed. On one occasion, interestingly, it was Rosh Chodesh Menachem Av, and the Rebbe was planning to go to the Ohel and from what I understand, one of the maskirim came, told-- mentioned to the Rebbe just to point out that today is Rosh Chodesh, and the Rebbe told him, "Rosh Chodesh Av, Rosh Chodesh Av, Rosh Chodesh Menachem Av, it says in Shulchan Aruch that it's a day of the passing of Aaron HaKohen, and if it's a day that tzadikim fast that day, it's actually not a regular type of Rosh Chodesh." So there went the argument that you can't go on Rosh Chodesh for Rosh Chodesh Av. But it so happens to be that two times afterwards, several months later, and then again after that, the Rebbe went again on Rosh Chodesh, so... And that was not a day that's mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch as time of tzadikim. So the Rebbe, although regularly would not go on Rosh Chodesh, he would normally go any Rosh Chodesh, but it's-- you can't really say it's a problem to go on Rosh Chodesh. It is a minhag, but, like, going to the kever of a Rebbe, where a person goes to a Rebbe as a living Rebbe, for sure wouldn't be an issue. Another question on another subject matter altogether. Someone wanted to know, he's noticed people when they're washing, they use a lot of water And I keep on refilling and pouring so much

12:09 more water. Is this, like, overdone? I mean, it says you're supposed to wash your hands properly and not wash Betzimtzu and not be-- right, wash exactly Yoreh Deah's and exactly to the edge. You're supposed to wash not only to the knuckles, but even further. There's two opinions how far you're supposed to wash, so we wash the entire hand. But this overdoing it, is this Yoreh? Is this Gaavah? Is it wasting water? So the Ish Bit Ahron, a sefer from a talmid of the Ba'al HaItzhver, Rav Avraham David of Bit Achav writes that this that it says in the Shulchan Aruch that you should use a lot of water is only when it has halachic benefit, but not stam just to waste water. But there's a sefer called Nimukei Harechaim of the Munkatsher, and he has a whole Toda'ah Richus that, no, this davka you need to fill up the k'vart, the, the thing that you fill up with water. You fill up the k'vart, fill it all the way to the top and use a lot of water. And he brings it with tzaddikim that actually did that, and they said that this is what the Gemara says, that I do a full washing, and I get full benefit and full favor and full brachos from the HaShem. Full over here means filling it all the way to the top. And even though someone has a k'vart which is extremely large and is more than a shir, still it is in to fill to the

13:29 top and wash Beshefa. And it is also brought that this idea of washing Beshefa is not only the first time you wash, but even the second time, which in Chabad the meaning is to wash three times, so even the third time. And today's day and age, whereas in the past people spoke about Bal Tashchis, and they spoke about the fact that it's a Tircha and there's not enough water. Today's day and age, we have so much water. That bit of water, the extra water that we're using for washing really wouldn't be an issue. Let's move on to another question. The question I've been asked, and we often are asked, someone-- you're walking on Shabbos, walking down the street, and because of your walking, you're causing another car to stop or slow down. Is it a problem that you're causing another car to stop on Shabbos? Particularly if it's a Jewish person driving the car. The answer is no, it's not an issue. Even if chas v'shalom, rachmanu l'tslan, there's a Jew that's driving on Shabbos, and because of you, he stopped his car, it's not a problem. Let's think about what happens when he's driving. He's constantly being over on the melacha of Hav'arah, of lighting a fire, when he's stepping on the pedal. Every time he stops, the fact that he's stopping, it could be that you're actually causing him to do less melacha than if he would be traveling. He's actually not doing melacha of Hav'arah. Also, he's actually continuously doing an issur.

14:58 So w-w-- he's been doing this anyhow. He's actually doing an issur anyhow. All that's happening now is you're actually changing one issur to another issur, whether he's doing Hav'arah, lighting a fire, or Kibu, extinguishing a fire, 'cause he's stopping. You're not making it easier to him to do the issur. You're not doing anything that's affecting him in any way. You might-- arguably, you could say that you're actually protecting him from doing an issur because he was still not doing a more serious issur, which is lighting a fire. Now extinguishing, extinguishing usually is less, usually would be a melacha she'eino tzrich legufa because you're not extinguishing with the purpose of making charcoal, which is there has to be a, a, a functional, constructive purpose in the extinguishing. Just the extinguishing over here is that it should not be a fire, not because you wanna get something from extinguishing the candle. So besides for the fact you're really doing the right thing, you're not supposed to... You don't have to stop doing what you're doing. You're not doing something for him because you shouldn't stop because someone else might do melacha because of that. There's, there's similar cases where, where a person's teaching Torah. Maybe a goy will come and listen, and I'll teach Torah to goyim, but I'm doing the right thing. I'm teaching Torah to my students. Or in Eretz Yisrael, people will often go and protest for Chilul Shabbos. The police might come as a result of me protesting, but I didn't ask the

16:19 police to come. I'm doing the right thing. I'm doing the normal thing. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach writes that you're allowed a-- someone who's not well, not talking about if he's a Sakanat Nefashot. Chilul Hashem is Sakan, he's not in danger. He's going to a doctor. Now, this doctor is a Mechallel Shabbos. So if I go to the doctor, the doctor will turn on the light. Do I have to consider the fact that he's gonna turn on a light? No, I'm doing the right thing. Indeed, you're allowed to go to a Beth Din and make a claim in Beth Din, and you know the other person might deny the claim, might even swear falsely. You're allowed to administer an oath to someone else because you-- he's swearing. Why is that not Lifnei Iver? So there's, uh, multiple answers, but one of the answers here is that I'm doing the-- I'm doing my own thing. Besides for the fact that in this particular case, like we mentioned, I'm actually helping him to, to, to do better than what he was doing till now. And furthermore, he's supposed to stop. He's actually doing a mitzvah of Pikuach Nefesh. He's Lo Saam Od Am Lecha. He's not supposed to run over people. So I'm not causing him to do an Aveira. He was driving, and now he's stopping. He was doing an Aveira originally. Now he's actually doing-- When he's-- Now that he's already driving and he's stopping, he's actually making sure not to run into someone and drive over

17:35 someone, which is Lo Saam Od Am Lecha. Besides a general argument of all of this is there's a law that he's supposed to stop. So he, he's not really stopping for me. He's stopping because the law says that he's supposed to stop. Okay, that would only work if he's stopping in a place where the law says he's supposed to stop, not where he just is in the middle of the street and there's no law that he has to stop, and you don't have to make way for the pedestrian, depending on the place, depending on the law. But the, the most important part is not really adding any Chilul Shabbos whatsoever. It's minimizing the Chilul Shabbos, and therefore it wouldn't be a problem. Talking from one issue in Halacha Shabbos, I'll move on to another issue in Halacha Shabbos. Question was asked, someone left money in their pocket, in their coat pocket, and now it's Shabbos and there's money in the coat pocket. Can they wear this coat? So there's, uh, multiple aspects of this question. Firstly, you can't wear an item... You can't wear something which has-- Like even if it wouldn't be muktzah, something in the poc-- in a place where there's no Eidov, even indoors, 'cause you might end up carrying it outdoors. So... But this wa-- that wasn't the question over here. This case, the person's question was that they actually emptied out the money from the pocket. They found a way how indirectly the halacha is muktzah tiltul begufa. If you

18:56 move it indirectly, the back of your hand, shake it out, there was no money in it anymore. But this-- the question was that the halacha is if something-- There's something called a bases le'devar asar. If something muktzah is laying on the table, not only the muktzah is forbidden, the entire table becomes muktzah. It becomes a base for the muktzah item. The, so the coat now seemingly became a bases to the money. There's a pocket in the coat with money. Now the entire coat is muktzah, even if there's no money in it anymore. Is that really the case? So firstly, the rule of bases is only bemanich v'lo b'shecheich. Is only if you intentionally want it to be there on Shabbos. And that could happen. You have a coat, you know, you don't normally use this coat, and you really your plan was to leave your money in it. So then that coat would be muktzah even if the money is no longer in it. Even if a goy came and took out the money, whichever reason the money's not in it. But if you forgot to empty your pockets from money, the coat doesn't become muktzah because of the money. The money is muktzah, but not the coat. That's rule number one. Rule number two, even if you intended to put money in a pocket, so to remain there throughout the entire Shabbos, and later you changed your mind and you decided you wanna wear it after this coat on Shabbos, it really depends what

20:20 kind of pocket we're talking about. There are two types of pockets. There's a pocket where the garment is a wall, serves as if it's a wall to the pocket, and there's a pocket where the pocket is sewn on top of the garment. Let me give you two examples so you'll know what I'm talking about. The typical shirt pocket is the pocket is formed via the shirt itself. The shirt itself is the pocket, and on top of that, you sew something else to be the front of the pocket. The back of the pocket is the shirt. In such a case, the shirt itself becomes a bases le'devar asar because the pocket and the shirt are considered one entity, and the fact that there's money in the shirt pocket, the entire shirt becomes muktzah, and you can't move the shirt, even if currently there's no money in there anymore because it was there in the beginning of Shabbos. If you're talking about a pocket that's sewn on top of a garment, like a typical pants pocket, which the pocket is not part of the pants, it's something else that's sewn onto. The pocket is a standalone thing. Then the, the beged, the pants, does not become a bases, a base for what's inside the pocket. The pocket is a separate item completely. The pocket is secondary to the garment. And then you're allowed to move the garment. The only problem is you have muktzah in it. You have to get rid of the muktzah. So you could

21:31 shake the muktzah out of the pocket. Don't put your hand into the pocket. Don't touch the pocket from the outside to shake out the money, the poc-- 'cause the pocket is, after all, muktzah. But as long as you shake it out, the coat itself does not become muktzah. You can wear that coat gezunt aheit and freilech aheit throughout Shabbos. Okay, another question which involves a number of examples. I asked this question from my Rebbe, Netzer Yisroel, who wrote many, many sefarim, and he asked a general question. A person made a bracha on a mitzvah, and the person who made the bracha spoke after the bracha. The question is, if the people that listened to the bracha, are they yoitze the bracha? So I asked him to give me examples to know exactly what he was talking about, and he told me-- He gave me several examples. An example was where a person made kiddush Friday night, and after he made kiddush, he spoke, and then he drank from the wine. So since his bracha was not done properly because he spoke, maybe the people are listening to kiddush. You're not allowed to talk after kiddush before you drink the wine. Maybe the people listening to kiddush are also not yoitze kiddush. Second example, someone is making a bracha on tefillin, but for some reason he's being motzi someone else. He-- The other person asked him, "Can you make the bracha for me?" And the person making the bracha on tefillin spoke be-- after the bracha.

22:51 Hanukkah candles. Often the family, particularly the woman and the children, are yoitze the brachos of Chanu-- mitzvos Hanukkah from the father who is lighting the menorah. The father made the brachos and then he spoke intentionally or unintentionally between the brachos and lighting the menorah. Sukkos. Person making kiddush said hallel in the sukkah, and then he spoke between the bracha and sitting in the sukkah right after the bracha, and other people are being yoitze hallel in the sukkah. So the short answer is it's not a hefsek. It's-- Well, it is a hefsek, but the people that are listening, for them it's not a hefsek and they are fully yoitze. But let's take this through slowly. So let's start with the example of Hanukkah, the most recent yom tov that we had. When it comes to Hanukkah, the people listening to the menorah lighting, they don't actually have to hear the bracha, strictly speaking. So they are yoitze the menorah, whether they heard the brachos, didn't hear the brachos, so it's irrelevant. They were yoitze the brachos, not yoitze the brachos. They don't have a chiyuv listening to the brachos to begin with. Now, other than Hanukkah, at kiddush you're supposed to hear the kiddush. Why is it okay? So the emes is that this question was asked also beeni geir to Birchas HaNehen. We have Birchas HaNehen and Birchas Hamitzvos. Birchas HaNehen is brachos that you make on food. Birchas Hamitzvos, brachos you make on mitzvos. So in Birchas HaNehen is a very, very big machloket

24:16 if you could be motzi someone if your bracha was not said properly. If your bracha was not said properly, it becomes a bracha levatalah, and therefore you didn't make a proper bracha, and therefore the other people maybe are not yoitze because they didn't hear a proper bracha. But many poskim say that a non-proper bracha does not mean when the person made a hefsek. The bracha, when it was said, was said, was a proper bracha. Later, there was a hefsek. So they were yoitze the bracha. They didn't make a hefsek, would be okay. But let's talk about Birchas Hamitzvos. Birchas Hamitzvos is even better. 'Cause Birchas Hamitzvos, we have a halacha of aravos. You're allowed to-- Since every Yid is responsible for other Yidden, when you're making a bracha, even if you're not being yoitze right now, you can just make a bracha for them. So who cares the fact that you were mafsik, that you spoke after the bracha, and you can't be yoitze. Even if you wouldn't be yoitze, you can make brachos for other Yidden. This argument, the Tur and Shulhan makes this hilluk regarding birkhat hamitzvot. The birkhat hamitzvot, it seems like everybody would a- would agree. There are poskim that disagree with this argument also. But the Tur and Shulhan argues, and we find this clearly from the poskim in Halakha Shleima where a baal tekiah, it comes out that if the baal tekiah would speak, it wouldn't be a problem. He could be motzi other people. So l'maaseh, pearl mamash,

25:38 if a person made a berakhah to exempt other people, and he spoke after the berakhah, we're not particularly concerned. And we are concerned that for him it's a hefsek, but for the people that listened, it's not really a problem. I'm just gonna share one more final question, which is negai to Hilchos Challah. The question I was asked is that the Halakha is-- It was a bit of an interesting question because a person made a mistake in a, in, in a particular Halakha. The Halakha is that when it comes in-- when it comes to Hilchos Challah, challahs... and if a person forgot to separate challah, and it comes Friday night, and they have the challah in front of them. So in Chutz LaArets, we have a solution. Challah Chutz LaArets, the Halakha is, "Oikhul ve-hilukh ve-akhach mafrish." When it comes to Chutz LaArets, you can eat and separate the challah later. So you don't have to worry about the fact that your challah, challah was not separated, and therefore this challah is tevel. Because in Chutz LaArets, you'll separate after Shabbos. It's fine. You can eat even before challah was separated. Ideally, you're supposed to separate challah before it was baked. If you can't separate challah before it was baked, you separate it after it's baked, which is what we do with matzah. And if you didn't separate it after it was baked, and it's already a time that you can't separate challah 'cause it's Shabbos, so no problem. Eat and leave a tiny bit over.

27:09 The Rama says, it's the Halakha of the Rishonim, the Rama says what you have to do is you have to leave an amount that you will separate from that amount also. Shireh and a kar, in other words, you leave a tiny bit of challah, and after Shabbos, from that tiny bit, you separate a-- you separate from that also. So that should be, it should be shireh and a-- shireh and a kar. It should be something that's remaining that you're-- you'll notice what was separated and what was not separated. The question that I got was... Let me go to the actual question that we got. The question the person asked was, they didn't know the Halakha very clearly, and they thought they have to separate an entire-- They have to leave a full loaf of bread. I don't know where they got that from. Uh, the basis of the mistake seems like the Halakha is that from each batch, you have to leave a bit of challah. Each batch, which is chayav b'challah independently, not from each loaf. But they, for whatever reason, they thought you have to leave a full loaf, so they were eating the challah Friday night, and they left a full loaf. Now they realized they made a mistake, and now their question was, should they-- What happens with the-- Could they eat part of this loaf right now? So this does bring us to a different question because they decided in their mind that the entire loaf should be challah. It

28:31 could very well be that in their mind, the entire loaf already became challah just by the very fact that they thought so, 'cause that becomes almost like a neder. So now what they would really have to do is they have to annul their commitment to make the entire loaf challah, and then after Shabbos, they have to again now leave a tiny bit and separate from that bit. The other question, which is a question not of this particular strange case, a general question, when a person sep-- leaves a tiny bit of challah in Chutz LaArets, small slice. They didn't separate challah. It's Friday night. They leave a tiny bit. They'll eat it afterwards. I'll just mention before I go to the question an interesting thing. The minhag of a lot of people is they only eat the edge of a bread. Nobody knows the source for this minhag, why people don't eat the edge of a challah. The Minchat Yitzchak writes we don't know the source, but that's the minhag of Nashim Kenas. That's what the Baba did. Yiddisha mamas do something, we follow them. The, the Yerushalmi says, "Tzarikh l'makeish," we have to be concerned what people are concerned about. People are concerned about not eating the edge of the bread. You can forget your learning, it's argued. Um, the Rashba writes, or it's brought in the name of Tur Rashba, that minhag Nashim Kenas about the power of a minhag that's old Yiddisha mamas, Yiddisha babas are doing. So we don't know the source.

29:47 But I've once heard argued that the reason for this minhag was in case some was not mafrish challah, so always leave a tiny piece, the edge. That's why they decided to leave the edge. Anyhow, the question here is when you leave the challah for after Shabbos, and now after Shabbos you have now leftover challah, do you make a berakhah now after challah-- after Shabbos? So Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was mechadesh a chiddush on his own that no, you shouldn't make a berakhah because there's no evidence that... You only do it when you do a real hafrashat challah. He argued... Part of his argument was even according to the Rama, which is what we do, that you leave a piece and you separate from that piece, since the way it works is that it's challah mafraya retroactively when you ate, it's as if it was separated then, you don't make a berakhah on something that happens retroactively. So the gemara says that if we say that you're supposed to separate after Shabbos, shireh and the kar, you're supposed to leave a piece, then it doesn't happen retroactively. It's not clear that it happens retroactively. And even if it happens retroactively, who says that you can't make a berakhah when you-- You normally make a berakhah when you do the mitzvah, not when the mitzvah is chall-- when the mitzvah has its effect. We have a lot of places where we clearly see the berakhot on the maaseh mitzvah, the action of a mitzvah. And the pashut

31:04 of all the poskim, none of the poskim say what Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach says. If we would accept that argument that you don't make a berakhah, then there wouldn't be a heter to go not to separate 'cause a person is missing out a berakhah. We have a Halakha, "Adam lo yitrom." You-- A person who's undressed cannot separate terumah 'cause then he can't make a berakhah. You can't miss out a berakhah. You can't do things in a way that you lose out a berakhah. So how could there have been a heter that a person can eat and then separate if he's going and missing out a berakhah? Clearly, you make a berakhah, and that's indeed what cl- quite a few poskim write, the Migdashimad, the Beit Sead, the Arukh HaShulchan, the Pnei Me'ir. And I found actually the sefer of the Rishonim, Sefer HaMa'adas klal that when you're, when you're separating challah after Shabbos, in such-- "Oikhul ve-hilukh ve-akhach mafrish" in Chutz LaArets, you do it with a berakhah. Another Rishonim, Sefer HaSufis, which is a collection of various diff- manuscripts of Rishonim, writes that in such a case that you're not gonna do the berakhah before the action, implying that you can do the berakhah afterwards, you missed out on making a berakhah, "evo al asiyasa." So clearly the consensus is in such a case you make a berakhah after Shabbos. Kol tuv, and we'll continue with gemara next week, B'nedarim.