3.44 Re'eh 5783

00:06 Speaker 1 Good evening. Welcome to the Mishnas Chalukah series. We’re now in Parshas Vayeitzei. We have three questions to address. The first concerns bread dough that, instead of being kneaded with water, was kneaded with beer. The question is: What berachah do you make on that bread? On the screen in front of us is a book called Shaar HaBerachah, by someone named Shtitzberg. It’s actually a very good book. He discusses what makes bread mezonos and brings up the laws of pas haba’ah b’kisnin. Let’s see what he writes: This applies only if the dough was kneaded with a large quantity of sweet ingredients relative to the water, and their taste is very noticeable in the dough. It then becomes a baked product that people do not ordinarily make a meal of because of its sweetness. But if only a small amount is added, even if its taste can be detected in the dough, the dough is still considered bread. That’s why, he says, the challahs people make—even though they generally put a little sugar in them, and sometimes a few raisins—do not lose their status as bread that people make a meal of. The difference is that you can eat less of something sweet than of something without such a strong taste. For a meal, the idea is to eat more; it’s carbohydrates, and it stays in the body for a while. By contrast, something that in English is called a snack is usually strongly flavored. It gives you a boost of energy, but only for a short time. In short, bread with a little sweetness, but nothing too strong, is still bread that people make a meal of. If it is very sweet,

02:57 Speaker 1 then it’s mezonos; people don’t make a meal of it. Now, the question is this: There is a rule that pas haba’ah b’kisnin can be made with fruit juice, but fruit juices are usually sweet, and that makes the dough mezonos. There are other things, though, such as eggs. Eggs aren’t sweet, and they don’t have a very strong taste; you could eat bread made with them as a regular meal. Yet there are what are called “bridge rolls” in English—small rolls made with eggs—and our halachic practice is to treat the eggs as fruit juice and the rolls as mezonos. The question now is about beer. Is beer water with flavor? Let me explain the uncertainty again. If beer were definitely considered fruit juice, we would say the bread is mezonos, just as we say dough made with eggs is mezonos even though it isn’t particularly sweet. The law of pas haba’ah b’kisnin applies when it is made with fruit juice. But what about beer? Can beer be considered fruit juice, or is it flavored water? Here in a footnote to the book, he cites a responsum in [unclear] stating that dough kneaded with barley beer has the status of pas haba’ah b’kisnin. He also cites [unclear] regarding liquid made from legumes being considered pas haba’ah b’kisnin. Apparently, their view is that the main thing is the change in taste, even though it is mixed with water. He then cites Hilchos Hanehenin, a contemporary book—I have it at home, but I’m in America now—which rejects that view and says one should not be lenient unless it is actual fruit juice. In short, there is a substantial discussion about this. For example,

05:29 Speaker 1 contemporary poskim discuss reconstituted grape juice. At the place where they process the grapes to make wine, they produce a very strong concentrate. Then they ship it elsewhere and add back the amount of water that was there originally, in its natural proportion. So the question is: You have, say, a quarter cup of concentrate and three-quarters of a cup—or even much more—of water. How do we regard that? Is it considered fruit juice? Well, it has been restored to its original state. Is it like ordinary grape juice, or is it a little fruit juice with a lot of water? This matters, for example, when making mezonos bread, and for Kiddush and so on. Most poskim have ruled that it is considered water: reconstituted grape juice is mostly water, and you cannot make Kiddush on it. Here in London, for example, there is mezonos bread. The instructions for it—Iitzik, perhaps you can add something here—the kashrus guidelines say that a little over fifty percent of the liquids must be orange juice. But ordinary orange juice isn’t enough if it is reconstituted from concentrate; that is considered water. The same applies even if you cook it with apples: it is still water. There is apple juice made by simply pressing the apples. That juice is generally greener and isn’t clear; it’s cloudier—

07:39 Speaker 2 What they do is include the oil, sugar, salt, yeast, and everything else in the calculation, bringing it to over fifty percent. But the juice itself can be a little under fifty percent.

07:52 Speaker 1 Ah, okay. So the other ingredients count too. Thank you very much. Those are the guidelines. In other words, if the juice was based mainly on water, it would be treated as water, or mostly as water. There is also a responsum of the Tzemach Tzedek about making wine from raisins. Some held that if you put raisins in water and they swell back to their natural state as grapes, the whole mixture becomes grape juice, and you can make a berachah on it. The Tzemach Tzedek cites a report in the name of a Rebbe who was very stringent and said that one cannot rely on this. It is true that a grape naturally contains a certain proportion of water, but halachically, the water inside the grape is fruit juice, while the water you add to the raisins is water. So you cannot rely on its becoming fruit juice in halachic terms. Back to our question about beer: Does all of the beer become fruit juice? That is hard to say. It seems more likely that we have to call it water—water with a strong flavor. In conclusion, if bread kneaded with beer has a strong taste, so that it isn’t just slightly different but the flavor of the beer is very noticeable, it becomes mezonos. Yes, although we generally speak about a sweet ingredient, here we’re talking about something that isn’t sweet but is more bitter. Still, it is strongly flavored, so the bread becomes mezonos. Okay, that is one discussion. The second discussion is about tzitzis. The question is, when a person wants to replace the—sorry, not that. It happened,

10:28 Speaker 1 it happened. All right. A person wants to replace the strings—the Sephardim call the tzitzis strings “the threads.” He wants to replace them, and there are old tzitzis on the garment. Can he simply cut or sever the old tzitzis, or must he take the trouble to untie and open all the windings, which takes time? What is the halachah? There is a well-known ruling in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch about whether one may remove tzitzis from one garment to put them on another. Here we have the Alter Rebbe’s words: It is forbidden to remove tzitzis from a garment if one does not intend to attach them to another garment. You have a garment and you want to take off the strings. You may not remove them, because you would be needlessly canceling the mitzvah fulfilled with that garment. Speaking about this reminds me of someone moving out of an apartment that has a mezuzah. You may not take down the mezuzah when you leave, because that removes the mitzvah from the apartment. Only if you know that a non-Jew will move in, and there is a concern that the mezuzah will be treated disrespectfully, is it a mitzvah to take it down. Otherwise, you leave the mezuzos in place. We understand that this concerns something valuable. Anyway, back to removing tzitzis from a garment: If the purpose is not to attach those strings to another garment, it is forbidden. But if the garment will no longer be obligated in tzitzis—for example, he wants to alter the garment, or he wants to sell it to a non-Jew—then the garment will no longer have that mitzvah, and he may remove its tzitzis. Further on, there is also a discussion about not giving a non-Jew a garment with tzitzis, because he could impersonate a Jew, and that could be dangerous.

12:48 Speaker 1 And so on. All right. So, it is permissible to remove the tzitzis from a deceased person’s garment. Now, does that mean you may simply remove the tzitzis and leave the garment as it is? No. If you remove the tzitzis because you want to alter the garment so that it is exempt from tzitzis, that is permitted. Certainly, you may remove the tzitzis to replace them with nicer ones. You want to put on more beautiful strings. You are not giving up on the garment’s tzitzis; you want to improve them. So that is permitted. Another case: the strings are fine, but, as you know, when tzitzis are first made, each string must be twelve fingerbreadths long. Afterward, if they become shorter, there are rules about how many ends may be affected and still leave the tzitzis kosher. Let’s not get into all the details now. If one of the strings tears, the tzitzis may still be kosher, but it is preferable for the strings to be whole. So what does it say here? If one of the ends tears and he wants to replace the tzitzis with whole ones, that is recommended. Even though the tzitzis with the torn ends are kosher, he may remove them and attach other tzitzis in their place. So let’s summarize for now. There is the ruling, disputed by Rav and Shmuel, that one may transfer tzitzis from one garment to another. There, the case is that you want to remove these strings and tie them onto another garment. Here, you do not intend to use the same strings again; you just want to remove them. If you want to remove them because you intend to put on a nicer replacement, that is justified. But so far, he has said that you may untie them. He has not spoken

14:52 Speaker 1 about cutting them. Right? Let’s continue. Here on the screen we have the Alter Rebbe—yes, the Alter Rebbe. He briefly gives the ruling that one may remove tzitzis. That is a different case: removing these tzitzis and putting the same ones on another garment. That is Shmuel’s ruling permitting a transfer from one garment to another. Then he brings the ruling we just read: you may remove these tzitzis, these strings, because you want to attach new strings. That is fine. Here he adds something: “But he should not cut them off; rather, he should untie them.” The strings you remove should not be torn off. You have to undo all the knots. One may not render kosher tzitzis invalid with one’s own hands, because that would demean a mitzvah. You have tzitzis, over which we say every day, “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning the mitzvah of tzitzis.” Tzitzis are not sacred in the way a mezuzah or tefillin are; those contain Hashem’s Name. But they are an object used for a mitzvah, and one may not treat such an object disrespectfully. There is a well-known story about the Chasam Sofer. Two students came to enroll in his yeshiva. He looked at them and refused to accept one of them. The explanation afterward was that this was just after Sukkos, and there was schach lying on the ground in the yeshiva courtyard. One young man walked around the schach, while the other stepped on it. The Chasam Sofer turned away the one who had stepped on it and did not want to accept him into the yeshiva; indeed, he was concerned that the young man would stray from the proper path. In other words, an object used for a mitzvah deserves respect and appreciation. Tearing these strings would be treating them disrespectfully. Let’s look at the sources. What you have at the bottom of the screen is not entirely

17:16 Speaker 1 clear. This is from the sefer Olas Tamid, a commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, probably from about a hundred years before the Alter Rebbe. He says that, in his view, one may untie tzitzis that are frayed even though they are kosher. That is one case. Likewise, if he finds tzitzis that are more beautiful and attractive than the first ones, he may replace them. [unclear] But he should undo the knots and windings rather than destroy the tzitzis, so that they remain suitable for another garment. So here we have a difference of opinion. Olas Tamid says: Why may you not cut off the tzitzis? Because they are still kosher—why ruin them? They can be used on another garment. Following his reasoning, one might say that nowadays, when there is no... Who would take old strings and tie them onto another garment? That hardly happens today. So his reasoning might leave room to permit it. But the Alter Rebbe says that tearing them off demeans a mitzvah. Let’s look below. You have a passage from the Mishnah Berurah. He cites later authorities who wrote that one should take care to undo the knots and windings and not cut the strings, so as not to destroy them. As our Sages said, a person should not pour away water from his cistern when others need it. The point is that these strings could be used for another garment. That is the reasoning of Olas Tamid. The Mishnah Berurah then cites the Chayei Adam: where undoing them is too much trouble for him, he may cut them off. This does not violate bal tashchis, since he is not doing it in a destructive manner. All right, in the middle of the screen you have the Chayei Adam. We said one may untie them, but he says it does not have to be done specifically by untying: if that is too much trouble for him, he may cut them off. It does not violate bal tashchis; it is not an act of destruction.

19:40 Speaker 1 He brings proof from Bava ben Buta, who advised Herod to demolish the Beis Hamikdash and build a more beautiful structure, even though there was nothing wrong with the existing building. So there you have evidence that one may demolish something in order to build something more beautiful. Well, first of all, there was no other option there. Here there is another option. But that is his novel point, and the explicit proof concerns whether there is an issue of destruction or of disrespect—whether what you are doing demeans the mitzvah. In any case, those who follow the Mishnah Berurah and the Chayei Adam have an opinion to rely on. It is strange: the Magen Avraham says to untie them, and he says that does not have to be taken literally. The Chayei Adam says it does not have to be taken literally. We all understand that untying them takes half an hour’s work, while cutting them off takes one minute. It is strange to interpret “untie them” as not specifically meaning that. He wrote “untie,” and you say he did not mean it specifically. Clearly, that is not what the Magen Avraham meant. Oh, sorry, thank you very much. The Knesses Hagedolah, sorry, yes. The Knesses Hagedolah—then it makes sense. All right, so according to the Alter Rebbe, one may not cut off the tzitzis, because that demeans a mitzvah. One must untie them before attaching the new ones. I saw in responsa that some are even stricter. The permission we mentioned to remove tzitzis in order to put on nicer ones—some disagree with that. They say: Why untie the tzitzis and remove them from a tallis katan while it is still fit for use, even if you want to put on new tzitzis? Some were very particular about this. So the Alter Rebbe permits removing them, while others are stringent even about what the Alter Rebbe permitted. All right, the

22:18 Speaker 1 last point. The question I was asked last Thursday was whether there is room for leniency at a place where they hold a Sheva Brachos and a kiddush on Shabbos afternoon, but there are not ten people eating bread. Perhaps three people are eating bread, but not seven. Usually the question is whether you need seven people who washed and ate bread, joined by another three who ate something else—not necessarily bread. But what if only three people ate bread? Is there still a basis for reciting Sheva Brachos? Here on the screen we have a responsum by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef in Yabia Omer. He cites Rabbi Aryeh [unclear], who brought the Zichron Avraham, saying that even if only a minority ate bread—say, three or more—and the rest ate meat and fish, one may recite Sheva Brachos. He cites the Ran, who says that the wedding blessings may be recited even without a meal, since they do not depend on Birkas Hamazon at all. In any case, Rabbi Aryeh was one of the leading Torah scholars of his time in Warsaw before the war—perhaps a little earlier, about a hundred years ago. He was a great scholar, and he permitted Sheva Brachos when three people ate bread and the rest ate something else. He also cites Rabbi Alfandari. He lived for more than a hundred years, I think. There is a story about how the Minchas Elazar, the Munkacser Rebbe, visited Eretz Yisroel and met Rabbi Alfandari. His responsa are called Saba Kadisha. He cites the Zichron Avraham and says that ten are required. Then he also cites Rabbi Shlomo Kluger, in his responsa HaElef Lecha Shlomo, that at any meal where two or three did not eat

24:58 Speaker 1 Bread, with the groom included, even though the second group did not eat at all. [unclear] ate only bread. In short, what we see here is that two great Torah authorities, the Maharik and Reb Shlomo Kluger, hold this way. I heard from my late uncle, Reb Muly Azimov, that he heard the Rebbe Rashab say to Rabbi Dovid Horodoker, who was one of the greatest Temimim, that Reb Shlomo Kluger was among the halachic authorities one could rely on. So we have two authorities to rely on who say that you can recite Sheva Berachos when three people ate bread and the rest ate something else. Rabbi Ovadia himself does not agree, and Nitei Gavriel also writes that, in practice, one should not do this. In practice, you need ten who washed their hands—seven who washed and three who ate something else. Right. But there is room to rely on those authorities, so one need not make a big protest against someone who follows the Maharik and Reb Shlomo Kluger, who permit it even when only three ate bread. So it is not considered a berachah levatalah. I have another three minutes, so I’ll just bring up one more thing. Second marriages: we’re talking about Sheva Berachos. For a second marriage, you can recite them for only one day, right? What if—there was a case where, for the groom, it was his second marriage, but for her, it was her first. But in the week before the wedding, she told me quietly that, when she was at university, she had once had relations with a man. So she was not a virgin. Now, what was my problem? She was a baalas teshuvah; she had returned to observance and was

27:31 Speaker 1 popular in the community. So several people in the community had already volunteered to host Sheva Berachos for her. Now, he was not a first-time groom, and she was not a virgin. So according to what we discussed, one may not recite Sheva Berachos throughout the week; it would be a berachah levatalah. But my consideration was that if I said anything, it would humiliate her. It would be terribly embarrassing for her if they had to cancel, and everyone would talk about why it was canceled, and so on. So I kept quiet and said nothing. And that’s how it was. Okay, be well, and may we meet on joyous occasions—with everlasting joy at the coming of our righteous Moshiach. All the best.

28:23 Speaker 3 Amen!