The Use of Electricity on Shabbos - Rabbi Michael Adrai

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Shalom u’vrachah. How fortunate we are, how good our portion and how pleasant our lot, that we sit and learn Torah and set fixed times for Torah study. As the Gemara says, one of the questions a person is asked upon reaching the World of Truth is: “Did you set fixed times for Torah study?” And the Rebbe points out in his sichos the emphasis on “set”: the fixed commitment itself, setting fixed times for Torah study. So, boruch Hashem, we have the media and the technological means to share Torah classes on social media. We use them for the very best purpose: studying halacha. “The ways of the world are His”—do not read “ways” but “halachos.” Through the halachos by which a person guides his home, he brings light into that home. The Gemara in Tractate Shabbos relates that Hakadosh Boruch Hu took Moshe and told him, “I have a great treasure, a great gift, in My treasury, and I wish to give it to the Jewish people.” That treasure is called Shabbos, and Hakadosh Boruch Hu gave Shabbos to the Jewish people. In the Minchah prayer on holy Shabbos, we say, “A rest of love and generosity, a rest of truth and faith, in which You delight.” That rest—how is the rest our Sages spoke about so much defined? The mitzvah of Shabbos appears in several parshas of the Torah. It appears in Sefer Hachinuch. Those who enumerate the mitzvos list several aspects of the mitzvah of Shabbos and what Shabbos is. Likewise, in the Babylonian Talmud’s Tractate Shabbos, there are more than 150 pages on the laws of Shabbos. In the Jerusalem Talmud, there are more than 90 pages. And the Shulchan Aruch, written by the Beis Yosef, Rabbi Yosef Karo, has 120 sections on the subject—section 242, section 302, 120 sections. All those sections, all those rulings based on what we learn from the Gemara—the essential idea behind it all is the wording of the prayer, “A rest of love You have given us.” What is this rest? How is it defined? How do we preserve

02:22 Speaker 2 that rest? How do we enter Shabbos? How do we keep Shabbos? How do we bring Shabbos to a close? How do we ensure that the entire Shabbos is a “rest of love,” as it says in the Minchah prayer? That is what the Gemara discusses in Tractate Shabbos of the Babylonian Talmud, what the Jerusalem Talmud discusses, and what 120 sections of the Shulchan Aruch address. In today’s world, in what we call the twentieth century, technology is developing so rapidly, with new modern innovations appearing every month and every day, that this rest can easily be lost. As the commentators write, to desecrate Shabbos is to make it chullin—ordinary. To take this holy day and turn it into an ordinary weekday is something that can happen very easily today. That is why we have these classes on the laws of Shabbos in the modern age. From the 120 sections of the Shulchan Aruch, we can go into the fine details of the halachos. Before we get to the subject itself, today’s class is about the law concerning air conditioning on Shabbos. May I ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner for me when it is terribly hot outside and the weather makes it impossible to sit around the table? Or when it is raining and bitterly cold? May I ask a non-Jew on Shabbos to turn on the air conditioner for me? That is the subject of the class. Before we get to the main discussion, let me give a wonderful introduction. A hundred years ago, in his introduction to the Mishnah Berurah, Rabbi Yisroel Meir, the Chofetz Chaim, Rabbi Yisroel Meir of Radin, repeated the same idea twice. He said: 120 sections of the Shulchan Aruch is a great deal, and these halachos are complex. Unless a person reviews and studies them very carefully, looking at all the details, he may miss certain halachos and fail to observe Shabbos properly. That is how serious it is. He repeats this twice in his introduction to the Mishnah Berurah, because the halachos are complex. And if he said this in his time,

04:36 Speaker 2 a hundred years ago, then certainly today, when technology and, as we said, modernization have advanced so far, we need to know what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is appropriate on Shabbos and where stringencies have been adopted, what is required by the letter of the law and what is only a custom. There are so many details in these halachos that every person should reflect, study, look into them, and set fixed times for Torah study, as we said at the beginning—fixed times for Torah study—and particularly for learning the laws of Shabbos properly. We are discussing electricity on Shabbos, so as Chabad chassidim, let us note the Rebbe’s words in letters from the fifties and sixties, from 5710 and 5708, in the early years of his leadership. When you open the letters, you see that the Rebbe pointed out several times that questions about electricity on Shabbos can involve Torah prohibitions. The Rebbe was not thereby ruling that electricity on Shabbos is, as such, prohibited by Torah law. No. Electricity, in all its different forms, was then beginning to develop and spread throughout the world. Among the halachic authorities there was a widespread approach—for example, the responsa Eretz Tzvi sought to permit turning on a switch on Yom Tov, arguing that kindling fire from an existing fire for food preparation is permitted. So if the power station is in Hadera or Haifa, where the electricity is generated, and I turn on the electricity in my home, I am bringing fire from Haifa or Hadera into my living room. He went so far as to seek to permit it. And it was not only among the halachic authorities that there was a tendency to permit or be lenient. There was also a lax attitude among the public. People treated this thing called electricity lightly, as though it did not involve serious prohibitions, or even rabbinic prohibitions, but perhaps only stringencies. So the Rebbe returned to this point several times in letters from 5710 and 5708. You can find many letters in which the Rebbe

06:45 Speaker 2 says that these matters raise questions of Torah law. Again, as I said, the Rebbe was not thereby ruling that electricity on Shabbos or Yom Tov is prohibited by Torah law, or that using it is a Torah prohibition. Rather, it is like any community rabbi who sees, G-d forbid, some weakening among members of his community in keeping kosher or observing Shabbos—people riding bicycles or playing ball, or not knowing certain halachos. The rabbi encourages them, strengthens them, and teaches them those halachos. In those years, there was a widespread tendency among the halachic authorities to be lenient, and the public, too, thought it was a rabbinic matter, perhaps even just a stringency. So the Rebbe said several times that electricity involves laws and questions of Torah law. Now let us discuss electricity on Shabbos. We will divide electricity broadly into two categories, and in each category there is a general rule and an exception. For now, we are making a broad distinction between incandescent bulbs and heating elements, which form one category, and LEDs, fluorescent lights, refrigerators, and ovens—certain ovens, especially the modern ones we have today—which form another category. Right now we are discussing the first category: incandescent bulbs and heating elements. The general rule is that virtually all the halachic authorities understood these to involve Torah prohibitions. As the Rambam writes in the laws of Shabbos, “One who kindles an ember is liable for kindling.” One who heats an ember... Sorry, what the Rambam writes in the laws of Shabbos is: “One who heats an ember is liable for kindling.” Using electricity on Shabbos where incandescent bulbs and heating elements are involved is prohibited by Torah law. That is the view of virtually all the halachic authorities; that is the general rule. The exception is a handful of opinions that were mentioned but that no one took into account: that this does not fall under “You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings.” The Torah said “fire”; it did not say “incandescent bulbs.”

09:05 Speaker 2 The Torah said “fire”; it did not say heating elements. Those are not included in “You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings.” The general rule is that nearly all the halachic authorities say this is a Torah prohibition. It falls into that category; virtually no one disagrees. Right now, though, we are talking about the second category: bulbs that are not incandescent, but fluorescent lights, LEDs, refrigerators, modern ovens, and all sorts of other... devices that have electricity rather than heating elements—all the advanced technology found today in most Jewish homes. Here the situation is the reverse. The general rule is that nearly all the halachic authorities have written that this is a rabbinic prohibition. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Shabbos, “One who heats a coal is liable for kindling.” That does not apply here. This is not kindling; it is not prohibited by the Torah, but by rabbinic law. What is the rabbinic prohibition? On that, the authorities disagree. We should note that most opinions follow the Beis Yitzchak, who says it is the prohibition of molid—bringing something new into being on Shabbos. That is rabbinic. Nearly all the authorities have written that it is rabbinic, apart from two opinions that sought to say that even the electricity found today in most Jewish homes—in fluorescent lights, LEDs, and the like—is prohibited by the Torah. One is the opinion of Rabbi Kook, joined by the Yaskil Avdi, Rabbi Ovadia... Rabbi Ovadia Hedaya, as well as the Mishpetei Uziel and another two or three authorities who followed his reasoning and held that this is fire, actual fire. Even modern electricity is considered fire, based on the Gemara in Yoma. The Gemara in Yoma, 21b, discusses six... six kinds of fire, and lists them there, showing that one kind of fire is not like another. The Gemara gives an example: the fire in which Hakadosh Boruch Hu revealed Himself to Moshe Rabbeinu in the burning bush did not consume the thorns. Yet you see that the Torah calls it fire—fire that did not consume or burn the thorns, and is still considered fire.

11:20 Speaker 2 Similarly, there in Yoma—Y... Yoma—Rashi gives the example of the fire that descended from Heaven to consume the offerings. That was not fire of the kind we have today, and yet it falls under the category of fire. Rabbi Kook says, as do the Mishpetei Uziel and the Yaskil Avdi, that fire does not necessarily mean an incandescent bulb or a heating element. It is defined by its effect. And what is its effect? It gives light; people around it benefit... those around it benefit from the light it produces. We consider that fire. It falls under “You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings.” Even though it has no heating element or incandescent bulb, we still consider it fire. That is a minority opinion. As we said, the general rule is that nearly all the authorities wrote that modern electricity is prohibited by rabbinic law. That was one opinion holding it to be prohibited by the Torah. The second is the opinion of the Chazon Ish, who says that building and dismantling are involved here. When a person turns on an electrical switch, even if there is no heating element or incandescent bulb, it is still considered building or dismantling. Turning it on is building; turning it off is dismantling. Those are the two opinions that took a stringent view: Rabbi Kook, the Mishpetei Uziel, and the Yaskil Avdi say it is fire. We look at the result. The resulting effect is considered fire and falls under kindling, even with modern electricity. That is one opinion. The other is the Chazon Ish’s opinion: building and dismantling apply to modern electricity as well. These are two isolated, exceptional opinions. The general rule is that nearly all the authorities wrote that it is rabbinic. Which rabbinic prohibition? The prohibition of molid, as the Beis Yitzchak holds. Let me briefly repeat. We have two categories of electricity. The first is an incandescent bulb or heating element. Nearly all the authorities wrote that this

13:15 Speaker 2 falls under kindling, which the Rambam wrote is a Torah prohibition. A few exceptional opinions wrote that it is a rabbinic prohibition—a rabbinic prohibition. In the second category, modern electricity, nearly all the authorities wrote that it is a rabbinic prohibition. Two prominent opinions wrote that it is a Torah prohibition. Now we come to our subject: the law of air conditioning on Shabbos. Here is the situation: it is Erev Shabbos, cold outside, and they forgot to set the timer, forgot to set the Shabbos timer, forgot to turn on the air conditioner. They finish davening and come home. It is terribly cold and raining. The house is not heated properly. There are children at home. They want to ask the neighbor across the way, a non-Jewish caregiver looking after an elderly Jew: “Please turn on the air conditioner for us so we can have comfortable heating, sit properly at the Shabbos table, and enjoy our time around the table.” Or the reverse: it is terribly hot outside, the weather is unbearable, there is a heat wave and it is sweltering. A person wants to study at home on Shabbos—to study, to study—and wants the air conditioner turned on. He wants to ask the non-Jewish caregiver who lives across the way: “Please come into the house and turn on the air conditioner for me.” May he ask him to turn on the air conditioner for him on Shabbos, or not? That is our discussion today. I will state the conclusion before explaining the reasons and showing how we arrive at it. The conclusion is that one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner for him on Shabbos. There are two main reasons for this, and one additional supporting reason. The two main reasons are the foundations—the basic principles—on which the reasoning permitting one to ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner rests. There is also another reason, an additional consideration that we include. No, we would not rely on it or bring it on its own, but since it exists, it

15:18 Speaker 2 also supports our ruling to permit it. Before giving the three reasons, let us first learn a concept—a concept that appears in the Gemara, in the Rishonim, and in halachic rulings. There is a category called shevus in the context of a mitzvah, and another called shevus d’shevus in the context of a mitzvah. Shevus in the context of a mitzvah means this: an act that, if I did it myself, would be forbidden to me by the Torah. Turning on an incandescent bulb, lighting a candle, kindling fire on Shabbos—fire, kindling fire on Shabbos. If I do it, it is forbidden by the Torah. When I say to a non-Jew, “Please do this for me,” that is called shevus in the context of a mitzvah. At the moment, I have not lit Shabbos candles. I want to ask the non-Jew, “Light Shabbos candles for me, so that I will have Shabbos candles on Erev Shabbos.” That is called shevus in the context of a mitzvah. That is one concept. Shevus d’shevus in the context of a mitzvah means an act that is forbidden to me by rabbinic law. It is not an incandescent bulb; it is a bulb—a type of bulb commonly used today. Or take an even simpler case, an ordinary rabbinic prohibition: carrying in a place that is not a full-fledged public domain, or anything similar that is prohibited by rabbinic law. If I do the act myself, it is a rabbinic prohibition. When I ask a non-Jew to do it, the request is also rabbinic. That is called shevus d’shevus in the context of a mitzvah. We have two layers of shevus. One is asking a non-Jew to do it. There are two explanations for why asking a non-Jew was prohibited, a disagreement between the Rambam and Rashi. The Rambam writes that Shabbos should not become something a person treats lightly; Rashi writes that it is to prevent a person from becoming accustomed to violating Shabbos. It was the Sages who prohibited this shevus—asking a non-Jew. If the act itself is forbidden to me by the Torah and I ask a non-Jew to do it, that is shevus in the context of a mitzvah. With shevus d’shevus in the context of a mitzvah, there are two rabbinic prohibitions here: first, asking a non-Jew, and second, the act itself, which is also prohibited by rabbinic law. That is

17:21 Speaker 2 This is called a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah. The Gemara in Tractate Eruvin—the Gemara in Tractate Eruvin, page 65, Mishnah—discusses a bris milah that falls on Shabbos. I ask a non-Jew: “Please go bring hot water.” According to some of the Rishonim, perhaps it is a knife. “Please go bring hot water so I can warm the baby.” Here we have a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah: a bris milah on Shabbos. It is a mitzvah to circumcise the baby: “And you shall circumcise him on the eighth day”; “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.” This is for the sake of a mitzvah. “On the eighth day”—and the rabbinic prohibition is telling a non-Jew, “Bring hot water through a public domain.” Is that permitted or not? The Gemara there says it is permitted. The great authorities, both Rishonim and Acharonim, disagree about whether this applies specifically to this case—a bris milah that falls on Shabbos—or whether we can extend it to all other cases. The Magen Avraham and the Shelah, in section 276; the Shulchan Aruch—Maran the Mechaber, the Beis Yosef—in section 307, paragraph 5; and the Alter Rebbe in section 276, paragraph 8: all of them understand that it applies specifically to a bris milah. What the Gemara there in Tractate Eruvin says applies specifically to a bris milah that falls on Shabbos. In that case, a rabbinic prohibition is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah: telling a non-Jew to bring hot water for me through a public domain into the house. This applies specifically to a bris milah on Shabbos, because the bris milah itself overrides Shabbos, so telling a non-Jew is permitted as well. But we cannot learn from this that a rabbinic prohibition is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah in every other case. That is why they were stringent. The Shulchan Aruch, section 307, paragraph 5, was stringent: only a double rabbinic prohibition is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah; a single rabbinic prohibition is forbidden. The case we saw in the Gemara of a bris milah on Shabbos applies specifically to a bris milah on Shabbos, not to other cases. Other Rishonim—the Baal HaItur and other Rishonim, other halachic authorities, great Rishonim, a whole group of other Rishonim—and the Rema rule differently. The Rema writes in accordance with them.

19:25 Speaker 2 He rules, as they do, that even a single rabbinic prohibition is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah. We see this from that Gemara in Tractate Eruvin: when a bris milah falls on Shabbos, one may ask a non-Jew to bring water from a public domain into the house for the baby. We can extend that to other cases as well. The Baal HaItur rules this way, other Rishonim agree with the Baal HaItur, and the Rema rules in accordance with them. So we find a fundamental disagreement: Did Chazal permit a single rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah, or only a double rabbinic prohibition? The Rema, the Baal HaItur and the other Rishonim understand from the Gemara in Tractate Eruvin that Chazal did permit a single rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah—not only for a bris milah that falls on Shabbos, but, by extension, in other cases too. Another group of authorities—the Shelah and the Magen Avraham in section 276, the Shulchan Aruch in section 307, paragraph 5, and the Alter Rebbe—understand that only a double rabbinic prohibition is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah. We forbid a single rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah. Now, after that long introduction, we come to our subject: the law of an air conditioner on Shabbos. As we said, virtually all the halachic authorities, apart from two views—those of Rabbi Kook and the Chazon Ish—say that operating an air conditioner nowadays is prohibited by rabbinic law. A rabbinic prohibition is a shevus. Telling a non-Jew to do something is a shevus. A double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah is permitted according to the Alter Rebbe, the Magen Avraham, the Shelah and the Shulchan Aruch in section 307, paragraph 5. So that is the first reason to permit telling a non-Jew on Shabbos to turn on the air conditioner for me: it is a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah. And even if we take into account the ten percent—the fact that there are views that say electricity nowadays is also prohibited by Torah law, as we learned earlier: Rabbi Kook, Mishpetei Uziel and Rabbi Ovadia say it is prohibited by Torah law, and the Chazon Ish says

21:27 Speaker 2 it is prohibited by Torah law—then this is a single rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah, because the act the non-Jew performs for me is prohibited by Torah law. We have the Rema’s view, which follows the Baal HaItur. According to him, it would certainly be permitted to tell the non-Jew. If we follow the Alter Rebbe’s view, it is a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah, and it is permitted from the outset. And even if we say that operating the air conditioner is prohibited by Torah law, a single rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah is permitted according to the Rema and the Baal HaItur. So that is the first reason to permit telling a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner for me on Shabbos. Another reason: the Shulchan Aruch writes, “Everyone is considered ill when it comes to the cold.” When it is cold outside, everyone is considered ill, though not dangerously so. We regard everyone as ill when the weather is cold—ill without being in danger. In the case of someone who is ill but not in danger, a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah is permitted. Therefore, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner for me when it is cold outside. The same applies in the opposite case, when it is very hot outside. Tosafos, there in Tractate Bava Basra, writes: “Just as everyone is considered ill when it comes to the cold, so everyone is considered ill when it comes to the heat.” What is more, when it is so hot outside that a person cannot sit properly at the Shabbos table because he is sweating so much, the weather does not allow him to continue the meal properly. He may ask the non-Jew—the neighbor across the way, or a caregiver looking after an elderly person—“Please come in and turn on the air conditioner for me.” That is the second reason. So let me summarize the two main reasons on which the permission to ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner for me on Shabbos rests. The first reason is that virtually all the halachic authorities wrote that operating an air conditioner nowadays, with electricity as it is supplied nowadays, is prohibited by rabbinic law. If it is rabbinic, then this is a double

23:27 Speaker 2 rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah. The Magen Avraham and the Shelah wrote that a double rabbinic prohibition is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah; the Alter Rebbe ruled in accordance with them, and the Mechaber wrote the same in the Shulchan Aruch, section 307, paragraph 5. And even if we are concerned that, Heaven forbid, operating the air conditioner is prohibited by Torah law, we have the Rema and the Baal HaItur, who permit a single rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah. That is the first reason. Another reason is that everyone is considered ill, though not dangerously so, when it comes to the cold, and the same applies to the heat, as Tosafos writes in Tractate Bava Basra, page 159. A double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah would therefore be permitted. Those are the two main reasons, the two legs on which this permission to tell a non-Jew to do something on Shabbos stands. There is one more consideration, another opinion, one more reason. Many have rejected this reason, and we include it only as support. We do not rely on it; we consider it only as supporting grounds. It is called a communal need. People are sitting around the Shabbos table and the weather is very cold. Around the Shabbos table are the parents, father-in-law and mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, uncles and aunts. It is a communal need: there are many people around the table. Or suppose there is a large congregation in a shul—a communal need. Does a communal need count as grounds to permit asking a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner for me on Shabbos, or not? The halachic authorities disagree. In one place, in the Shulchan Aruch, section 276, the Shulchan Aruch discusses a case where the eruv has become damaged. The eruv is not in proper order. May I ask a non-Jew to go and repair the eruv so people can carry? The Shulchan Aruch rules there that I may. Some halachic authorities wanted to say: Here you see that, for a communal need—so that people can carry—they permitted telling a non-Jew to repair the eruv. The halachic authorities who opposed this approach said that this

25:28 Speaker 2 That is not considered a communal need, because in that case the purpose is to prevent people from violating a prohibition. People are walking around the town or neighborhood, unaware that the eiruv has broken. I have to ask a non-Jew to repair the eiruv to prevent them from violating a prohibition. Don’t conclude from this that, because it is a communal need, asking a non-Jew is permitted. Permission to ask a non-Jew in this case is very specific: it is permitted in order to prevent people from violating a prohibition, but not every communal need permits it. As evidence for their position, they cite the Taz, who discusses a very interesting, unusual case in the laws of Sukkah. An entire town or neighborhood has no lulav. The lulav is still on a tree. Can I ask a non-Jew, “Please go pick the lulav so that everyone in town can fulfill the mitzvah of the Four Species”? Is that permitted or not? It is certainly a communal need. Many people need to fulfill the mitzvah of the Four Species. It is the first day of Sukkos, when the Torah says, “You shall take for yourselves”; every person has a mitzvah to have the Four Species. May I ask a non-Jew to pick the lulav for me or not? The Taz explicitly writes that I may not. So here we see a communal need, yet it is forbidden. Nevertheless, some authorities understood the Gemara and the Shulchan Aruch in section 276, regarding the eiruv, to mean that asking a non-Jew is permitted for a communal need. They understood this simply: the permission is not limited to preventing people from violating a prohibition; rather, asking a non-Jew is permitted for a communal need. So we can add that as supporting grounds alongside the first two main reasons. The first reason is that this is a shevus d’shevus for the sake of a mitzvah, and the second is that everyone is considered ill in the cold, and everyone is considered ill in the heat. Therefore, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner

27:21 Speaker 2 on Shabbos. And as further support, we have the communal need. True, many authorities disagreed with that reasoning when taken on its own, including the Taz in the laws of Sukkah, as we said, and those who understood the Shulchan Aruch in section 276 to permit it only to prevent people from violating a prohibition. Nevertheless, that reasoning is available to us. So, to sum up, we have three reasons: two main reasons on which the permission to ask a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner on Shabbos rests, and one additional reason in support. To conclude, I’ll mention two things: one as an aside, and one final point. As an aside, everything we have discussed until now concerns asking a non-Jew. The permission to ask a non-Jew does not mean there is permission to ask a minor. Although the Alter Rebbe has a major innovation in section 342: he follows the opinion of the Rashba, who says that, on an occasional basis, one may ask a minor to perform a shevus d’shevus for the sake of a mitzvah. This does not mean that every time I forget to turn on the air conditioner, I can say, “You’re a minor—please come turn it on for me.” We forgot to turn off the refrigerator light—let the minor deal with it. We forgot about the bathroom light—let the minor deal with that. On an occasional basis, not systematically, the Alter Rebbe permits asking a minor to perform a shevus d’shevus for the sake of a mitzvah. The Mishnah Berurah disagrees, but each case has to be considered individually. One must ask a halachic authority beforehand, because no two cases are alike. That is why I mention this only as an aside. But it is important to know that the Alter Rebbe does allow this. It is not a permission accepted everywhere, nor is it a blanket permission, but it does exist in the Alter Rebbe’s ruling. One more point: until now, we have seen that the Alter Rebbe agrees with the Magen Avraham, the Shelah, and the Shulchan Aruch of the Mechaber, section 307, paragraph 5: a shevus d’shevus is permitted for the sake of a mitzvah. There is one exceptional ruling in which the Alter Rebbe

29:16 Speaker 2 says that even a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah is permitted. I’ll repeat that: a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah—meaning that even if the act itself is forbidden by Torah law, I may have it done through one rabbinic prohibition, asking a non-Jew. That is a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah. This concerns the law of bein hashmashos, twilight. A common situation is that people come into 770 and immediately need to break the iron chain on the lockers, or they need to light some candles and set up the hot-water urn, and they ask a non-Jew to do it for them. It is already bein hashmashos, Shabbos is beginning, and people have lit Shabbos candles. Is it permitted or not? Although everywhere else the Alter Rebbe permits only a shevus d’shevus for the sake of a mitzvah, in section 342 he says that during bein hashmashos, a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah is permitted. The later authorities disagree and examine whether the Alter Rebbe’s permission applies only during bein hashmashos on Friday, or also during bein hashmashos on Shabbos, just before Shabbos ends. The Mishnah Berurah writes that it applies specifically on Friday, when bein hashmashos might be day or might be night. We can rely on the possibility that it is still day—Friday, a weekday—and if it is a weekday, the act is permitted. So a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah is acceptable. But on Shabbos, when it might be day or might be night, if it is day, it is still Shabbos. How, then, could we permit a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah? He forbids it. He says the permission during bein hashmashos applies on Friday, not on Shabbos. The Alter Rebbe permits it even during bein hashmashos at the end of Shabbos. This is a major innovation with significant practical implications. On Shabbos, ten minutes before Shabbos ends, the power goes out while people are sitting and learning. They have not yet made Havdalah or davened Maariv; they are sitting and learning Pirkei Avos or a maamar of Chassidus. Is it

31:00 Speaker 2 permitted to ask a non-Jew to turn on not only the air conditioner—which we discussed earlier and said was permitted—but even the incandescent bulbs and heating elements in the shul? Is that permitted or forbidden? According to the Alter Rebbe, it is permitted, because during bein hashmashos even a shevus for the sake of a mitzvah is permitted, not only a shevus d’shevus for the sake of a mitzvah. That concludes the law and our discussion of air conditioning and asking a non-Jew to do work on Shabbos. If Hashem wills it, in the next class we’ll discuss the laws of Shabbos timers: when one may touch a timer, when one may add teeth or remove teeth. Are the Shabbos timers used in Eretz Yisroel like those used outside Eretz Yisroel? If there is a difference, what is it? If Hashem wills it, we’ll cover all of that in the next class. Thank you very much. Good news, and much success.