The Laws of the Synagogue - Rabbi Eyal Peled shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You are listening to the “Lema’an Yishme’u” podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Greetings to all our dear viewers. Today we’re going to talk about proper conduct when we’re in a shul. First, I want to start with the basic principle: a shul is a holy place. There is a mitzvah called reverence for a shul: “You shall revere My Sanctuary”—reverence for the One Who dwells there. Since a shul has holiness, it is called a “minor sanctuary,” as the verse says, “I have been for them a minor sanctuary.” It bears a resemblance to the Beis Hamikdash, and we need to treat it accordingly, with sacred reverence and respect. As for the holiness of a shul itself, some hold that it is from the Torah, and that the mitzvah of reverence for the Sanctuary—including reverence for a shul—is from the Torah. The Sdei Chemed cites many groups of halachic authorities on this question, and the Mabit also holds that the holiness of a shul and the mitzvah of reverence for the Sanctuary are from the Torah. By contrast, some authorities hold that it is rabbinic. Among them is the Meiri, who concludes in his commentary that the holiness is rabbinic, and that seems to be the position most authorities take. But ultimately, it is holy, and one must conduct oneself respectfully there. The same includes a beis midrash. We’ll see later what this holiness requires. In addition, the halachic authorities—including the Mabit, and Shaarei Teshuvah also addresses this—write that even the outer walls of a shul have holiness. The entire shul is holy. In fact, one could say there is some disagreement among the Rishonim about the nature of a shul’s holiness. According to the Ran, it is a rabbinic holiness that the Sages conferred upon it. According to the Ritva, a shul is defined as an article used for a mitzvah. Such articles have holiness while the mitzvah is being performed with them, even though, once the mitzvah is finished,

02:40 Speaker 2 they no longer have holiness. But while the mitzvah is being performed, an active shul where people daven certainly has holiness. It must be treated in keeping with the restrictions that apply to sacred articles. We’ll learn about those later as well, but the halachic authorities write that even a shul’s outer wall is included in its holiness. We’ll see later what practical difference that makes, but it’s important to know that the outer wall, too, has the holiness of a shul—particularly regarding the prohibition against demolishing a shul, as we’ll see. So the authorities write that even on the outer wall, it is not proper to hammer in nails or hang wires, electrical lines, telephone lines, and the like. That wall has holiness, even though it is an outer wall. The Tzemach Tzedek also addresses this himself in responsum 20 of his Orach Chaim responsa. He discusses the thickness of the walls and agrees that it has holiness—perhaps a somewhat lesser degree of holiness, but holiness nonetheless. So it is not proper to hammer in various nails or attach wires and the like there, unless it is needed to supply electricity to the shul, for example; then it would be fine. Because a shul has holiness, the Mishnah in Tractate Megillah teaches us: “One may not behave frivolously in shuls, such as by engaging in idle conversation, sleeping, eating, entering to escape the heat or entering to escape the rain,” and the like. All kinds of conduct that can be classed as frivolity are forbidden in a shul, because of its holiness, as we said. The basic point is that when you enter a shul, you’re entering a place for serving Hashem. It’s a place where you should daven or learn, where you should be occupied with serving Hashem. It’s not a place for all kinds of private, personal matters. So if

04:52 Speaker 2 so, the Magen Avraham divides uses of a shul into three—one could say three levels—of things that are not appropriate to do there. He starts like this: first, there is a use that involves no frivolity at all, but still shouldn’t take place in a shul. For example, strolling. Even just sitting in a shul for no particular reason isn’t appropriate. A person simply wants to rest, so he comes in and sits down: “Oh, let’s rest here a bit, sit for a while.” There’s nothing frivolous about it, but it’s not something one is supposed to do in a shul, so one may not do it there. The wording of the Mishnah, which also appears in halacha, is: “One may not stroll in them.” What does that mean? In the book Tzedakah Umishpat, he writes that it means entering as one might enter a sukkah to feel more at ease, to rest, to get some air—I don’t know, all sorts of things for which you can’t use a shul. The Aruch Hashulchan writes something interesting. He says that “strolling in a shul” refers to a person who feels restless and wants to walk from one end of the shul to the other to ease his mind and stroll around. That’s how the Aruch Hashulchan explains it. That’s not appropriate. A shul isn’t meant to be a place where you calm yourself by pacing back and forth. It reminds me a little—and perhaps lends some support to—what I know about the Rebbe Rashab: he wasn’t so fond of the practice of walking around the shul while davening. I don’t know if the reason

06:57 Speaker 2 was connected to the davening itself, probably, but there seems to be another aspect here too: a shul simply isn’t meant for that. Now, if walking helps you daven better, then presumably there’s no problem with it. But just walking around the shul for a stroll isn’t appropriate. The same applies to entering a shul to call someone. That, too, is not a use for which a shul is intended. If you have some business with a person, a shul isn’t meant to be a place where you start calling people out, and so on. Of course, there are situations where you have no choice and need to call someone who is in the shul. In that case, the halacha says—the Shulchan Aruch says—that when you enter a shul to call someone, meaning you have no intention of doing anything connected with the shul’s purpose, such as davening or learning, you may enter on condition that you recite a verse or remain there briefly. This distinction is drawn from the Mishnah Berurah, which uses the word “or.” In other words, you don’t have to do both. You don’t have to both stay and recite a verse. You can even review a verse as you walk in, call the person, and continue on your way. Or you can enter the shul and sit for a little while. The halachic authorities write that the required time to sit, according to the Shulchan Aruch, is the time it takes to pass through two doorways. What does “two doorways” mean? One doorway is four amos, so two doorways are the time it takes to walk eight amos. That’s a few seconds. So a person sits and remains there

09:03 Speaker 2 He stays there a little while and calls the person he needs, or takes what he needs from the shul, and then he can leave. But it’s important that he first spend some time there or say a verse, and only afterward call the person, so it doesn’t look as though he came in to call that person and, by the way, also said a verse—as though the verse was secondary. No, entering to say a verse or spend some time there has to be the main purpose. Once you’ve done that, you can also call the person or take what you need from the shul, and that’s fine. So let’s return to our levels. The first level, as the Magen Avraham says, is a use that involves no frivolity at all. Even that is ruled out; you can’t do it in a shul. You shouldn’t stroll around there, sit there for no reason, call people in, and so on. That isn’t appropriate in a shul either. The second level is a use that’s somewhat more problematic. In the Magen Avraham’s words, it involves “a little frivolity.” What does that mean? Examples are eating, drinking, sleeping, casual conversation, going in to escape the sun or the rain, smoking in shul, or reading newspapers in shul. Even if it’s Kfar Chabad, even if it’s Beis Moshiach, shul is not the place to read it. With all due respect, that’s not what we have a shul for. This is called a use involving a little frivolity. So let’s go into some detail. First, regarding sleep: the halachah explicitly says that neither a brief nap nor a regular sleep is permitted. You don’t—

10:52 Speaker 2 sleep there, neither a brief nap nor a regular sleep. A shul isn’t a place to sleep. It’s important to emphasize that the two levels we’ve discussed concern someone who comes into shul to daven. He’s supposed to be there to daven, not to do the things we mentioned, so he shouldn’t sleep, eat, drink, and so on. But for people who study in shul, the halachah discusses a beis midrash, where Torah scholars study. It’s their home; they’re there all the time. But it doesn’t have to be specifically a beis midrash or people who study there regularly. Even someone who comes in to learn—say he wants to learn a maamar of Chassidus before Rosh Hashanah, or just sit down and learn a sicha, a maamar, or a Talmudic topic—the rules are much more lenient for him. To prevent him from losing time he could spend learning Torah, we permit these things. If he needs to smoke, all right, he can smoke. If he needs something to eat to keep his strength up, he can eat or drink. He can even rest his head on his hand and doze a little. But it’s worth knowing that when you rest your head and doze, you shouldn’t do it facing the Aron Kodesh. Move a little to the side; doing it directly in front of the Aron Kodesh is still disrespectful. So when we speak about the prohibition on sleeping, we don’t mean someone who came to learn. We mean someone who came to daven; he shouldn’t be sleeping there in shul. The same applies to casual conversation. This is something that needs emphasis. First, it’s important to clarify that when casual conversation is prohibited in shul, the Mishnah Berurah already writes that this doesn’t mean—

12:46 Speaker 2 we’re not talking about completely idle chatter. We’re talking about conversation for a purpose, a substantive discussion about earning a living or another personal need that a person is permitted to discuss. Completely idle talk is problematic even outside shul. We’re talking about conversations a person needs to have, things halachah permits, and even those casual conversations shouldn’t take place in shul. The Rebbe writes about this. The Rebbe writes that talking in shul, especially during davening or Torah reading, is utterly contrary to the honor and sanctity of the shul. That is what the Rebbe writes. The Zohar uses very, very severe language. The Alter Rebbe himself cites that language in section 124. The Alter Rebbe writes that speaking during davening is very serious: it shows disrespect for the Shechinah. The congregation is occupied with honoring Heaven, while he shows that it doesn’t interest him and carries on talking. “His sin is too great to bear.” That wording appears in the Shulchan Aruch, and the Alter Rebbe quotes it: “His sin is too great to bear.” We know these are weighty words. They were said about Cain, who did very, very grave things. “His sin is too great to bear.” That shows how serious this is and how much attention we need to give it. The Alter Rebbe goes on to cite something that also appears in the Zohar: the Zohar says this prolongs the exile. It says that because of this, the Jewish people remain in exile. We ask, “How much longer?” We want so badly to leave exile already. We would be the last people to want to prolong it, G-d forbid. Yet it says explicitly that this prolongs the exile. And more than that, the Zohar says, “He has no share in the G-d of Israel.” The Alter Rebbe quotes—

14:51 Speaker 2 those words about having no share, and so on. So we need to be extremely careful about this, especially during davening and Torah reading. The Rebbe Rashab discusses it at length and rejects it entirely. In any case, as we said, the prohibition on casual conversation applies even to conversation for a purpose. All the more so when it’s just idle chatter: that certainly isn’t desirable and doesn’t belong in a shul. That’s not what a shul is for. The same applies to going in to escape the sun or the rain. Of course, that isn’t appropriate either. Some people even asked whether air conditioners could be installed in a shul, because someone might be walking down the street, feeling terribly hot, and want to get to the shul. Why? For the air conditioning, to cool off a little—or perhaps he wants water. So there were people who discussed this. In practice, of course, there’s no problem. Today air conditioning isn’t a luxury; it’s a basic necessity. It has to be installed for summer and winter, and so on. But that shows how seriously the rule against going in to escape the sun or rain was taken. So that’s the second level we discussed in some detail: a little frivolity. As we said, it also includes eating and drinking. Those things shouldn’t be done in shul either. We’ll see different circumstances later, but for now, that’s the basic halachah. The third level of frivolity is what the Magen Avraham calls “great frivolity.” What is great frivolity? He says it means laughter and mockery. It’s

16:45 Speaker 2 That is already considered a real show of disrespect for the shul. Joking around and making fun, and all sorts of things like that, are obviously a serious form of frivolous behavior. You could include in this, for example, situations where people want to perform shechitah in the shul before Rosh Hashanah or before Yom Kippur. Obviously, that is disrespectful. It is unbecoming, and you don’t do it in a shul. If it has to be done, it can be done in the shul courtyard, but not inside the shul itself. Even though shechitah is a mitzvah, it is still not appropriate behavior for a shul. There is blood and mess and so on, so it is not done in a shul. That, too, is among the serious forms of frivolous behavior. So that is the third level of what we call a person’s conduct in a shul. At the beginning, we discussed the basis for the sanctity of a shul: whether it is from the Torah or rabbinic, what kind of sanctity it has, and so on. But the Gemara in Megillah tells us that the shuls in Babylonia were built on a condition. In other words, the Gemara tells us that there is such a thing as building a shul on a condition. What does that mean? The Rishonim have different views on this: whether the condition helps only while the shul is in use or only after it falls into ruin; only in Eretz Yisroel or only outside Eretz Yisroel, or perhaps in Eretz Yisroel as well. There are many, many opinions. In practical terms, the condition means that the people who built the shul did so on the condition that it would be possible to eat and drink there and the like. That is, its sanctity is, so to speak, conditional from the outset: it is limited in situations where we need to eat and drink there, and so on, and the condition allows that. Now, regarding shuls built on a condition, there is

18:52 Speaker 2 a disagreement about what the condition permits. Since we discussed those three levels of conduct in a shul, there is a disagreement here as well. The Magen Avraham says that building a shul on a condition helps only with the first level: uses that involve no frivolous behavior at all. The Mishnah Berurah, on the other hand, says that it also applies to the second level, allowing people to eat and drink there, and to sleep there when necessary. Casual conversation is still not allowed. Even in a shul built on a condition, casual conversation in the sense of idle chatter is still not allowed. Conversation for a purpose can be treated more leniently. It is still not desirable, but there is room to be lenient. And again, not during davening or Torah reading. We are not talking about that at all; obviously not. We are talking about a time when people are not davening, when the congregation is not davening. If a need arises to discuss something important and practical, related to earning a living and the like, that is possible in shuls built on a condition. There is another level to this matter of conditions. So we said that it allows casual conversation; it allows eating and drinking, and it also allows a brief nap, at any rate. There is something else concerning the condition, which we will discuss a little more fully shortly. There is a kind of condition that is actually much stronger, because, after all, whether a condition helps with these things is subject to disagreement. As we said, the Magen Avraham does not agree, while others do. So G-d-fearing people who did not want to enter into this problem or concern, and certainly did not want even a possibility of disrespecting the shul, decided that when they built a

21:01 Speaker 2 shul, they would do so on the condition that it would have no sanctity as a shul at all. It would not be called a shul; it would not have that sanctity at all. Rather, it would be a kind of meeting place for Torah scholars, where people gather to daven, to learn, and so on. But it would not have the halachic status of a shul, so they did not call it a shul either. They called it a shtiebel, a kloiz, and other names that indicate that this is not a shul. When a building is constructed on that condition, there is even more room for leniency, and even casual conversation is permitted there. But again, although casual conversation and idle chatter may be permitted in such a place, not during davening or Torah reading. One must also avoid joking, mockery, excessive frivolity, and the like, because, after all, there is an aron kodesh there, there are seforim, and there is sanctity. So care is still required. These, then, are places built on the special condition that the sanctity of a shul will not take effect in them at all. On the one hand, this has the advantage of avoiding the concern, and the very undesirable possibility, of compromising the sanctity of a shul. On the other hand, we lose the sanctity of a shul. There is a mitzvah to build a shul that has sanctity, and davening is more readily accepted there. So this really requires care; not everyone can allow themselves to do such a thing. It truly calls for people who are thoroughly G-d-fearing. As for shuls in practice today, the poskim write that the prevailing view among them is that all shuls today are built on a condition, unless someone explicitly built a shul with the intention that it would have

23:01 Speaker 2 full sanctity. But generally, shuls today are built on a condition. That is why we see that we do use shuls for eating, for seudos mitzvah, such as a bris milah, a pidyon haben, and so on. We do eat and drink in shuls. So how is that permitted? Because the shul was built on a condition from the outset. Even if no explicit condition was made, this is what is called “the beis din’s understanding makes that condition.” Since these things are customary and commonly done, when I build a shul, it is understood from the outset that it is on the condition that I can eat and drink there at seudos mitzvah and the like. The question is—and here the poskim really disagree—what does this unspoken condition permit? Some have written that it permits only seudos mitzvah that do not involve frivolous behavior: meals for a bris milah, a pidyon haben, a bar mitzvah, and the like. But some poskim write otherwise. It is reported in Rabbi Wosner’s name that one should not rely on this to eat, for example, a meal for a bride and groom, sheva brachos, and the like. He does not agree that this is permissible. On the other hand, there are those who say that it is. Actually, Rabbi Wosner relies not on the condition but on the Yerushalmi, which says that seudos mitzvah may be held in a shul. So he says that this applies only to seudos mitzvah. Other poskim maintain that other meals are also permitted, even eating in general—whether it is sheva brachos, a kiddush on Shabbos, a farbrengen, and so on. In fact, the Rebbe also addresses this point. The Rebbe was asked this question: what is the basis for permitting

25:11 Speaker 2 Making kiddush in a shul? The Rebbe writes explicitly: Since this was and still is the practice in Jewish communities, we assume that a shul was built from the outset on the condition that people could hold kiddushim there. And we know what kind of kiddush we’re talking about: it’s something like a celebratory meal, where people drink and may even get drunk, and so on. So we can learn from this that shuls nowadays are built from the outset on the condition that people can eat and drink there. But again, not just any meal—a meal with the content of a mitzvah. Even if people drink there and may get drunk, that is possible too. Another thing to note regarding respect for a shul is what’s called kapandarya. You must not use a shul as a kapandarya—a shortcut. I can’t use the shul to shorten my route. But there are several exceptions to this prohibition. There are certain circumstances in which I can pass through a shul as a shortcut. First, the Mishnah Berurah writes that if a person recites a verse or stays a little while—as we discussed earlier, when someone wants to enter a shul to call someone or take something from there, he may do so by reciting a verse or staying a little while. According to the Mishnah Berurah, that applies to a shortcut too. I can use the shul as a shortcut provided I first recite a verse, or stay a little while, and so on. That’s one way. The Mishnah Berurah does write this, but many poskim disagree. They also infer from the Rambam that using a shul as a shortcut was not permitted. The allowance was for calling someone. So, say you stay a little while and so on, but if you’re using the shul as a shortcut, how does staying there help? In their view, it doesn’t. So, ideally, it’s hard to rely on this allowance.

27:17 Speaker 2 Ideally, one should not rely on this allowance or use a shul as a shortcut. In a pressing situation, though, the Mishnah Berurah does rule that it is possible, using that solution. But ideally, don’t rely on it, because many poskim disagree with this allowance. In addition, the Pri Megadim says that if the shortcut is for the sake of a mitzvah, it is permitted. The Mishnah Berurah comments on this Pri Megadim and qualifies his words: He means when I need to do something connected with a mitzvah in the shul itself. For example, we said I can’t enter a shul just to call someone or take an object from there. But if I enter the shul for a mitzvah—say, I want to distribute leaflets there about schach, about Sukkas HaGeulah, or about other mitzvah needs, or I want to take a sefer from there or something like that—then I may enter the shul. Even if I only do that mitzvah and leave, without davening or learning anything there, but just take something from there or leave something there, it is permitted. That’s how the Mishnah Berurah explains the Pri Megadim’s position. But from this we also understand that if I want to take a shortcut through a shul to reach another mitzvah—say there are places with one shul beyond another, and I could walk through the first shul

29:08 Speaker 2 to reach the second—that is not acceptable. I can’t do that; I need to go around to get there. The same applies to other mitzvos that aren’t performed in the shul. If walking through the shul would give me a shortcut to a mitzvah, that doesn’t help. This allowance doesn’t apply. Another matter concerning respect for a shul is spitting in the shul. The Gemara learns from the rule about the Temple Mount that a person may not enter wearing his money belt or carrying his pack, or use it as a shortcut, as we said. Accordingly, one may not use a shul as a shortcut either; and spitting on the Temple Mount is forbidden by a kal vachomer. The Gemara asks: Why, then, is spitting permitted in a shul? What is the difference between that and using it as a shortcut? We said you cannot use a shul as a shortcut, but spitting is permitted. That is also how the Shulchan Aruch rules. The Gemara explains this with an important principle: A shul is like a person’s home. A person objects to people using his home as a shortcut—no one would agree to that—but people do not generally object to spitting. So the same applies in a shul: we object to using it as a shortcut, but not to spitting. That’s all well and good. But the apparent conclusion is that this was true in their day, when people really didn’t object to spitting, so it was permitted in a shul too. Nowadays, an ordinary person doesn’t want anyone spitting in his home; he doesn’t spit in his own home. So we need to be very careful about spitting in a shul—not to spit there casually. Certainly not. We also need

31:06 Speaker 2 to bear in mind what the Gemara in Chagigah says about the verse, “For G-d will bring every deed into judgment”: this includes someone who spits in front of another person. We need to be very careful. I think that all those movements the Rebbe would make with his hand were also so that it wouldn’t be spitting in front of someone else. After all, people find it unpleasant, so one should try to do it discreetly, so to speak. But when it comes to spitting during Aleinu, that is a different matter. It has the substance of a practice connected with a mitzvah, a custom. First of all, this custom is recorded in the Taz, who explains it as a form of contempt for idol worship: we say “to idols,” and so on. And there is the explanation in Hayom Yom that we don’t want to benefit from the saliva, and so on. So that is a different matter. If I’m not mistaken, even at home, a person davening at home would spit at that point. It is for the sake of a mitzvah. What I personally don’t accept—and I’ve encountered several people like this; I’m giving my personal opinion now—is doing it in a shul where people don’t have the custom to spit, a shul for a particular nusach and a particular community. It isn’t appropriate to spit there; it doesn’t respect the place or the congregation. They aren’t familiar with it, and it goes against their custom. If they see it as disrespectful and so on, then one should respect that. But in a chassidic shtiebel and the like, where people from different groups and different chassidic communities come to daven, and often someone steps up and davens according to his own nusach, it isn’t appropriate for someone to remark, “Why are you spitting?” It’s a recorded custom. That would be like someone objecting, “Why do you slaughter chickens? It’s not nice, it’s not respectful, it’s not…” That’s how it is; this is about idol worship.

33:01 Speaker 2 And there is a point to expressing a certain measure of contempt for idol worship. So yes. But at the same time, be considerate—don’t spit, so to speak, with extra zeal. Do it discreetly. That’s regarding spitting during Aleinu Leshabeiach. And while we’re talking about spitting, of course we know that one should cover the saliva with one’s foot and rub it away. On Shabbos, though, be careful not to rub it; just place your foot over it. Another very important point about conduct in a shul is something the Tashbetz raises. The Shulchan Aruch cites him too. The Tashbetz says not to enter a shul with a long knife, and he explains why. The reasoning is very understandable: prayer is meant to lengthen a person’s life. We know that prayer is among the things whose fruits a person enjoys, and so on. Prayer lengthens a person’s life, while a knife is meant to shorten a person’s life. The two don’t go together. That’s why the Tashbetz writes that one should not enter a shul with a knife. Now, we don’t come in with knives, but often people need to enter a shul with a weapon—soldiers, security personnel, and so on. Does the same issue apply here? The truth is that it does. A weapon, too, is meant to shorten life. Follow the reasoning: if a weapon is meant to shorten a person’s life and prayer is meant to lengthen it, the two don’t go together. So ideally, first of all, if it’s possible, don’t come to shul with a weapon. Of course, if it isn’t possible—you can’t just leave a weapon unattended. But if it’s possible to arrange a safe where weapons can be deposited, it’s best not to bring them into the shul. If

35:16 Speaker 2 you do need to bring one in, the poskim write that you should cover the weapon, at least so it isn’t visible. The Tzitz Eliezer says to cover it with your tallis or clothing, to put it under your clothing—make sure the weapon isn’t visible. I haven’t really seen people being particular about this, and I also haven’t seen anyone permit otherwise. The Yechaveh Daas also writes that if there’s no choice and one must enter a shul with a weapon, it should be covered. Ultimately, though, he says that if it can’t be covered either, one may enter even with a visible weapon. As is his way, he relies on a combination of considerations—one point, another point, and yet another. He brings in the Rosh’s novel ruling about going out with a weapon on Shabbos: for a soldier who has no choice and needs to carry a weapon, it is considered like clothing. He also brings in the Taz, who asks: Why did the Tashbetz speak specifically about a long knife? Why not a short one? The Taz says that a long knife isn’t really needed. If you want to peel an orange, take a short knife; you don’t need a long one. So you shouldn’t enter with a long knife. But if it’s a small knife that you do need, the Taz says you may enter with it. He adds that consideration too: a soldier who needs to enter with his weapon may do so. So in the end, he says that if there’s no choice, one may enter with a visible weapon. But most poskim do write that one should make every effort to keep the weapon from being visible. The Tzitz Eliezer

37:03 Speaker 2 also offers an interesting suggestion. He says: Take the weapon and remove the magazine, keeping them separate. That way, he says, it isn’t a weapon that can shorten a person’s life. It can shorten life when it’s loaded with the magazine and can be used. But while the weapon is taken apart, he sees no problem with it. So these suggestions can be used. If there’s no choice, one can at least follow the Tzitz Eliezer’s suggestion, and if that isn’t possible, try to cover the weapon. If it can’t be covered, then there’s no choice. There are situations of danger in which one must enter with it, so one enters. But it is important to know that one should try to keep it covered. Entering with a dog: There are people, unfortunately, who cannot see well and need to enter a shul with a dog. I saw the Rebbe address this. I think the Rebbe was replying to someone who cited Torah Sheleimah, which says that a dog should not come into a shul, drawing on “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot,” and “the price of a dog,” and so on. He wanted to infer that entering a shul with a dog is forbidden. The Rebbe says: No—who says it’s forbidden? We haven’t seen that. There’s no source for it, the Rebbe says. It isn’t written anywhere. The Rebbe then points out something interesting: The fire on the altar was crouched there. According to one version, it was shaped like a lion; according to another, like a dog. So what do you see from that? There you have a dog on the altar. The Rebbe uses this to show that a dog is not

38:52 Speaker 2 such a problem. So, of course, the Rebbe says that if it’s possible for the person to come without a dog, and instead have another person lead and guide him, he should do that. But if that isn’t possible, would you cause him distress? Everyone else is praying inside, and he has to stand outside? There’s no need to distress him; he may enter with a dog. There should be no problem with that. That is how the Rebbe understands it. What about meetings and lectures in a shul? Of course, holding just any meeting in a shul isn’t appropriate. But if it’s for a mitzvah-related purpose—for example, an educational workshop, guidance for parents, or things like that—the poskim do write that it can be preferable. Sometimes, if you don’t allow it to take place in the shul, people will go to secular venues or places with an undesirable atmosphere. In situations like that, it can be permitted in a shul, even though it isn’t a Torah talk or some in-depth discussion. It might be a lecture about finances or the like. In certain circumstances, it can be permitted in a shul. Again, not as a blanket permission, but when there is a need, and holding it elsewhere could cause some kind of harm, including spiritual harm, then yes—so that people won’t go hear it from secular speakers, so to speak, who do not yet fully observe Torah and mitzvos. The poskim do suggest beginning the gathering with a Torah thought, as it were: saying a verse or chapter of Tehillim, or sharing a teaching, to give it at least some Torah content. The Rebbe speaks about people who came to him with the complaint: How could he hold women’s gatherings in a shul? Heaven forbid! How could women be in a shul?

41:00 Speaker 2 As is known, the Rebbe gives a number of reasons in response. One thing the Rebbe writes is: Where have we seen or heard that women may not enter? Where is such a thing written? Where does it say anywhere that women are forbidden to enter a shul? He also brings a proof from the women’s section. At first, it was in the same area as the men; later, it was placed above because the arrangement had led to frivolity. But nobody said that the mere presence of women there was a problem. The issue was that it led to frivolity and breached the proper boundaries, so the section was moved upstairs—not that women’s presence itself was a problem. And who decided to forbid it? The Rebbe does not agree with that at all. It’s interesting that the Rebbe says this as well: A man, too, is not always at the same level of yiras Shamayim. Sometimes a person has his lapses, and sometimes he isn’t in a proper state of yiras Shamayim—perhaps he’s in a worse state than the women. Yet he doesn’t say, “Right now my mind is full of distracting thoughts, so I won’t enter the shul.” No, he lets himself in, and that’s fine. So why not women? Especially when it helps them: they’re being taught Torah and other important things there. Of course it’s possible. So the Rebbe does agree that it’s possible.

43:06 Speaker 2 to do that. Greetings and blessings to all our dear viewers. We’re discussing the laws of a shul. We’ve covered several topics, and now we’ll talk about demolishing a shul: when it’s permitted, if it’s permitted, and so on. First of all, it is forbidden to demolish a shul. It’s important to know that, according to the Rambam, this is a Torah prohibition: “You shall not do so to Hashem your G-d”—after the command to “tear down their altars,” and so on. According to the Rambam, it’s a Torah prohibition. Other authorities hold that it isn’t a Torah prohibition. That question does not depend on the dispute over whether the sanctity of a shul is from the Torah; those are separate disputes. In any case, demolishing a shul is forbidden, whether by Torah law or rabbinic law. Even a shul built on a condition is still a shul, and it is forbidden to demolish it. And when we speak about demolishing a shul, we don’t just mean someone taking a hammer and breaking down the walls. As we’ll see later, even making a hole in a shul wall is included, even in its outer wall. We said that the outer wall, too, has sanctity and is subject to the prohibition against demolishing a shul. So in certain situations, when there’s no choice and nails need to be driven into a wall, or similar work needs to be done, halachic authorities advise simply selling the wall. By selling it, you remove its sanctity, and then the work can be done, even on the shul’s outer wall. We’ll see later how such a sale is carried out, but that’s what needs to be done. The Yaavetz writes this in She’eilas Yaavetz: even the outer side of a shul wall has sanctity, and it is forbidden to demolish it.

45:24 Speaker 2 In addition, the sanctity of the shul and the prohibition against demolishing it extend to all the shul’s furnishings. The Mishnah Berurah writes that “the furnishings of a shul have the sanctity of a shul.” So all the furnishings used by the people who daven there—chairs, benches, and the like—are included in the shul’s sanctity and in the prohibition against demolishing it. We need to be aware of this. We’re not here to decide whether this is all right or not, but sometimes people get a little carried away, whether at a farbrengen or something else, and start jumping on the tables and stamping their feet, and so on. Maybe that’s all right; it happens in the course of holy enthusiasm—I don’t know what to call it. But a person needs to know that, aside from the possibility that this is communal property and there may be an issue of theft or damage, destroying shul property is also like demolishing a shul. So we won’t go into this at length, but it’s important to know: damaging shul property falls under “You shall not do so to Hashem your G-d”; it falls under the prohibition against demolishing a shul. We need to be as careful about this as we can. Now, when we nevertheless have to demolish a shul, the halachic authorities cite the well-known Gemara: “A person should not demolish a shul”—if I’m not mistaken, it’s in Bava Basra—unless he first builds another shul. You don’t demolish a shul until you’ve built a new one. Only then may the old shul be demolished, when there is already a shul ready for people to daven in.

47:33 Speaker 2 The sanctity, so to speak, transfers from the old shul to the new one, and then the old shul can be demolished. But you cannot demolish a shul and only then build a new one. We’re concerned that they may not manage to build it, and people will miss davening and Torah study, and so on. We’re concerned that they may be negligent even if they already have the resources—which nowadays means the money. Only when the money really is ready and the new shul is ready—in any event, the old shul is not demolished until there is a new one. The question is: what if there’s another place where people can daven? Before we get into that, perhaps we should discuss something more common nowadays. Ordinarily, people aren’t demolishing shuls; at most, they buy another shul or build a new one. What we do encounter, though, is expanding a shul. Often there’s a need to expand it. First, we need to know that if the work is merely a renovation to beautify the shul, to make it nicer, but people can still daven there as it is—it isn’t broken or about to fall, and it can accommodate the people who daven there; they just want to renovate and make it more attractive—then this is conditional on providing them with an alternative place that they find acceptable. It must suit them, with their nusach and their accustomed way of davening, somewhere they feel comfortable. Otherwise, it can’t be done. You can’t just close the doors of a shul; that’s a problem. If I provide the people who daven there with a suitable alternative that isn’t far away and works for them in every respect, then it’s possible. But to close

49:42 Speaker 2 the doors of a shul without offering an alternative, or to offer a place the community does not find acceptable—that cannot be done. In such a case, halachic authorities suggest renting a hall. When renting a hall, one must make sure it is a genuine rental, paid for with money, with no time limit until the renovations are finished, and that people can daven there the same services they davened in the shul. In that situation, it is possible. But if we want to expand the shul because it is cramped and cannot accommodate the people who daven there, the halachic authorities compare that to a structurally unsound shul. What we said—that you cannot demolish a shul until you’ve built a new one—applies to a shul that is still standing soundly. But if a shul is unsound and about to fall, halachah says it may be demolished, and rebuilding must begin immediately, working day and night, so that, G-d forbid, no obstacle or delay prevents the work from continuing. They must start building immediately, day and night, with all their strength and speed, to build a new shul. This concerns a shul with a defect that makes it unable to remain standing. In the Gemara’s words, “chazi bei tiyusa”—a defect was found in it. The Gemara relates that this was the situation with Rav Ashi’s shul. He discovered a structural defect; the shul might collapse. So he demolished it and put his bed there to spur himself to rebuild the shul quickly. This is the exception that permits us to demolish a shul even before building a new one. Similarly, a shul that cannot accommodate the people who daven there is comparable to a shul

51:40 Speaker 2 that cannot really be used. It isn’t fit for its purpose: people cannot all get in, it cannot hold everyone, and the crowding makes it very difficult for them. In such a case, it would even be permissible to close the shul’s doors if we cannot find a proper alternative place. Ideally, we should find a good place, but this is less of a problem. It is considered “chazi bei tiyusa,” like a shul that is about to fall. Just as that shul may be demolished, this one may be closed for expansion. In cases where we aren’t doing a complete renovation of the entire shul, the expansion is sometimes done by knocking down a wall and building a new wall farther out, making the shul larger. In that situation, the Rambam holds that the same principle applies: don’t knock down the wall until you’ve built the new one. In other words, even within the shul itself, when we’re not demolishing the whole shul but only one part of it, the Rambam applies the same principle: don’t demolish any wall until you’ve first built the new wall; only then demolish the old one. That is what is written in the Rambam’s name, and how it appears in the Shulchan Aruch in his name. On the other hand, the Mishnah Berurah says that the Rosh has a different view. The Rosh writes that it doesn’t have to be done that way: you may demolish the wall right away. Why? Because, he says, it’s like “chazi bei tiyusa.” You want to expand the shul? As we said, “chazi bei tiyusa” describes a situation where the shul does not meet the needs of the people who daven there. It needs to be expanded,

53:45 Speaker 2 So you can demolish the old wall even before building the new one. In practice? The halachic authorities write that the Rambam would probably agree that if there is no choice—if you cannot build the new wall without first demolishing the old one—then you have to demolish it first. But if it is possible, you should take the Rambam’s position into account: build the new wall first, and only then demolish the old one. As we said, this situation can arise when the shul cannot hold all its worshippers. Another question the Tzemach Tzedek addresses is what happens when we want to enlarge the women’s section. At whose expense would we enlarge it? At the expense of the men’s section. The men’s section is apparently large enough and does not need so much space, while the women’s section is small and cramped. So we want to enlarge the women’s section. And here a question arises. When we spoke about enlarging a shul, we were talking about space with the same level of holiness. I enlarge it—that is fine. It is demolition for the sake of building; it is not considered demolition. In the words of the Mordechai, “This demolition is called building.” It is not considered demolishing the shul. You are building it, because the demolition is necessary for the construction. So it is as though you are building it. That is all well and good, but when we want to demolish part of the men’s section to make more room for the women’s section, we run into a problem. As we said, the men’s section has a level of holiness. The women’s section—so...

55:41 Speaker 2 We cited the Tzemach Tzedek and said that he, too, agrees that its level of holiness is lower. So I cannot reduce the men’s section for the sake of the women’s section, which has a lower level of holiness. This is not demolition for the sake of building. I am demolishing something to gain an improvement, but I am going down a level. So that demolition is problematic. The Tzemach Tzedek also discusses whether demolition for the sake of an improvement applies only when the improvement is made in the same place that is demolished. But what if the demolition is in one place and the improvement in another, as in our case? In other words, even if you were to say that the women’s section has the same level of holiness, the demolition is in the men’s section and the improvement is elsewhere. He discusses whether that qualifies, in light of certain positions of the Rambam and so on. But in any event, this is a real problem: ultimately, the women’s section has a lower level of holiness. So in such a case we need to find a solution. The halachic authorities suggest selling the wall, thereby removing its holiness through the sale. It should not be sold to one of the shul’s worshippers, because he is a partner in it and the sale would not be valid. Preferably, it should be sold to an outsider who buys the wall. He does not have to pay its full value; it is enough for him to give even a down payment or some token sum for it. And the demolition of that wall should not be done by a Jew, but by a non-Jew. So that is the solution: sell the wall, and have a non-Jew do the demolition rather than a Jew, to avoid the problem of demolishing a shul. So, as we said,

57:40 Speaker 2 This is also consistent with how the Tzemach Tzedek views the status of the women’s section and the problematic nature of this expansion. So that is the solution one can use when one wants to do something like this. Now, if we want to make a recess: the Taz discusses making a recess in a shul. He describes a situation that was apparently common in his time, where you made a recess for practical use—for example, to put a stand there on which to place a siddur and other things. The Taz regards this as demolishing part of a shul. Why? He says: I can demolish part of a shul in order to build, but here I am making a recess, a hole in the shul wall. True, it serves a purpose, but I am not building. I am only demolishing. That is why the Taz considers it problematic. On the other hand, the Eliyah Rabbah is lenient. He says it is permitted: it serves a purpose, and you are putting a stand there for siddurim and prayers. So the Eliyah Rabbah agrees that one may do this. The Tzemach Tzedek also addresses this disagreement between the Taz and the Eliyah Rabbah. He suggests connecting it to the disagreement between the Mordechai and other opinions—perhaps the Rambam’s position. Yes, the disagreement between the Mordechai and the Rambam. He examines the Mordechai’s wording: “This demolition is called building.” The Mordechai requires the demolition itself to actually constitute building. It is not enough that it is not considered destruction; it has to be called building. So when I make a recess, is that called building? There is no building here. Perhaps there is no

59:49 Speaker 2 destruction, but it is not called building. On the other hand, the Rambam’s wording is that one must not demolish “in a destructive manner.” That implies that the problem is doing it destructively; if I am not doing it in a destructive manner, it would be permitted. So the Tzemach Tzedek suggests that this is the disagreement between the Taz and the Eliyah Rabbah. The Taz follows the Mordechai: the demolition must itself have the character and significance of building. The Eliyah Rabbah says it is enough that it not be destructive. In practice, then, it is worth taking this concern into account. If one wants to make some kind of recess in a shul—a hole in the wall or something similar—one should bear in mind that there is a problem with it, even though some permit it. Preferably, one should try to avoid it. Another point concerns the use of shul furniture. As we said, shul furniture has the holiness of the shul, so one may not demolish or damage it. But taking furniture out of the shul is not included in the prohibition against demolition. So when there is a need—for example, someone is hosting a sheva brachos meal and is short of chairs or tables—there is no problem from the standpoint of demolishing a shul. He may take benches or tables from the shul. Of course, he must ask the gabbai’s permission and make sure this does not disrupt the worshippers’ prayers by leaving them nowhere to sit. He should use the furniture and return it properly, in the normal way. Of course, all these permissions apply only when there is a need, as we have seen. It is important to do everything possible to care for and preserve the shul—its furnishings, furniture, walls, and so on. Selling a shul: when is it permitted?

1:01:57 Speaker 2 Sell a shul? Why is it permitted to sell a shul, and when is it not? And so on. First of all, we know that a shul may be sold only if the people are offered an alternative place. They may want to sell it now and buy a new one later, or something like that. Even that is not simple, because, as we said, you may not demolish a shul until a new shul has been built. The same applies to selling it: you do not sell a shul until there is a new shul. If everything is already in place—the agreement, everything is ready—and only the money is missing, then we sell it and immediately put the money toward the new shul. That is possible. But generally, we do not sell a shul until we have a new one. And if there is any delay, we need to arrange an alternative place in the meantime, where the people can comfortably daven. Once selling a shul is permitted, halachah sets certain criteria for the sale. It also addresses what we do with the proceeds, even in cases where the sale itself is permitted. Halachah requires that the money go toward something of greater sanctity. If I sell a shul, I need to buy something with the proceeds. I can buy a Sefer Torah, a mantle for a Sefer Torah, various sacred accessories, and so on. That is for an ordinary sale: I have to increase the level of sanctity. I sell a shul, and I need to buy something of greater sanctity. Nevertheless, if the sale is because the shul cannot hold the people who daven there, or it is no longer fit for use, or similar circumstances, there is no obligation to increase the level of sanctity. I can use the money to buy another shul. That applies when the sale is made for those reasons. But if the shul can still

1:04:01 Speaker 2 function and they nevertheless want to sell it, the proceeds must be used for something of greater sanctity. All of this is when the sale is carried out by people who decided to sell the shul—the congregation agreed and gave them permission, whether they are gabbaim or others. In that case, this restriction applies: the money must be used for something of greater sanctity. There is also a restriction on how the sold shul may be used, as we will see. It does not have to remain a shul; it may be used for other purposes, but not for degrading uses, such as a bathhouse, a tannery, a lavatory, and the like. The sale does not permit that. The effect of the sale is that the shul loses its sanctity, which passes to the proceeds, and we use the proceeds to buy other things. The sanctity thus leaves the shul, and it may be used for ordinary purposes, but not degrading ones. That is the basic halachah. But there is a case in which a shul is sold by “the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community,” as the wording in halachah puts it. Such a sale has a very strong effect: I am not required to use the proceeds to buy something of greater sanctity. I can use the money for whatever I want—for communal needs and other things as well. The sanctity does not attach to the money. So the seven leading members of the community acting in the presence of the community have a special standing. They can remove the sanctity of the shul, and so a sale carried out this way is not subject to those restrictions. In addition,

1:06:20 Speaker 2 according to the basic halachah, a shul sold by the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community—we will soon see what that means in practice—may even be used for degrading purposes. Its sanctity is removed to that extent. What does a sale by the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community actually mean? First, there do not have to be seven; three are enough. These leading members can be the shul’s gabbaim. A shul usually has a gabbai, or two or three gabbaim. The gabbaim count as the leading members for our purposes. We are not talking about an entire town here, but about a shul. The congregation has given them its consent to run and manage the shul’s affairs, so a sale by them is like a sale by the seven leading members of the community. But we need one more condition: “in the presence of the community.” That does not have to mean a town either; we are talking about a shul. It means that the group of regular people who daven there must agree to the sale. When the gabbaim sell the shul with the consent of its congregation, that is called a sale by the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community. Consent does not have to be explicit. It is enough to publicize the planned sale—put up notices and announce it in a way that can reach everyone—and for the congregation not to object. At any rate, if the majority do not object; in these matters we follow the majority. So if the majority of the congregation consents and the gabbaim sell the shul, then

1:08:17 Speaker 2 that sale has the power to remove the shul’s sanctity, and the money has no sanctity either. It can be used to buy whatever they want, and certainly to buy a new shul; there is no need to increase the level of sanctity. The book Tzedakah Umishpat raises the possibility that even a single gabbai may be enough. It leaves the question unresolved, but a single gabbai may also suffice. A rabbi, however, who is accepted by the congregation and whom they have given full authority and permission to act as he sees fit in the shul’s affairs, is considered like the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community. He may act as he sees fit: he can sell the shul and remove its sanctity. He has that authority and power. Presumably, the same is true of any one person whom the congregation appointed from the outset to manage everything, entrusting him with all these matters and relying on him. He, too, would presumably have the authority of the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community. There is another novel ruling in the Chasam Sofer: he maintains that a shul’s sanctity can also be transferred through redemption, not necessarily through a sale. In his view, one can simply take a sum of money—not even necessarily the value of the shul—and say, “Let its sanctity be transferred to this.” The sanctity of the shul is transferred to the money, and with that money we buy something of greater sanctity, and so on. Unless the transfer is carried out by the seven leading members of the community in the presence of the community. As we said, in that case even the money becomes available for ordinary use. However, that is the Chasam Sofer’s view,

1:10:14 Speaker 2 He argues, but not everyone agrees with this innovation of the Chasam Sofer. Some infer from the Ramban that a shul can lose its sacred status only through a sale, not through redemption. So if there is no need to use redemption, it is better to use a sale. We said that if a shul is sold by the seven trustees of the city in the presence of the townspeople, it can indeed be sold. The sale removes the shul’s sacred status, and the building can then be used for ordinary purposes. Some opinions even permit demeaning uses. The Magen Avraham writes that if the sale was carried out by the seven trustees in the presence of the townspeople, the building may also be used for demeaning purposes: a tannery, a bathhouse, or a toilet. It could be used as a slaughterhouse or a mikveh, and the like. But if we take that a little further, we might say that it could also become a place of revelry, or even, G-d forbid, a house of worship—a Christian church, for example. This is a real question when people are forced to sell a shul to non-Jews: is that possible at all? First of all, even a sale to a non-Jew who is not going to turn it into a church falls under the category of demeaning uses. A non-Jew’s residence is considered a demeaning use. So even an ordinary sale of a shul to a non-Jew falls into that category. The Shulchan Aruch and the Magen Avraham say that, strictly speaking, it may be sold even for demeaning uses. That is permitted. But the Mishnah Berurah

1:12:36 Speaker 2 discusses this at length, at length. And he concludes that it is not so simple to say that, because ultimately a shul has sanctity. Certainly according to the Ran’s view that a shul has rabbinic sanctity, it would not be appropriate. After all, sacred articles that have worn out must be put away respectfully; you cannot just throw them in the trash. So a shul, too, cannot be used for demeaning purposes, even if it was sold by the seven trustees of the city, or is no longer fit for use, or whatever the case may be. He adds that even if we say a shul has the status of an article used for a mitzvah, which halachah says may be discarded when it wears out and does not require genizah, we know that the Shulchan Aruch says in siman 8 that it still must not be treated disrespectfully. We do not have to put such articles in genizah, but we must not put them in a demeaning place. So care is still needed here. Accordingly, even if we say a shul has the status of an article used for a mitzvah, it ultimately cannot be treated disrespectfully. It is therefore inappropriate to designate it as a bathhouse or a toilet, and all the more so as a non-Jew’s residence, and certainly not as a house of worship, a church, and the like. Still, halachah does address a shul that is no longer usable, where there are no longer people praying. This can happen in various places throughout the diaspora, in Europe and elsewhere, where communities no longer exist or have moved away, and we find abandoned shuls there. No one prays in them. So the Magen Avraham writes in the name of the Mabit that when

1:14:52 Speaker 2 that is the situation, the shul may be sold, and the proceeds do not have to be used for something of greater sanctity, and so on. That is possible. It may even be sold to non-Jews. That is what seems to follow from the Magen Avraham’s citation of the Mabit. So, all right. The Chasam Sofer addresses this ruling cited in the name of the Mabit, and he disagrees. He says it refers to a shul that has already been used for demeaning purposes, in which case it is better to sell it. But the Chasam Sofer argues that even a shul that is inactive and stands abandoned should not be sold—certainly not to Christians. What does he base this on? He says: You see that they, too, treat their houses of worship—lehavdil, the houses of worship of non-Jews—that way. Once they stop praying there and the buildings are no longer active, they do not sell them to be used for all sorts of other things, not even for an ordinary purpose. So if we do not act the same way, it would be a kind of chillul Hashem. That is the Chasam Sofer’s argument. So what does he say? Do not sell even abandoned shuls. Keep them as long as you can; do not sell them. Still, the leading later halachic authorities disagree with the Chasam Sofer. They argue that, on the contrary, abandoned shuls can become gathering places for disreputable people, with filth and decay accumulating in them. So it is better—and a mitzvah—to sell them to the highest bidder, transfer their sanctity to the money, and use that money to buy other things, other institutions, public institutions, and the like. Ultimately,

1:17:11 Speaker 2 although it does seem that the halachic authorities agree that an abandoned shul may be sold, there is still reason to avoid selling it for demeaning uses as far as possible. Even when a sale is permitted, it should not be sold for demeaning uses or as a house of worship, and so on. And all of this applies only when there are constraints and no alternative, and the shul can no longer be maintained, or something like that. If it can be preserved in some way, then care should be taken to preserve it. I heard a story about one of the shluchim—I do not remember where it was, somewhere in the United States—where a shul stood abandoned, with no one praying in it. The shliach was offered the chance to buy it, but he did not agree. He wanted to see to it, and did see to it, that the shul would remain and would not be sold. In the end, after many years, he received a letter demanding an enormous sum for all the taxes the shul had accumulated over the years. He took it very hard, and ultimately it affected him badly. So in cases like that, it is certainly possible to sell. Those grounds for permitting a sale exist, and it can be sold. The question is whether it can be sold for use as a house of worship, as a Christian church. Of course, every effort should be made not to reach that situation and not to sell it as a house of worship. There is also an element of punishment in this: the Midrash speaks of shuls being turned into such places, and so on. It is a kind of punishment. So one must be very careful and make every effort not to reach a situation where it is sold

1:19:35 Speaker 2 for use as a house of worship, as a church. In very exceptional cases of extreme hardship, Igros Moshe discusses this and says that perhaps it could be done through a broker: that is, to bring in an intermediary and sell it to someone who might then sell it to a church. That is the only way such a thing might be permitted, but it is very, very, very difficult to permit it. So in such a situation, every effort should be made to keep the shul and not bring it to such a state of disgrace.