The Laws of Purim - Rabbi Michael Shlomo Avishid shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast of Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 In section 429, at the beginning of the laws of Pesach, there’s the well-known discussion at the beginning of tractate Pesachim, on page 6. There are two opinions there about whether we should begin studying the laws of Pesach on Rosh Chodesh Nissan or thirty days before the festival. And the halacha is ruled without dispute in section 429: we study the laws of Pesach thirty days before the festival. The Alter Rebbe takes the view that this means from Purim itself. In other words, on Purim, the 14th of Adar, we actually have to begin engaging with the laws of Pesach and studying them, according to the Shulchan Aruch. There’s another, much less familiar halacha, in section 695, right in the middle of the laws of Purim. The Shulchan Aruch discusses the Purim meal and cites the verse in the Megillah, “The Jews had light and joy and gladness and honor.” Our Sages expound this verse in many ways, and the Rema cites that “light” means Torah. And what is “joy” in “The Jews had light and joy”? Joy alludes to Yom Tov and to a feast. So the Rema writes an interesting halacha: there is a custom to study Torah before sitting down to the meal. A number of halachic authorities have written that it’s an excellent idea to combine these two halachos. Everyone knows how busy every Jew is with mitzvos on Purim, and it isn’t always easy to sit down and study. So it’s worth knowing that after Mincha, when the family gathers for the Purim meal, the father should sit down for a little while and, if he can, include the family. Before beginning the Purim meal, they should study the laws of Pesach. That way, they can observe both of these holy customs: studying the laws of Pesach on Purim itself, as stated in section 429, and studying a little before the meal, to fulfill “The Jews had light and joy.” So that’s the first point I wanted us to pause on. It’s a halacha that sometimes goes unnoticed: sit down and study the laws of Pesach before the meal, and that way we’ll fulfill both instructions brought

03:12 Speaker 2 in the Shulchan Aruch, in sections 429 and 695. Now let’s go through the halachos relevant to Purim in order. The first thing is the Fast of Esther. This year in particular, the fast isn’t on its usual date. We move the Fast of Esther forward to the preceding Thursday. Now, with regard to fasts in general, everyone is certainly obligated to fast. Men and women are obligated to observe these fasts from the age of bar or bas mitzvah, and no one can easily exempt themselves unless they receive a specific allowance based on their circumstances. The first point we wanted to emphasize is that this fast is somewhat different from the others. If you look at the halacha, the strictest fast in terms of its laws is Yom Kippur. Everyone is obligated to fast then, and the only grounds for exemption are a concern that fasting could endanger a person’s life. There’s another fast that is less stringent than Yom Kippur but more stringent than the other fasts: Tisha B’Av. That is why the Gemara says in tractate Pesachim, as brought in the Shulchan Aruch, in sections 550 and 554, that pregnant and nursing women are exempt from fasting on all the fasts except Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur. That’s the wording of the Talmud, and it’s how the halacha is stated. So Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur are the strictest fasts. Tisha B’Av is less stringent than Yom Kippur: you don’t have to reach the point of a possible danger to life to be exempt. But you do at least need to be considered ill, even without danger—a definite medical condition. Otherwise, you’re obligated to fast, and so pregnant and nursing women fast as well. There are other fasts that are more lenient than both of these, and we can group them

05:48 Speaker 2 together: the Fast of Gedaliah, the Tenth of Teves and, of course, the Seventeenth of Tammuz. These are fasts connected to events surrounding the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. Although people sometimes think the Seventeenth of Tammuz is among the strictest fasts, or that the Tenth of Teves is especially strict because of the famous words of Rabbi David Abudraham—that if the Tenth of Teves fell on Shabbos, which cannot happen now but could have happened when the new month was established by sighting the moon, we would fast on Shabbos because the verse says “on this very day”—in the end, their halachic status is the same. The Tenth of Teves, the Fast of Gedaliah and the Seventeenth of Tammuz are all more lenient than Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur. One straightforward example, brought at the beginning of section 550 of Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, is that pregnant and nursing women are exempt from fasting on these fasts. The Rema, however, added a further condition: when he wrote that pregnant and nursing women are exempt from the Fast of Gedaliah, the Seventeenth of Tammuz and the Tenth of Teves, he specified that they are “suffering greatly.” One of his students, Rabbi Mordechai Yaffe, the Levush, wrote that this expression, “suffering greatly,” went a little too far. It isn’t mentioned in the Gemara in tractate Pesachim, nor in the Shulchan Aruch in section 554. And here in section 550, the author, the Beis Yosef, didn’t use that expression either; it was the Rema who added “suffering greatly.” Incidentally, the Alter Rebbe also includes a reference to suffering. We don’t have these laws in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, but words of Torah are sparse in one place and rich in another. We have this law in the laws of the Fast of the Firstborn. There’s a case where both the father and his son are firstborns. The father cannot fast on the Fast of the Firstborn on behalf of his son, because he himself is a firstborn, and you can’t

08:05 Speaker 2 fulfill both obligations at once. So the Shulchan Aruch says that the fast falls to the mother. The Alter Rebbe writes there, in section 550, paragraph 1, that if the mother is pregnant or nursing and fasting causes her discomfort, she is exempt from that fast. So he too uses the term “discomfort.” He didn’t write “suffering greatly,” but he did write that fasting causes them discomfort. Halachic authorities today discuss the possibility of being lenient despite the Rema’s words, and simply exempting women from these fasts—the Seventeenth of Tammuz, the Tenth of Teves and the Fast of Gedaliah. And here we come, of course, to our fast, the Fast of Esther, which is even more lenient in a certain respect. Why? Because the Fast of Esther does not commemorate the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. It doesn’t mark one of the stages of that destruction. It isn’t like the death of Gedaliah, after which the exile intensified: he had still managed to gather the Jewish people around him, and when he died, the exile began to spread more extensively outside the Land of Israel. Or the Seventeenth of Tammuz—the first breach in the wall of Jerusalem. Well, there’s a dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds as to whether that happened on the 9th of Tammuz during the destruction of the First Beis Hamikdash and on the 17th of Tammuz during the second, or whether both happened on the 17th of Tammuz. But in any event, all these events—including the Tenth of Teves, when the king of Babylonia laid siege to Jerusalem—are events of destruction and mourning. The Fast of Esther, by contrast, is different. As the Rema brings, and as the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch also brings, it is known that the Jewish people would fast on days when they went to war, as they did in the war against Amalek. So they fasted, and what was the outcome of that war? A decisive victory for the Jewish people. Therefore, it isn’t a commemoration

10:16 Speaker 2 to a tragic event; this fast commemorates the fact that they fasted. So there are many poskim who write that conscientious people should be stringent about various matters on the other fasts we mentioned, such as 17 Tammuz, as the Pri Megadim writes in siman 550. But here, there is no need to take on so many stringencies. If people do not want to take on those stringencies on the other fasts, then certainly on this fast there is much more room for leniency, even about playing Purim songs. This fast is much more lenient because it does not commemorate a tragedy. One straightforward indication of the leniency of Ta’anis Esther, which we do not find with the other fasts, is the ruling of the Radbaz at the end of Tractate Ta’anis: a bride and groom do not fast on Ta’anis Esther during the seven days of their wedding celebrations, even when the fast falls on its regular date. All the more so when the fast is moved up to Thursday. So the poskim say that, in practice, pregnant and nursing women are exempt from other fasts, and many poskim today ask: what woman can say that fasting causes her no distress? All the more so on Ta’anis Esther, and especially when Ta’anis Esther is moved from its regular date, pregnant and nursing women are, of course, exempt from the fast. There is an interesting discussion about women who are within twenty-four months after giving birth. In the laws of niddah, regarding the cessation of menstruation, the Gemara has a rule concerning nursing women for twenty-four months, whether or not they are actually nursing. That raises a question about fasts. When we say that pregnant or nursing women, for example, do not fast on Ta’anis Esther, does that also include a woman who is not actually nursing? Some women do not nurse, or nursed for a few months and then stopped,

12:14 Speaker 2 and now the child is not drinking or receiving anything at all from the mother, only from other sources. The question is whether the mother is exempt from fasting within those twenty-four months. Some rabbanim are more lenient, and some are more stringent. From my study under rabbanim, my view is that, in principle, a woman who is not actually nursing is obligated to fast on 17 Tammuz, Ta’anis Esther, Tzom Gedaliah, and 10 Teves. If she is not actually nursing, she should be obligated, because the rule about the cessation of menstruation is a separate matter, while the rule here is different. The evidence is in siman 554, se’if 5, in the Shulchan Aruch. The Beis Yosef writes there that pregnant and nursing women are exempt from the fast and may eat. He then writes how much they may eat. He begins with a pregnant woman and then mentions a nursing woman, and says that they may eat enough to sustain the child. That somewhat suggests that they eat according to the child’s needs: when a woman is pregnant, the child is in her womb, so she needs to eat to nourish the child as well; and when she is nursing, she needs to eat enough to nurse her child. So a woman who is not actually nursing is obligated to fast. It is true that several leading Torah authorities, including the Eshel Avraham of Butchatch and a number of contemporary poskim, allow a leniency even when she is not actually nursing. In practice, though, when a fast is moved from its regular date, even the poskim who are generally stringent about a woman who is not actually nursing tend to be lenient. So this year, when Ta’anis Esther is not on its regular date, a woman who is not actually nursing but is

14:21 Speaker 2 within twenty-four months after giving birth may, in fact, be exempt from Ta’anis Esther this year. That is regarding the fast. Of course, there are many other questions about fasting in particular circumstances, but so that we can cover as many laws of Purim as possible, we will move on. Each person, man or woman, should ask their own rabbi in other circumstances whether or not they are obligated to fast. There is a halachah that is especially relevant right now. Many young men and many baalei korei are preparing to read Megillas Esther. Sometimes people think that a mistake in reading the Megillah is not so serious, and that a mistake in the cantillation is not so serious. Nevertheless, it is clear from siman 690 that, ideally, one should certainly read without any mistakes. A mistake that changes the meaning can also be a serious problem in reading Megillas Esther. As for the cantillation, the Magen Avraham there and other poskim indicate that it is important, at least ideally. The cantillation marks were not put there for nothing. All the more so, someone who studies Chassidus knows that the cantillation notes represent the highest levels, associated with Kesser and with very, very lofty levels, higher than the letters and the vowel points. So no one should rely on the fact that he knows the Megillah and has been reading it for fifteen or twenty years. If you do not prepare, you will certainly miss a few cantillation notes and finer points here and there. But when preparing the Megillah, there is a question that is not so well known: it is not so simple to hold a Megillah directly in your hands. The well-known Gemara in Tractate Megillah 32 discusses holding a Sefer Torah with bare hands, which is very serious.

16:33 Speaker 2 There is also a well-known sicha of the Rebbe on this subject. So that rule is more or less familiar, and when people touch a Sefer Torah, they use a tallis or the Sefer Torah’s belt; they do not touch the parchment itself. With other sacred writings, however, there is a discussion, and in practice, many—indeed, most—poskim permit touching the Megillah itself, the parchment, with your hands. But the Rema brings a halachah in siman 147 that even before touching sacred writings, one must wash one’s hands. When people come to shul, they wash their hands before Maariv or Shacharis in any case, so their hands should be fine. And if they are not, they will certainly wash their hands before davening, so that is not much of a problem. But in the days before reading Megillas Esther, right now, young men may pick it up when they suddenly have a little time during a break or in the afternoon. Sometimes they use an actual Megillah. Many use a Tikkun Kor’im, but sometimes they take the actual Megillah to get used to it, and they hold it in their hands. The Rema writes that one must wash one’s hands before touching sacred writings. And if we think that perhaps the Rema did not mean Megillas Esther because the Divine Name does not appear in it, we can look at the Magen Avraham there, subsection 1. He explicitly gives Megillas Esther as an example of sacred writings for which one must wash one’s hands. So certainly, while there are many halachos about which people say, “I have not seen anyone observe that,” we should not be quick to say that a halachah no longer applies just because we do not ordinarily see it observed. It is worth paying attention to this; it is an explicit Rema,

18:27 Speaker 2 That’s the Magen Avraham. The poskim generally cite it. There’s another halacha brought down: if you touch it in the middle of a meal, you have to wash your hands again, right? This goes back to the discussion of when they went up to the upper chamber, where Beis Shammai’s students prevailed, at the end of the first chapter of Tractate Shabbos—the eighteen decrees. But in practice, the poskim wrote that we don’t follow that ruling. As for washing hands, though, people often simply aren’t familiar with this halacha. So it’s worth being stringent: whenever a bochur touches the Megillah and hasn’t kept his hands clean—and not just a bochur, but anyone who touches an actual Megillah during the week—he should remember to wash his hands first, to be stringent about the halacha explained in section 147, paragraph 1. There’s also a halacha concerning Megillas Esther this year: 13 Adar falls on Shabbos. So there’s the well-known question of whether you can prepare the Megillah at all on Shabbos, or even hold one—perhaps it’s muktzeh. On the face of it, the simple reasoning is that it isn’t muktzeh. Section 308 explains that food and sacred writings are the least subject to muktzeh of anything. After all, even picking up a cup for no reason on Shabbos raises a halachic question: there’s an issue with picking up a utensil normally used for permitted work for no reason. But sacred writings, such as books, and food are things you can pick up for no reason, so a Megillah shouldn’t be muktzeh. The Pri Chadash, however, wrote a major novel ruling in section 688: that the Megillah is muktzeh. Some understood—the Chasam

20:23 Speaker 2 Sofer writes in his responsa, section 194—that the Pri Chadash was quite possibly speaking specifically about a situation in which Purim falls on Shabbos. Since there’s a decree lest someone carry it four amos, perhaps in that case the Megillah is muktzeh. But most poskim rejected this. So in practice, there’s no problem holding a Megillah on the Shabbos before Purim, or on any Shabbos, and you can study from it and prepare it. There’s no problem with that, nor is sitting and studying the Megillah considered preparing on Shabbos for a weekday. True, they said that Torah study is set aside for the reading of the Megillah, but we know that doesn’t mean setting aside Torah study in the literal sense. The Rebbe once cited the Rashash and rejected his view in one of the sichos. So there’s no problem doing that. What certainly would be a problem is taking Megillas Esther to shul on Shabbos so that it will be there later, because that really is preparing on Shabbos for a weekday. It’s better to wait until after Shabbos. And it’s very important to remember that in most communities, people will probably daven Minchah in shul, go home, and then come back after nightfall. Once Shabbos is over, people will start getting ready, and many will certainly do work, including driving to shul. So don’t forget the straightforward halacha in section 299: each person should say, “Boruch hamavdil bein kodesh lechol,” so that they can drive, get ready, take the Megillah along, and come to shul. Before that, during Shabbos, preparing is certainly prohibited, as stated explicitly in section 688. It’s also brought in the Machatzis Hashekel on section 693 that you may not bring the Megillah during Shabbos. After Shabbos, as we said, once you’ve said “Boruch hamavdil bein kodesh lechol,” there’s no problem with it. So of course everyone

22:40 Speaker 2 will come to shul to daven Maariv first. Maariv is the usual Maariv for after Shabbos. This time, after Shemoneh Esrei, instead of saying Half Kaddish and Vihi Noam, we’ll say Kaddish Tiskabel, and then read Megillas Esther. We leave Havdalah until the end. Many shuls make Havdalah at the end every week after Shabbos, because they have a lot of guests—as is customary at 770, or in places with bochurim and others who really need Havdalah. Other places don’t make Havdalah. In any case, this year it would often be a good idea for the gabbaim to arrange Havdalah: men, women, and children come to shul without having heard it, so it’s an excellent service to the community. When Havdalah is made for the community, it’s always left until the end. That reminds us of the halacha in section 681, in the laws of Chanukah: first we light the Chanukah candles in shul after Shabbos, and then we make Havdalah. Incidentally, there’s a very interesting ruling here that several later authorities wrote about. The Daas Torah and several other poskim wrote that, just as in section 681, in the laws of Chanukah, we said that Havdalah comes at the end of the service and the Chanukah candles are lit first, the Taz says that at home it’s different: at home, you first make Havdalah and then light the Chanukah candles. By that reasoning, although section 693—the place where the law of delaying Havdalah until the end is stated in the laws of Purim—doesn’t make this distinction, apparently when a person gets home, it may matter. Often his wife and children have come to shul, and if they heard Havdalah there, that’s wonderful. But if they didn’t hear Havdalah in shul,

24:48 Speaker 2 the husband may arrive home to find his wife there. Perhaps she didn’t come to shul because she has small children who might disturb the reading. By the way, there’s an interesting halacha in section 689. At the beginning of that section, it says that everyone is obligated in the Megillah: men, women, and children who have reached the age of education. Later, in the very same section, the Shulchan Aruch cites the Yerushalmi in its final paragraph, saying that young boys and girls should also be brought to shul. Many ask: What’s new about that? There’s already an obligation to educate them to hear the reading. True, the first paragraph doesn’t explicitly say they must hear it in shul, but it seems obvious that we educate young children to do as adults do: just as adults hear the Megillah in shul, where “in a multitude of people is the glory of the King,” children should be brought to shul too. So what does the final halacha add? Why say it again? The Chofetz Chaim, in the Biur Halacha, understood it as I said earlier: the first paragraph says only that they must hear the Megillah, not that they must be brought to shul. The point made at the end of the section is that it’s worthwhile to bring them to shul. But there’s certainly no reason to bring very small children to shul. They may also cause a disturbance, as is brought to some extent in the Rema on the Shulchan Aruch, section 98: children who might disturb the shul should not be brought there at all. Many, though, argue otherwise. They say this case is different. Why, then, does it say again to bring them? The beginning of the section is speaking about children who have reached the age of education, while the end includes even those who haven’t. It’s along the lines of Mordechai gathering all the Jews—men, women, and children. There’s a point to it. Haman said, “There is one people, scattered”

26:51 Speaker 2 “And scattered among the peoples.” So here we see the strength of the Jewish people—men, women, and children. It also recalls the giving of the Torah, as the Gemara says in Shabbos 88a, “They accepted it again in the days of Achashverosh.” Everyone is brought together, almost like at Mount Sinai, so that everyone—men, women, and children—is there. And indeed, many halachic authorities say, and this is worth knowing, that if I have even a baby whom I know will be calm—some babies are calm; they either want to eat or they sleep—there is a reason on Purim to bring those children to shul, so that “in a multitude of people is the King’s glory,” and so that we fulfill this halachah. Of course, according to all opinions, a child who will disrupt the reading certainly should not come. So this applies to a child who will not disrupt it. When a child will disrupt it, very often the mother makes the sacrifice of staying home. And when the mother stays home, then when the father comes back, she has not made Havdalah. Now, there is the well-known halachah in section 296, arising from the disagreement between the Rambam and the Ramban about why we make Havdalah: whether it is an obligation in its own right or part of Kiddush. According to the Rambam, who holds that we sanctify Shabbos at its beginning and at its end, since whoever is obligated in “remember” is obligated in “observe,” women are obligated in Havdalah. But according to the Ramban, there are two ways of understanding his position as to whether a woman is obligated or not. The Alter Rebbe ultimately rules that, since there is a doubt, although women may recite a blessing even over time-bound positive mitzvos—as stated in section 17 and in many other sections, including section 589 in the laws of Rosh Hashanah—someone who has already fulfilled his obligation, if the husband has fulfilled his Havdalah obligation in shul, cannot make Havdalah for his wife. The Alter Rebbe—

28:42 Speaker 2 She makes Havdalah in the usual way. That is our practice. But then the question arises: should we first read the Megillah for her and then make Havdalah? Here, the later halachic authorities say that, regarding Chanukah, in section 681, the Taz writes explicitly that at home we do not follow the order used in shul: first we make Havdalah, and then we light the Chanukah candles. So on Purim too, it is best for her to make Havdalah, and afterward we can read Megillas Esther for her. That is regarding Motzaei Shabbos. Now, it is very, very important to say something about the nighttime reading. People often have the feeling that the reading of Megillas Esther at night is more important. Why does it feel that way? Because the large gathering—“in a multitude of people is the King’s glory”—is generally at night. Why? Because women who were at home come to shul, and boys and girls come too. But in the morning, when the husband goes to shul early, it is not so simple for women to come in large numbers, so the atmosphere during the day is less lively. Of course, the obligation to hear the Megillah applies both at night and during the day, and hearing it at night does not fulfill the daytime obligation. More than that, it is well known that reading it at night is an enactment of the Sages. It is rabbinic. Reading it during the day, by contrast, is based on what is written in Megillas Esther. It is something written in Tanach. That is called divrei kabbalah, the words of the Prophets and Writings. It is like Torah law—that is how it is described. We will return to this later. But there, in [unclear], it says that something written in divrei kabbalah, in Tanach, is like Torah law in every respect. And many halachic authorities maintain that when there is a doubt concerning divrei kabbalah, we rule stringently, so it is considered almost like a Torah obligation. We see this also in the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in section 261: sometimes, for the sake of Shabbos, one may do something rabbinically prohibited during bein hashmashos, twilight at the onset of Shabbos. During bein—

30:59 Speaker 2 hashmashos at the end of Shabbos, as you will see in [unclear]. But there is one rabbinic prohibition that cannot be set aside even for the sake of Shabbos: techumin, the Shabbos travel boundaries. Why can’t one establish an eruv techumin during bein hashmashos, even after the fact, when one may place food in an insulating material that does not add heat, and may do many other things prohibited by the Sages during bein hashmashos if they are needed for Shabbos or for a mitzvah? Because an eruv techumin involves an act of acquisition: one must acquire a place of rest for Shabbos, and acquisition is connected with buying and selling. True, it is not among the 39 categories of work listed in the Mishnah in Shabbos 73a, but it is written about in Tanach, in Nechemiah. So it is divrei kabbalah, like Torah law, and therefore much more stringent. We should know, then, that the daytime Megillah reading has a much more stringent status. This is also emphasized in our custom to recite Shehecheyanu—not as written in the Siddur, but as instituted by the Tzemach Tzedek. The Chabad custom is to say Shehecheyanu during the day as well. Where else do we say Shehecheyanu both at night and during the day? We do not find that anywhere. When someone makes Kiddush on Yom Tov, he says Shehecheyanu at night. He does not say Shehecheyanu again during the day. But here it is a new reading: yesterday’s was rabbinic, while today’s reading is based on divrei kabbalah, like a Torah reading. So, of course, we must be careful not to forgo it lightly, and “the eager perform mitzvos at the earliest opportunity.” We should read the Megillah on time, as early as possible, and not think that because we fulfilled our obligation yesterday, missing a few words today is not so serious because we heard it yesterday. We need to know that there are two obligations, and on the contrary, the daytime obligation is even more important than the nighttime one. When I say “more important,” I mean because its status is like Torah law. But of course, I—

32:49 Speaker 2 do not forget the Sages’ expressions, “The words of the Sages are dearer to Me than the words of the Torah,” or “The words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah,” as the Gemara says in Eruvin and the Mishnah says in Sanhedrin. These are clear statements, and of course we pay close attention to rabbinic obligations too. Since we mentioned that the daytime reading is based on divrei kabbalah while the nighttime reading is rabbinic, there is another very interesting practical difference. We know that one really needs to hear every word of Megillas Esther. It does not help to miss a few words and have the baal korei, or someone else who knows how to read, read us the missing passage at the end of the Megillah, because one who reads the Megillah out of order has not fulfilled the obligation. It must be read in order, without missing a single word. That often makes everyone anxious. So it is worth knowing that there is a solution. If someone has a kosher Megillah, excellent—he can follow along with the baal korei. But some people do not have a kosher Megillah and use a Chumash. When you have a Chumash in hand and are following the Megillah carefully, you should know that there is no need to become confused or frightened if a child interrupts his mother or someone else in the middle. Just as the baal korei says, “And let the king appoint officers,” the child says to his mother, “Mom, I want Bissli,” and sometimes she cannot hear two things at once. There is no need to panic. Take the Chumash and read the words you missed. True, the Chumash is not a kosher Megillah; it is an invalid scroll. But reading those words from it is like reciting them by heart, and one may recite part of the Megillah by heart—sometimes up to half of it. There are questions about whether this applies to the beginning and the end, but we are usually listening very, very carefully at the beginning and the end. Ultimately, we should know that in most parts of the Megillah, there is no concern about doing this. So

34:43 Speaker 2 The main problem that can arise is when a woman finds it very difficult to read the Megillah. Sometimes she can read, but not very well, and she is in a large shul where there is a concern that she will not hear everything. Today, it is possible to have the Megillah in Hebrew words written in Latin letters. Then, if she reads Latin letters more easily, she can also read more quickly. The main thing is that if she misses a few words, she reads them quickly, catches up to where the shliach tzibbur, the reader, is holding, and continues along with him. That way, she is considered to have heard it all. But when there is doubt, people often come and say, “I’m not sure whether I heard the words or not. There was a bit of noise, and I’m worried I may not have heard everything.” Often that is just fear, because they know the halachah that if you miss a word, you lose the whole thing, and so they sometimes imagine that they missed one. Of course, one should take care from the outset to hear every single word. It is also worth knowing that although many poskim disagree with the Levush in section 4, he writes that one must not only hear but actually concentrate on the words. Sometimes you can be watching a fly moving around the room while sitting very close to the reader, so there is no reason you would not have heard him. Clearly you heard, but you were not concentrating. He says you must really concentrate. So everyone should certainly follow along and concentrate, but should not immediately imagine that they did not hear. If, however, after looking into it a little, a person has a genuine doubt whether they heard everything,

36:28 Speaker 2 then during the day one must be stringent, because in a case of doubt concerning divrei kabbalah, we rule stringently. That is what the Turei Even writes in Tractate Megillah, page 4. This is the Ran’s objection in Tractate Megillah: in a case of doubt, one must take the stringent approach. He also derives another, less well-known consequence. Sometimes a boy is thirteen years old, but it is not known whether he has developed the two hairs that establish halachic adulthood. In that case, it is not so simple that he can fulfill a woman’s obligation for her during the day. At night there is no problem. If there is doubt whether someone heard everything during the day, we rule stringently. At night, the doubt is: perhaps I heard it, perhaps I did not. Since the nighttime obligation is rabbinic, we rule leniently. But we should stress an interesting point that the Turei Even also emphasizes: for a woman, even the daytime obligation is rabbinic. For a man, the nighttime obligation is rabbinic, while the daytime obligation is divrei kabbalah. For a woman, both at night and during the day, it is rabbinic. Why? Because it is a time-bound positive mitzvah, and women are exempt even from time-bound positive mitzvos written in the Torah. So why are they obligated to hear Megillas Esther? Because they, too, were part of that miracle, particularly since the miracle came about through a woman—through Esther, who played a major part in the whole story of Purim. That is why they were obligated. But who obligated them? The Sages did. In other words, it is rabbinic. So this also means that a thirteen-year-old boy, even if it is not known whether he has developed two hairs, can certainly fulfill a woman’s obligation to hear Megillas Esther even during the day. It may also mean that if a woman is unsure, whether at night or during the day, if she heard everything, one can rule leniently

38:08 Speaker 2 because in a case of doubt concerning a rabbinic obligation, we rule leniently: her obligation is, in fact, only rabbinic. These are a few matters relating to the Megillah. There are many laws concerning how one hears it. Strictly speaking, we stand for the blessings, and the reader continues reading while standing. The congregation can sit. In Chabad, the Rebbe also stood throughout the Megillah reading, and one often sees members of Anash standing throughout it as well. This is not required by halachah, but it is an important custom. It is worth remembering the law brought in the Tosefta in Tractate Shabbos, that one does not eat before performing mitzvos. There is a whole list there. Incidentally, it includes Krias Shema, and there are discussions about why people are not always so careful about this before Maariv, despite the laws concerning a shomer in sections 232 and 235. But we will not go into that. In any event, we see the practice of not eating, and effectively fasting, before mitzvos. There is a disagreement there in the Tosefta over whether it means literally fasting, or only not eating a meal or more than an egg-sized portion of mezonos, while fruit and other things permitted as a snack before Minchah and Maariv would also be permitted before mitzvos such as lulav, Megillas Esther, and shofar blowing. As everyone knows from the laws of Rosh Hashanah, our practice is to fast before the shofar blowing. Some have wanted to be lenient about drinking, and in some places they permit it; others are stringent. The practice I was taught is to be stringent: no drinking. One simply fasts before these mitzvos, particularly these infrequent mitzvos that come up from time to time, like lulav. So sometimes, when people look in the laws of Rosh Hashanah for these laws,

40:16 Speaker 2 they ask: where does the Shulchan Aruch say not to eat? In fact, it does not say so there. It is stated more explicitly regarding the Megillah, toward the end of section 690 or 692, that one does not eat beforehand. Now, it does not say there that one fasts. The laws of lulav also say not to eat before taking the lulav, but there, too, they debate whether that means fasting or not. The Mishnah Berurah does not understand it to mean fasting: in his view, a snack is permitted, but actual eating—more than an egg-sized portion—is forbidden. The Magen Avraham, in the laws of Megillas Esther, is the one who cites something that seems to indicate that, in the plain sense, one does not eat at all and fasts. He writes explicitly that this appears to be the meaning. For someone who is somewhat weak, there is a halachic discussion there about reading the Megillah earlier, from plag hamincha, or later, but simply eating is not a straightforward option. This is a subject that could be discussed at great length. But our ruling, at least, is that we actually fast. So much so that in an ordinary year, the Megillah reading takes place after a fast. A person has already davened Maariv, the fast has ended—why should the reader not have a few cups of water so that he can read more easily? And why should everyone not refresh themselves with a little food and drink? But they continue fasting, and that is very, very difficult, precisely because of this additional practice of fasting before mitzvos. So you remember that I spoke about the case of a husband arriving at shul in a situation like this year, when he has already made Havdalah. In that case, the woman makes Havdalah herself, as we said, and she does so before the Megillah, along the lines of

42:09 Speaker 2 What Tosafos wrote regarding, uh, lighting Chanukah candles. So the question is really how she can drink before the Megillah. First of all, this is one reason it’s often preferable for the husband not to make Havdalah in shul. In any case, there’s an important idea in the words of our Sages: there should be Havdalah in every home. So the husband can come home and make Havdalah for his wife, and then there’s no question at all. He hasn’t fulfilled his obligation in shul, so he can drink too, without any question. But if he did fulfill his obligation in shul, and the woman makes Havdalah, it’s not a problem if she drinks before the Megillah. Many halachic authorities wanted to say that if a person has actually been fasting, then of course he should continue fasting. But here she certainly hasn’t been fasting. She ate during Shabbos; we ate during the day, we ate lunch. There are even laws concerning seudah shlishis: sometimes the meal can continue past nightfall. There are some interesting cases in sections 187 and 188, in the laws of Birchas Hamazon, about what to do when seudah shlishis continues into the night, and whether we say Retzei and also Ve’al Hanissim. The halachic ruling is to say Retzei but not Ve’al Hanissim, because that would be a contradiction. If it were Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo, that’s a little different: first we say Retzei, indicating that it’s Shabbos, and with Yaaleh Veyavo we’ve moved into the weekday. But if we say Ve’al Hanissim before Retzei, that indicates that Shabbos is over. So we say Retzei and not Ve’al Hanissim. In any event, the woman ate during the day, and everyone ate, so no one is coming to the mitzvah after

43:55 Speaker 2 a fast. It’s not a problem if she drank; that’s what several halachic authorities say, and that’s how we can approach it. As for the daytime reading, as stated, the Mishnah Berurah, following his approach, doesn’t say this is a fast, but says that eating and tasting are permitted. He writes, though, that the same rule that applies at night obviously applies during the day. On the contrary: the nighttime reading is rabbinic, while the daytime reading is from the Torah, at least for men. So certainly during the day, too, there is the rule not to eat before the Megillah. We need to remember that. A woman is no less obligated than a man in Megillas Esther. All right, we said her obligation is rabbinic, but she is obligated. So it’s very worthwhile to arrange either for her to come to shul or for her husband to arrange an early Megillah reading for her, so there’s no question. On Motzaei Shabbos, baruch Hashem, we eat, and there’s also the practice of having a Melaveh Malkah meal, as brought in Shulchan Aruch, section 300, in the laws of Shabbos. There’s also the halachah in Tefillas Tzaddikim that it’s good to have a more substantial meal at night, on Purim night. So it’s important to bear in mind that in the morning she won’t be so hungry because she ate well the night before—but don’t overdo it. If the husband goes around delivering mishloach manos and matanos la’evyonim and gets home at one or two in the afternoon, and then they plan to read the Megillah for his wife, perhaps in the middle of the Purim meal, why put her in a situation, to begin with, where there’s a question about not eating before Megillas Esther? Of course, since it’s a day of feasting and joy, if the husband does come home and arrange a late reading for her, the rabbis will generally be lenient and allow her at least to drink, and sometimes even

45:50 Speaker 2 to eat. We certainly don’t fast on Purim day, especially if she’s eating foods that aren’t mezonos—fruit or other things. There is room to rely on that. So it’s worthwhile to think ahead about this and avoid the question. It’s true that we can rely on lenient rulings after the fact, but we’re not Jews who plan around after-the-fact rulings. We’re Jews who want to do things properly from the outset, and from the outset we refrain from eating before these mitzvos. So it’s best to arrange an early Megillah reading so the woman can eat without any question. Let’s talk a little about the mitzvos of the day. The Magen Avraham writes that when we recite Shehecheyanu in the morning, we should have in mind the mitzvos of the day. That includes the Purim meal and mishloach manos, in addition, of course, to having in mind Megillas Esther. Some of you may ask why matanos la’evyonim wasn’t included. Some halachic authorities do include matanos la’evyonim, and that’s what’s recommended here: when hearing Shehecheyanu during the day—sorry, at the morning reading—explicitly have in mind matanos la’evyonim too. But several halachic authorities wrote that the Magen Avraham was concerned that if this were stated explicitly, a poor person might come in the morning and ask for money, and we’d tell him, “Sir, wait. We haven’t read Megillas Esther or recited Shehecheyanu yet.” The mitzvos of the day can be performed throughout the day. Ideally, they begin at sunrise, but if they were done from dawn onward, they count after the fact, until the end of the day. So certainly one can give to a poor person then, even before the Megillah reading. Some therefore said that this is why the Magen Avraham omitted matanos la’evyonim. But it’s worthwhile to have matanos la’evyonim in mind as well, certainly if we haven’t done it yet. Now, regarding matanos la’evyonim: how much are we obligated to give, can we use maaser money,

47:59 Speaker 2 and to whom should we give? Institutions often come and say, “I’m a yeshivah; give me matanos la’evyonim.” We’ve spoken with rabbis about this, and I certainly don’t want, G-d forbid, to upset anyone over it. There really are students who are poor, whose families are in need. It isn’t simple, and they may qualify as poor. But let’s quickly put things in order. First, one must give to two poor people. That’s what it says: matanos la’evyonim. You can’t give to just one poor person; you have to give to another as well. Each person must give to two poor people. Now, who is obligated? Both women and men. As for children, there are discussions about what age this begins—whether it’s from the age of chinuch, from thirteen, or later. But in practice, the ruling is that we train children in this mitzvah as well. The Rebbe also spoke in his sichos about how good it is to accustom them to these mitzvos. So we do give to two poor people, and women and children, boys and girls who have reached the age of chinuch—roughly five or six—also give matanos la’evyonim. The father can certainly fulfill the obligation on their behalf by taking the amount for everyone and passing it to a tzedakah administrator who distributes it to poor people, or by giving it to poor families he knows himself. Now, it’s very important, as we mentioned earlier, that what’s written in the Prophets, in Tanach, is called divrei kabbalah, and the verse says evyonim, the destitute. Some understood that word in light of the Gemara in Bava Metzia, which says that an evyon is even more needy than an ani—not just poor, but truly destitute, lacking everything. In practice, though, the Aruch Hashulchan and most halachic authorities said no: it’s enough that they are poor, struggling to make it through the month and without sufficient income.

50:01 Speaker 2 Not because... Sometimes people do have enough, but they always like to live far beyond their means. I’m talking about people who struggle even with the basics. They have trouble making it through the month, they’re constantly behind on their electricity and municipal tax bills, and they face real difficulties. So yes, the recipients of matanos la’evyonim certainly have to be poor. It’s written in Tanach: “gifts to the poor.” We can’t get clever about it and say, “Well, this person is needy...” We’re talking, at the very least, about poor people, and that’s who we have to give to. There’s a discussion between the Aruch Hashulchan, the Maharsha, and other halachic authorities: since we have to give to two people, if I give matanos la’evyonim money to a father who has a wife and children, does that count as giving to at least two poor people, or does it count as one person? Some say it counts as several; that’s how some understand the Maharsha. The Aruch Hashulchan understood that it does not. Often, when you give to a tzedakah administrator, they can distribute it themselves. After all, they have many families on their list, sometimes within the community and sometimes outside it, to whom they distribute matanos la’evyonim. So what you should do is make a kind of stipulation that all the money received will be distributed to at least two families. That way you fulfill the obligation according to all opinions. Of course, if you gave to one family, you can rely on the Maharsha and several other authorities who say that this already counts as several poor people. Now, that’s regarding matanos la’evyonim. So if someone wants to bring an incorrect proof from later in that same section, 694, where it says that you give to anyone who holds out a hand, that you don’t need to investigate, and that you should even give to a non-Jew to avoid ill will—that is certainly a mistake

51:50 Speaker 2 in understanding the plain meaning. That passage is not about matanos la’evyonim, even though it’s in the same section. Rather, there are matanos la’evyonim, which must certainly go to two poor people who are Jewish—that’s clear. And there is another halachah: on Purim there is also the concept of Purim funds. It has practical implications; Purim funds are discussed in the Talmud, in Bava Basra, and also in Choshen Mishpat, along with many other matters. Purim funds mean that on Purim, even after we’ve given matanos la’evyonim, there is also a practice of giving to anyone who holds out a hand. That’s a separate law. But the two poor people to whom we give matanos la’evyonim must genuinely be poor. So increasing one’s tzedakah and giving to institutions is excellent, but matanos la’evyonim must be given to poor people in the literal sense. And if you want to give to a yeshivah, then look specifically into which students come from families that are truly poor, that lack things and are struggling—students who don’t have many shirts or much clothing, whose families simply live below the poverty line—and give directly to them. That’s at least as far as matanos la’evyonim is concerned. Now, how much do you have to give? Here’s the interesting thing: you study the entire discussion on page 7, and all the early and later halachic authorities, and almost all of them give no minimum amount. The Pri Megadim even wonders about it and says, “We haven’t found a minimum amount.” It’s true that the Ritva was not widely known; his writings were not in the hands of all the halachic authorities, so they didn’t cite him. But the Mishnah Berurah cites the Ritva, who writes that it is the value of a perutah, which works out to about ten agorot for each poor person. Many people say, “What do you mean, ten agorot? That’s a joke.” What? Even at a wedding, sometimes the requirement is the value of a perutah. Of course, a ring is given, but they cover the bride’s eyes to indicate that she agrees to marry

53:42 Speaker 2 even for the value of a perutah, so she can’t later make a claim about it, as the Rema rules in Even Ha’ezer, section 31. But people often ask, “What is this value of a perutah? What value does it have?” My brother-in-law once told me that he had gone to visit a Jew who was very, very far away, in Japan. This Jew was in prison, and my brother-in-law would bring him food, traveling hundreds of kilometers there and back each day. There was only one train a day for the return trip, and the place was many hours away. One time, he went to pay for his return ticket just three or four minutes before the train, and he was short precisely one small coin—something like the value of a perutah. The non-Jewish woman at the counter was very stubborn and inflexible. She said, “No, you have to pay it.” So he started asking people, and at first they didn’t quite understand him. Between his explanations and her insistence, the train came and left, and he was stuck there for twenty-four hours. That’s when he understood the value of a perutah. Sometimes we may not feel that a perutah has much value on its own, but it can make up the difference. Sometimes a person is very, very hungry and wants to buy a little bread to ease the hunger, but is short ten agorot. So we shouldn’t always dismiss a small sum. That’s why many halachic authorities hold that giving ten agorot is enough, and that is indeed how we should rule according to the basic law, so that this halachah is accessible to everyone. As the Rebbe spoke about several times, it’s good to publicize that the mitzvos of Purim are not so difficult and are very easy to fulfill. So that is the basic law. Still, we should

55:42 Speaker 2 mention that there are other opinions, including the Zera Yaakov and many other halachic authorities, who argue that the reason the early authorities and later halachic authorities, apart from the Ritva, did not discuss an amount is that it was obvious that one gives a substantial gift. You know what it says in Bava Basra 53: “Anyone who gives, gives generously.” And the Maharsha uses that expression on page 7 in Megillah: one must give a fine gift, a substantial gift, something the recipient can actually buy something with. But ideally, the money should reach the poor person during Purim, rather than being distributed afterward. The Shulchan Aruch says that if there are no poor people available, you keep the money until you meet them. But ideally it should reach them on Purim so they can buy something. So it’s worthwhile at least—if we’re being stringent and teaching our children to do this, then for children, fine, they can fulfill the obligation with ten agorot. That comes to twenty agorot per child: two amounts worth a perutah, for two poor people. So it doesn’t add up to much. Even if someone has a large family with many children below bar or bas mitzvah age, it won’t come to a large sum. For a shekel and a half or two shekels, he’s covered all the children. Then what remains is the father, the mother, and those who have reached bar or bas mitzvah age. So why not be stringent here if you can? Granted, the basic law may require only ten agorot, but if you want to take other authorities’ opinions into account, give enough for the person to buy something to eat—a falafel and a drink, two slices of pizza and a drink, something that will let them buy a little food. Say around fifteen or twenty shekels for each. Do the math and see how much that comes to. Even if someone has, bli ayin hara, ten children, that leaves the father and mother and a few of the children, so it’s

57:24 Speaker 2 Twenty shekels—that comes to about forty shekels per person, because he has at least two poor people to give to. So that’s forty shekels for him and forty for his wife, which is already eighty. Say he also has another three or four older children, and it comes to around two hundred shekels. Together with the younger children, for a little over two hundred shekels he has given gifts to the poor. We shouldn’t forget the Rambam’s well-known words: it is better to spend more on gifts to the poor than on the Purim meal and mishloach manos combined. If someone followed that literally, then if he spends seven hundred or a thousand shekels on all the other expenses, he would supposedly have to spend more than that on gifts to the poor—if he wants to be really exacting about the Rambam’s wording. It’s true that this Rambam isn’t quoted in the Shulchan Aruch. The other statement of the Rambam, that it is good to increase one’s mishloach manos, is quoted there. This one is quoted by the poskim, though; it appears in the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. And it’s obvious that it’s good to give more gifts to the poor. So if we’ve spent a thousand shekels, it’s not such a terrible thing to spend another two hundred. Poor people look forward to this date, and we can give. Of course, all this is a hiddur, an enhancement of the mitzvah. If someone finds it difficult, he can rely on the Radbaz, who says that the required amount is a perutah’s worth. Now, can it be given from maaser funds? There is a clear rule in halachah that you cannot use maaser to fulfill your halachic obligations. If a person has no tefillin and wants to buy tefillin for himself—that’s different from buying tefillin for someone else who has none. Buying them for himself with maaser is a serious problem, because he is obligated to have tefillin. So anything

59:10 Speaker 2 he is obligated to do cannot be paid for with maaser funds. More generally, there is a question whether maaser must be given only to the poor. That is the Rema’s view at the beginning of siman 249, but the Taz and Shach there write that this isn’t necessarily so; it can also be used for mitzvos. The Alter Rebbe also writes about a person whose father passes away, G-d forbid, and he inherits from him: should he say Shehecheyanu or Hatov Vehameitiv? He says to say Shehecheyanu. Now, one might think that poor people also benefit from the money, since he will give tzedakah. But the Alter Rebbe says no: his father could have given that tzedakah to the poor too, so nothing new has happened in that respect. With maaser, though, perhaps they will gain, because even if the father already gave maaser, the son who inherits must give maaser again on the amount he receives. But the Alter Rebbe says: who says he’ll use it for the poor? Perhaps he’ll use it for mitzvos. So we see that he holds maaser can also be used for mitzvos, but not for mitzvos that are obligatory. Gifts to the poor are obligatory, so maaser cannot be used for that obligation. Now there’s a question: since the basic halachic requirement is ten agorot, if I give, say, two hundred shekels or a hundred shekels to a poor person, can I make the amount beyond that come from maaser funds? It isn’t so simple, because when you give it as one gift, you have expressly decided that this is how you are fulfilling the mitzvah of gifts to the poor. But if you’ve already given to two poor people and afterward want to give more to another poor person—since there is a mitzvah to increase your gifts to the poor by giving to additional people, that too fulfills a mitzvah of gifts to the poor. It is no longer an obligation, though, so there is no question that the additional money can come from maaser funds. Sometimes you can work it out

1:00:56 Speaker 2 this way: people often come to shul asking for money, and you can see that they really are poor. You can give one a shekel here and another a shekel there, and then say, “I’ve fulfilled my obligation.” After that, the larger amount you wanted to give to the poor can come from maaser funds. That’s one possibility. Or sometimes it’s the same people. Baruch Hashem, we haven’t found many poor people in town, and there are only two poor people or two families here. In that case, you can sometimes give to them twice. You give them something and say that with this you are fulfilling your obligation; then you add money because you want to do the mitzvah in a more beautiful way. That money will also count as gifts to the poor, but not as part of your obligation, and that is enough to allow you to give it from maaser funds. That’s regarding gifts to the poor. As for mishloach manos, the basic halachic requirement is to send to one person. There are, of course, the reasons given by the Ksav Sofer and the Manos Halevi, and all the practical differences between those reasons for giving mishloach manos. But one of the well-known reasons is to strengthen bonds of friendship in response to Haman’s statement that “there is one people, scattered among the nations.” Here we bring people together—sometimes specifically people we see in shul. I once heard from Rabbi Hillel Pevzner, a"h, that we should think particularly of people we sometimes meet but with whom there’s some rift, or a certain coolness in the friendship. We shouldn’t necessarily think only of giving to our very best friends. Sometimes giving to someone can actually strengthen the relationship: “I thought he didn’t like me; I thought he was cold toward me, and here he thought of me and gave me mishloach manos.” That certainly achieves the purpose of mishloach manos. Of course, you can send it. Some poskim maintain that, since the expression here is “sending portions,” you need to do it through a messenger.

1:02:54 Speaker 2 So, as many people do, you prepare the mishloach manos and have a child or someone else take it: “Here, bring this for me.” One practical point is that it’s best not to send mishloach manos anonymously, because one of its purposes is certainly to strengthen our relationships with people. An anonymous gift can strengthen Ahavas Yisroel, but not the personal relationship with them. So it’s best not to send it anonymously. Now, regarding mishloach manos, as we said, the obligation is to send one mishloach manos. There’s not much need to debate the quantity, because I believe Jews give mishloach manos very generously, well beyond what halachah requires. But it should contain good food—a nice piece of cake and a drink, for example, or any ready-to-eat food. The poskim write that the food should be ready to eat. And since it says to increase one’s mishloach manos, as that Rambam quoted in the Shulchan Aruch says, some people certainly go beyond giving to one person and give to more. It’s known that the Rebbe himself gave three mishloach manos, at least. I once heard that they went to a Kohen, a Levi and a Yisroel—that needs checking—but he did give to three. So many people, even though this isn’t necessarily written in Sefer Haminhagim and isn’t stated as a directive for everyone, say: since we increase our mishloach manos, why not adopt this practice too and give more? And I believe that without my asking or saying anything, people will in any case sometimes give far more than three mishloach manos. So that’s regarding mishloach manos. As for the feast itself—we’ve been going more or less in order through the day—of course there is the

1:04:53 Speaker 2 One thing everyone is already careful about, even without anyone publicizing it, is “a person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim.” That is what it says in Megillah, page 7, and everyone knows the story of Rabbah, who rose and slaughtered Rabbi Zeira, and the Rebbe’s wonderful sicha on the subject. But this halachah is brought in the Shulchan Aruch, in section 695. There was even a year when the Rebbe said he did not want to intervene in what is written in the Shulchan Aruch, whether to impose limits or not. But in the end, meetings were held about it; Rabbi Ginzburg and many others gathered the material. I also once heard from Rabbi Rosovsky that there is a concept of limits even on Purim, and that the Rebbe would sometimes choose one person in a community to fulfill the obligation on everyone’s behalf. That is what I once heard from him. But of course, the Shulchan Aruch says explicitly, word for word, that “a person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim.” A person needs to get drunk. It does not, however, say what one must get drunk on. You can get drunk on whiskey, on mashke, on wine. There are several Rishonim who did write specifically about wine—the Rambam and Rashi. So it is not stated there in the Shulchan Aruch, but it is not quite right to say that it is not in the Shulchan Aruch at all. In section 696, in another paragraph—after all, our Torah is sparse in one place and rich in another—there is a law concerning an onen, someone whose close relative has died but has not yet been buried. By rabbinic law, an onen may not have meat or wine until he has buried the deceased. So may he have wine and meat at the Purim meal? The Shulchan Aruch says yes. Surely, if these were not essential, he could fulfill his obligation with other things, with mashke. So regarding an onen, he brings this from Rabbi Aharon of Lunel, one of the great Rishonim in France,

1:06:42 Speaker 2 in Orchos Chaim. So an onen, too, needs to have both meat and wine, because that is what one is supposed to have on Purim, at the Purim feast. Incidentally, the law about wine is brought in the laws of the Purim feast in section 695. So it is true that many people already drink in the morning, in the afternoon, all the time, saying l’chaim. But certainly we should not lose sight of the fact that the straightforward setting for “a person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim” is the Purim meal. One proof is precisely the story of Rabbah slaughtering Rabbi Zeira. The next year he invited him again, and Rabbi Zeira said to him, “Does a miracle happen every day?” But all Rabbah had done was invite him to a meal. Who says they had to drink at the meal? Perhaps they could drink in the morning, and then no one would drink at the meal. Clearly, the requirement to drink wine, to become intoxicated, is fulfilled at the Purim meal itself. Incidentally, that is also good advice for not getting too drunk, because when you eat, the wine is absorbed more easily and you get a little less drunk. But all right, it says to drink “until one does not know.” So the Mechaber writes it plainly: one should get drunk. The Rema writes it a little differently. He says to drink a little more than usual, but to keep some balance, and at most, to fulfill “until one does not know,” to rest for a while, put one’s head down for a bit, and then, naturally, one will not know the difference between “Blessed is Mordechai” and “Cursed is Haman.” That is what the Rema writes. So the Pri Megadim, Rabbi Yosef Teomim, writes: on one hand there is the Mechaber, who says to take it literally, and on the other there is the Rema, who says this. His answer is very simple. He says, “When wine enters, secrets come out,” as the discussion in Eruvin explains at length. It is also well known that the numerical value of “wine” is seventy, the same as “secret.” So when a person drinks, he reveals his secrets, his inner self. So

1:08:32 Speaker 2 someone with a good inner self can drink sometimes. That is how the Pri Megadim puts it: if drinking will lead him to tell us more about his hiskashrus to the Rebbe, or about his love of Torah, and make it easier for him to share teachings of our Sages, more interesting stories, a greater closeness to Hakadosh Boruch Hu and a stronger connection to tzaddikim, then fine—why shouldn’t he drink? But someone who reveals other sides of his personality when he drinks—the Pri Megadim says it is better for that person not to drink. There is another possibility, too: some people are not used to drinking, so when they drink, they are completely knocked out and fall asleep. They cannot do any mitzvos, will probably barely manage to say Birchas Hamazon, may not daven Maariv on time, and might sleep until after midnight, along with all sorts of other things. So if a person becomes completely unable to function, he should certainly think about that as well. As for what one should actually do, each person should speak with his rabbi and with the mashpia who knows him, and follow their guidance. Of course, based on much of what has been written on this subject, people have said that the Rebbe’s well-known restrictions on mashke may, more or less, apply on Purim as well. But I am certainly not closing the door completely; each person should consult his mashpia and his rabbi about it. As for the feast itself, one certainly needs to drink wine, and there should be meat as well. In Chabad, of course, there is the custom of kreplach, which is dough with meat inside. And in general, it is good to eat meat on this day. True, this is not stated in its place in the Shulchan Aruch, in section 695, but it is written, as we mentioned earlier, in section 696, in the name of Orchos

1:10:32 Speaker 2 Chaim. The Mechaber states that an onen should have both meat and wine at the feast, so that means meat clearly ought to be there. There are sichos and letters from the Rebbe about this. Is one actually obligated to make Hamotzi? No, one is not obligated—just as the halachah is that if one forgets Al Hanissim in Birchas Hamazon, one does not repeat it, as the Alter Rebbe brings in sections 187 and 188. But in the end, this is the custom and what people do: they wash for bread. As the Rebbe said, since there is an obligation to rejoice here, even more than on Yom Tov—as the Alter Rebbe asks in Torah Or, how is it that the joy of Purim is even greater than what the Torah describes with “You shall rejoice on your festival”? Here it is “until one does not know,” whereas on Yom Tov the required joy is more restrained. As the Rambam explains in Hilchos Lulav, [unclear], and the Alter Rebbe brings this in halachah, in section 529 of the laws of Yom Tov. But here there is no restraint. It is a joy that breaks through boundaries, a great joy. And that is how it is on Purim: there is tremendous joy at this feast. If there is joy, then seemingly there is also meat. The Alter Rebbe writes in section 529 that although, when the Beis Hamikdash stood, there was no joy without meat, while now that there is no Beis Hamikdash, there is no joy without wine, there is still a reason to eat meat on Yom Tov. So there is also a reason to eat meat amid the great joy of Purim. And this halachah from Orchos Chaim, as we said, demonstrates that one should indeed eat meat. The main part of the meal should be during the day, as we said. It can continue into the night, and we continue to say Al Hanissim, but ultimately, the main part of the meal needs to be

1:12:28 Speaker 2 during the day. It is true that people often go out on mivtzoim, travel around a lot and help many Jews fulfill the mitzvos. But if possible, it is worthwhile to arrive in time so that the main part of the meal takes place during the day, and then, with Hashem’s help, it can carry on into the night. Of course, no one should forget to daven Maariv. But be aware that when Maariv falls in the middle of the meal, questions sometimes arise afterward about Al Hanissim. In any event, with Hashem’s help, may each and every person’s joy be a joy that breaks through boundaries. May “everlasting joy be upon their heads.” And as the sefarim say, and as Torah Or discusses at length, there are aspects of all the festivals that will cease, but Megillas Esther will not cease, and the festival of Purim will not cease. May we, with Hashem’s help, be able to celebrate together with the Rebbe, here below ten tefachim. And with Hashem’s help, may we merit the true and complete Geulah and all celebrate Purim in holy Jerusalem. Then, naturally, all of the Jewish people, in every group, will celebrate there this year, 5786, with Hashem’s help.