When Should One Turn to the Police? - Rabbi Avraham Meir Rabinovich shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast of Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 A Jewish man came to our beis din after receiving a check from someone that bounced. When he looked into the person, he discovered that this was his regular practice: he wrote checks with no funds to cover them. He had given checks to him and to others. He came to ask whether he could go to the police about this person, at least to stop him from continuing this behavior, and perhaps to investigate whether he had money somewhere that people couldn’t otherwise reach. The question is also relevant when someone behaves inappropriately with children, or commits other kinds of crimes. Can such people be reported to the police or not? The underlying question is whether turning to law enforcement violates the prohibition against informing. We all know how serious the prohibition is against handing a Jew over to non-Jews—to the authorities or the police. Is it permitted here? According to most halachic authorities, the prohibition applies wherever the punishment they impose is not exactly what the Torah prescribes. Take theft, for example. Under Torah law, a person who steals must return the money. The Torah does not say that he receives a prison sentence or other such penalties. Today, courts in Israel and elsewhere may sentence him to prison or impose a fine. So according to most authorities, if the punishment does not follow Torah law exactly, there is a prohibition against informing. Seemingly, that would apply here too. On the other hand, it’s clear that today a beis din cannot do anything to a thief. What can it do to him? So where there is no other way to prevent harm, surely one can go to the police. That makes sense. The question is: What is the basis for permitting a report to the police, and when is it permitted and when is it not? What

02:46 Speaker 2 are the rules? To understand when it is permitted, let’s begin with the Rashba. The Rashba writes: “I believe that if the witnesses are considered reliable by those investigating the matter”—meaning either the judges examining the case or the community leaders—“they may impose a monetary fine or a corporal punishment, as they see fit. This is necessary for the preservation of society. For if you insist that everything follow only the laws written in the Torah, and that no punishment be imposed except those prescribed by the Torah, the world would be destroyed. People would break down society’s boundaries, and the world would become desolate. The Sages already imposed fines on one who strikes another. In every place, judgments are made to safeguard the generation, and this is done in every generation and every place when the times call for it.” In effect, the Rashba is telling us that we cannot allow the world to become desolate or be destroyed. If we follow only the exact punishments the Torah specifies, there are cases and circumstances where we understand that this won’t work. This is one of them: what happens if a person doesn’t go to beis din? In the case before the Rashba, the person refused to come to beis din at all. He could not be brought to court; he had taken money and fled, and even wanted to go abroad. To stop him, the Rashba permitted bringing him before the authorities. That meant involving the police, so that society would not become desolate and could function properly. Another source the Rashba cites is the Gemara in Bava Metzia, page 83. The Gemara tells of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon—Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s son—who caught thieves and handed them over to the government. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha asked him: How can you do

05:18 Speaker 2 that? In his words: “How long will you hand over the people of our G-d to be killed?” Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon answered: “I am clearing the thorns from the vineyard.” I take these thieves, the thorns, and remove them from the vineyard. Rabbi Yehoshua replied: “Let the owner of the vineyard come and clear away His thorns.” Let Hakadosh Boruch Hu do it, not you. So we see a disagreement here. According to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, we may hand thieves over to the government because there is no choice; the thorns must be removed. According to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, Hakadosh Boruch Hu will do that—it is not your job. Most halachic authorities rule like Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, that it is permitted. Seemingly, we see again that it is permitted because there is no alternative if society is to be preserved. There is also an interesting responsum of the Mabit, which the Tzitz Eliezer cites as a halachic ruling. The Mabit relates: “I was summoned to the council of the sages and leaders of Tzfas concerning Yaakov Zarkon.” This was a Jewish man named Yaakov Zarkon who, unfortunately, had fallen into heresy and had also had relations with a man. They authorized the community leaders to have him imprisoned by the non-Jewish authorities—the police of that time—and he was taken into custody. We see that in the Mabit’s case too, they had no ability to deal with this Yaakov Zarkon themselves, so they referred him to the authorities. Later, through those authorities, they also compelled him to divorce his wife. The Mabit says that although ordinarily it would not have been lawful to hand him over to the non-Jewish authorities, because this was done with the authorization of the beis din, as a temporary measure to safeguard the community, we consider it lawful. Why? Because it was necessary to protect him,

07:47 Speaker 2 to protect society and meet the needs of the time. If we understand that, to safeguard the community, a person must be handed over to the authorities—to the non-Jewish authorities, to the police—then it is permitted. So both the Rashba and the Mabit show us that it is permitted for the sake of preserving society, so that the world does not become desolate. But there is another interesting point here. The Aruch Hashulchan writes: “Anyone familiar with the history of earlier times knows that, in the distant lands of long ago, no one could feel secure in life or property because of robbers and violent men, even when those men held official positions.” They held positions of authority. As we know, even today in some African countries, government officials engage in robbery and plunder; there is corruption there too. “The kings of Europe should be remembered favorably, and especially His Imperial Majesty of Russia and his imperial predecessors, and the kings of Britain, who extended their rule over distant lands so that every person could feel secure in life and property. The wealthy no longer had to hide their money for fear that it would be taken and they themselves killed. All the laws concerning one who informs on another person relate to this.” We see that, according to the Aruch Hashulchan, the entire prohibition against informing applies only in corrupt countries—like in earlier times, when feudal lords did whatever they wanted, or in corrupt countries where officials seize a person because they decide they want his money. But in orderly Western countries, where there is a functioning legal system, even if its laws do not follow Torah law, the prohibition against informing does not apply. The Tzitz Eliezer cites this view and relies on it as a halachic ruling for today as well. In a country like Israel today, we can generally say that if someone harms children, a person is not simply arrested because someone made up an accusation against him. Nor is someone casually accused of forging checks; rather, there is

10:12 Speaker 2 There is order, there are degrees of severity, so it really is permissible to report them—again, in Western countries. But most halachic authorities do not agree with the Aruch Hashulchan. They hold that the laws of mesirah apply wherever the punishment is not according to Torah law—where it does not correspond precisely to what the Torah prescribes. For example, a thief is imprisoned rather than being required only to return the money. They add that even today, a prison sentence can sometimes lead to death. Just in the past year, a Jewish prisoner in the United States was imprisoned for a certain reason, and two other prisoners abused him until he died. Oy, oy, oy, [unclear]. But that is what happened to him: he was killed, simply because he was Jewish. So we understand that imprisonment, too, can lead to even more serious consequences. That is why they say that if the punishment does not correspond to Torah law, the laws of mesirah apply. We return, then, to the permission given by the Rashba and the Mabit, for the sake of maintaining society—we have no choice. But if we read the Shulchan Aruch’s laws of mesirah, in Choshen Mishpat, siman 388, se’if 9, it says: “It is forbidden to hand a Jew over to non-Jews, whether his person or his property, even if he is wicked and commits transgressions, and even if he causes him distress.” It explicitly says that it is forbidden. The Rema says that where there is reason to fear he will report him again, or if there is no other way to save oneself, it is permitted. In other words, the Rema tells us that if today we have no other way to protect ourselves, it is permissible to report someone to the authorities, to law enforcement, to the police. Today it is clear to everyone that a beis din cannot do anything to a thief; it cannot stop him from stealing again tomorrow. If he wants to steal, he will continue. The same is true of indecent acts involving children. There is

12:29 Speaker 2 no way for us to stop it other than through the authorities. So, seemingly, according to the Rema, the laws of mesirah do not apply at all. We do not need to justify it on the grounds of maintaining society; there is no prohibition of mesirah here in the first place. Perhaps we can even add the position of the Mechaber. The Mechaber himself says in se’if 12: “Anyone who reports a community and causes them distress may be handed over to non-Jews to be beaten, imprisoned, or fined, but one may not hand him over on account of the distress of an individual.” The Mechaber himself distinguishes between an individual and the public. If something affects one individual, it is forbidden, but if it affects many people, it is permitted. Someone who forges checks, someone who harms children—usually this is not an isolated case. More often than not, it happens repeatedly. It is something that continues. Therefore, even according to the Mechaber, it is certainly permissible to report him. There is no prohibition of mesirah here at all. But it is not merely that there is no prohibition. In Shulchan Aruch, Hilchos Nizkei Guf Venefesh, se’if 6, the Alter Rebbe writes: “One who habitually strikes others, and it is impossible to protect people from him unless he is reported—it is a mitzvah for every person to report him to non-Jews, so that they will take his money or cut off his hand, and he will not continue to strike others.” So according to the Alter Rebbe, not only is it permitted; it is a mitzvah for a person to report someone who steals, robs, commits crimes, or commits indecent acts, so that he will not continue. We can add that some halachic authorities say that with indecent acts, or other acts involving a transgression punishable by kareis, they must also be stopped to prevent the person from continuing to transgress. That, too, may be a mitzvah. But the Alter Rebbe’s ruling rests on the basic point: to stop him from striking others again, it is permissible—and a mitzvah—to report him. From this we have clear proof

15:05 Speaker 2 that in these cases—someone who steals, someone who causes distress to many people, someone for whom this is a consistent pattern of behavior—even without relying on the need to maintain society, according to the Mechaber it is certainly permitted. There is no prohibition of mesirah here at all. And according to the Alter Rebbe, not only may one report him; it is a mitzvah to do so. There was once a case brought before Rabbi Elyashiv. A Jew who worked in a religious council office somewhere sent him a question. He wrote that cash had been stolen from the council’s funds several times. All the indications pointed to one of the employees, but they had no means of obtaining a confession from him. How could they uncover something like this? There were no hidden cameras then and the like. The question was whether they could turn to the police, whose investigation, if successful, would bring the suspect before a secular court. They wrote that the consequences could be serious: the suspect might have a large family, and the negative publicity could be very damaging. In addition, if he was involved in holy work, there might also, G-d forbid, be a chillul Hashem, rachmana litzlan. On the other hand, if this was theft, public funds were disappearing, and who knew what else? What should they do? Rabbi Elyashiv cited the Pischei Teshuvah, in Choshen Mishpat, siman 388, subsection 19. It discusses someone who found that his chest had been broken into and a large fortune stolen from it. Several indications pointed to one of his servants. Was it permissible to hand him over to the courts to be punished and beaten, to discover whether he really was the thief? In that case, they did permit it, and there was evidence to support it. The Pischei Teshuvah also relates a story about Rabbi Heshel, with whom the Shach had deposited a gold chain. It was stolen by a servant, and they agreed to punish him a little so that he would confess the truth. In other words, from here

17:38 Speaker 2 the Pischei Teshuvah shows that, seemingly, it can be done. He continues: “But I have serious reservations about handing him over to their courts,” and so on, “for there is reason to fear that if he confesses, they will sentence him to death.” That is the Pischei Teshuvah’s qualification. Rabbi Elyashiv’s response was that this concern does not apply in our times. As a matter of law, one may turn to the police. In other words, where there is no fear of a death sentence, it is permissible to turn to the police. The Pischei Teshuvah hesitated to permit it only because of the possibility that it would lead to death; without that concern, it is permitted. Rabbi Elyashiv does address the issue of chillul Hashem: “However, in your opinion there may be a chillul Hashem, and I cannot express an opinion on that, since I do not know the details. The matter is left to your judgment.” So the issue of chillul Hashem must also be considered: how to avoid it, and how to weigh it when deciding whether or not to go to the authorities—whether the matter is minor or major, whether it is ongoing. But one thing is clear from this ruling: our primary concern is to prevent further harm to the public. That is something we cannot allow to continue. We can consider every possible qualification and try various approaches, but the first thing is to stop it—to stop the theft from the offices, to stop the forging of checks, to stop indecent acts against children. That is the first responsibility before us. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein was once asked by a rabbi who provided kosher certification for meat in the United States. Another Jew had forged his kosher seal and sold non-kosher meat. The rabbi asked whether he could report him to the federal authorities, to the FBI, knowing that if they uncovered it, the man would face both a large fine and a prison sentence. Was it

19:55 Speaker 2 Is it permissible to report him to the authorities? Rabbi Moshe Feinstein answered as follows: Although his wrongdoing is very grave, and apparently he is not at all a baal teshuvah, nevertheless, as long as we have not seen that a Jewish beis din cannot stop him, he should not be brought before the secular courts. In short, first check whether there is another way to stop it: through a beis din, through public notices, by making it known in his shul. Let’s check first. Furthermore, if they will sentence him to imprisonment or financial penalties that do not accord with Jewish law, there is certainly reason to be concerned about the prohibition of mesirah. As the Aruch Hashulchan says, it is forbidden to hand a Jew over to non-Jews, whether in person or with regard to his property, even if he is wicked and commits sins. We see from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein that if we have a way to stop this without going to the authorities, we do not go to the authorities. We need to check that first. Count to ten. Maybe through a beis din, maybe by approaching the people around him. Don’t immediately go and contact the authorities. There is also a story about the well-known dayan Rabbi Shafran. Parents came to him about a teacher who was hitting students and mistreating them. They wanted to go to the Ministry of Education, to the police. He said, “Wait, let’s stop for a moment. First, go to the administration. The Talmud Torah has an administration. They’ll dismiss him, and that will be the end of it. He won’t be able to mistreat them anymore.” Going to the Ministry of Education—which, of course, will also go to the police—is a step to take if there is no alternative: if the administration does not cooperate and we see that it continues, then there is no choice. But if you can go to the administration, there is no reason to do otherwise. What we see from this is that complaints to law enforcement, to the police, are not a punishment. As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha said in the Gemara, “Let the owner of the vineyard come”—let Hakadosh Boruch Hu administer the punishment. We are not punishing people here, even if he stole, even if

22:12 Speaker 2 he committed indecent acts. That is not what we are doing. We are doing this to stop it from continuing, to stop the ongoing harm he is causing people. But if there is a solution that does not require going to the police—through a beis din or through the administration of a Talmud Torah—do it that way. Don’t go to the authorities. We also see it in the Alter Rebbe’s wording. Notice what he writes: “One who habitually strikes other people, and it is impossible to protect them from him unless he is reported”—as in the Rema’s ruling, where there is simply no other choice. It is the only way: not through a beis din, not through any other avenue. “It is a mitzvah for anyone to hand him over to non-Jews, so that they take his property or cut off his hand, and he will not continue to strike others.” What is his purpose—our purpose here? Not to punish. It is not a punishment, but to ensure “he will not continue to strike others.” To stop it from continuing. To stop the harm from continuing. In other words, the entire permission to report him, the entire permission to pass the information to law enforcement, is solely to prevent him from continuing to strike others, from continuing to cause harm—not as a punishment. Another point we need to discuss is what happens when children come forward and testify about something an adult did. Can we rely on their testimony? There is a Rema in Choshen Mishpat, section 35. He cites an early enactment. In principle, testimony can only be given by an adult over the age of thirteen, after bar mitzvah, and women are also ineligible to testify. But in a place where only women are present, such as the women’s section of a shul, the early enactment, which he cites from the Kol Bo, is that we rely on a woman’s testimony. He also discusses minors, children:

24:26 Speaker 2 where only children are present, we rely on their testimony. Accordingly, in a case involving an indecent act, where it is clear that there will be no testimony about it except from children, if their testimony is clear—not an inference, not something exaggerated—we can rely on it. We can rely on children’s testimony in order to report someone to the authorities or to take action against him. Again, not as a punishment, but to prevent further harm. But we have to be very aware and alert, because children sometimes tend to exaggerate. Children sometimes tend to take revenge on a teacher, especially with the stories in recent months, when the whole matter involving the well-known author became public and children were exposed to it. Sometimes children can make up stories too, so we need to be very careful. There was once a teacher about whom a complaint was made, and he said that he felt he would be better off dead than alive. Rachmana litzlan. That is an extremely serious matter. So to prevent something like that, there is no doubt that we must be very careful and check thoroughly before taking an action that could be devastating to a person. We rely on children’s testimony, but we really need to examine whether it is one child or several children. Even with one child, we need to look at whether there are signs of harm, whether we see a pattern, whether it could be that he is simply taking revenge on a teacher who may have slapped him or something, and he wants to retaliate and exaggerate. We have to be very, very careful about this. And in general, even when reporting someone for what he did, we need to know that publicizing it remains prohibited as lashon hara. That prohibition still applies. It shames him and his family. We need to prevent publicity in every way we can. The fact that we have stopped him from causing harm and have approached law enforcement does not mean that from then on everything is permitted and

26:41 Speaker 2 anything goes—that we can publicize it and publicly destroy him or his family. Another interesting point appears in that same section of the Shulchan Aruch. The Shulchan Aruch says: “Anyone who informs on the community and causes them distress may be handed over to non-Jews.” The Rema says: “If there is reason to fear that he will harm many people, warn him not to do so; and if he pays no attention, he may be handed over.” The Rema is telling us, “Let’s check for a moment. Warn him; caution him. Don’t do it immediately.” The Minchas Yitzchak permitted going to the police about someone who is driving dangerously on the road, swerving between lanes. I think we all understand that when you see someone like that on the road, you say, “Listen, he’s about to cause an accident.” You see a police officer. Is it permissible to tell the officer, “Officer, there’s a dangerous car here; stop him”? The Minchas Yitzchak says: Certainly. It is certainly permissible. It is a mitzvah; it is an obligation. We have an obligation to stop this. Someone’s life could be at risk. Would anyone think to say, “No, wait, wait, wait. Let’s hold off, find the license plate number, find out who owns the car, warn him, and only then report him to the police”? Certainly not. It is clear that there is no other way to prevent it. We must contact the police. By contrast, what if we know of a child—a young man, a teenager—who took his parents’ car and drives carelessly, but he is not driving now; he is not on the road? You can first call his father and say, “Listen, your son does not drive safely. Don’t give him the car. We’re warning you. If there is no other choice, we will contact the authorities.” In other words, sometimes there are situations where you can give a warning, and sometimes that really is not possible. There are also cases where a warning will not help, because sometimes a person has a tendency in his nature to

29:00 Speaker 2 He feels driven to do it, and he has no control over himself. What good would warning him do? He might just hide it even more, because he thought no one could see what he was doing. So we also have to be careful about when a warning can actually help and when it cannot. Sometimes, when we do not know, the solution is simply to approach a rabbi who rules on halachic questions and consult him. For one thing, he has the perspective of Torah and is less emotionally involved in the case, so he can tell us what halachah requires: whether or not to give a warning. Our conclusion from this class is as follows: According to most halachic authorities, there is no question that the prohibition against informing applies wherever the punishment is not precisely in accordance with Torah law. The Aruch Hashulchan, however, holds that in Western countries today the prohibition does not apply, because there is no fear of being put to death, the authorities are not corrupt, and for the most part there is no corruption there. But most halachic authorities disagree with him. It should also be noted that some say censorship influenced what the Aruch Hashulchan wrote. Perhaps that is why he described Western countries as free of corruption and bias—only because of censorship. In any case, most authorities do not rule that way. They hold that the prohibition applies, and that imprisonment can even lead to death; therefore, the prohibition against informing remains in force. So why do we permit going to the police and law-enforcement authorities today? To prevent a person from continuing to cause harm. We also have a basis for permitting it from the Rashba and the Mabit, for the sake of maintaining society, so that the world is not destroyed. Or, according to the Rema, it is because there is no other way to stop him. And according to the Alter Rebbe, it is not merely permitted; it is an obligation and a mitzvah to report him to law-enforcement authorities so that he does not continue to assault others. It follows that when it is clear to us that there was some

31:07 Speaker 2 incident of violence, or even an old act committed by a young adolescent that has not been repeated, but was a one-time act, it is forbidden to report it to the authorities. We are not seeking to punish anyone; the purpose is only to prevent further harm. So if this is not a pattern or something recurring, and for some reason it is clear to us that it was a one-time incident, it is forbidden to go to the authorities. We can also rely on children’s testimony, based on an enactment of the early authorities permitting us to do so in a case where it is clear that no adult could have witnessed it, only children. But before taking that step, we have to check very carefully that this is not a child seeking revenge, something imagined, or a rumor, but that something real has happened—that there are several children, or that you can clearly see a child has been harmed, and so on. A mere rumor—someone spreading rumors that another person committed theft, improper acts, or the like—is not something we may rely on. Not only that, spreading it violates the prohibition against lashon hara, and so it is forbidden. Even when we know for certain that someone did it, there is no permission to forward messages and tell the whole world. That kind of publicity harms the family and is simply a transgression. It harms the family and their good name. Again, we are not seeking punishment; we only want to prevent harm. So publicity must be kept to the absolute minimum, especially since there is also the concern of chillul Hashem, a desecration of Hashem’s name. If there is a concern about chillul Hashem, it has to be weighed. And as part of weighing these considerations, sometimes we need to consult a rabbi who rules on halachic questions—when there is a genuine need, or when there is concern or doubt as to whether the matter is truly

32:59 Speaker 2 substantiated and real, or whether it is something recurring or a one-time incident. So if there is any doubt about it, we need to approach a rabbi who can examine the matter and give a ruling. May we merit, with Hashem’s help, that Moshiach come soon, when delicacies will be as plentiful as dust. There will be no theft, none of these concerns, and no need for any of this. May the rule of Moshiach be here very soon indeed.