Conversion According to Halacha - Rabbi Gedalyahu Axelrod shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to “Lema’an Yishme’u,” a podcast of Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today we’re talking about conversion according to halacha. In fact, you can’t separate this from the Rebbe’s campaign—the campaign the Rebbe led to have it enshrined in law that conversion must be according to halacha. And... as I recall, that campaign lasted nearly twenty years. In the late eighties there was also a period when I appeared together with Rabbi Shmuel Chifer [unclear] and Dr. Branover at several places in Israel. Not regularly, but I remember at least two occasions: once in Nachala [unclear] and once here in Haifa. The purpose was that the Rebbe foresaw hundreds of thousands of non-Jews arriving here, and there was a serious concern that they would become assimilated among the Jewish people. So he wanted people—especially rabbis—to understand that conversion must be according to halacha, with acceptance of the mitzvos. Acceptance of the mitzvos is required for conversion; without it, the conversion does not take effect. Plain common sense says the same thing: If a person converts but does not accept the mitzvos, in what sense is he converting? What is a Jew? A Jew is someone who received the Torah at Sinai. But if he accepts none of the Torah, what makes him a convert? A certificate from the Chief Rabbinate saying he is a convert? That does not make him a convert. So what is the source for this? It is the source we mentioned earlier: Two Torah scholars stand there and inform him of some of the easier mitzvos and some of the more stringent ones. That is at the time of immersion. But beforehand, all opinions agree that three people must be present. There is a dispute among the halachic authorities over whether three are needed at the time of immersion to inform him about accepting the mitzvos, or whether two suffice. But before sending him to immerse, before sending him to be circumcised, all opinions require three. The Ramban, in Yevamos 45b, says: “Acceptance of the mitzvos requires three, even after the fact.” Tosafos there in Yevamos says: “If there are not three, there is no acceptance of

02:39 Speaker 2 the mitzvos.” That is what it says about acceptance of the mitzvos. Tosafos in Kiddushin 62 says: “It appears that three are required specifically for acceptance of the mitzvos,” but for immersion, Tosafos in Kiddushin says one is enough. Since the main element of conversion is acceptance of the mitzvos, Tosafos says there: “The ‘judgment’ mentioned in the Torah refers to acceptance of the mitzvos.” The Rashba in Kiddushin says the same thing: “Acceptance of the mitzvos requires three.” The Ran, the Rosh, Tosafos Chad Mikamya—all the Rishonim on that Gemara in Yevamos say that acceptance of the mitzvos is a condition of conversion. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch also rule this way as halacha. At the beginning of section 3, the Shulchan Aruch rules that acceptance of the mitzvos is required. Regarding circumcision and immersion, it cites a dispute among the authorities over whether three are needed or whether one or two judges suffice. But for acceptance of the mitzvos, all opinions require three. If there are not three present for acceptance of the mitzvos, then all the more so, if there is no acceptance of the mitzvos at all, there is no conversion at all. This is explicit in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, as it is in all the authorities and in the Gemara. There is, however, a point in the Rambam that we will study now, because those who perform conversions today without acceptance of the mitzvos—even though they say that, as rabbis appointed by Israel’s Chief Rabbinate, by the chief rabbis of Israel, they were instructed to perform conversions with acceptance of the mitzvos... So someone comes and asks to convert, and hundreds of thousands of non-Jews have arrived from abroad over the last twenty or thirty years. Rabbi Chaim Druckman even received the Israel Prize—I heard about this—for bringing fifty thousand non-Jews into the Jewish people with false certificates. So, since there was no acceptance of the mitzvos in the conversions performed by those mass-conversion institutes, he received the Israel Prize for it. We are talking about fifty thousand non-Jews who received certificates saying they were Jewish on the basis of conversion without mitzvos. But the instructions for the government conversion institutes—which are not even under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, nor

05:05 Speaker 2 under the authority of the Chief Rabbinate; the conversion institutes are under the Prime Minister’s Office—I heard about this when I was at Bar-Ilan University. There was once a symposium about converts. I was invited to represent the Orthodox views. I expressed the position of the Shulchan Aruch, that acceptance of the mitzvos is necessary. There were others for whom the Shulchan Aruch carried no weight, but they said in the name of Ariel Sharon, who was prime minister at the time, that he had said Israel had two most important tasks: security, and bringing in the non-Jews who had arrived from Russia, or from other countries as well, but mainly Russia, and turning them into Jews. This was a national task of the highest priority, as important as security. So they did not leave it to the chief rabbis or the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Instead, they placed conversion under the Prime Minister’s Office, where it remains to this day. Money is no object; they provide all the funding. The main thing is to convert as many non-Jews as possible and bring them into the Jewish people. Of course, the instructions still call for acceptance of the mitzvos, since the chief rabbis are, for now, responsible for religious matters in the country. So what does acceptance of the mitzvos mean in practice? The candidates go and study there. I think the conversion process takes a year, and they are also sent to spend Shabbos with observant families to get a sense of what accepting the mitzvos means. Perhaps this is the place to mention that I have received many questions from Chabad shluchim. Candidates are referred to shluchim at Chabad Houses because Chabad chassidim are committed to bringing every Jew closer. So when these conversion candidates need a place to stay, they are told, “Go to the Chabad shluchim; they’ll surely host you.” Many—one could say the overwhelming majority—of Jews who know that a conversion without mitzvos is not a conversion,

07:17 Speaker 2 and who know that close to one hundred percent do not observe the mitzvos after conversion, do not want to host them. They know it is a false conversion and do not want to host them, but the candidates come to Chabad chassidim and ask, “Will you host us for Shabbos?” I received quite a few calls from Chabad shluchim: “What should we do? They are sending families or individuals who are candidates for conversion to me. Should I host them for Shabbos or not?” I told them, “Run from them as you would run from fire.” According to the statistics compiled by Rabbi Yaakobi, an attorney who was then the legal adviser to the rabbinical courts, he published a booklet and said that, scientifically and statistically, among those who divorced between 1999 and 2008—over those twelve years—his examination found that 97.2 percent were not observing the mitzvos when they divorced. How could he tell that they were not observing the mitzvos? Because when a get is written and the name of the person divorcing is recorded, a convert is identified, for example, as “Avraham the convert” or “Yaakov the convert” if he does not observe the mitzvos. After all, he comes to have a get written; there is no avoiding that. But for someone who does observe the mitzvos, they write “Yaakov son of Avraham Avinu” or “Avraham son of Avraham Avinu”—whatever his name is. And 97.2 percent, across all the rabbinical courts—he checked it on a computer. I have the booklet at home. It is a study of whether a conversion can be annulled if it was not sincere. “Can an Insincere Conversion Be Annulled?” is the title of his booklet. I think he wrote it at the request of the High Court of Justice or the attorney general. There he writes that 97.2 percent, in those twelve years that he

09:23 Speaker 2 They checked, and they weren’t keeping mitzvos. Why? Because for ninety-seven percent or more, it doesn’t say “son of Avraham Avinu”; it only says “the convert.” So if it doesn’t say “son of Avraham Avinu,” that means the witnesses got the impression—got the impression—that they weren’t keeping mitzvos. I’m bringing this up because we wanted to get to the Rambam, and now we’re getting to the Rambam. Some of those who are lenient about conversion say that the Rambam holds that even without accepting the mitzvos, [unclear], a person is a convert. So in a moment we’ll read the Rambam and study what he says, and we’ll see that it’s simply not so. They’ve attributed things to the Rambam that never happened. And the Rambam does not disagree with the Gemara or hold differently from all the poskim and all the Rishonim. Not one of the poskim says that the Rambam holds that acceptance of the mitzvos isn’t necessary. So we’re getting to the Rambam, but before we start reading him, we need to explain something. The Mishnah speaks about “one suspected of involvement with a non-Jewish woman.” People are talking: this man has a non-Jewish girlfriend, and afterward she converts and wants to marry him. Everyone is talking. She converted because she was his girlfriend. It says that ideally, she should not be converted because of what people will say, lest they say that she really was his girlfriend and did not— But if he married her, the marriage is valid and the conversion is valid, even though she converted for his sake. The question is: How can the Mishnah—how can it really be that a non-Jewish woman goes to convert? Why is she going to convert? Because she has a Jewish boyfriend. But from what we see today with almost all of them, there should already be thousands upon thousands of baalei teshuvah among the converts. There should be over a hundred thousand baalei teshuvah here, from all these converts whom the conversion institutes have converted—over a hundred thousand of them. Where are the hundred thousand baalei teshuvah who should have come from among the converts? We don’t see those baalei teshuvah

11:32 Speaker 2 at all. So how does the Gemara pass over this? There was a woman people were saying was a Jew’s girlfriend. It could be that they had no intimate relationship, but she converted and she is marrying him. So how am I not concerned that perhaps she is really a non-Jew, and she just went through all the motions—everything they told her to do, immersing for conversion and saying she accepts the mitzvos? Maybe it’s a deception. Why didn’t the Gemara consider that? And why would it happen in the first place? Why would she agree to accept the mitzvos? Hakadosh Boruch Hu went to every nation and asked them to accept the Torah, and all the nations said, “We don’t want to accept the Torah. The Torah is too hard for us.” So this woman, because she has a Jewish boyfriend, is going to accept the mitzvos? And we see in practice, in our generation, that they don’t want to accept the mitzvos. They wait a whole year for the certificate, and after they receive it, they forget everything. Until they get the certificate, they try to show the rabbis that they do observe the mitzvos, even though among themselves they say it’s all just for show. So how can someone who converts because he has a Jewish girlfriend, or she has a Jewish boyfriend, genuinely accept the mitzvos? Yet the Gemara says—and it is ruled as halachah—that the person is Jewish even if the conversion was for a particular reason. The answer can be explained through something we see today. I have close acquaintances who live in Brazil. One of them is a Chabad shliach in São Paulo, and he himself told me that every Shabbos, hundreds—hundreds—of non-Jews come to him to study Pirkei Avos. They want to do whatever mitzvos they can and study as much Torah as they are permitted, but they don’t want to be Jews. They know

13:37 Speaker 2 that a person can be a ben Noach, and they know that a ben Noach has a share in the World to Come. They know that a ben Noach has to believe that the Torah comes from Hakadosh Boruch Hu and was given through Moshe Rabbeinu. They believe wholeheartedly that the Torah we have, the Tanach—the Written Torah—was given through Moshe Rabbeinu to the Jewish people. They believe that wholeheartedly, and they are completely non-Jewish, and they don’t want to be Jews. So we see that such a thing exists. The fact is that there are the mitzvos of bnei Noach. So how does Hakadosh Boruch Hu command a non-Jew to believe that the Jewish people received the Torah and to observe the seven mitzvos because Moshe Rabbeinu said that non-Jews have to observe them? Indeed, our Sages say that as soon as the Torah was given, the whole world sensed that something was happening. So they came to Bilaam, who was a prophet of the nations, and said to him, “Something is happening in the world.” Bilaam said, “Don’t worry, don’t worry. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is now giving the Torah to His people, the Jewish people.” In other words, non-Jews generally know that the Jewish people are the chosen people. Generally, they know it. So it really could be that she is a non-Jewish woman with a Jewish boyfriend, and she believes the Torah is true, but she doesn’t want to be Jewish. She wants to remain a ben Noach and keep the seven mitzvos. But because she has a Jewish boyfriend, and he won’t marry her unless she converts, she accepts the mitzvos. She believes in them. Today, though, this is a generation of atheists—particularly those who come from Russia, and not only Russia, but from all countries. Atheism has conquered the world, from Darwin, from Napoleon, so people don’t believe in the existence of G-d at all, and they don’t believe in the Torah. So why would someone accept the mitzvos just because the rabbinate wants him to? There is no

15:24 Speaker 2 logic to that. So today it’s different. By contrast, there was a time when people worshipped idols, but there were also people who knew that the Jewish people had received the Torah. So it could be a case of “one suspected of involvement with a non-Jewish woman,” and then she converts, and after the fact he marries her. Today it is ruled as halachah that if a man comes with a non-Jewish girlfriend, and it is clear that she wants to be Jewish and there is sufficient evidence, even the most religious batei din will convert her. Because that’s how it is: it is better that he marry her than that he remain involved with a non-Jewish woman. So today they convert such a woman even from the outset. The Gemara says that ideally she should not be converted, but if she converted after the fact, she is Jewish. So we’ve explained one point here. Now we’ll talk about the Rambam. It is very important to explain what he says. The Rambam is pleading with us, because all those who are lenient about conversion shout, “It’s possible even without accepting the mitzvos! Don’t be so righteous.” So let’s read the Rambam and see that this isn’t true. Here it is: the Rambam, chapter 13 of Hilchos Issurei Biah, halachah 1. The Rambam cites the Gemara in Kerisos 9. The Rambam says, “The Jewish people entered the covenant through three things.” Here he means the covenant that Hakadosh Boruch Hu made with them when they left Egypt, before the Giving of the Torah. So the Jewish people entered the covenant through three things: circumcision, immersion, and a korban. We’ve already discussed that today there is no korban, but the halachah is that the lack of a korban does not prevent conversion. Acceptance of the mitzvos, circumcision, and immersion are enough. The convert is obligated to bring a korban; when Moshiach comes, he will bring one. “And so too for future generations, when a non-Jew wishes to enter the covenant and shelter under the wings of the Shechinah.” Let’s pay close attention to the Rambam’s wording. What does the Rambam say? How can someone convert? He wants to enter the covenant of the Torah, the covenant of the Jewish people with the Torah, and shelter

17:44 Speaker 2 Under the wings of the Shechinah? He does not want a conversion certificate from the Chief Rabbinate. He wants to come under the wings of the Shechinah and accept upon himself the yoke of Torah. That is how the Rambam puts it at the outset: a person wants to come under the wings of the Shechinah and accept upon himself the yoke of Torah. What are the requirements? How is it done? How is it carried out? There must be circumcision and immersion, and the offering of a sacrifice; for a woman, immersion and a sacrifice. As it says, “As you are, so shall the convert be”: just as you entered through circumcision, immersion, and the offering of a sacrifice, so must a convert in every generation enter through circumcision, immersion, and the offering of a sacrifice. Nowadays, when there is no sacrifice, circumcision and immersion are required. When the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, he will bring a sacrifice, and he must immerse before three people. The Rambam, in chapter 13 of Hilchos Issurei Biah, halachah 17, says: “A convert whose background was not investigated, or who was not informed of the mitzvos and their punishments”—they did not investigate whether he sincerely intended to accept the mitzvos, or they did not inform him of the mitzvos and their punishments—“but who was circumcised and immersed before three ordinary people, is a convert.” The Maggid Mishneh writes on this that clearly, informing him of the mitzvos is not indispensable. If the convert was not informed of the mitzvos, that does not invalidate the conversion. But on halachah 9, the Maggid Mishneh writes that he understands the Rambam to mean that a non-Jew must accept the mitzvos before three people. Yet here he writes that informing him of the mitzvos is not indispensable. So there is a contradiction in the Maggid Mishneh, and in the Rambam himself as well. The Rambam says that a convert must accept the mitzvos and come under the wings of the Shechinah, while here he speaks of a convert who was not informed of the mitzvos. The Chemdas Shlomo explains that the straightforward understanding of the Rambam is this: there are two separate matters, acceptance of the mitzvos and being informed of the mitzvos. Acceptance of the mitzvos means accepting, in general terms, entry into the Jewish faith, which itself constitutes acceptance of the mitzvos. There is acceptance of the mitzvos, and there is being informed of the mitzvos,

19:59 Speaker 2 Being informed of the mitzvos means telling him about the mitzvos. As the Gemara says, there is no need to tell him about all 613 mitzvos. He is informed of some of the lighter mitzvos and some of the more stringent mitzvos. A convert does not have to know the entire Torah when he converts, but he does need to know something about the lighter and more stringent mitzvos, so that he knows what mitzvos are and agrees to accept all of them. That is what the Rambam means. “They did not go into the details of the mitzvos” means they did not spell out the mitzvos for him. But the Rambam already said at the beginning that acceptance of the mitzvos is required. In halachah 1, the Rambam said that he wishes to come under the wings of the Shechinah and accept upon himself the yoke of Torah. So surely the Rambam is not going against the Gemara—the Rambam—and no one says that the Rambam holds that mitzvos are not required. It follows that there is no basis for relying on this passage in the Rambam. In my book Migdal Tzofim, volume 6, I wrote a response to a letter from a Torah scholar who wrote to me as follows: “The Rambam’s intent in his remarks about the wives of Samson and Solomon is to establish a definition of a special category of conversion. They did not completely abandon their outlook and thought they could be Jewish while also committing transgressions, even worshipping idols. That is why, even when this became known, their conversion could not be annulled.” So once again, he is trying to rely on the Rambam’s discussion in halachah 16 of Solomon’s wives, who were considered Jewish despite worshipping idols. But how can he speak of a special category of conversion? There is no special category of conversion, and there are no such definitions. We will explain this Rambam as it really is. The Rambam says the following in halachah 15: “Therefore, the courts did not accept converts throughout the days of David and Solomon. In David’s days, lest they were converting out of fear”—perhaps they did not intend to accept the mitzvos, but were afraid of King David. So there were

22:17 Speaker 2 people who wanted to become Jewish because they thought that if they remained non-Jews, King David might kill them. “And in Solomon’s days, lest they were converting because of the sovereignty, prosperity, and greatness enjoyed by Israel.” So perhaps that was why they wanted to become Jewish. “Anyone who turns from the nations for the sake of something worldly is not a righteous convert. Nevertheless, many converts converted in the days of David and Solomon before ordinary people, and the high court regarded them with suspicion. They did not reject them after they had immersed.” Even though there was concern that they might be converting out of fear, or because of the honor and high standing Jews enjoyed in Solomon’s time, since courts of ordinary people had converted them, they neither rejected nor drew them close. Until when? Until their future conduct became clear. The Sages of that generation, of David and Solomon, decided to see whether they would observe the mitzvos. If they did, that would show they were genuine converts; if they did not, they were false converts. “For Solomon converted women and married them, and Samson likewise converted a woman and married her.” The Rambam understands that Samson did not—he had two or three women mentioned in Tanach—take them without conversion. Samson converted them, and King Solomon converted the women too. “And it is known that they converted only for some other purpose.” They did not convert for the sake of Heaven. They converted because Solomon asked them to, because Samson asked them to. “Their conversion was not conducted by the court, but by a court of ordinary people. Scripture regards them as though they were non-Jews and remained in their non-Jewish state.” That is one point: the verses in Melachim and Ezra regard them as though they were non-Jews. But the truth is that—the Rambam’s word is “as though,” not that they actually were non-Jews, as we can see from what follows. “Furthermore, their end proved what they had been from the outset.” The verse regarded them as though they were non-Jews even before their end proved what they had been from the outset. But the Rambam

24:44 Speaker 2 adds, “Furthermore, their end proved what they had been from the outset, for they worshipped their idols. They built altars for them, and Scripture attributes the building to him, as it says, ‘Then Solomon built an altar.’” So because they built altars, their end proved what they had been from the outset: there was reason to suspect that their conversion was not a valid conversion. Where do we see this? We will see it in the Book of Melachim and in the Book of Ezra. In Melachim I, chapter 11, it says, “Then Solomon built an altar for Chemosh, the abomination of Moab, on the mountain facing Jerusalem, and for Molech, the abomination of the children of Ammon. And so he did for all his foreign wives.” When did this happen? In Solomon’s old age. “When Solomon was old, his wives turned his heart after other gods, and his heart was not wholly with Hashem his G-d.” The Gemara says that the Sages even considered King Solomon to have no share in the World to Come. The Mishnah in the chapter Chelek in Sanhedrin lists three kings and four ordinary people who have no share in the World to Come. They wanted to add King Solomon to those three kings who have no share in the World to Come, until a heavenly voice came forth and said: Leave Solomon alone. He built the Beis Hamikdash seven years before building his own house. Leave him alone; do not include him among those who have no share in the World to Come. Nevertheless, Tanach says, “He did what was evil in the eyes of Hashem.” “Solomon did what was evil in the eyes of Hashem.” And what else does it say? “Solomon built an altar for Chemosh.” We have to say that Naamah the Ammonite, from whom Rehoboam descended, and from whom the entire Davidic dynasty descended, was originally a righteous convert. Because if she had not originally been a righteous convert, the entire dynasty of King David would be non-Jews. That cannot be, because Hakadosh Boruch Hu promised King David that Moshiach would come from him and that his dynasty would continue, and he receives

26:59 Speaker 2 the crown of kingship until the end of all generations. And if the son of a non-Jewish woman became king, that would mean he was a non-Jew. Then the entire Davidic dynasty would end right there with King David—because, with Solomon, Solomon’s wife was Naamah the Ammonite, and King Rehoboam was born to her. So we have to say that Naamah the Ammonite was, at the outset, a sincere convert. What happened later, I don’t know, because there is a dispute among the halachic authorities about her, the mother of Rehoboam, whom she raised and who later became king: whether she worshipped idols or not. As I recall, the Radak says that Naamah did worship idols. But even if she did, at the time of her conversion she intended to be a genuine convert, because otherwise, as we said, Rehoboam would not have been Jewish, and that cannot be. What does it say here? That Solomon built the high places for idol worship, “and so he did for all his foreign wives.” This was many years after he married them, because it happened “in Solomon’s old age,” yet the Tanach calls them foreign wives. If the Tanach calls them foreign, and Kings was written by a prophet, then they were foreign. But if they were foreign and the Rambam says they had converted, how can the prophet call them foreign? Here we have an explicit statement from the prophet that if someone converts for some ulterior reason, and afterward it becomes clear that the conversion was not sincere, that person remains a non-Jew. We find the same thing in the Book of Ezra—in the Book of Nehemiah. It says in Nehemiah about—Ezra and Nehemiah both refused to allow the foreign women who came with the Jews returning from exile to the Second Temple to stay with them. They separated families and sent

29:22 Speaker 2 the women back to Babylonia with their children, even though they had come from Babylonia to Eretz Yisroel. They could have converted them—Ezra and Nehemiah. It says that Ezra was as great as Moshe Rabbeinu. They did not want to. Ezra was concerned: Am I going to convert who knows how many hundreds and hundreds of non-Jewish women, only for them to bring all the idol worship back here at the beginning of the Second Temple era? I absolutely do not want that. And he sent them all to Babylonia. So that was with Ezra. Now, I don’t know who is speaking here at the end of Nehemiah, because Ezra was mentioned earlier, and at the end of Nehemiah it may be Nehemiah. This is what it says. It would seem to be Ezra, because it speaks here about a judgment. Ezra rendered judgments. Nehemiah was the leader, but Ezra was the rabbi. It says: “I contended with them and cursed them, and struck some of the men and pulled out their hair, and made them swear by G-d: You shall not give your daughters to their sons, nor take their daughters for your sons or for yourselves. Did not Solomon, king of Israel, sin because of these? Among the many nations there was no king like him, and he was beloved by his G-d.” It says that as soon as he was born, Hashem loved him, before he had managed to do a single mitzvah. Nothing. He was born, and Hashem loved him. “And G-d made him king over all Israel.” So what point is being made here? That in this matter of taking foreign wives, “Did not Solomon sin because of these?” If they were Jewish, what was Solomon’s sin? After the fact, the conversion is valid. We see explicitly, both from Kings and from Nehemiah, that when someone converts and it later becomes clear that their acceptance at the time of conversion was not genuine, but fraudulent, the conversion is not a conversion, and the Tanach calls that person a foreigner, a non-Jew. Now let’s move on to a somewhat more yeshivah-style approach to the learning. Until now we’ve discussed the halachah, the Shulchan Aruch. Now we’ll try to study it a little more deeply. I wanted to make a point here: We meet converts, sincere converts, who invest tremendous emotional effort and go through many hardships before they receive their conversion certificate. And if the beis din sees—or not only the beis din, but people who meet them and see—that this is a genuinely sincere convert, then there is no greater mitzvah than bringing them under the wings of the Shechinah. For it says that Hakadosh Boruch Hu exiled the Jewish people only so that converts would be added to them. Converts are very lofty souls that fell into the kelipos, and a non-Jew who is moved to become Jewish has a lofty soul, and that is why [unclear]. Although they are a very small minority, they do exist, and they suffer because of those who convert insincerely, whose conversions are not genuine. The genuine converts suffer because of that. So if you see a sincere man or woman who has converted, and you see that it is not a sham or a lie, then of course you must help. Now, regarding what we discussed about the situation today, I’ve already said some rather sharp things, though they aren’t sharp at all. The reality is more severe than anything one can put into words. The main severity lies in what I said: there are conversion institutes operating under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office, with the signatures of Israel’s chief rabbis, and these are fraudulent converts. I’ve already spoken about this, and the main thing is that it goes on. It goes on. I know that about five years ago, no more, there was some awakening, particularly because of the IDF conversions, where it became clear that they were making a complete mockery of conversion. There was talk of a demonstration of half a million people. I don’t know for what political reason—probably some self-interested reason—they canceled the demonstration. How can people be silent about such a thing? They are blurring the distinction for the Jewish people with the backing of the rabbis, and how can people be silent? This is the Shechinah in exile. Hakadosh Boruch Hu weeps over it, so to speak. Now, all I wanted to do here, as we are about to finish the class, is read from people who lived a hundred years ago, perhaps more, who wrote about fraudulent conversions. There is the Achiezer, a great rabbinic authority of Lithuania, back when Lithuania was Lithuania and Vilna was the “Jerusalem of Lithuania.” He was the rabbi of Vilna. In Achiezer, volume 3, section 26, he says, regarding the general practice of converting non-Jewish women who had married Jews: In the Achiezer’s time, the maskilim who came from Berlin, the students of Moses Mendelssohn, had destroyed religious life in Germany—almost all of Germany—as well as Austria and Western Europe. They drew eighty percent of Lithuania and eighty percent of Russia away from religious observance. Those were the maskilim, and here in the countries of the East, the Alliance destroyed religious life. Whoever fought back was saved; whoever failed to pay attention fell. The fact that we live here in this country today and people don’t know what “Shema Yisroel, Hashem is our G-d, Hashem is One” means—that is all thanks to the maskilim and the Alliance, both together. Now, this is what the Achiezer says about the general practice of converting non-Jewish women. In other words, in the Achiezer’s time, a hundred years ago, it was already customary to convert non-Jewish women who had married Jews—men who had already married non-Jewish women—“although, in truth, by law it is not proper to convert them, since there is no acceptance of the mitzvos. And the gaon Rabbi Yitzchak Schmelkes already discussed this at length in his book Beis Yitzchak and ruled that a proper beis din should not involve itself in this.” Let’s read further from the Devar Avraham, whom we mentioned earlier and who lived in the same generation: “In our time, we know that for most of them”—all those who married non-Jewish women—“their sincerity will never become evident afterward, and even after the conversion there will be no compulsion from any quarter to observe the mitzvos of the Torah. It is not possible to say that because of the compulsion, then”

31:48 Speaker 2 The Shulchan Aruch. Now let’s try to study this a little more closely. I wanted to make a point here: we meet converts, sincere converts. They invest tremendous emotional effort and go through many, many hardships before receiving their conversion certificate. If the beis din sees—or not only the beis din, but people who meet them see—that this is a genuinely sincere man or woman, there is no greater mitzvah than bringing them under the wings of the Shechinah. As it says, Hakadosh Boruch Hu exiled the Jewish people only so that converts would join them. Converts are very lofty souls that fell into the kelipos. A non-Jew who is moved to become Jewish has a lofty soul, and that is why [unclear]. Although they are a very small minority, they do exist, and they suffer because of those who convert insincerely, whose conversions are not genuine. The sincere converts suffer because of them. So if you see a sincere convert, a man or a woman, and you can see that it isn’t a sham or a lie, of course you must help. Now, regarding what we were discussing about the situation today: I’ve already said some rather sharp things, though they aren’t sharp at all. The reality is more severe than anything one can even say aloud. Above all, the serious issue is what I mentioned: there are conversion institutes operating under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office, with the signatures of Israel’s chief rabbis, and these are fraudulent conversions. I’ve already spoken about it. The main thing is that it passes without protest. It passes. I know that about five years ago, no more, there was an awakening, particularly because of the IDF conversions, when it became clear that they were making a complete mockery of conversion. There was talk of a demonstration of half a million people. I don’t know for what political reason—probably because of someone’s interests—they canceled the demonstration. How can people remain silent about such a thing? They erase the—confuse the Jewish people about how the

34:21 Speaker 2 rabbis... How can people remain silent? This is the Shechinah in exile. Hakadosh Boruch Hu weeps over it, so to speak. Now, as we’re about to finish the class, I just wanted to read here from people who lived a hundred years ago, perhaps more, and wrote about fraudulent conversions. There is the Achiezer, one of the great rabbinic scholars of Lithuania, back when Lithuania was Lithuania and Vilna was the Jerusalem of Lithuania. He was the rabbi of Vilna. So he says, in Achiezer, volume 3, section 26, concerning “the general practice of converting non-Jewish women who married Jews.” In the Achiezer’s time, the Maskilim who came from Berlin, the students of Moses Mendelssohn, destroyed Jewish religious life in all of Germany—almost all of Germany—and in Austria and Western Europe. They drew eighty percent of Lithuania and eighty percent of Russia away from religious observance. That was the Maskilim. And here in the Middle Eastern communities, the Alliance destroyed religious life. Those who fought it and stayed alert were saved; those who did not pay attention fell. Today we live here in the Land of Israel, and people don’t know what “Shema Yisroel, Hashem Elokeinu, Hashem Echad” means. That is all thanks to the Maskilim and the Alliance, both of them together. Now, the Achiezer says this about “the general practice of converting non-Jewish women.” In other words, in the Achiezer’s time, a hundred years ago, it was already customary to convert non-Jewish women who had married Jews. They had already married non-Jewish women, “whom, in truth, according to halachah it is not proper to convert, since they do not accept the mitzvos.” And the great Rabbi Yitzchak Shmelkes already discussed this at length in his book Beis Yitzchak and ruled that a proper beis din should not involve itself in this. Let’s read more from the Devar Avraham, whom we mentioned earlier and who lived in the same generation: “In our time, we know that in most cases”—of all these people who married non-Jewish women—“their sincerity will never become evident, even in retrospect, and after the conversion there will be no pressure on them whatsoever, from any quarter, to observe the mitzvos of the Torah. One cannot say that, because of the pressure they face, then

36:51 Speaker 2 “They accepted the mitzvos.” There is no compulsion to observe mitzvos. The same is true of those who convert in Israel. Nobody forces them to observe mitzvos after the conversion. Why would they suddenly observe mitzvos? When Hakadosh Boruch Hu went and asked them to accept the Torah, they did not want to. So now, when they come here and are given a course, they will want to accept the Torah? There is also Rabbi Breish here. As far as I remember, he was a rabbi in Switzerland. He was from Lithuania but went on to serve as a rabbi in Switzerland. He says: “I am very astonished, very astonished, to see that the rabbis living in countries where religious standards are lax”—so I am not the first to speak against the rabbis. Here is Rabbi Breish, astonished at the rabbis living in Western Europe—“cannot fool themselves when they know full well that the vast majority of such converts are people who have become attached to a Jew in order to marry, and most of those Jews are transgressors who have no desire at all to know about Judaism, kashrus, Shabbos, or the laws of family purity. The mitzvos are a burden to them; they are Jews only by nationality. And they surely know that the non-Jewish woman converting for that purpose will not change at all because of it. In such a case, it is clear to me that even after the fact there was no conversion at all.” He wrote the book Chelkas Yaakov. “For acceptance of the yoke of the mitzvos, too, is among the requirements whose absence invalidates a conversion even after the fact.” And what acceptance of mitzvos is there if they know these people scoff at and disregard Shabbos, kashrus, and the laws of family purity? I will not go on much longer. I will finish the class in a few minutes, but I will read from the rabbis of Israel. I have a ruling from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, in Yoreh De’ah, section 157: “Regarding the question of whether someone who converted without accepting the yoke of the mitzvos is considered a convert: It is simple and clear that he is not a convert at all. My father and teacher, the gaon, z”l, also ruled this way in practice in Strovbin, in such a case: that the person was not a convert at all, whether for a stringent or a lenient ruling, because a convert’s acceptance of the mitzvos is indispensable. Indeed, I do not understand the reasoning of the rabbis who err in this matter.”

38:56 Speaker 2 There are rabbis who err in this matter, and those today certainly do. I give them the benefit of the doubt. In my book Migdal Tzofim, I ruled regarding genuine converts who convert through them. Some say that even those conversions do not take effect because the dayanim are disqualified. I wrote that the dayanim are not disqualified, because they are acting in error. The law is that if someone does something unwittingly, he is not disqualified from giving testimony. He does not know it is forbidden. And I say: they have seen that for seventy years already—sixty years; let’s reduce it a little, forty years already—there have been institutes conducting false conversions. So they think that if those older rabbis are performing conversions, the conversions must be valid. That is why I said they are acting in error. So the genuine converts who convert through them are indeed converts. Although I heard of a great rabbi who wanted to invalidate those converts, I wrote that they are indeed converts. Now there are two more rabbis from Israel here. I will read two lines from each, and you will see that these, too, were Israeli rabbis, chief rabbis. But they were just one generation earlier, and their approach was entirely different. There is Rabbi Kook, the chief rabbi of Israel, who served back during the Mandate period and is known to everyone. In his book Da’as Kohen, section 154, he writes: “But those who accept converts drawn in by material considerations and the desires of their hearts—of them it is surely said, ‘Evil will befall them,’ and one misfortune after another will come upon them. For such converts are certainly as harmful to the Jewish people as a plague; they bring thorns into the vineyard of the House of Israel and do not observe the mitzvos. And since their intent was also improper, there is no conversion here at all.” That is Rabbi Kook. Now we will bring just Rabbi Herzog, and with that we will finish. Rabbi Herzog, in his book

40:57 Speaker 2 Heichal Yitzchak, says that “if these converts come before us to be converted, we must refrain, refrain.” And Rabbi Unterman, at a conference of dayanim in 5714, says this: “Today we see a non-Jew marrying a woman who observes nothing, and it is very hard to fool ourselves into saying that there was an acceptance of the yoke of the mitzvos and that only afterward the evil inclination overcame him and he failed to observe them. Rather, from the outset there was no acceptance.” Rabbi Unterman states that today, when people come to convert in order to marry a woman, or for other reasons to be like everyone else in Israel, there is no acceptance of the mitzvos. I have heard rabbis, when I told them they were being too lenient about accepting converts, tell me that they were following the Shulchan Aruch. I do not think that was in accordance with the Shulchan Aruch. One must pay attention not only to what is written explicitly, but also to the spirit of the halachic authorities. In the Diaspora, a convert lived among Jews, saw people observing the Torah, became part of that environment, and conducted himself according to Judaism. But here they live among Jews who behave differently and not in accordance with the religion, and conversion does not compel them to observe even a minimum. In Israel, conversion is naturalization. If a non-Jew comes to the country and has a business and a Jewish wife and lacks nothing, all he needs is n-a-t-u-r-a-l-i-z-a-t-i-o-n, because he feels like a stranger among the people around him, and that is why he wants to convert. Once accepted into the Jewish community, he feels just like any other Jew. But he has no intention of accepting our holy faith and its mitzvos, and conversions must not be accepted hastily, because that harms us. I am certain that they have no desire to draw close to Judaism, only a desire for naturalization. All this haste in conversion is painful, and it is not in accordance with the law. There is a mistaken outlook behind this haste. I could have accepted a thousand converts when I was in England, and I did not accept a single one. Parents whose children had become involved in intermarriage came to me and cried a great deal, and I cried with them, but I did not change my mind. Here we have become

43:03 Speaker 2 too softhearted and accommodating in that respect, and that is not in accordance with the law. I hope the rabbis will show greater firmness, courage, and steadfastness, and will not accept a convert hastily. And if a genuine convert comes and we are convinced that he seeks only the true faith, I will run with you to immerse him. But I have not yet encountered such a convert.” I will finish by saying that, with Hashem’s kindness, I served as a dayan here on the rabbinical court in Haifa for twenty-three and a half years. The three dayanim decided together that if we could see right away that the applicants were the usual sort of converts and showed no sign of Jewish observance, we would not draw things out, only to find it difficult to turn them away later. We would decide immediately whether they were serious or not. We did not convert a single person during all the years I was a dayan here in Haifa, apart from one convert when I had been a new dayan for just a few weeks. That one somehow got through, but I simply had not yet found my footing on the court in my first month as a dayan. Apart from that, I did not convert a single person. Then one chief rabbi—I will not say his name, of course—met the head of my court, before I myself became its head, and said to him, “Why do you reject all your converts? They appeal to me, and I send them all away. Why do you turn away all the candidates for conversion?” That is the situation. Here Rabbi Unterman cries out not to convert them, Rabbi Herzog cries out not to convert them, Rabbi Kook cries out not to convert them, and now, suddenly, everyone has twisted the Shulchan Aruch. May Hashem have mercy, may Moshiach come, and may we merit “I will restore your judges as at first, and your counselors as at the beginning”; then you will be called “the city of righteousness, the faithful city.” It is brought in Tractate Yevamos, page 47a. I will read

44:50 Speaker 2 Let’s look inside. The Sages taught: When a prospective convert comes to convert nowadays, we say to him, “What did you see that made you want to convert? Don’t you know that the Jewish people nowadays are afflicted, oppressed, downtrodden and harassed, and that suffering comes upon them?” If he says, “I know, and I am unworthy”—meaning that although the Jewish people are not in a good situation materially, he feels unworthy even to join them, yet wants to be a Jew—we accept him immediately. We inform him of some of the lighter mitzvos and some of the more stringent mitzvos. We inform him about the obligations of leket, shichchah and pe’ah, and the tithe for the poor, and we inform him of the penalties for transgressing mitzvos. I won’t read the whole passage of Gemara here, but the Gemara says that just as we tell him about the penalties—telling him at the outset that he is taking on a very great responsibility—we also tell him about their reward. We say to him, “Know that the World to Come is made only for the righteous.” The Jewish people in this world cannot bear an abundance of either good fortune or calamity. That’s it. We don’t press him too much. If we see that he is serious, we don’t scrutinize him excessively in order to turn him away; quite the opposite. When we see that a prospective convert is serious, we circumcise him immediately, and once he has healed from the circumcision, we immerse him immediately. Two Torah scholars stand over him and inform him of some of the lighter mitzvos and some of the more stringent mitzvos. “Once he has immersed and emerged, he is a Jew in every respect.” That’s it. Here we see that accepting the mitzvos is a condition of conversion. On the previous page of Tractate Yevamos, 46b, Rabbi Yochanan says, “A convert requires three, because the Torah uses the word mishpat—judgment—with regard to him.” It says, “As for the convert, so for the native-born.” This also appears in Tractate Kerisos, where it says, “There shall be one law for you and for the convert.” So the Gemara says that conversion is a judicial matter. And because it is a judicial matter, it requires three judges. That is one point. And perhaps we’ll already get into the question Tosafos asks. If

47:25 Speaker 2 it requires a judicial proceeding, then it requires ordained judges. But today we have no ordained judges. After all, the chain of semichah ended, since semichah had to be passed from one person to another in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu. There was a period, as the Gemara relates, when Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava risked his life to ordain five Tannaim. But at a certain point, semichah came to an end. None of today’s judges are ordained in the sense of having that ordination stretching back to Moshe Rabbeinu. So how can we perform conversions today? That is Tosafos’s question. Tosafos answers that there is a principle called “we act as their agents.” We carry out the mission of the earlier judges. They had the responsibility to convert those who wished to convert, and they knew a time would come when semichah would cease and there would be no ordained judges. So we are the agents of those ordained judges. This is Tosafos on page 46b of Tractate Yevamos. In the passage beginning Mishpat, Tosafos says, “But how do we accept converts? Don’t we require qualified judges?” Tosafos answers, “We act as their agents.” It is like the way we adjudicate monetary cases in general. Otherwise, all the batei din today would have to close. A beis din requires ordination. So how do we adjudicate monetary cases at all today? Just as the Sages were concerned that lenders might shut their doors to borrowers, so, as stated in Tractate Gittin 88, they were concerned that the door might be shut to converts. Look at Tosafos—it needs explanation. There is a principle that “what a beis din declares ownerless is ownerless.” The source appears in the Book of Ezra, where Ezra confiscated the property of people whose property had to be confiscated because of sins or similar reasons. So a beis din can declare property ownerless when the circumstances call for it. But even that principle requires a beis din. Without

50:18 Speaker 2 a beis din, how can its power to declare property ownerless be exercised? The Sefer Me’iras Einayim says regarding the Tur that there is no semichah nowadays. So today’s judges are not judges under Torah law; rather, we act as the agents of the ordained judges of earlier generations. We are the agents of those earlier generations. The Nesivos Hamishpat, who is also one of the major commentators on the Shulchan Aruch, says that this too needs to be understood. What does it mean that we are the agents of earlier generations? How can someone appoint an agent for generations to come? A living person can appoint another living person as an agent. But can someone appoint an agent for people who will come ten years from now, a hundred years from now, a thousand years from now? How is that possible? The Nesivos Hamishpat says, “In my humble opinion, it is actually a matter of Torah law.” It is not simply that “we act as their agents” through a rabbinic enactment. The Sages can make an enactment, applying the principle “It is a time to act for Hashem; they have voided Your Torah,” to allow monetary cases to be judged. But that only helps with monetary matters. It cannot turn a non-Jew into a Jew. If making a non-Jew into a Jew requires an ordained beis din, then it is not a matter of saying that the circumstances call for it. The circumstances may call for measures such as those described in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, chapter 2: even imposing the death penalty, financial penalties and other sanctions in order to uphold religious observance. But you cannot turn a Jew into a non-Jew—sorry, the other way around, a non-Jew into a Jew. That requires the authority of a judge. The Nesivos says that “it is actually a matter of Torah law, only it was entrusted to the Sages,” and that they made us their agents only where [unclear]. The Nesivos says that, yes, an agent can be appointed even for future generations. And he brings proof from the acceptance of converts nowadays. How could the Sages uproot a Torah law? By converting a non-Jew, I make him a Jew, and he can marry a Jewish woman. The Sages have no power to uproot a Torah law through a positive action

52:37 Speaker 2 like that. It is difficult to say that the Sages simply annul such marriages—that when we turn a non-Jew into a Jew, it works because the Sages annul the marriage. In other words, that there is no marriage. But seemingly, annulling a marriage is not relevant here either. What would annulling the marriage accomplish? Even without a formal marriage, it is forbidden for a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman, or a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman, to live together. So how is annulment relevant? There is also a Tosafos that actually sheds light on the whole matter. Tosafos says, “Rabbeinu Nasan[?] also said: Regarding a convert, the Torah says, ‘throughout your generations.’” This is on the subject of conversion in Gittin 88b. Ah, sorry, the Tosafos is not in Gittin but in Kiddushin 62b, in the passage beginning Ger. Rabbeinu Nasan[?] said that regarding a convert it says “throughout your generations,” implying under all circumstances, even when the judges are not qualified—that is, even when they are not ordained. And necessarily, nowadays there are no qualified judges, since there are no ordained judges, while “throughout your generations” means for all generations. So because the Torah says “throughout your generations” regarding a convert, the law of conversion must apply in every generation. How could there be conversion “throughout your generations” if there would be generations without ordained judges and therefore without converts? Rabbeinu Nasan says that this shows something new: although the Torah calls conversion a judicial matter, and a judicial matter requires ordained judges, conversion does not require ordained judges. And it says in Tractate Gerim, chapter 2, law 5: Just as the Jewish people entered the covenant through three mitzvos, so converts enter through circumcision, immersion and an offering. Here it discusses circumcision and immersion—whether they require three people or two suffice—but regarding acceptance

55:05 Speaker 2 Mitzvos. All the poskim say that three are required. He must accept the mitzvos before three people: he accepts the mitzvos of the Torah, all the mitzvos, even all the details instituted by the Sages. He must accept this before a beis din of three. What is the verse Rabbi Nasan cites when he says it states “throughout your generations”? The verse is in Bamidbar 15:14: “And if a convert lives among you, or one who is among you throughout your generations.” So it says that a convert may live among you throughout your generations. This implies that, in any case, even if they are not ordained judges, the beis din can perform a conversion. That is why Maseches Gerim says that what is indispensable for conversion today is circumcision and immersion, but a korban is not indispensable today. As the Rambam explains—we’ll read his words shortly—just as before the giving of the Torah the Jewish people entered the covenant through circumcision, immersion, and the offering of blood, bringing korbanos, so too a convert must bring a korban. Today we have no Beis Hamikdash, so it is impossible to bring a korban. How, then, can we perform conversions at all today? Maseches Gerim says that a korban is not indispensable. The Rambam says that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, all converts from all the generations will have to go and bring a korban, and then their conversion will have fulfilled all its requirements. But a person already becomes a convert through acceptance of the mitzvos, circumcision, and immersion. So we have one approach that we discussed in the name of Nesivos Hamishpat: the principle of “we act as their agents.” Earlier generations can confer authority and power on later generations to judge cases, to compel someone to give a get. Someone who is obligated to give a get but refuses can be compelled until he says, “I want to.” To compel him until he says, “I want to,” you need an ordained beis din. How can we compel someone today who, according to halachah, must be compelled

57:23 Speaker 2 to give a get? After all, he is not appearing before an ordained beis din. It is all based on “we act as their agents”; the matter of divorce, too, is based on “we act as their agents.” We find in the Gemara that permission was given to judge even when the person granting it was not present. It says in Maseches Sanhedrin: When Rabbah bar bar Chanah was going down to Bavel, Rav Chiya said to Rebbi—Rabbah bar bar Chanah was Rav Chiya’s nephew. Rav Chiya asked Rebbi, who was the leader of the generation, to grant his nephew, who was going down to Bavel, semichah: “He may issue rulings; he may judge cases.” That is called semichah. “He may rule on firstborn animals” as well. When Rav was going to Bavel, Rav Chiya said to Rebbi, “My sister’s son is going down to Bavel.” Rav, too, was Rav Chiya’s nephew. He was also granted permission to issue rulings and judge cases, but not to rule on firstborn animals—to decide whether a firstborn animal has a blemish or not. That permission was not given to him. So we see that semichah can be divided: permission can be granted for some things and withheld for others. In any event, we’ll continue along the lines of Nesivos Hamishpat: there is the power to ordain judges for future generations as well. The Torah gave those who were ordained that power. In fact, it is possible to reconcile Rabbeinu Yonasan [unclear] with the Nesivos. We could say that the source for granting future generations the power to do things that only ordained judges can do is learned from a convert. Regarding a convert, Rabbeinu Nasan [unclear] says that the verse “a convert ... throughout your generations” reveals that, even though conversion requires a judicial proceeding, the Torah tells us that converts can be accepted even when there are no ordained judges. But how can conversions be performed when a judicial proceeding is required, and that means ordained judges? The Torah reveals to us that “we act as their agents.” Not

59:41 Speaker 2 that the Torah is telling us that a convert does not need ordained judges. Rather, the Torah is telling us that ordained judges are required, but those judges can confer the authority of semichah on judges in future generations as well. So it would seem possible to bring these approaches together, and this gives us a better understanding of what the Nesivos means by “we act as their agents.” We find something similar in the Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin, chapter 4, halachah 6. The Rambam makes a very novel statement: “It appears to me that if all the sages in Eretz Yisroel agree to appoint judges and ordain them, they are considered ordained.” The Rambam is introducing a new idea here, and it seems he did not receive it from his teachers but arrived at it himself, since he says, “It appears to me.” If all the sages in Eretz Yisroel agree to appoint and ordain judges, then semichah can be renewed today. The Beis Yosef tried to renew semichah—more precisely, his teacher, Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, renewed it on the basis of the Rambam’s words—but the sages of the generation opposed him. The Radbaz writes in his commentary on the Rambam: “The sages of Tzfas, led by their foremost sage, relied on this wording to ordain judges who could adjudicate cases involving fines, but they did not succeed, because the sage in Jerusalem did not agree with them. While I was in Egypt, they asked my opinion and that of my colleagues, and we did not agree.” The Rambam gives a condition. When can semichah be renewed? When all the sages agree. But if sages object—the Radbaz was one of the great sages of the generation, and he also mentions the sage in Jerusalem, who did not agree—then there is no agreement among all the leading sages of the generation. So semichah was not renewed in the time of Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, the Beis Yosef, and the Radbaz, because the leading sages of the generation did not agree to renew it, for reasons they certainly had. Now we’ll begin a topic and try to understand it in a little more depth. The Gemara in Yevamos 47b says: “A pregnant woman

1:02:08 Speaker 2 who converts—her son does not require immersion.” The sentence I just read, “A pregnant woman who converts—her son does not require immersion,” is from the Gemara. The Rambam adds to this: “But he does require conversion.” The Beis Yosef cites the Ra’ah, one of the Rishonim and the author of Sefer HaChinuch, as saying that when a pregnant woman converts, her son does not require immersion and is a Jew in every respect; his circumcision is not a circumcision for conversion but the circumcision of a Jewish child. According to the Rambam, though, the child needs circumcision for conversion. From this the Rambam learns that, after the fact, immersion before circumcision is also effective. The usual order of conversion is circumcision first and immersion afterward. What if immersion takes place before circumcision? Wouldn’t that be ineffective? The Rambam says this Gemara proves that immersion before circumcision works: here, the immersion takes place while the mother is pregnant with the child, and he undergoes circumcision for conversion after he is born. So the immersion precedes the circumcision. The Rambam says this is proof that, after the fact, immersion before circumcision is valid. The Devar Avraham raises a difficulty. The Devar Avraham was one of the great rabbis of the generation before ours. His name was Rabbi Shapiro; I think he may have been the rabbi of Kovno, and, if I remember correctly, he was Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik’s brother-in-law. He raises a difficulty with the Rambam from a Mishnah in Bechoros. The Devar Avraham says: “I find a difficulty in the Mishnah in Bechoros 46a.” The Mishnah says, “If she converted while pregnant, her son is a firstborn subject to redemption by a kohen.” If she converted while pregnant, what does it mean that her son is a firstborn subject to redemption by a kohen? It means he is obligated in pidyon haben. This is called the first issue of the womb of a Jewish woman. So the Devar Avraham asks: According to the Rambam, who says the child requires circumcision for conversion, he is not yet Jewish. Then he is not the first issue of the womb of a Jewish woman; he was not born Jewish,

1:04:43 Speaker 2 So why does he need pidyon haben? The truth is that others raise further questions about the Rambam. The law is that if twin brothers were born after their mother converted while pregnant with them, they are disqualified from testifying for one another, and one is forbidden to marry the other’s wife if his brother dies. She has the status of a brother’s wife. Why? And elsewhere, the Gemara speaks not only about twins. It says that if the mother converted while pregnant and gave birth, and then, after becoming Jewish, married and had another son, the two brothers have the law of a brother’s wife. In other words, if one dies, the other is forbidden to marry his wife. This applies whether the one who died was the brother who converted in his mother’s womb or the one born afterward. They are also forbidden to testify for one another, so they are relatives. But according to the Rambam, there should be no law of a brother’s wife here; according to the Rambam, they are not relatives. So that is a question. The Devar Avraham answers by suggesting a novel idea. The part of the child that developed first, while his mother was still a non-Jew—for example, if she converted when she was five or six months pregnant—that part is a convert. But during the two or three months of pregnancy after her conversion, before he was born, she was already Jewish. That part is Jewish. That is what the Devar Avraham says: the part that developed while she was a non-Jew is non-Jewish, and the part that developed after she immersed and became Jewish is Jewish. So Jewishness and non-Jewishness are mixed within him, like someone who is half slave and half free. The non-Jewish part therefore requires conversion. When the Rambam says that a child conceived and born outside of holiness needs circumcision as part of his conversion, his circumcision must

1:07:13 Speaker 2 convert that part of him. But he also has a Jewish part. Because of that, the prohibition concerning a brother’s wife applies to him, and because of that, he is obligated in pidyon haben. He says this has a practical consequence for when the child is circumcised. If I say he does not need circumcision for conversion because he is Jewish, then he was born Jewish and must be circumcised on the eighth day. But if I read the Rambam in the straightforward way, that he needs circumcision for conversion, that means he is a non-Jew—because immersion without circumcision has not yet made him Jewish—and he should be circumcised as soon as he is born, whenever a doctor says it is medically permissible. There is no need to wait eight days. He could even be circumcised on the first day, because the law of circumcision on the eighth day applies only to a Jew. According to the Rambam, there would be no need to wait until the eighth day. But according to this idea, that the Jewish and non-Jewish parts are mixed together, he must be circumcised on the eighth day because of the Jewish part mixed with the non-Jewish part. First of all, this reasoning of the Devar Avraham is very puzzling, especially since he brings no proof for it. Why is it puzzling? How can one introduce such an idea—that just as someone can be half slave and half free, a person can be half non-Jewish and half Jewish? There is no such thing. Especially since... anyone who has learned even a little Chassidus, and even someone who has not, knows that a Jew has a Jewish soul and a non-Jew has the soul of a non-Jew. What is being mixed together here? Half Jewish and half non-Jewish is very, very hard to conceive of. That is one point. Second, there is a question on the Devar Avraham from an explicit Mishnah. At the beginning of Bechoros it says: “One who enters into a partnership with a non-Jew”—say he has an animal, a cow, that is about to give birth. Now, if it gives birth to a firstborn, there is nothing he can do with it. He must wait until it develops a blemish, because without a blemish he is forbidden to benefit from it. It has the status of a consecrated offering, and today there is no Beis Hamikdash where it can be offered. So this is indeed what people do: someone who does not want the complications of a firstborn sells a leg of the cow to a non-Jew. The non-Jew then owns a share of the cow, and even if a firstborn is born, it does not have the status of a firstborn. That is what the Mishnah says at the beginning of Bechoros.

1:09:25 Speaker 2 One who enters into a partnership with a non-Jew is exempt from the laws of the firstborn, as it says, “among the Jewish people,” but not among others. The verse about the sanctity of the firstborn, in Bamidbar 3, says, “Consecrate to Me every firstborn among the Jewish people, from man to beast.” From this we learn that a firstborn owned in partnership, when one of the partners is a non-Jew, is exempt. The Gemara derives this from the words “among the Jewish people”: it must belong entirely to a Jew, with no share belonging to a non-Jew. But the same verse says “from man to beast,” so it speaks about a human firstborn as well. If an animal’s firstborn has no firstborn status when a non-Jew owns a share in it, then seemingly the same is plainly true of a human firstborn. Even if we say, as the Devar Avraham does, that Jewishness and non-Jewishness are mixed together here, at the very least it is a partnership. And in a partnership, the law of the firstborn does not apply. So the Devar Avraham’s original question returns: how can I say that a firstborn is given to a kohen when, as soon as a non-Jew has a share, there is no obligation concerning the firstborn? There is something else very difficult about the Devar Avraham’s explanation. The Ramban does not distinguish based on when the child was born after the immersion. Even if she immersed for conversion today and gave birth today, the Ramban says the child needs circumcision for conversion. So how much did the child develop in that time? Are we going to say the child develops with every passing second? It is difficult. And what if no time passed at all? What if, immediately after she immersed, her labor pains resumed and she gave birth right away? Are we going to say the child had already received something extra from a non-Jew and become part non-Jewish? That is very difficult. Why—because he received nourishment from his mother? Then does a non-Jewish infant nursed by a Jewish woman receive a little Jewishness, or does a Jewish infant nursed by a non-Jewish woman become a little non-Jewish? Seemingly the Devar Avraham’s explanation is very difficult. Another point to note is that the Ramban says that when a pregnant woman converts, the child is a non-Jew and needs circumcision for conversion. Seemingly, one could only say that if one holds that a fetus is not considered part of its mother, but a separate entity. There is a dispute about this in the Gemara in Bava Kama regarding damages, and there is an opinion that a fetus is considered part of its mother. The Ramban himself rules that a fetus is considered part of its mother. So if it is considered part of its mother... What I see written here in the sefer is that the Ramban’s statement—that when a pregnant woman converts, the child is a non-Jew and needs circumcision for conversion—applies only according to the opinion that a fetus is not considered part of its mother. I mean that this is what the Devar Avraham writes: the Ramban’s statement that circumcision for conversion is needed applies according to the opinion that a fetus is not considered part of its mother. But if it is considered part of its mother, then surely, even according to the Ramban, circumcision for conversion is unnecessary. My response to that is that the Ramban himself holds that a fetus is considered part of its mother, and that is the halachah. So how can the Ramban say the child needs circumcision for conversion? The answer is plainly that even if

1:11:37 Speaker 2 For conversion, and today she gave birth to the child. So the Ramban says the child needs circumcision for conversion. But why? How much could the child have grown already? Are we going to say that the child grows every second? It’s difficult, very difficult. And what if no time passed at all? What if immediately after she immersed, her labor pains returned and she gave birth right away? Are we going to say that the child already received something additional from a non-Jewish source and became partly non-Jewish? That’s very difficult. Why? Because he received nourishment from his mother? Then if a non-Jewish baby nurses from a Jewish woman, does he acquire a little Jewishness? Or if a Jewish baby nurses from a non-Jewish woman, does he become a little non-Jewish? On the face of it, the Dvar Avraham’s explanation is very difficult. Another point to note: the Ramban says that if a pregnant woman converts, the child is a non-Jew and needs circumcision for conversion. Seemingly, that would only be if we say that a fetus is not a limb of its mother—that the fetus is not part of the mother, but an entity in its own right. There is a dispute about this in the Gemara in Bava Kama, concerning damages, and one opinion holds that a fetus is a limb of its mother. The Ramban himself rules that a fetus is a limb of its mother. So if the fetus is a limb of its mother—what I see here in the sefer is that the Dvar Avraham says the Ramban’s statement, that when a pregnant woman converts the child is a non-Jew and needs circumcision for conversion, applies only according to the opinion that a fetus is not a limb of its mother. That is what he means. I’m referring to the Dvar Avraham: the Dvar Avraham says that the Ramban’s requirement for circumcision for conversion applies according to the opinion that a fetus is not a limb of its mother. But if a fetus is a limb of its mother, then certainly, even according to the Ramban, it would not need circumcision for conversion. To that I respond that the Ramban himself holds that a fetus is a limb of its mother, and the halachah is that a fetus is a limb of its mother. So how can the Ramban say that the child needs circumcision for conversion? And clearly, even if

1:14:15 Speaker 2 I say a fetus is considered part of its mother, that is only with regard to the laws of damages. If a pregnant cow gored another cow, and the cow belongs to one person while the fetus belongs to someone else, then the owner of the fetus is also liable for the damages, because the fetus is not considered part of its mother; it, too, played a part in causing the damage. But what does that have to do with conversion? Even if I say a fetus is considered part of its mother, what does that mean? It means the mother’s immersion works for the child too. The Gemara asks: if I say a fetus is not considered part of its mother, how can the immersion work? The fetus is not part of the mother. The mother immersed, but the fetus did not. Could you say that the mother does not form a barrier? That does not make sense. She does form a barrier; the fetus does not touch the water at all. So the Gemara answers that this is the fetus’s natural way of developing, inside its mother’s womb. Her immersion is therefore considered as though the fetus immersed. That is how the Gemara answers. But in general, even if I say a fetus is considered part of its mother, that does not prove it does not need circumcision for conversion. Indeed, if it is considered part of its mother, there is no need to reach the answer about its natural way of developing. I can say that the mother’s immersion is like the child’s immersion, because physically the child is part of the mother. But spiritually, they are two souls. There is a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and Antoninus about when a soul enters a child. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi said it is from the time the child is born. Antoninus, who was the Roman governor in Syria, was a good friend of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and would come secretly to study Torah with him. There is an opinion that he later converted, and an opinion that he did not convert, but he was a righteous man, even if he was a non-Jew. But our Sages

1:16:13 Speaker 2 They convert him. So, Antoninus—the Gemara records a disagreement between Rebbi and Antoninus. Antoninus says to him: “The soul is given to a person from the time of conception,” from the moment the pregnancy begins. At that very moment, he already has a soul. Perhaps this can explain the verse about Rivkah going to inquire. She was in great pain during her pregnancy, so she went to the beis midrash of Shem and Ever to ask what these pains meant. They told her: “There are two nations in your womb.” The two nations in her womb are Yaakov and Esav, but our Sages say they are Rebbi and Antoninus. What does it mean that they are Rebbi and Antoninus? Perhaps there is a hint here: our Sages were saying, “You have Rebbi and Antoninus in your womb.” Although you have Yaakov and Esav, Antoninus would descend from Esav, and Antoninus was righteous. And even while he was still in the womb, Antoninus held that his soul had entered from the very beginning of the pregnancy. So Rebbi and Antoninus were already in her womb. There is another statement of our Sages, too: while a child is in his mother’s womb, an angel comes and teaches him the entire Torah, and a candle burns above his head. In any case, we need to resolve the Divrei Avraham’s question. How can there be a circumcision for conversion, while there is still a pidyon haben and the prohibition against marrying a brother’s wife? But seemingly there is a very straightforward way to resolve the Divrei Avraham’s question. We can say this: As the Rambam says, the Gemara states that conversion requires circumcision, immersion, and the offering of a korban. But the Rambam says that since there is no Beis Hamikdash today, circumcision and immersion suffice, and the person becomes a convert. When the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, he will also bring a korban. The same applies to a pregnant woman who immerses: her immersion causes the child to become Jewish. The child becomes Jewish,

1:18:29 Speaker 2 Why? Because he cannot be circumcised. While he is in his mother’s womb, it is impossible to circumcise him. So when she immerses, it is as though he has immersed. Now, if it is as though he has immersed, the question is: How can immersion be effective without circumcision? Since he cannot be circumcised, then just as the inability to bring a korban means that the korban does not prevent the conversion from taking effect, so too, while the child is in his mother’s womb and cannot be circumcised, circumcision does not prevent his conversion from taking effect. Since circumcision does not prevent it, he becomes Jewish through immersion alone. But he still needs to be circumcised for the sake of conversion. That is what the Ramban means: although he has immersed and is Jewish—and therefore there is the mitzvah of pidyon haben and the law concerning a brother’s wife applies to his brother—his circumcision is a circumcision for conversion. Circumcision is one of the three requirements for conversion; it simply does not prevent the conversion from taking effect initially. So when he is born, he is Jewish, but he still needs circumcision as part of his conversion, even though its absence did not prevent the conversion from taking effect. The practical consequence is that even according to the Rambam, he must be circumcised on the eighth day, since he is Jewish. The point is that there are two aspects to his eighth-day circumcision. First, because he is Jewish, he is circumcised on the eighth day. Second, because circumcision is part of the conversion, it is called a circumcision for conversion. The question we still need to consider is how the Ramban learns from here that circumcision does not prevent immersion from taking place first. If I say that perhaps the Ramban’s meaning should be understood this way: if immersion could not precede circumcision, then...

1:20:50 Speaker 2 Then we would have to say... it would have been impossible... I could not have said that her son does not need immersion. If the Gemara says that her son does not need immersion, even though circumcision is required, that proves that although he can be circumcised after he is born, if the immersion makes him Jewish, immersion before circumcision must take effect. Because if immersion before circumcision did not take effect at all, that would hold up his conversion, and he would have to wait until after birth to convert. Seemingly, we can bring proof from another Gemara as well that the child does have the status of a Jew. The Rambam says in Hilchos Mamrim, chapter 5, halachah 15: “For example, a convert who was conceived before his mother’s conversion, though born after her conversion, is not liable for striking his father.” That is understandable. A person conceived before his mother’s conversion and born afterward is a convert. Since he is a convert, his father does not have the halachic status of a father in relation to him. If he strikes his father, he commits the offense of causing another person pain, but not the offense of striking a father, because after conversion he no longer has that father-son relationship. But the Gemara teaches: Just as he is not liable for striking his father, so too he is not liable for striking his mother. As it says, “One who curses his father and his mother”: when he is liable with respect to his father, he is liable with respect to his mother, but if he is not liable with respect to his father, he is not liable with respect to his mother. In other words, a verse is needed to teach that he is not liable for striking his mother. Without the verse, I would have said that he is liable for striking his mother. Why would he be liable? If I say that he is a convert, then he has no familial relationship with his mother either. And the verse says that just as he is not liable for striking

1:22:51 Speaker 2 his father, so too he is not liable for striking his mother. That implies that he really is Jewish and was born Jewish. This is a Gemara, and the Ramban cannot disagree with the Gemara. So even according to the Ramban, who requires a circumcision for conversion, that circumcision is needed, but the immersion itself has already made him Jewish. Suppose a woman converts and the beis din does not know she is pregnant. Afterward, it becomes clear that she was pregnant. Does the immersion the beis din arranged for her conversion also work for the child, or not? The Dagul Merevavah—that is, the Noda BiYehudah, who wrote glosses on the Shulchan Aruch under the name Dagul Merevavah—writes as follows: “If the beis din knew at the time of immersion that she was pregnant, the law is straightforward.” If they knew she was pregnant, then they immerse the child too; it says that a minor convert is immersed with the approval of the beis din. “But if the beis din did not know she was pregnant, I have discussed this at length, and it depends on a dispute among the great authorities.” He does not set out his lengthy discussion here, but says it depends on major halachic authorities. If a beis din arranged for a pregnant woman to immerse without knowing she was pregnant, does the conversion take effect for the child? Does the mother’s immersion mean that the child no longer needs an immersion for conversion, or not? This depends on a dispute among the Rishonim. First, let us mention the Aruch Hashulchan. The Aruch Hashulchan says that if I hold that the fetus is part of its mother, then even if they did not know she was pregnant, the child does not need a separate immersion. Certainly, then, her immersion works for the child. Since he is part of his mother, he does not need his own immersion for conversion. But seemingly, the Aruch Hashulchan’s reasoning is not conclusive. One could say that even if the fetus is part of

1:25:26 Speaker 2 its mother, that is only with regard to what we discussed earlier, the laws of damages, not with regard to souls. The fetus is part of its mother, but there are still two souls here. “Your providence has guarded my spirit.” So if there are two souls, then although the fetus is part of its mother, the beis din cannot convert him while thinking it is converting only a woman, when there is another person inside her womb who also needs conversion. Let us try to explain the Dagul Merevavah. We will try two approaches, though I think that in the end we will reach a different conclusion from the Dagul Merevavah. One way to explain his statement—that if the beis din did not know the woman was pregnant, the question of whether the mother’s immersion serves as an immersion for conversion for the child depends on a dispute—is that it depends on the disagreement between the Ramban and the Nimukei Yosef [?] in the name of the Ran. According to the Ramban, who holds that the child needs a circumcision for conversion, the mother’s immersion is an immersion for conversion for the child. But the beis din did not know there was a child there, and a minor is immersed with the approval of the beis din. If the beis din did not intend to convert him, did not intend for his immersion to be for conversion, then the immersion does not take effect. According to the Ran, as cited by the Nimukei Yosef [?], the circumcision is not a circumcision for conversion. Rather, the mother’s immersion works because, let us say, the fetus is part of its mother and the child follows her. What happens to the mother automatically takes effect for the child. So even if the beis din did not know there was a child—that she was pregnant—what takes effect for the mother takes effect for the child. But in a moment we will discuss why, seemingly, on logical grounds

1:27:51 Speaker 2 It’s hard to say that. Another way we could put it is that it depends on the two opinions in Tosafos, Sanhedrin 68b. Tosafos discusses how it is possible to convert a minor on the authority of beis din. The Gemara in Kesubos 11a says, “A minor convert is immersed on the authority of beis din.” How is that possible? We also see that if his father and mother bring him for conversion, he can be converted, but that is no longer on the authority of beis din. The explanation, they say, is that they can confer this benefit on him, because becoming Jewish is a benefit for him. Since it is a benefit, they can confer it on him even though he has no understanding. Just as one can acquire property for him even though he does not understand and is not yet capable of making an acquisition, they can confer the conversion on him. So Tosafos in Kesubos asks: the ability to confer conversion on a minor is not from the Torah; it is only rabbinic. Tosafos then says something remarkable. According to one opinion in Tosafos, the conversion is—according to one opinion, the conversion is rabbinic. Tosafos concludes that there is an opinion that the conversion is conferred on him and takes effect by Torah law, and another opinion that, just as property can be acquired for him by rabbinic law, conversion can be conferred on him by rabbinic law. So the question arises: how is this possible according to Tosafos? Is he not a convert by Torah law? If he isn’t, how can he later marry a Jewish woman? By Torah law, he is a non-Jew. How can he be allowed to observe various mitzvos that a non-Jew is forbidden to observe? We must therefore understand Tosafos in Kesubos to mean that his status is not merely rabbinic throughout his life. There are even opinions in Rashi there that the Sages have the authority, when necessary, to override a Torah law through an active act, not only by refraining from an act. But with a minor convert, what need is there to immerse

1:30:09 Speaker 2 him now? Let him be immersed when he grows up. It does not seem reasonable to declare him Jewish when he is not, and thereby override a Torah law, just for that. Rather, we must say that even when Tosafos says in Kesubos that he is a convert by rabbinic law, that is only until he reaches adulthood, until he turns thirteen. Now, there is a question about what happens when he turns thirteen. The Gemara says that if a minor who was converted as a child does not protest when he reaches adulthood, the conversion is valid. If he does not protest when he reaches adulthood, that means he has agreed to be Jewish; he has not said, “I don’t want to be Jewish.” So the conversion is valid. We can say that when he turns thirteen, he accepts the mitzvos. And since he accepts the mitzvos then, even though he was circumcised and immersed as a child—as we discussed earlier, just as the fact that a korban cannot be brought now does not prevent the conversion from taking effect—so too with the acceptance of mitzvos. Since a benefit can be conferred on a person without his knowledge, he will surely want to accept and observe the mitzvos. We are speaking here about a convert whom a mitzvah-observant person immerses with the intention of raising him to observe mitzvos. He will surely want to observe them. There was a time here in Israel when people spoke of the “children of Brazil,” and even today people adopt non-Jewish children. They travel abroad, find a child there, bring the child home for adoption, and convert the child, but the parents are not observant. If the parents are not observant, the conversion is not a conversion. The Achiezer says that it is not a benefit for the child. The whole basis for converting a minor is that it is a benefit for him, but

1:32:09 Speaker 2 if he grows up without observing mitzvos, he will not want to be Jewish only to commit aveiros. That is not a benefit for him. So if it is not a benefit, what can we say? One might argue that it is a benefit after all, because being Jewish, even while committing aveiros, is better than being a non-Jew who commits no aveiros. But the Gemara in Kesubos explicitly considers his worldly inclinations, not only the spiritual benefit. It asks: how can a minor be converted? Because it is a benefit for him. The Gemara asks, “Isn’t that obvious?” And it answers that I might have thought he prefers a life without restrictions and does not want to be Jewish. That applies specifically to an adult: he has grown accustomed to that life and wants it, just as the non-Jews did not want to accept the Torah. But a child has not yet tasted sin, so he wants to be Jewish, because being Jewish is the greatest thing in the world. Surely he wants it—that is what the Gemara says. We see from that Gemara that his worldly inclinations matter: if, from that perspective, he would not want it, it is not considered a benefit. So if I say that conversion is conferred on a minor as a benefit, then according to the Achiezer there is no benefit here at all. Other halachic authorities say this too. Rabbi Kook, in Daas Kohen, says that this is not even considered bringing the child for conversion. It is not just that conversion is not a benefit for him. If non-observant parents bring a child for conversion while intending to give him a secular upbringing—an upbringing that does not recognize the Torah or believe in Hashem—then they are not bringing him to convert. They are bringing him for a ceremony. So the essential element of the parents bringing him for conversion is missing. The same applies to beis din. When beis din circumcises a child and converts him on its authority, it must be with the intention of converting him. But if the intention is that he will not observe mitzvos, that is not considered bringing him into conversion at all, and it is not a benefit for him.

1:34:04 Speaker 2 In any case, that was an aside. What we wanted to say about the Dagul Mervavah’s statement that this depends on differing opinions is that it might depend on the opinions in Tosafos in Sanhedrin. One opinion in Tosafos is that beis din converts the minor on its authority: beis din confers the conversion on him. A second opinion is that the minor acquires the conversion himself, while beis din merely agrees to his conversion. According to these two opinions, one could suggest—tentatively—that if the minor acquires the conversion himself, rather than beis din acquiring it on his behalf, then even if they do not know she is pregnant, the child acquires the conversion. His mother converts, and the child takes the opportunity and becomes Jewish. But if beis din must convert him, then if beis din did not know at all that she was pregnant, it did not convert him. Still, this too seems difficult to say. Why? Because if beis din did not know it was converting him, in what sense does the minor acquire the conversion? The minor knows nothing about the conversion; he knows nothing of any act he performed to convert. Even if we say that a fetus is considered part of its mother, how does he acquire the conversion? How can he acquire it? It would seem reasonable that if beis din did not know she was pregnant, then according to all opinions there is very serious doubt whether the conversion took effect. And as for what should be done in practice, a woman who was pregnant and the parents did not know—

1:36:18 Speaker 2 And the beis din did not know that she was pregnant. So when the child is circumcised, he must be circumcised for the sake of conversion, and afterward immersed for the sake of conversion because of the doubt—and perhaps it is even more than a doubt. If the beis din did not know he was a convert, how did he become a convert? Let me mention another point. I saw in Mishpetei Shmuel, a book by one of the veteran dayanim, Rabbi Werner, of blessed memory. I knew him. He discusses a case that, unfortunately, is common: in an intermarriage, the mother is not Jewish, she gives birth to a boy, and the Jewish father wants the boy to have a bris. They call a mohel and tell him nothing; they do not tell him the child is not Jewish, and the mohel circumcises him. Later, when they realize the child needs to be converted, must they draw a drop of blood for the bris, or is the circumcision he already had sufficient? Would immersion alone suffice to make him Jewish? Mishpetei Shmuel wants to say that there is no need to draw a drop of blood. We see that the Levi’im circumcised themselves in Egypt, even before Moshe Rabbeinu came to redeem them. It does not say they were circumcised a second time, or that a drop of blood was drawn from them. So how did they enter under the wings of the Shechinah? He cites the Ramban, who says that the Levi’im did not have a drop of blood drawn. Rather, they entered the covenant of the Jewish people, the covenant for receiving the Torah, in the same way as women did. In other words, immersion alone brought them under the wings of the Shechinah. The Levi’im had circumcised themselves in Egypt. Throughout the 210 years in Egypt, in exile, they continued to practice circumcision, unlike the other Jews, who were commanded to circumcise themselves on the night of Pesach, before offering the Pesach sacrifice,

1:38:57 Speaker 2 as it says, “I saw you wallowing in your blood”—the blood of the Pesach sacrifice and the blood of circumcision. But the Levi’im did not need to be circumcised, because they had practiced circumcision all along. So just as the Levi’im, who had already circumcised themselves, did not need a drop of blood drawn, this baby, too, would not need one, since he had already been circumcised. But this comparison is seemingly very difficult. What resemblance is there between the circumcision of the Levi’im and the circumcision of a non-Jew? First of all, the Ramban himself says that from the days of Avraham Avinu, Yitzchak and Yaakov and their descendants had the status of Bnei Yisroel. That is what the Ramban says at the end of Parshas Emor. If they had the status of Bnei Yisroel, the entire proof falls away. When the Levi’im circumcised themselves, they did so to fulfill the mitzvah of circumcision. That circumcision was therefore effective, and there was no need to draw a drop of blood. But that is no proof concerning a non-Jewish child whose status the mohel did not know. The mohel thought the child was Jewish. For circumcision to serve as part of a conversion, it must be done for the sake of conversion, and that was not done here. This is explicit in the Chasam Sofer. In a responsum, the Chasam Sofer says that a non-Jew who wishes to enter the holy covenant through circumcision needs it to be performed with that intention [unclear]. I should also make a general point here. Some people want their child circumcised, but they do not trust mohelim—even though, boruch Hashem, Jews have been performing circumcisions since Avraham Avinu, since the Giving of the Torah, and doing them well, without anything happening to the child. They want a doctor, and in many cases that doctor publicly desecrates Shabbos. They bring in such a doctor to circumcise the child. I am not talking here about conversion. I am talking about a circumcision where both the father and mother are Jewish,

1:41:09 Speaker 2 G-d-fearing Jews, and they want their child circumcised, not left uncircumcised. So they bring in a nonobservant doctor who publicly desecrates Shabbos. The Shulchan Aruch says that if a non-Jew circumcises a Jew, a drop of blood must be drawn for the bris. The Beis Yosef says so, and the Rema says so as well. So this is not the way to do it, and that certainly needs to be said. Anyone who knows this should bring in a mohel who will circumcise the child for the sake of the mitzvah of circumcision. If a doctor comes and performs the circumcision, then according to halachah, according to the Shulchan Aruch, a drop of blood must be drawn for the bris.