Damage from Visual Intrusion via Security Cameras and Drones - Rabbi Yisrael Metuf shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:10 Speaker 2 Good evening, everyone. Baruch Hashem, we’ve reached an even more interesting stage than in the previous class. Our classes began with the basics: What is a courtyard? What is an alleyway? What is forbidden and what is permitted? What about a doorway or a window? Then we learned the laws concerning courtyards and balconies today: when you need to put up a partition and when you don’t. Last time we learned about doorways and windows. Does the mere fact that you live in an apartment building imply consent? Still, if one window faces another, what needs to be done? And now we’re moving to the next topic. It’s very interesting: security cameras and drones. The more we get down to practical details—there’s a passage that says, “With mortar and bricks.” “Mortar” refers to kal vachomer, and the Jewish people were made to work hard with mortar and bricks. “Bricks” refers to clarifying the halacha. The more we get into the practical details, the more complicated things become from all sorts of angles, and it’s much harder to reach a ruling. So we have many questions on these topics. Flying a drone. Let’s take a few possibilities. Someone who—for example, here in Karmei Hanadiv, from time to time they photograph the new construction of 770. They fly a drone around to film it, and along the way it also sees—its camera picks up—people’s balconies and courtyards. Another possibility is an amateur drone enthusiast. He’s in his own courtyard flying drones, and the neighbors around him complain: “Your drone goes up and can see my window, my home, my courtyard, the courtyard next door.” Now, is that drone passing through the other person’s courtyard, or is it only in my space? What if the other person says, “You’re entering my property. You’re violating my sovereignty”? Right? With countries, that’s a major issue: an aircraft that enters their airspace violates their sovereignty. Can that concept be applied here?

02:44 Speaker 3 A drone also takes pictures.

02:45 Speaker 2 It takes pictures. How? Right. So if it can see the other person’s courtyard, is that a problem?

02:53 Speaker 3 It only takes pictures if you turn the camera on, doesn’t it?

02:56 Speaker 2 Correct.

02:56 Speaker 3 If it flies by and takes pictures, or just...

02:58 Speaker 2 I’m talking about someone flying it and taking pictures. Now the neighbor also says, “I don’t know whether you’re taking pictures or not. I see the drone, and it makes me uncomfortable.”

03:06 Speaker 3 It enters his personal space.

03:08 Speaker 2 Yes. A second case: a digital peephole. Really, the question applies to any peephole. You put a peephole in your door. We don’t install them ourselves; ours was already there. But there’s a stairwell, people pass through it, and... If we recall—let’s look for a moment at the Alter Rebbe’s wording in number six. There is a prohibition against looking, against looking and seeing. We’ll come back to the distinctions shortly. Besides that, there’s also a prohibition against creating an opening through which one can look, even if you say, “I won’t look.” Take the example of a doorway facing a doorway, in section 12 here. I make a doorway facing another doorway, or a window facing another window. I say, “I promise you I’ll never look through the window.” That doesn’t help. We even said that if both parties waive their rights with respect to each other, that doesn’t help. The very fact that you’ve created the possibility of looking into the other person’s space is a problem.

04:13 Speaker 3 So that applies to a peephole.

04:14 Speaker 2 Correct.

04:15 Speaker 3 What about a courtyard—is that only at prayer times?

04:19 Speaker 2 So we said that in a courtyard, not all activities require privacy, while in a home they all do. In a courtyard, some activities require privacy and some don’t. So if a person eats in his courtyard, presumably he’s less likely to do things there that require privacy. But inside the home, one person can see the other person’s screen all day long. You say, well, yes, at this point you can’t object to that. With this peephole, when I look through it, I see people passing outside. Now, what do I see? First of all, someone walking alone in the stairwell sometimes feels free to adjust his clothes, or maybe scratch himself somewhere he wouldn’t do it in front of other people. Or... you look and see when he leaves, when he comes in. You’re tracking me. So here, too, the question has two parts: Am I allowed to look? And am I allowed to create a situation that makes it possible to look? As he said, doors today are certainly built with peepholes. There’s certainly no problem with that; people have waived their objection. Once... It’s not just a waiver; it’s the accepted practice. Everyone has a peephole. There’s certainly no problem with having one. The question is whether you’re allowed to look through it.

05:35 Speaker 3 But it can take pictures.

05:36 Speaker 2 And the question is whether you’re allowed to install a digital peephole. A digital peephole. Here, too, I’m not familiar with the practical options. Are there models where you can see the image all day? In principle, if it works by pressing a button—you press it and see—that’s more or less like an ordinary peephole. With a regular peephole I look and see; here I press a button instead of looking. But what if I’ve installed one with a screen, so I can see what’s happening outside all the time?

06:05 Speaker 3 There’s a peephole in the shul.

06:06 Speaker 2 A security camera. Yes.

06:09 Speaker 3 That’s...

06:10 Speaker 2 Let’s talk about that too. Let’s see. A shul is a public place.

06:19 Speaker 3 Those are the boundaries of...

06:20 Speaker 2 Now, let’s say there’s a digital peephole with a screen on your door, and you can constantly see what’s happening outside. The neighbor can say, “Listen, that makes me much more uncomfortable. I know that every time I pass by, you see me.”

06:36 Speaker 3 What do you mean, “see”? He can see him.

06:37 Speaker 2 Right, right. That’s the question. Is that... Right. Okay. Now, the third topic is security cameras, and there are several possibilities here too. One possibility is that you put a security camera in your courtyard, and part of the area it covers includes a section of the other person’s courtyard. That’s one possibility. The second is that you put a security camera, for example, outside near your entrance.

07:08 Speaker 3 It captures all the passersby.

07:09 Speaker 2 Yes, the passersby on the street. Or, as he mentioned, a shul is a public place. There’s also the case of a shared courtyard: I put a security camera in a shared courtyard. So there are two issues here. First, what can the camera see? And second, where did I put it? There’s always a difference. I mentioned this in previous weeks. If I put something on my own property—let’s state the general rule now—there are two grounds on which the other person can stop you from doing something. One is that you’re causing him harm. If you’re causing him harm, it makes no difference that you’re on your own property. He can say, “I don’t care that you’re on your own property.” If you shoot arrows from your property toward someone else, you can say, “I’m doing it on my own property,” but the arrow goes beyond it. If you do something on your property that directly harms someone else, that’s your problem. Now, this is a question you could study for months. The halachic term for it is girei dilei. Girei means “his arrows.” How do you define “his arrows”? It’s a whole complicated subject. In siman 155, the Ketzos Hachoshen spends pages and pages just discussing one opinion or another, examining it from all sorts of angles. But generally speaking, as I mentioned in earlier classes, there’s a dispute about who must take steps to keep the harm at a distance: the person being harmed or the person causing the harm? Can the person causing the harm say, “I can use my property however I like; if it bothers you, find some way to deal with it”? Or does he have to keep the harm away? The halacha was decided according to Rabbi Yosi, that the person being harmed must take steps to keep the harm away. Yes—with the exception of cases of girei dilei, meaning direct harm. If I directly harm

09:07 Speaker 2 him, then I have to make sure I don’t harm him. And that’s where all the definitions throughout the laws of neighbors come in. There’s harm from heat, noise, vibrations, all sorts of things. For each one, what’s the definition? What counts as direct harm, and what doesn’t?

09:24 Speaker 4 Seeing isn’t something tangible.

09:25 Speaker 2 The Ramban says that harm caused by looking is considered direct harm. Why? Because you look at him and see him; that’s considered direct harm. That’s how he defines it.

09:34 Speaker 4 The evil eye, so to speak.

09:36 Speaker 2 So there’s the evil eye—that’s one possibility. Let’s see; let’s recall the reasons.

09:40 Speaker 4 A field, not the field.

09:43 Speaker 2 Right, that’s the— that’s the evil eye. So we have three reasons: privacy, the evil eye, and the evil eye means that it can physically harm him. When you look at him and see the size of his field, see his successes, it could physically harm him. And as an aside, in the last class I brought a passage from the Rebbe about the evil eye, and we didn’t get to discuss it. Next class I’ll talk about it at greater length, but in a word: in that letter, the Rebbe speaks about a woman who was overly particular about the evil eye, and the Rebbe told her, “About this it is said that if you are not particular about it, it will not affect you.” Yes, things of that sort, especially when they aren’t things written in Shulchan Aruch. Something like that. In other words, Shulchan Aruch does mention situations involving the evil eye. Which ones? Not marrying off two sisters on the same day, or in the same week. There is also not calling brothers, or a father and son, up to the Torah one after the other. Or our case: not looking at someone else’s successes. As we heard from the Rebbe, what is written in Shulchan Aruch exists; it’s a fact, it exists. But you want to be overly particular now? Don’t be overly particular, because then it will affect you too. That seems to be the meaning. In any event, whether it harms or doesn’t harm, the halachah is the halachah: you may not look. And the third thing is lashon hara. That’s what the Ramban says; he calls it lashon hara. What does lashon hara mean here? He isn’t saying anything. The idea is that it falls within the broader category of lashon hara. You look, and afterward you’ll tell others. It comes under lashon hara, gossip, things like that—the very act of looking at someone else and seeing his private affairs. And if you remember, the Maggid was very, very precise in his wording: do you see, or do you look? Regarding the evil eye, it’s only if

11:40 Speaker 2 he looks that it causes the evil eye. If he merely sees and moves on, that doesn’t cause the evil eye. Regarding privacy, the very fact that his neighbor sees him—even for a single second—means he already knows what the other person is doing. He has already intruded on his privacy, and that is a problem. Even seeing. Now, even if his neighbor agreed to be seen, agreed to open a window and so on, he still may not look, because being seen is somewhat disturbing, but being watched is disturbing in even more significant ways. In other words, there’s a person who—ah, for example, we mentioned changing clothes. It’s enough for someone to see him for a second; that bothers him. A person who knows he can be seen won’t do those things. But there’s a situation where someone is sitting and eating. If another person sits and watches him for a long time, it bothers him. Even if being seen is permitted, being watched bothers him. So even where seeing is permitted, watching is forbidden. Now, let me go back for a moment to what I said earlier about a security camera. As a general rule, why can the other person stop you? Or why do you have to refrain from doing something on your own property? Because you are harming him. If you are directly harming him, you must refrain from doing so. Now, if you’re doing something not on your property, but on the other person’s property or in an area you both share, he doesn’t even have to claim, “You are directly harming me.” Even the slightest complaint, as long as this isn’t an accepted practice, allows him to stop you. He says, “You’re using my space and causing me a disturbance”—that’s enough. If you’re causing me no disturbance at all, then the principle is that we compel a person not to act like the people of Sodom. A person wants to do something—to use something

13:36 Speaker 2 in the shared courtyard—and it causes no disturbance at all. Why would you tell him no for no reason? That’s when we compel a person not to act like the people of Sodom. If it causes a disturbance, even a small one, he can prevent it, unless it is an accepted practice. Okay? Let’s take the example of a peephole in a door. A person says, you—no, a peephole in a door is a little different; it is on my property. But say I put a security camera outside in the stairwell. The stairwell belongs to me too. You’re putting something here. True, these aren’t private activities at all, but it bothers me, so I can stop you from doing it—unless it has become accepted under a more recent custom. We’ll discuss that a little more shortly. Now, one more halachic topic, and then we’ll move on to the practical details. Another thing we learned about this halachic topic is when something counts as consent and when it counts as custom. I won’t go over it again. If you want me to, say so, but we’ve already gone over it many times. In a word, consent is effective only in courtyards, not with doorways and windows. Okay? As for custom, even in courtyards, consent does not help against a custom. Now, what happens when a situation of visual intrusion already exists and I increase it? This will be relevant later to all the cases we’ll discuss. Visual intrusion already exists, and I increase it. I’ll give you four examples from halachah, and afterward we’ll see how they apply to us. First example: a shared courtyard. This is a picture from Jerusalem, I think. Several neighbors share this courtyard, and their windows are already open onto it. But what happens if someone wants to open a window? From that window he overlooks the shared courtyard. The neighbor says to him, “You’re watching me when I use the courtyard.” The owner of the window says, “What do you mean? I can go out into the courtyard myself and see you. So why does it bother you if I look at you from the window?”

15:36 Speaker 2 I can go out into the courtyard myself and see you. So why does it bother you if I look at you from the window?”

15:42 Speaker 5 He has other windows.

15:45 Speaker 2 Right. In this case, where there are other windows, there’s certainly no claim to make. But let’s say there are no windows and I’m opening one now. The question is whether the claim, “I can go out into the courtyard myself, so why do you care if I have a window?” is accepted.

15:58 Speaker 5 It isn’t accepted.

15:58 Speaker 2 It isn’t accepted. Why?

16:00 Speaker 5 What?

16:00 Speaker 2 Why isn’t it accepted?

16:02 Speaker 5 Because it’s completely different. If someone sees me while he’s in the courtyard, then I see him; I can see that he sees me. Here he’s also watching me through a window.

16:09 Speaker 2 Exactly. Now, about your point that I can see him: let’s say the window is low. It’s a low window, so when you stand there and look, people can see you. Even so, you may not open it. Why? Because it adds more time. In other words, I want to do private things in the courtyard. When you’re in the courtyard, that affects when I can do them. Now it’s not only when you’re in the courtyard; even when you’re at home, I can’t do them. That’s already a problem. You’re further limiting my use of the courtyard. You’ve effectively added more time during which I’m disturbed, and I can prevent that. Let’s look at the sheet.

16:41 Speaker 5 But fine, he’ll tell me to go over there.

16:45 Speaker 2 No—go over there? I’m allowed to walk in the courtyard; it’s my courtyard too. The courtyard is mine too, and I’m allowed to go there and do what I want.

16:52 Speaker 5 [unclear]

16:56 Speaker 2 The courtyard is meant to be used. Okay? Now, when you open a window, you create a situation where you can see the courtyard even while you’re inside your home.

17:07 Speaker 5 Otherwise he has to leave the house to see.

17:09 Speaker 2 Yes, exactly.

17:11 Speaker 5 He just wants to sit comfortably.

17:13 Speaker 2 He wants to watch properly. Let’s look at number one on the sheet. Shulchan Aruch: “A person may not open a window overlooking his neighbor’s courtyard.” That’s his neighbor’s courtyard. “And even if one of the partners in a courtyard wishes to open a window from his house onto the courtyard, his partner can prevent him, because he can look at him from it.” Now, the Gemara explains that the point is that you can look for a longer time. That’s one type of intrusion that is forbidden, and that someone can prevent. The second thing we mentioned in previous classes: a shop. You can see this man sitting in his shop, with a respectable amount of merchandise.

18:00 Speaker 5 Someone who has a window—does that count too?

18:04 Speaker 2 Ah, that’s it, that’s it. Earlier I said that if there are already windows, the question is whether you may open another one, and now that you ask, I remember: no, certainly not. That’s another thing we’ll see. You can’t open another one either. You can’t open another one, because it adds to the intrusion. Let’s see. But if it’s a place that is so visible from all sorts of directions, it becomes effectively a public place, and then there’s no claim to make. Um, so that’s it. This person sitting in his shop—what does he have to do all day besides look straight ahead? Now, in principle—

18:44 Speaker 5 You can see he’s bored.

18:45 Speaker 2 One more person. In principle, what happens if there are two houses on opposite sides of a public thoroughfare, with the thoroughfare running between them? One has a window or doorway, and the other opens a window or doorway opposite it. Is he allowed to or not? The answer is that he is. Why? Because just as I can see you, people in the public thoroughfare can see you. Now, what might you say to me? Maybe you’ll stand at the window, focus on me and watch me closely. So I tell you I won’t do that. In other words, the window means that as I move around my house, I might happen to see you from time to time. But people in the public thoroughfare also see you from time to time. You say that maybe I’ll watch you; I tell you I won’t. You can’t simply suspect me of standing there and watching you. Now—

19:37 Speaker 5 If he doesn’t say that.

19:38 Speaker 2 How?

19:38 Speaker 5 If he doesn’t say that, then maybe it is allowed. Wouldn’t he go and open it?

19:41 Speaker 2 Then he could stop him from doing it. Don’t look. But the window itself—

19:45 Speaker 5 Isn’t a violation.

19:46 Speaker 2 Apparently. Now let’s look at section 22, the last part of the page. “Even if a public thoroughfare separates them, one may not open a window opposite a window.” Notice when: “If the windows are high.” This is very interesting, and the Alter Rebbe goes into great detail here. You often see how practical the Alter Rebbe is: he takes great care to describe exactly what the case looks like. Now notice, the windows are high. What does that mean? If they’re high, imagine two houses at ground level, and I have a very high window, with another very high window opposite it. I can’t see him, and he can’t see me. So that’s one situation… And if the public thoroughfare is also high, as high as I am, then the people there can see in, and I can see in too. Rather, it has to be a situation where the ground level of the houses is higher than the public thoroughfare. Then the people in the houses can see one another, but people in the thoroughfare cannot see them. And what would that be nowadays? The second floor. The floor level of the second floor is higher, so to speak, and the two second floors can see each other. But passersby can’t see in, so in that case it would indeed be forbidden. The Alter Rebbe goes into great detail about this. In other words, even if a public thoroughfare separates them, I may not open a window opposite a window if the windows are high—if people in the thoroughfare can’t see into them as they walk by, while the floors of the houses are high enough above the thoroughfare that the people in the houses can see into one another’s windows. Then it is forbidden. But if people in the thoroughfare can see into them as they walk by, there is no concern even with a window opposite a window. After all, he already has to limit his private activities because of the public thoroughfare. People pass by there all day. Needless to say, this applies to an entrance opposite an entrance, which are lower down. So if a public thoroughfare runs

21:42 Speaker 2 between them and the windows are low, one may open the window. But he can’t open a shop there. Why not? You might say, “Everyone can see you. What’s the difference between me and them?” You’re there on a regular basis, looking at me regularly. So there’s another factor here. If something is constant, then even though people could already see in, its constancy adds to the harm, and that too can be prevented.

22:06 Speaker 6 What do you mean by “constant”? He’s working too. He doesn’t sit there all day doing nothing.

22:10 Speaker 2 Yes, but there’s a kind of permanence to it. He’s sitting there, facing that way.

22:13 Speaker 6 Wouldn’t we say the same about someone at home?

22:14 Speaker 2 At home, a person doesn’t sit facing the entrance. He moves around the house and so on. It could be, though. Incidentally, if there’s a window directly opposite the sofa, perhaps that would be like a shop. That’s possible. But in a shop, apparently, he really does sit there all day, and whenever there are no customers, he looks out. It’s a much more definite situation. Yes. One more thing: let’s read the wording about the shop in number two, in the second passage: “Nevertheless, a person may not open a shop opposite his fellow’s entrance or window, because he is there all the time. People in the public thoroughfare pass by and do not look at him constantly, whereas this person sits in his shop all day and looks toward his fellow’s entrance or window. He must therefore keep far enough away that he cannot see into it at all.” If he wants to open an entrance, it has to be somewhere really far away. Otherwise, he shouldn’t open it opposite the window; he should open it to the side, facing somewhere else. Now a third possibility: splitting an entrance. He had one large entrance, and he says, “I’ll divide it into two. I’m not going to open a completely new window or entrance. I’ll close off half this entrance and put another half to the side.” That is also forbidden. Why? Because they tell him: with one door, one entrance, it’s either open or closed. When you have two, one could be open and the other closed all day, and that increases the possibility of an invasion of privacy. And a fourth case: bringing a stool. It could be a ladder or a stool. There’s a dispute over whether you can prevent someone from opening a high window in his house—not a high window facing another high window, but a high window facing a courtyard, a private courtyard, for example, or a shared courtyard. Can you prevent him? The halachic ruling is,

24:22 Speaker 2 [unclear], you can prevent him. Why? Because you can tell him, “You might bring a stool, stand on it, and look out the window.” Again, we don’t mean that he’ll deliberately look in order to watch me. He might want to… I don’t know, look at the view or look at something else, and then he’ll see me. So what’s the point here? It’s what we mentioned earlier: I won’t know to avoid it. I won’t realize you can see me. In a courtyard, I can ask you when you’re there and when you’re not. Here, you suddenly look out the window while I’m sitting there. It’s a high window; I won’t notice you’re there, and I’ll engage in private activities without realizing you can see me. So anything that happens without my noticing also adds to the harm.

25:05 Speaker 7 That’s something we also had with neighbors in an apartment in [unclear].

25:10 Speaker 2 Right. So this brings us to what we discussed then: consent. If you bought the home that way, you agreed to the windows being there, with lots of people looking in from all the different floors. Consent is effective in the case of a courtyard. But if someone now comes to open a new window, that won’t help him.

25:29 Speaker 7 Nowadays there are balconies that they attach…

25:33 Speaker 2 They build a new balcony.

25:34 Speaker 7 They want it in order to renovate or something, and it becomes a problem.

25:37 Speaker 2 So if that creates a new invasion of the neighbors’ privacy…

25:42 Speaker 7 It doesn’t create an invasion of privacy.

25:42 Speaker 2 Sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes there’s a continuous row of neighbors’ balconies all around, open to view, and everyone can see them. So now you can see them too, just like everyone else. You haven’t added anything.

25:52 Speaker 7 Except for the courtyard of the… floor. If someone has a private courtyard and opens the… there could be a situation where they can see one another, and he relied on the neighbors’ courtyard.

26:01 Speaker 2 Right. So if there aren’t balconies around it that overlook it—but if there are already several balconies around it, then what? I’ve added one more. What have I added here? We see that in all these situations there’s… and I say, “I’m adding more times, uh, more situations.” But if there are several balconies, you already have no privacy in that place. In general, let’s turn now to the practical question. With our courtyards—we already spoke about this then—and balconies, it depends on the character of that particular courtyard or balcony. If it’s a private place, then an invasion of privacy can be an issue. If it’s completely open to the public thoroughfare, it certainly won’t be an issue; nor will it be if it’s open to several balconies or several other places. Now let’s start with the drone. Let’s start with the case where he says: suppose it’s a drone without a camera. Why are you entering my property? There’s an example in halachah of someone who puts up, installs, uh, a rack or a shelf. He lives on the roof, on the second floor or on the roof. He has some kind of parapet there. He has to put up a wall four amos high so that he can’t see his neighbor. But off to the side, where it doesn’t face his neighbor, he wants to put up some kind of rack to hang things on. His neighbor says, “Every time you hang things there, you’ll look at me.” So he says, “I won’t look. I’ll walk over—I’ll turn my back and put the things there.” Now the Amoraim disagree about whether he can make that claim. The halachic ruling is that he can’t. Why? Because the case there is where a person has a wall four amos high, right? Facing his neighbor, he puts up a wall four amos high. He has to put it up so that he won’t see the

27:50 Speaker 2 The second one. He feels safe, so he can even walk with his back turned, let’s say, without looking. But on the side, we’re talking about a wall that isn’t high, but low. It says, “You shall make a parapet for your roof.” A low wall is enough; you don’t need a high wall. But a person still doesn’t feel safe enough standing near the edge of a roof with a wall that isn’t very high. When he doesn’t feel safe enough, what is his natural instinct? To look, so he’ll feel safe. So the other person says to him, “You’ll look, and you’ll tell me you did it to feel safe, but while you’re at it, you’ll also see me.” That’s how the Gemara explains the whole reasoning. And that’s why he can stop him: Don’t put hangers there, don’t put shelves on the outside of your wall. But what do we learn from all this? Wait, leave aside the question of “Will you see me or not?” Whose airspace was that? That airspace belongs to the owner of the courtyard below. When a person buys a courtyard, there are various possibilities as to what needs to be stipulated and what doesn’t. Generally, in many situations, the entire space from... up to the sky, and also below, belongs to him. So how can you suddenly put a shelf or a hanger out into his airspace? What we can infer is that using someone else’s airspace in a situation where it causes him no harm at all is like the principle that we compel a person not to act like Sodom. What do you care if I put something here? So that’s what we said then, too. If someone uses another person’s space and you have even the slightest claim against it, fine, you can stop him. But if you have no claim at all, what do you care? And someone flies a drone on a one-time... Let’s start with a situation where he flies a drone just once. He flies it, and it passes through

29:39 Speaker 2 the other person’s courtyard. What do you care? It doesn’t do anything to you. So seemingly that wouldn’t be a problem. Now, what happens—

29:49 Speaker 8 The concern is that he’s flying a camera there.

29:51 Speaker 2 Right. Ah, he says, “I don’t know, maybe there’s a camera, and that makes me feel unsafe.” That’s an interesting question. I’ve seen it discussed. Some say that’s his problem; in practice, I’m not harming him. There’s room to discuss it. Now, what happens if you can see that there is one—a drone with a camera? Here there’s a distinction. If I bring it into the other person’s property, there’s no question that he can stop me.

30:20 Speaker 8 He can stop him outside, too. He can film me from the street.

30:24 Speaker 2 Oh, wait. Now, that’s true. First, let’s start with when it enters the other person’s property. He can say to me, “You’re entering my property. I don’t want you in my space.” What are you going to tell me—that we compel a person not to act like Sodom? No, you’re disturbing me. You can see me. So he can certainly stop me. But what happens if I fly it outside? Let’s divide this into two cases. Something a person does occasionally. He’s asking himself, too: Am I allowed to do this? Now I want to film the procession, and the drone also sees things along the way, and so on. Here, seemingly, it’s like the distinction between seeing and looking. I’m not actually coming to stand there and look into someone else’s property. I’m coming to film this specific thing, and along the way it sees other things. So the question here is whether this courtyard is private enough that even seeing into it causes harm, or whether only looking causes harm, as the Alter Rebbe says. In many courtyards today, merely seeing into them doesn’t cause harm, because one way or another, the courtyard isn’t completely sealed off. There’s a window above, there’s some other spot, there’s an opening in the fence. People can see you; they can see—what? Even if it simply passes through your line of sight in the courtyard or on the balcony, a passing glimpse doesn’t cause harm. If a passing glimpse doesn’t cause harm, then I pass by with the drone and see you for a second. So there’s no prohibition here, no problem, and you can’t stop me. But if that’s my purpose—if I go around with a drone and start looking into other people’s balconies and so on—that is certainly forbidden. Now, flying it near a house window is certainly forbidden, because we said that even seeing into a home is forbidden. So it’s forbidden to fly it near a house. That’s regarding an occasional flight. What happens with someone who flies it regularly? He

32:11 Speaker 2 is in his own courtyard, he likes drones, and he flies one regularly. Here there’s an additional problem. That neighbor says to him, “I’m sitting in my courtyard and I don’t feel safe, because at any moment I think a drone might suddenly come up, and I don’t know what to do.” Now, if someone flies a drone by once, fine. But you do it regularly, and that’s already similar to the cases we mentioned of opening a window. With a window, true, I’m not looking through it all the time, but suddenly you may see me from here or from there. So this is along the lines of opening a window. Someone who uses that same drone regularly creates a situation where the other person is seen on an ongoing basis—or intermittently, but from time to time—and that makes him afraid to use his courtyard. Seemingly, in that situation he does have a claim against him. Unless it’s such an open courtyard that there’s no privacy there at all; then it would be like a street. There’s no problem flying a drone in the street. The Alter Rebbe—I think he mentions this. The Alter Rebbe emphasizes in the second passage of section six: “Even looking at another person’s activities where there is no concern of harm from being seen, if he does them in his home and on his property, it is forbidden to look without his knowledge, for perhaps he does not wish others to know of his activities and affairs.” The point is that if I’m on my own property but the other person is outside, there’s no problem with seeing him. So that’s regarding a drone. Let’s move on so we have time. To sum up, it depends on the type of courtyard and also on whether it’s occasional or regular. If it’s occasional, but it’s in the other person’s space and harms him even a little, he can certainly stop it. If it’s outside and merely catches an occasional glimpse, and no private activities take place there, it’s

34:05 Speaker 2 not a very private courtyard, so it would be permitted. But if it happens regularly in a way that disturbs him—even the fact that it sees him bothers him because it happens so often—then it would be a problem. Now, a digital peephole. We said this: In a shared courtyard, in principle, we said it’s forbidden to open a window onto the shared courtyard. Now, someone puts a peephole in his door. Let’s say there weren’t any before... This is the first peephole I’m installing. It’s a new idea, my patented invention. I install a peephole in the door. What am I actually doing? Opening a window onto the shared courtyard. First of all, it’s a shared courtyard, and the peephole is a window; I can see through it. It’s even worse than a window. Nobody knows when I’m looking. But then again, a shared courtyard is a place where people don’t do private things. Still, it can be somewhat disturbing: perhaps you’re keeping track of me, seeing when I leave and when I come back, or little things like... I shout at my child. Small things. So as for an existing peephole, there’s no question that it’s permitted; there’s no problem. As for looking through the peephole, that depends on whether I have a reason to look. If I have a reason, then of course I may look. I hear a noise or something, and I look. What’s the problem? Now, if I’m looking in order to watch the other person, I’ll ask you what you think. After all, we said there are two reasons it’s forbidden to look at another person. One is seeing his successes, which can cause an ayin hara. So here, if a person walks by and he isn’t carrying a diamond or something, I’m not seeing his successes, so there’s no problem on that account. Or the second possibility: perhaps he doesn’t want others to know of his activities and affairs. I look and see him walking. Am I seeing his activities and affairs here? Seemingly

35:55 Speaker 2 There’s no problem with that. Of course, there is this aspect of looking at someone else—it’s like “Do not go about as a talebearer.” You look and see what the other person is doing; seemingly, that falls under it. But this issue of a lack of privacy seemingly isn’t present. Unless you track when the other person comes in and when he goes out. That, too, is a lack of privacy: you see that he leaves at this time and comes in at that time. That’s with an ordinary peephole. Now, with this digital peephole, if it works as shown here—you press a button and then you can see—then seemingly it’s exactly like an ordinary peephole. I press and look; instead of looking through it, I press a button, which is easier for me. But it would be different in two situations. If it shows the view all the time, then seemingly, if the neighbor knows you’ve installed such a thing at home or want to install it, you need to ask the neighbors, because you see them constantly. Being able to see them constantly is much more disturbing. Another possibility that’s disturbing is if it records—if it records the… the people there. Now, here we’re already moving on to security cameras. With security cameras, first of all, we already mentioned their placement. If you place them in someone else’s space or in a shared area, he can tell you, “It bothers me. Why are you putting them here?” But this is where customary practice comes in. In a shared courtyard, what do people use the courtyard for? Say I want to put a mirror with a dresser in the stairwell. I want to do my makeup there all the time, or whatever. Or I want to put a table and chairs there for the children to draw. So if that isn’t customary in that place, then yes, it’s a shared courtyard, but those aren’t the uses that are customary there.

37:50 Speaker 2 It says in halachah: “All partners can prevent one another from using the courtyard, except for laundry.” In a shared courtyard, you can prevent any use except laundry, because if you prevent her from doing the laundry there, she’ll have to go to the river, where there would be a problem of modesty because her arms would be seen. So that can’t be prevented. But all other uses can be prevented, unless they are actually customary. No, that was then. That was then, that was then. Today there are washing machines, but that’s what it says in halachah. The Shulchan Aruch describes the situation back then. Now, if I want to use the space—if I put up a security camera, I’m essentially using the shared area; I’m installing something there. If these are newer buildings where it’s customary to put cameras throughout the area, then it becomes something everyone accepts. So you can’t tell me, “This is my space.” What could you say—that there’s a problem of hezek re’iyah, harm caused by looking into someone’s space? First of all, a security camera has a purpose; it isn’t there just to watch people. And second, viewing the footage really needs to be carefully controlled, arranged so that it’s viewed only in specific cases, only when necessary. It shouldn’t be someone with a screen at home who watches the… the stairwell all day. But it’s a building, and yes, there will be access, and there need to be rules. You can’t just look at it. The law also has a lot to say about when it’s permitted and when it isn’t. If it records, then there’s much more of a loss of privacy: suddenly, later on, you’ll have a recording of me walking with the… I don’t know, with my son’s ball that I found in the street and took home at night. Video recording.

39:37 Speaker 9 Not recording sound, where you can hear—

39:38 Speaker 2 Ah, I meant filming and saving the footage. That’s what I meant. So now I’ll go back to the peephole.

39:45 Speaker 9 Harm caused by overhearing.

39:45 Speaker 2 Ah, harm caused by overhearing. Right, right. Now, last class I said we’d also talk about eavesdropping or offenses involving overhearing, but I saw that the subject is so broad, so we’ll discuss eavesdropping next class. And… wait, let’s see if we’ve finished. So with a security camera, it depends on where it’s placed. If I put it in the shared courtyard and it isn’t customary to put one up in that area—for example, here in Nachlas Har Chabad, in the older buildings, it seemingly still isn’t customary to put up a security camera. Seemingly. And if someone comes along and wants to put one up, I can stop him. Why are you putting that here? But if it becomes widespread throughout the area, then it becomes the custom. It’s accepted to put up a security camera. Right, right, but ultimately a person lives in a place, so he has a say over his own place. Unless it’s part of the character of the whole… of that particular… It depends on the place and the situation of his building. Is that also how it works legally? Legally, there are all sorts of questions about a majority of 51 percent, 66 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent. There’s wording about that—actually, just one minute to finish. In halachah, things always look very, very complicated. You read this and that in halachah, the commentaries and everything, while in civil law it looks as though everything is neatly laid out. But when someone really tries to arrive at… to decide matters that aren’t written down, or even matters that are, they’re written in such a complicated way. For example, this question of how large a majority is needed: 51, 66, 75, or 100 percent. Lawyers disagree with one another: this should be derived from one law, that from another law—it’s a complete mess. For example, with an elevator, the prevailing view is that you need 100 percent agreement to put a camera in the elevator. And if an owner

41:28 Speaker 2 is there, he feels he has privacy, and you’re putting a camera there—that’s a loss of privacy, so you need 100 percent agreement. For other things, sometimes 66 percent, 75 percent, or 51 percent is enough. So that’s the subject of cameras and drones. Next class we’ll also talk about eavesdropping, and about recording someone in a conversation with another person. Even though that isn’t related to matters between neighbors, we came to it along the way. And there’s also an interesting case I saw about a moshav that arranged a singer’s performance. The organizers learned that some residents intended to stand on the surrounding hills and watch the performance without paying, without entering the venue, and they told them, “You’re not allowed to do that.” Is there a situation here where they’re the target audience? Shall we call them the target audience, and is that relevant? We’ll talk about it, with Hashem’s help, next class.