General Principles of the Shabbos Labors - Rabbi Dror Cohen shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast of Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 With Hashem’s help, today we’ll begin a series of classes on the 39 melachos of Shabbos. The first class will focus on an introduction to the 39 melachos, and perhaps on some general foundations of the laws of Shabbos—principles that will come up again and again as we study plowing, sowing, threshing, and so on. They’re very important for understanding the halacha. What is distinctive about the Alter Rebbe’s writing of halacha is that he emphasizes the reasoning behind it. A person should know not only the halacha itself, but also its background and foundations: the basic principles on which it rests. Then he’ll see how those principles recur time after time, and he’ll understand the root and source of the halacha. With Hashem’s help, we’ll try both to teach the 39 melachos and to explain each one: its source, the root of the prohibition, how it appears in the Torah and then in the Mishnah and Gemara, the questions, discussions, and main points of dispute about it, and, finally, what the later poskim ruled and why they reached their conclusions—or why they disagree. So the Torah speaks about performing the 39 melachos on Shabbos, right? Its commandments regarding the melachos of Shabbos include positive commandments, which require us to do something active, and prohibitions. That is why, on the one hand, the Torah says in the book of Shemos, “On the seventh day you shall rest,” while on the other hand it says, “The seventh day is a Shabbos to Hashem your G-d; you shall not do any melachah.” In other words, Shabbos also includes positive commandments. We have a positive obligation to observe the commandments of Shabbos actively, and we also have

02:15 Speaker 2 a commandment to refrain from performing prohibited melachos. Now, if we look carefully at the verses in the book of Shemos, we’ll see that the Torah explicitly mentions only four primary categories of melachah: plowing, reaping, kindling a fire, and carrying from one domain to another. The other primary categories are not stated explicitly in the Torah; they are included in its general wording, “You shall not do any melachah.” The Sages received as a halacha given to Moshe at Sinai—which is a very common concept—which other melachos are included in the Torah’s prohibition. We also learn from the placement of the passage about the Mishkan alongside the commandment to observe Shabbos that “You shall not do any melachah” includes the work performed in the Mishkan. That is how we arrive at the 39 melachos. That’s the first point. The second is that, because the melachos of Shabbos are learned from the work of the Mishkan, they have a particular character and form. Not just any action becomes a prohibited melachah on Shabbos. Here we come to a very important concept, a central theme in the laws of Shabbos, called meleches machsheves—purposeful work. What does that mean? A person put thought and skill into it. It isn’t just any work. So we say that a person is liable on Shabbos only for a melachah involving thought—which also means intent: he intended to perform that melachah. But a melachah that happens on its own, without thought—as we’ll see, many actions associated with the melachos of Shabbos sometimes happen on their own—is not considered prohibited, at least not by Torah law. It doesn’t fall under the Torah’s definition of performing a melachah. Yes, it will often be prohibited by rabbinic law, but by Torah law it does not

04:27 Speaker 2 fall under the prohibition. Many people mistakenly think a melachah is defined by the effort, exertion, or strain involved, but that isn’t necessarily true. If someone moves stones with force and works hard, that must be a melachah; but if he lights a small match, what effort did that take? Or if he flips an electrical switch, there’s no problem. The truth is that this isn’t so. It’s the other way around. Even if someone takes a needle and carries it from a private domain into a public domain, although that involves no exertion—he simply took a little needle from his pocket and carried it from a private domain into a public domain—if, as we said earlier, he did so deliberately, intending it and knowing what he was doing, he violated a Torah prohibition. By contrast, someone who dragged large benches from one side of his house to the other, moved a huge cabinet, or opened a heavy iron gate has not necessarily violated a prohibition. The effort a person expends has no bearing on whether he has performed a prohibited melachah. Our Sages prohibited creating a new state of affairs. In our case, taking the needle from a private domain into a public domain created a new state of affairs. At first the needle was in a private domain; now it’s in a public domain. Its status has changed. A new situation has been created: the needle is now in a place where it wasn’t before. So, under the Torah’s definitions, this is called meleches machsheves. The Mishnah, in the chapter “Klal Gadol” of Tractate Shabbos, says that there are 39 primary categories of melachah. More precisely, its wording is, “The primary categories of melachah are forty minus one.” Why does it say “forty minus one”? Many explanations have been given. One simple reason is that it’s easier for a person to remember “forty minus one” than “39 melachos.” The distinctive wording helps a person remember them.

06:41 Speaker 2 Let’s sum up what we’ve discussed so far. An av melachah, a primary category, is first of all a melachah that was actually performed in the Mishkan. A toldah, a derivative, is an action that resembles that primary category. Anything similar to an av melachah performed in the Mishkan is called a toldah. Determining what is an av and what is a toldah is also a matter for the Sages’ judgment, not each individual’s judgment. So we need to understand the whole picture: what the av is and what its toldos are. The Gemara discusses this at great length for each primary category. The Rambam writes that a person must not take this lightly and think that violating a toldah is somehow less serious, or that the transgression is of lesser significance. Whether someone violates a toldah or an av, the severity is the same. If he does it deliberately, he is liable to kares; if he does it unintentionally, he must bring a sin offering. So what is the difference? As the Gemara in Bava Kamma also explains at length in the chapter “Arba Avos,” if a person violates ten different primary categories, he is obligated to bring a separate sin offering for each one, assuming, for example, that he did so unintentionally. But if he violates an av and its toldah, he needs to bring only one offering. So even if, for our purposes, he violated one av and another fifteen of its toldos at the same time, in a single incident, he would be obligated to bring only one offering. But that doesn’t mean a toldah has some kind of

08:40 Speaker 2 Less significant than the other primary categories. Up to this point, we’ve summarized how the Torah defines the primary categories of work, where they come from—the work involved in building the Mishkan, right?—and, in general, how we define a primary category and a derivative, which is something similar to it. We’ve also discussed what “thoughtful work” means. From the juxtaposition of the work of the Mishkan with the prohibition of work on Shabbos, we learn that it isn’t just any incidental activity; it has to be work that involves thought and intention. That is the main meaning of the term. Now we’ll explain how we divide the types of work prohibited on Shabbos into groups. We have 39 categories of work, which are divided broadly into four main groups, right? Each group has a guiding principle. The first group contains eleven primary categories, all connected with preparing the dyes. In the Beis Hamikdash, there were substances used as dyes to color the curtains, and so on. These categories, in order, are sowing, plowing, reaping, gathering, threshing, winnowing, sorting, grinding, sifting, kneading, and baking. Baking is essentially cooking. That is the first group, comprising eleven primary categories of work. The second group contains thirteen types of work involved in making the curtains themselves—not in dyeing the curtains, but in making them. They are shearing—when a person shears wool—bleaching, combing, dyeing, spinning, warping, making two heddles, weaving, unraveling, tying, untying, sewing, and tearing. You don’t need to remember them all, but you do need to remember that the common theme is preparing the curtains themselves. We have a third group, the second-to-last, containing seven primary categories. They were needed to prepare the coverings of dyed ram skins and tachash skins. What are they? Trapping, slaughtering, flaying, tanning, smoothing, marking lines, and cutting. All of these

10:59 Speaker 2 fall under the heading of preparing the coverings for the Mishkan. The fourth group contains eight primary categories of work needed to erect the Mishkan itself: writing, erasing, building, demolishing, extinguishing, kindling, completing an object with the final hammer blow, and carrying from one domain to another. They would write on the boards of the Mishkan, marking which was the male and which was the female, so they could join the boards correctly. These are the primary categories of work that we will study thoroughly, one by one. So we’ve learned that there is a division into four groups. The first group is preparing the dyes. The second is preparing the curtains themselves. The third is preparing the coverings—the dyed ram skins that covered the Mishkan. And the fourth is erecting the Mishkan itself. From here we move on to the next topic: the punishment for someone who desecrates Shabbos. If a person deliberately desecrates Shabbos, as we mentioned, by violating one of the 39 primary categories of work or their derivatives—the primary category and its derivative carry the same severity of punishment—and there were witnesses and a warning: two witnesses came and told the person, “You may not do this. You are about to violate a Shabbos prohibition.” This perhaps teaches us that sometimes, if we see a person who won’t listen when we point out a Shabbos prohibition, then, G-d forbid, we might be causing him to commit a Torah prohibition deliberately and incur the penalty of kareis. So perhaps it is better not to say anything to someone we know for certain will not heed our advice. The Torah says: “On the seventh day, it shall be holy for you, a Shabbos of complete rest for Hashem; whoever does work on it shall be put to death.” The Torah, incidentally, does not state the method of execution here, but our Sages learned it from the law in the well-known account of the man who gathered wood. He deliberately desecrated Shabbos, there were witnesses and a warning, and he was punished by stoning: “The man shall surely be put to death; the entire congregation shall stone him with stones,” and “they stoned him with stones, and he died.” So that covers what happens when a person deliberately violates a Shabbos prohibition. What happens if a person committed the act

13:17 Speaker 2 without witnesses and a warning, but nevertheless did it deliberately? According to Torah law, he is liable to kareis, as it says, “Whoever does work on it, that soul shall be cut off,” as the Torah states in the Book of Shemos. So he is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, since there were no witnesses and no warning. If he did it unintentionally—he didn’t know—for example, if a person didn’t know that this type of work was forbidden on Shabbos, or he knew the work was forbidden but forgot it was Shabbos: he woke up in the morning, forgot it was Shabbos, did some work, and suddenly remembered, “Wait, wait, today is Shabbos!” Then, as we mentioned, he has to bring a sin offering. The Rambam gives us a rule in Hilchos Shegagos: whenever a person is liable to kareis for a deliberate violation, he brings a sin offering for an unintentional one. In other words, if a deliberate violation would make him liable to kareis, an unintentional violation requires him to bring a sin offering. Now, how does a person do teshuvah? If someone has, G-d forbid, violated the prohibitions of Shabbos, then when the Beis Hamikdash stood, a person who desecrated Shabbos unintentionally had to bring an offering. But because of our many sins, the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed and has not yet been rebuilt—may it be rebuilt and established speedily in our days. So the main path now is teshuvah. Some say, according to Chassidus, that there may even be something loftier about teshuvah than about bringing an offering. Let’s recall, in general, what teshuvah is. Teshuvah has four parts. The first, as the Alter Rebbe explains at length in Igeres Hateshuvah, is abandoning the sin. After that comes regret

15:11 Speaker 2 for the past. The third part of teshuvah is verbal confession. A person must acknowledge and confess, saying aloud that he committed a sin. And then comes a commitment for the future. The fourth part is that from now on, he will not sin. It isn’t enough that he has not sinned up to now; he has to resolve that from now on, he will not sin again. Many, many halachic authorities, particularly later authorities of our generation, have written that he should increase his study of the laws of Shabbos. Why? Because Shabbos is so great that, as our Sages say in the Jerusalem Talmud, Tractate Berachos, it is equal to the entire Torah. And as our Sages also said in Tractate Shabbos, “If the Jewish people were to observe two Shabbosos according to halachah, they would be redeemed immediately.” In other words, observing Shabbos is of tremendous importance. And since a person who does not study the laws of Shabbos properly will almost inevitably desecrate it unintentionally, the way to make amends and improve is to study the laws of Shabbos thoroughly. Today, when multimedia devices are everywhere and, with the press of a button, a person can study the laws of Shabbos from outstanding rabbis—some who connect with his way of thinking through their teaching style, and others who connect with him emotionally—then certainly the opportunity and the obligation are even greater, much greater than they may have been in earlier generations, when books were less readily available and perhaps harder to find. So far, we’ve surveyed how the types of work prohibited on Shabbos are divided into groups. We’ve also explained, in general, the punishment for someone who desecrates Shabbos and the path to making amends. With Hashem’s help, we’ll now begin discussing principles and definitions in the laws of Shabbos. We’ll go through the basic definitions one by one, and for each one, we’ll try to explain fully what it means and how we will then weave it together with the laws we’ll study later. The first principle concerns something that is done

17:33 Speaker 2 With a major change in the way it is done. In other words, any melachah that I do with a major change, or, as explained in halachah, with two changes from the way it is normally done. I don’t do it the usual way; I change the way I generally do it. For example, a person may crush peppercorns by taking a peppercorn and using the handle—the back end—of a knife to crush it on a table. Why? Because there are two changes here. First, he didn’t use a pestle or a mortar. He didn’t crush it with the implements made for that purpose. And second, he crushed it on a table. So because there were two changes from the normal way of doing it, I would say that it is permitted even from the outset, as the Shulchan Aruch states in section 321, paragraph 7. The Shulchan Aruch also discusses a person who wants to suck grapes. He puts grapes in his mouth and sucks them. He is doing it by sucking, which is not the normal way of squeezing, even though in practice he squeezes the grapes, drinks the juice and leaves the fruit behind. Nevertheless, as the Shulchan Aruch states—and the first opinion cited by the Rema says the same—this is permitted. Now, we cannot apply this to every melachah, because each melachah has its own laws. Even though we are learning the general principles, they have many qualifications and limitations, so we need to know how to draw a comparison from one case to another. But in general, we

19:24 Speaker 2 can see the guiding principle behind what is permitted and what is forbidden on Shabbos. So let’s give another example of something done with a major change. We said either one major change or two changes together. A person may not milk his animal on Shabbos, for example, even if he does it with a major change. Say he uses his left hand when people normally do their work with their right. He has made a change, but why is it still forbidden? Because with all the prohibited melachos, whether a person does them with his right hand or his left, he is liable. An exception is writing, for example. Writing must be proper, complete writing. What does that mean? Proper writing is done specifically with the right hand, so if a person writes with his left, it is not considered proper writing and he is exempt. Let’s give an example. A person goes to a hospital, and they won’t admit him. He needs to be hospitalized now, or it’s an emergency. Nowadays, thank G-d, this problem generally doesn’t arise: the medical world also understands that there are people who observe Torah and mitzvos—and may there be many more of them—so they allow them to sign after Shabbos. But suppose he goes to a place run by non-Jews who refuse to admit him unless he signs. What does he do? In a pressing situation, he can sign with his left hand. Why? Because writing with his left hand would violate a rabbinic prohibition, but not a Torah prohibition. Again, it is certainly forbidden to write with one’s left hand from the outset. But we want to minimize the prohibition. If my choices are to violate a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic prohibition, I would certainly choose the rabbinic prohibition rather than the Torah prohibition. Someone once said to me, “But the words of the Sages are treated more strictly

21:17 Speaker 2 than the words of the Torah.” That is a classic example of why someone who is not well versed in all the layers of halachah cannot reliably reach a conclusion that reflects the truth of Torah. Why? Because when the Sages said that their words are treated more strictly than the words of the Torah, it was to prevent people from treating the Sages’ rulings lightly. People might say, “All right, I won’t violate Shabbos on a Torah level, but I’ll violate a rabbinic prohibition.” The Sages did not want people to make light of their words, because the source of their words lies in the higher worlds. So the Sages said: Woe to a person who treats their words lightly; if he does, he may receive a more severe punishment from Heaven than someone who treats the words of the Torah lightly. But the Sages themselves want a G-d-fearing person to observe the Torah’s mitzvos according to halachah. They themselves instruct you that, when you must choose between violating a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition—and your choice does not come from treating their words lightly—you should certainly violate the rabbinic prohibition rather than the Torah prohibition. So far, we’ve spoken about something done with a major change. The next principle we’ll learn is called misasek, inadvertent involvement. What is misasek? It is when someone does something without intending to, because he wasn’t paying attention or wasn’t being careful. He wasn’t watching what he was doing, and he had no intention of performing the melachah. We said earlier that the melachos of Shabbos require meleches machsheves—deliberate work. The action must be done with the intention of doing it. Here, he had no such intention. A person who does something like this has not violated a prohibition. So, for example, if a person leans against a switch—an

23:26 Speaker 2 electrical switch—on Shabbos and accidentally turns it on, he has not violated a prohibition. Nevertheless, the Sages wrote that he needs to examine himself: Why did this mishap happen through him? Why did he end up doing it? He therefore needs to do teshuvah. Why? Because merit comes about through a meritorious person, and wrongdoing comes about through a person who is liable. Nothing is merely an accident; a person needs to examine his deeds. Take the example given in halachah of someone who gets confused on Shabbos and begins saying, “You graciously grant knowledge to man.” In fact, it would have been fitting, even on Shabbos, to use the weekday order of blessings in Shemoneh Esrei. So what is so wrong with saying those words? Halachah even says that he should finish that blessing and then continue with the Shabbos prayer as usual. What, then, is the problem? The point is that if a person began saying, “You graciously grant knowledge to man,” it may be a sign that his Shabbos is a little too weekday-like. He needs to reflect on how to correct his conduct and how to let the holiness of Shabbos penetrate him more deeply. The same applies here: a person accidentally handled something and, by mistake, violated Shabbos—or more precisely, did not violate Shabbos, but inadvertently did something that would be forbidden if done deliberately. He needs to reflect on it. The Gemara in Shabbos, page 72, gives the example of a person whose knife fell among the garden beds, and in the process he cut something growing there. He had intended to do something permissible—say, to cut a tomato with the knife and eat it—but accidentally detached something that was growing. This is misasek, and he is exempt. He had not intended to cut the vegetable that the knife fell on. The same applies if a person goes out into the public domain with an object in his pocket

25:22 Speaker 2 And he did not intend to go out with that object, so he is exempt. He is not liable because he did not intend to do it; there is no deliberate, purposeful work here. Nevertheless, he needs to think about why this mishap happened through him, and why he ended up doing something that would be forbidden if done deliberately on Shabbos. Now, what is the difference between being preoccupied with something else and acting unwittingly? A person who acts unwittingly did not want to do a forbidden act. He did not know it was forbidden, or he did not know it was Shabbos. What does “unwittingly” mean? He did not know the act was forbidden, or he did not know what day it was. Someone who is preoccupied with something else did not want to do that act at all; it happened entirely by accident. In other words, the act itself was accidental. Someone acting unwittingly did the act, but did not know it was forbidden. He intended to do it and had a reason to do it. For example, he cut a vegetable, but it was still attached to the ground. He did not know that cutting something attached to the ground is forbidden on Shabbos, or he did not know it was Shabbos that day—but he did intend to cut the vegetable. By contrast, someone preoccupied with something else did not intend to cut the vegetable at all. As we just learned, the knife simply fell from his hand and cut something on the way, incidentally. So that sums up the definition of someone who is preoccupied with something else: he acts innocently, without intending to perform that forbidden act. The next category we will discuss today is an unintended consequence. A person intends to do something permitted, and while doing it, he might end up performing a forbidden act.

27:12 Speaker 2 So there is no prohibition in doing it. And that is true, by the way, even if he knows in advance that a forbidden act might result. In other words, he may have taken into account, even subconsciously, that something could happen when he does this, but his main intention was to do something permitted. The other result would happen incidentally, without his intending it. An important detail here is that the result must not be certain. If he knows for certain that the permitted action will cause a forbidden act, then it is forbidden. A classic example brought in halachah is someone dragging a bench, a bed, or a table, and making a furrow in the ground as he drags it. He has a garden apartment and is dragging a bench inside because guests have arrived. It is not certain that he will perform a forbidden act. Yes, he might make a furrow in which seeds could be planted, thereby violating the prohibition of plowing. That is possible, but it is not certain. This brings us to a related concept called psik reisha—literally, “cut off its head.” The term comes from the example of someone who takes a knife, cuts off a chicken’s head, and says, “I didn’t intend for it to die.” It is forbidden to kill an animal on Shabbos, but he says, “I didn’t intend for the chicken to die; I only meant to remove its head.” Of course, that is almost comical: you cannot cut off a chicken’s head and expect it not to die. That is why the expression is “psik reisha and it won’t die?” You cut off its head, and the chicken won’t die? This is a fundamental concept for defining any action that will certainly

29:26 Speaker 2 bring about a forbidden act. So an unintended consequence means that I do something permitted, and there is some chance that another act will result—but it is not certain. It is not a hundred-percent chance; let’s say it is fifty-fifty. By contrast, psik reisha means that the action will certainly, or almost certainly, bring about a forbidden act. To sum up: I can do something with an unintended consequence on Shabbos, sometimes even from the outset, although it might result in a forbidden act. But two conditions must be met. To drag a bench across the ground, I need two things: first, I do not intend to plow. There is no deliberate, purposeful work here. I do not intend to perform the act that might result. I do not want to—I have no—I am not intending to plow now, of course. Second, I am not certain that dragging the bench, bed, or table will actually make a furrow that is forbidden by the Torah. So far, we have discussed unintended consequences. The next category we will discuss today is a melachah that is not needed for its own sake. What does that mean? When doing it, he does not intend to achieve its usual purpose. He has no need for that purpose—certainly not the purpose for which the melachah was performed in the Mishkan. Either he has no purpose for it, or his purpose differs from the way it was done in the Mishkan. The Gemara gives examples of melachos that are not needed for their own sake, such as someone who digs a hole and does not need the dirt. He dug a hole, and he does not need the dirt from it. In the Mishkan, when they dug holes, they used the hole itself, not the dirt. Let’s explain this properly: in our case, he needs the dirt and does not need the hole. In the case

31:38 Speaker 2 of the Mishkan, they needed the hole and did not need the dirt. Another example: someone extinguishes a burning lamp. Why? To save the oil? To save the wick? In the Mishkan, why did they extinguish a flame? To produce charcoal; they needed charcoal. They were not trying to save wicks. So someone who extinguishes a lamp to save the wick is exempt under Torah law, because he did not need to produce charcoal; he wanted to keep the lamp from being used up. The Mishnah in Shabbos, on page 93, records a dispute about a melachah that is not needed for its own sake: is the person liable or exempt? This is a very well-known dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehudah says that if someone intended to perform the act, he is liable, even if he did not intend its usual purpose. In other words, Rabbi Yehudah is stringent. He says: it makes no difference—you intended to dig a hole, so you are liable. When are you exempt? Only if you did not intend to dig a hole at all, or you moved something by accident and a hole was dug. In other words, it is not necessary to intend the act’s usual purpose; intending the act itself is enough. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yehudah and holds that he is exempt under Torah law, though it is forbidden by rabbinic law. So according to Rabbi Yehudah, you have violated a Torah prohibition; according to Rabbi Shimon, a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because Rabbi Shimon says the person does not need the melachah itself. He did not intend its usual purpose, as we defined it earlier, but had a different purpose, and therefore he is exempt under Torah law. In practice, most halachic authorities follow Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, that a melachah not needed for its own sake is forbidden only

33:35 Speaker 2 Rabbinically prohibited. That is what the Shulchan Aruch writes in section 8 of siman 397, and the Mishnah Berurah explains his words and rules accordingly. Now, although the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon that this is a rabbinic prohibition, you should know that the Sages were stricter about it than about other rabbinic prohibitions, because it has an aspect of a Torah prohibition. So everyone should be especially careful with this rabbinic prohibition and, even in circumstances that might allow leniency, not combine grounds for leniency or be lenient with this melachah. That concludes another principle, called melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah—a melachah not needed for its own sake. The next principle we’ll discuss is called mekalkel. What is mekalkel? There is another condition for a melachah to be prohibited by the Torah: it must be done to achieve a constructive result, not to cause damage. If I’m trying to fix something, that’s one thing; but anyone who acts destructively is exempt from Torah liability. As the Rambam writes in Hilchos Shabbos, chapter 1: “All who act destructively are exempt.” That is the rule. Anyone who does an act that causes damage is exempt. For example, someone demolishes a building—not in order to build, but simply because he wants to destroy it, with no intention of putting anything in its place. He is exempt from Torah liability, though the act is forbidden. The Sages prohibited it, but he is exempt under Torah law. But if I cause damage for the sake of a constructive result—for example, I tear a garment to... I widen the tear so that it will be easier to sew—then the tearing was for the sake of fixing it. Since the tearing was for a constructive purpose, I have violated the prohibition. The tearing, the destructive act, is an integral part of the repair, and so it is forbidden. This is called tearing in order to sew. Or if someone... or erasing in order

35:55 Speaker 2 to write. Someone erased something because he needed the page to write on. The erasing is destructive, but I erased in order to write, so it is forbidden. The next point we’ll address today is doing a melachah for a lasting result. What does that mean? Another condition for a melachah to be prohibited by the Torah is that its result must last for an extended period. It can’t be something fleeting or temporary, something I’ve done just for the moment. In the Mishkan, all the melachos were done for a lasting result. So if someone writes in ink on parchment, or writes with a pen, it is forbidden. By contrast, if he writes on the condensation on a window, he has not violated a Torah prohibition. Why not? Because it doesn’t last. The Sages did prohibit writing on a window’s condensation, but under Torah law I have not violated the prohibition, because this is not a melachah with a lasting result. And so, as I mentioned when discussing the earlier principles, if someone goes to a hospital and needs to write or sign something, it is preferable to sign, for example, with an erasable pen. There are pens whose ink disappears after some time. An erasable pen. Why? Because the writing does not last. Or use a pencil that can be erased, rather than something that... The more he writes with something that does not last, the more he reduces the severity of the prohibition. In practice, he violates lesser, rabbinic prohibitions rather than a Torah prohibition. That concludes the principle of doing a melachah for a lasting result. The next principle we’ll address today is called grama, indirect causation. What is grama? The Gemara in Tractate Shabbos expounds on the verse, “You shall not do any melachah.” The Gemara asks: What does “do” mean? Only actually doing the melachah is forbidden. But if the melachah is caused by you

37:53 Speaker 2 indirectly, that is permitted. In other words, from the wording “do,” I learn that I am liable only if I perform a direct, active deed. But if I merely cause something to happen—grama—if it happens as a result of my action, that is permitted. So, generally speaking, grama does not incur Torah liability. The Sages nevertheless prohibited acts of grama as well. There are many instances, as we’ll learn, where we rely on grama to be lenient when there is a need. But each case requires its own discussion: whether several factors can be combined and whether one may be lenient on the basis of grama. For example, say I want to move up the time when a Shabbos timer turns a light on or off—in this case, we could say it turns it off. What am I doing? I’ve caused the light to stay on for a certain length of time. I haven’t switched the light on; I’ve only adjusted the timer. Adjusting the timer itself does nothing immediately. Only later does it cause the light to turn off earlier on Shabbos, or to turn on at a different time. So although I am not directly doing the action myself, it is still forbidden to do this from the outset. As we’ll learn, in many cases we do not make this adjustment. There is a distinction between turning a light off and turning it on, because, as we learned, the Torah says, “You shall not kindle a fire in any of your dwellings.” In other words, the Torah forbids kindling; it does not forbid extinguishing in the same way. Therefore, many authorities were lenient about extinguishing through grama. Where there is a need, a great need, or a need for a mitzvah, they permitted extinguishing through grama, but they did not permit kindling through grama. So if I extend the timer’s setting or adjust it to turn something off, as we learned, strictly speaking there is no Torah prohibition, because it is grama.

40:14 Speaker 2 But we’ll discuss in detail later which cases are permitted and which are forbidden. The next principle we’ll learn is called “two people who did it”—two people performing a melachah together. The Torah says: “And if one person from among the people of the land sins unintentionally by doing one of Hashem’s commandments that must not be done, and becomes guilty, he shall bring his offering.” What did the Sages derive from “one person”? They derived from the verse that a person is liable under Torah law only if he performed the melachah himself, alone. But if it is a melachah that one person could do, and two people did it together unnecessarily—one person would have been enough—then each is exempt from Torah liability, because the verse says “one person.” The Sages prohibited performing a melachah in this way too, with two people. But we should remember that under Torah law it does not incur liability; only the Sages prohibited it. For example, two people hold a pen and write together, like the example I gave earlier of signing a form or giving authorization at a non-Jewish hospital where I have to sign for them. If two of us are there, we can both hold the pen and sign together. Then it is a case of two people doing it: I have violated only a rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah prohibition. Another example, though, is forbidden even under Torah law: two people sawing a thick tree trunk. A thick trunk is different because it is very difficult for one person to saw it alone. Since this is a task that needs to be done, and is normally done, by two people, they are liable under Torah law. The next thing we’ll discuss, which I mentioned earlier, is the expression pesik reisha: “Will he cut off its head?” This refers to an action that inevitably causes something forbidden on Shabbos to happen as a matter of course. Right?

42:23 Speaker 2 So, as I said, this expression comes from someone who wanted to cut off a chicken’s head, or did cut off its head, and said he did not intend for it to die. Of course, that would be forbidden. Now we’ll learn about different kinds of psik reisha. The first kind discussed in halachah is psik reisha d’nicha lei: a person performs an action, and the result is desirable to him. He washes his hands over plants, and he wants the cucumber to grow. If he wants the cucumber to grow, that is a psik reisha. Certainly, when he washes his hands over the cucumber, the cucumber will absorb that water and grow. Incidentally, later, when we learn the relevant halachos, we’ll see that under a combination of circumstances there may sometimes be room to pour out water in winter onto ground that is already saturated with water. In that case, the cucumber will not grow from it; the water does not benefit it. It makes no difference whether you poured out the water or not. But the first kind of psik reisha is psik reisha d’nicha lei: he wants the resulting action to take place. He dragged a bench, a bed, or a table and made a furrow. He is pleased that the furrow was made, because after Shabbos he will come and plant seeds there. The second kind—there are three kinds—is psik reisha d’lo nicha lei. He does not want the result. For example, someone turns on the hot-water tap. He has a solar water heater, not an electric one. When he turns on the hot water and hot water comes out, cold water enters the tank. He does not want that cold water to enter

44:36 Speaker 2 the tank. On the other hand, he has also cooked the water, because the cold water is now flowing onto the boiling water in the tank. So that is a psik reisha. When he opens the tap, what will happen? Certainly, cold water from the water supply will flow into the tank and be heated by it. Nevertheless, he does not want that to happen. We’ll see, for example, that many halachic authorities were lenient about opening a hot-water tap on Shabbos when the water comes from a solar heater. Why? Because with a solar heater, this is a rabbinic prohibition: it involves something heated by the sun. There is no heating by fire here, no “You shall not kindle a fire in any of your dwellings.” The heat comes from the sun, and there was nothing like that in the Mishkan. It is only a decree of the Sages, who prohibited cooking with something heated by the sun because of the similarity to cooking with something heated by fire. But here we have both a psik reisha and a rabbinic prohibition, and he does not want the result, because it cools his water. He would prefer that the water in the tank remain hot without new water mixing in. That is why some were lenient in this case. The third kind of psik reisha, yes, is a doubtful psik reisha. He does not know whether the result will occur. It is highly likely, but not inevitable. We distinguish among these three types of prohibited psik reisha. First, there is a psik reisha involving a Torah-prohibited melachah. We’ve added another detail. Notice that the laws of Shabbos melachos involve many details; by putting them together, we’ll know how to rule and how to weigh the halachah. So, a psik reisha involving a Torah-prohibited melachah, where he violates a Torah prohibition and wants the result, is completely forbidden. Why? Because it is a psik reisha—the result will certainly

46:29 Speaker 2 occur—he wants it, and the prohibition is from the Torah, not rabbinic. It is therefore considered as though he performed the melachah intentionally, and it is a serious matter. Take the example we gave: a person washes his hands over the plants in his garden. His intention is not to water the plants; he intends to wash his hands. But watering the plants is certain to happen, it is forbidden, and he wants the result. His liability is under Torah law. By contrast, suppose a person performs an action that will certainly result in a Torah-prohibited melachah, but he does not want the result. That is a matter of dispute in the Gemara and among the later halachic authorities. Some say it is permitted, but most of the Rishonim wrote that it is forbidden. They said that although he is exempt under Torah law, it is forbidden by the Sages. The Shulchan Aruch rules that way too: it is forbidden. For example, as I mentioned, someone turns on a hot-water tap supplied by an electric boiler. What will certainly happen now? Cold water will enter the tank and be cooked by the hot water inside it. Cooking is a Torah prohibition. This is not something heated by the sun, as I explained earlier; it is something heated by fire. That counts as fire. So although this is a psik reisha d’lo nicha lei—he does not want the water to mix, because that cools the water in the tank—it is nevertheless forbidden, as the Shulchan Aruch rules, because the melachah here is prohibited by the Torah. The fact that he does not want the result is not enough. A third case: psik reisha d’nicha lei involving a rabbinically prohibited melachah. What if a person does something that will certainly cause a melachah to occur? What he does

48:31 Speaker 2 will inevitably cause that result. But the melachah here is prohibited by the Sages, while on the other hand, he wants the result. There are factors in favor of permitting it: he did not directly intend to perform that melachah, though it will certainly result from his action, and the melachah is only rabbinically prohibited. But the fact that he wants it weighs against him. So our halachic ruling is that in such cases we are stringent from the outset and forbid it. For example, a fly is bothering someone and flies into his bottle. Now there’s a fly buzzing around inside this bottle of mine, and I want to put the cap on. This is a psik reisha involving a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because of the melachah of trapping. First, let’s mention trapping: when I put the cap on, I trap the fly. But trapping a fly is not prohibited by the Torah. Why? Because it is not a species that people trap. People do not trap flies; the trapping done for the work of the Mishkan did not involve flies. This kind of living creature is not considered one that is normally trapped, so the melachah is rabbinically prohibited. On the other hand, trapping it is desirable to him, because the fly is bothering him and he wants it to stop. Nevertheless, here too there is a dispute about whether this counts as trapping when I trap the fly: do I need the fly itself, the trapped creature, or not? In this case I do not need the fly itself. I only want it to stop bothering me; I am not taking the fly to feed it to animals. So if he does need

50:27 Speaker 2 the fly itself, then it is certainly forbidden even after the fact, according to all opinions. But if he does not need the fly itself and closes the cap because the fly is causing him considerable distress, there are grounds for saying that, after the fact, he is exempt. So we have now learned about psik reisha in cases involving rabbinic prohibitions. We explained why trapping the fly is prohibited by the Sages and why he wants the result. We said that we do not do such a thing from the outset. The fourth kind of psik reisha we’ll discuss now involves a rabbinically prohibited melachah whose result he does not want. In general, most halachic authorities permit it, especially when there is a need. We’ll add another detail to the laws of Shabbos melachos: what kind of need? A mitzvah-related need, or a great need. For example, someone is in considerable distress because a fly is bothering him so much. That is called a need; it is distress. Sometimes—and again, as I said, only Torah scholars and halachic authorities may rule whether something is permitted or forbidden—when a person is in great distress, or there is a communal need or a mitzvah-related need, those become additional factors in weighing whether there is reason to be lenient. For example, take a solar water heater, as I mentioned earlier, rather than an electric one. We have a psik reisha involving a rabbinic prohibition, and he does not want the result. As we said, cooking with something heated by the sun is rabbinically prohibited, and he does not want new water entering the tank and cooling the water there. That is why many were lenient. But there is a qualification: first of all, many were stringent about this and used only cold water. Even for someone who follows the lenient view, the Sages ruled that one may not use it to wash one’s entire body. That is, it may be used only to wash one’s hands, feet, or face separately

52:43 Speaker 2 If he washes each limb separately, he may do so. But he may not do so if he has washed his entire body. The fifth and final point about pesik reisha is a doubtful pesik reisha: I don’t know whether the result will happen. The Taz writes something novel here: a doubtful pesik reisha is like an unintended act, and it is permitted. Take a box, for example. I have a box here that I use for storage, and there are a few flies inside. If I close the box now, the flies will be trapped automatically. What am I allowed to do? There is a doubt: perhaps when I close it, they will fly out, or perhaps I will close it and one will remain inside without my having seen it. The Taz writes that in such a case, where there is doubt about the pesik reisha, I may do it. Later authorities disagreed about the Taz’s position: is this permitted even for a Torah prohibition, or only for a rabbinic one? Flies, as we mentioned earlier, are not a species ordinarily trapped, so there is room to be lenient in accordance with the Taz. But can I also be lenient where a Torah prohibition is involved? I won’t quote all the authorities, but let’s go over the general range of opinions. Some say that it can be permitted even for a Torah prohibition; that is also the ruling brought in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah. In the Mishnah Berurah, though, there is a contradiction. Both in the Mishnah Berurah and in the Biur Halachah, there are passages that suggest leniency, while elsewhere the Mishnah Berurah says it applies only to rabbinic prohibitions. In other words, we find indications in the Biur Halachah both that it is forbidden and that it is permitted, while the Mishnah Berurah also says it is permitted. So there is no—

54:54 Speaker 2 clear, consistent position here. In light of this, with a doubtful pesik reisha involving a Torah prohibition, a person should be stringent and not perform the act. With a rabbinic prohibition, there is room to be lenient when necessary and to rely on the Taz. Let’s remember that, when necessary, one can ask a non-Jew to help in these situations. I’ll give another example. A person is unsure whether the light in the refrigerator is on or off. People who didn’t have a Shabbos refrigerator used to disable the light. I don’t know how many people today are familiar with this, but they would unscrew the bulb so it wouldn’t turn on during Shabbos. Today refrigerators are electronic. We buy a Shabbos refrigerator, and ideally that is what one should do for various reasons. We don’t have time to go into them now, perhaps later. But what happens if someone wants to open the refrigerator after Shabbos has begun and doesn’t know whether its light will turn on? Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah says that when this doubt arises, we presume the bulb retains its original status—that it is on—and therefore it is forbidden to open the refrigerator. Others are lenient. Some, for example, have permitted having a young child do it. The question, as we said before, is whether I presume the refrigerator retains its original status, as Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah writes, or follow Menuchas Ahavah, which writes that one may open the refrigerator before Shabbos. One may open it, take out everything one needs, or leave

57:06 Speaker 2 the refrigerator open and later have a non-Jew close it. Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah is stringent and says that even in this case, we should not open the refrigerator. The further question, as I outlined earlier, is whether I presume the bulb retains its original status and is on, or say: no, I have a doubt here. This is a doubtful pesik reisha, and in this case I can be lenient. We also have to remember that turning on a light on Shabbos is itself the subject of a major question: is it a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic prohibition? That leads to another question: is the bulb incandescent, as was more common in the past, or is it LED or fluorescent? With an LED or fluorescent light, there is even more room to be lenient. Why? Because there is a doubt about those as well. There is a general question whether turning on electricity on Shabbos is a Torah prohibition at all, and if it is, we ask whether it falls under the melachah of building or the melachah of kindling. Regarding LEDs, most authorities hold that it is not the melachah of kindling. That leaves the question of building. But since the melachos of Shabbos are serious and one must be careful with them, everyone should be stringent in this matter and ask a non-Jew to open the refrigerator. So far, we have summarized all the types of pesik reisha. We said there is a pesik reisha d’lo nicha lei, where the result is not desirable to him. We said there is a pesik reisha d’nicha lei, where it is desirable to him. And we said there is a doubtful pesik reisha, where it is uncertain whether the result will occur. After defining these three types, we made a halachic distinction between them. We spoke about a pesik reisha involving a Torah-prohibited melachah whose result is desirable to him, and a pesik reisha involving a Torah-prohibited melachah

59:03 Speaker 2 whose result is not desirable to him. Again: a Torah-prohibited melachah where he wants the result, and a Torah-prohibited melachah where he does not. Then there is a pesik reisha involving a rabbinically prohibited melachah whose result is desirable to him, and one whose result is not desirable to him. And the fifth and final category we defined is a doubtful pesik reisha. That concludes our summary of the types of doubt involved when a person performs an act whose prohibited result is fairly certain to occur. The next principle we will study is the last of the fundamental principles of the laws of Shabbos: the minimum amount of melachah. How much must a person do? In the laws of what is forbidden and permitted, there are minimum amounts. How much must a person eat to become liable under Torah law? Most Torah mitzvos have minimum amounts for liability. Eating forbidden fat and eating on Yom Kippur have minimum amounts, as do many, many other things. Most Shabbos melachos also have prescribed minimum amounts. Below those amounts, a person is not liable for penalties such as a sin offering, kareis, or stoning. But although there are minimum amounts, as we will learn later, someone who does less than that amount has still committed a prohibition and needs to do teshuvah. Doing less than the minimum may exempt you from bringing an offering, but you have still violated Shabbos. For example, someone who wrote on Shabbos: we will learn in the laws of writing that one is liable only if one writes two letters, not one, because in the Mishkan they wrote two letters on the boards. They would write on the board with the projecting end and on the board with the corresponding socket, and the two letters together constituted the prohibited act. Here he wrote only one letter, but he still needs atonement and teshuvah. He does not need to bring an offering, but he does need to do teshuvah. The authorities disagreed,

1:01:12 Speaker 2 What happens if a person did half the required measure, as we find in the laws of what is forbidden and permitted? Is half the required measure prohibited by the Torah or by rabbinic law? The Magen Avraham, and likewise the Mishnah Berurah, say that it is prohibited by the Torah. By contrast, most halachic authorities understand the Rambam himself to hold that it is prohibited by rabbinic law. So there remains a dispute about half the required measure of a prohibition. Of course, a person should keep away from it. One should not enter into doubts in these matters at all, and certainly should not knowingly transgress even half the required measure of a Torah prohibition, even if some authorities hold that it is prohibited only by rabbinic law. I’m now summarizing the rules and definitions in the laws of Shabbos. We spoke about something done with a major change from the usual way, or with two changes together. We gave the example of crushing something with the handle of a knife: I’m crushing it with the handle, and I’m also not using the usual implements, a pestle and mortar. We spoke about misasek, an action a person does incidentally, without intending it at all; it happens without his noticing. We said that even in this case, a person needs to be careful. And even if someone sinned by mistake, he needs to examine his actions, though this is permitted and does not involve a Torah prohibition. We spoke about davar she’eino miskavein: he had no intention at all of performing this melachah, but while doing one thing, he also did another. We explained that he must neither intend for the melachah to occur nor be certain that it will result from his action. We explained pesik reisha and defined the term itself. We gave the example of a person cutting off a chicken’s head and saying he did not intend for it to die. It makes no sense to say that, and it is not accepted in halachah either. Here, too, he performed an action that was permitted

1:03:17 Speaker 2 but that led, with near certainty, to a prohibited action. We defined types of pesik reisha: one whose result benefits him, one whose result does not benefit him, and a case where it is uncertain whether there will be a pesik reisha. We distinguished between the types of prohibition involved. We spoke about a pesik reisha involving a Torah-prohibited melachah whose result benefits him, and one involving a Torah-prohibited melachah whose result does not benefit him. We defined a pesik reisha involving a rabbinically prohibited melachah, whether its result benefits him or not, and we defined a case of uncertain pesik reisha. That completes our summary of pesik reisha. We then went on to melachah she’einah tzrichah legufah, where a person does not intend the melachah for its defining purpose, and we brought the dispute among the halachic authorities. As a general rule, we explained that the tendency is to rule that he is exempt from Torah liability if he did not intend the action for that purpose. This is the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon. He did not intend it for the specific purpose it served in the Mishkan, so he is exempt under Torah law, but it is still prohibited by rabbinic law. After that, we defined destructive melachah. A further condition is that he intend to do something constructive, to build and not merely to destroy. We explained that demolishing for the sake of building is also considered constructive. We defined the requirement that a melachah endure over time rather than be temporary, such as writing on something that will be erased, or writing in the condensation on a window, as opposed to writing with a pen on paper, which endures. We defined the rule of grama, where I merely cause a melachah to happen. The Torah prohibited a melachah involving an actual act, but not one caused indirectly. Therefore, anything caused indirectly is exempt under Torah law. I stress: under Torah law, not rabbinic law. Second to last, we defined the case of two people performing a melachah together: the melachah must be done by one person, not two, and if two did it, they are exempt under Torah law.

1:05:19 Speaker 2 For any melachah that one person could perform alone, if two nonetheless performed it together, they are exempt under Torah law, though it is prohibited by rabbinic law. We also explained that most Shabbos melachos have minimum required measures. If a person performs less than the required measure, he is not liable. Nevertheless, even if he did only half the required measure, he has transgressed a prohibition. There is a dispute over whether that prohibition is from the Torah or rabbinic law, but in any event, he needs to do teshuvah for the sin he committed. With Hashem’s help, we have completed the introduction to the 39 melachos. From here on, we will go through each of the melachos and try to explain it thoroughly, using the many rules we brought together and explained today. We have tried to explain them in a way everyone can understand. Be blessed.