What is the Kesubah? - Rabbi Eliyahu Gabbai shlita

00:02 Speaker 1 You’re listening to the Lema’an Yishme’u podcast from Machon Halacha Chabad.

00:09 Speaker 2 Today we’ll discuss the ketubah. A ketubah contains many terms and concepts whose meaning you need to know—both halachically and financially—because, after all, a ketubah is a financial agreement. For example, what are nichsei tzon barzel? What are nichsei melog? When I say 200 zuz, how much money is that really? Or zekukim—what are they worth in today’s terms? What does the woman bring into the marriage, what are her rights, and so on? This is a subject that matters to every one of us. Everyone either has a ketubah at home or, if he’s a young man, will be giving one soon. There are also many details specified in the ketubah that people aren’t aware of. That’s why they draw up various prenuptial agreements, when those provisions are already built into the ketubah from the outset. There’s a fundamental difference between the ketubah, a halachic legal instrument developed by our Sages over thousands of years, and a prenuptial agreement, which might be a document drafted by a lawyer without much knowledge, judgment, or experience in the matter. With Hashem’s help, I’ll divide this into five chapters: generally, what the purposes of the ketubah are; then the structure of the ketubah; the husband’s obligations under the ketubah—there are several of them; and then the wife’s obligations under the ketubah. So, in this first chapter, we’ll discuss the structure of the ketubah. As a halachic legal document, the ketubah contains several details that are very important to pay attention to. First, the date. It’s very important that it be accurate: the day of the week, the day of the month, and the year. This has halachic significance, because if it was written with the previous day’s date, the document is invalid. It’s preferable to write the date of the night

02:11 Speaker 2 That is, they arrive close to sunset and start preparing the ketubah. If they write that day’s date but haven’t completed the kinyan—whether a handshake or a formal kinyan, as is customary today by lifting a cloth, and so on—then the date of the ketubah is unclear, and if there are earlier documents, that could possibly invalidate it. That’s why the ketubah should bear the date of the night when the chuppah takes place. If they did it during the day, they must complete the kinyan for all the details, not just write the date and complete the kinyan afterward. That covers the date. Another very important matter is the location. The exact location should be written, for several reasons. The most significant is that, if they unfortunately need to divorce later, various things depend on local custom. For example, abroad—in South Africa, say—it may be customary for a woman, when she marries, to have what are called maids or household helpers, so her own household duties are minimal. By contrast, for a woman who marries in Israel or elsewhere, the nature of her household duties may be entirely different. Local customs are therefore very important and have halachic implications for various matters, so it’s very important to specify where the chuppah takes place. Another thing is the names. It’s very important that the names be accurate: the father’s name, the mother’s name, and the family name. And if, for example, she is a convert, that should be written, or she should be identified as “daughter of Avraham Avinu.” If they simply write “daughter of Avraham,” people will think her father’s name was Avraham, with no indication that she converted. What practical difference does it make whether or not she’s a convert? For example, whether her ketubah is

04:03 Speaker 2 for 200 or for 100, which is called a maneh. So every detail—whether she is a widow or not, and all the other particulars—is very important. There are also implications for marrying a kohen. Many halachic implications lie behind every word and every mark in the ketubah. Now, the ketubah involves obligations: ten matters that the husband undertakes toward his wife, and four that the wife undertakes toward her husband. Not all of them are written in the ketubah. Some are what’s called a condition imposed by beis din: they are binding even though they aren’t written there. But you need to know those details too. Another concept we’ll touch on briefly is the dowry—the things a woman brings into the marriage. It might be household items, clothing, sometimes furniture, or even, for example, a car. How are these recorded, in whose name are they registered, and what are the rights involved? And of course, it’s important to make sure that while the ketubah is being written, I perform a kinyan, that both parties understand what they’re undertaking, and that the witnesses sign it. In a Sephardic ketubah, for example, it is customary for the husband to sign as well. That concludes the first chapter, which explains the matter in general terms. We’ll also discuss the purposes of the ketubah and the husband’s obligations—the ten things he undertakes at the time of marriage. There is a difference between kiddushin and nisuin. Kiddushin is the stage at which the man makes the woman forbidden to everyone else and, in fact, also makes marital relations with her forbidden to himself. In the time of our Sages, there would then be a year for the bride to provide herself with jewelry and so on. Nisuin is the stage when the financial obligations take effect. He brings her under the chuppah, there is an obligation to recite the blessings, and so on. The ketubah primarily concerns nisuin, of course, rather than kiddushin. Another thing to bear in

06:21 Speaker 2 mind is what the ketubah means for the woman. A woman cannot live with her husband without a ketubah, because the ketubah provides her financial security. This is really quite straightforward. If, unfortunately, a couple divorces or the husband dies—either of which releases the woman from her obligations to him—our Sages were concerned about how she would support herself during the following year. So the husband effectively undertakes to provide for the year ahead, and our Sages expressed that as an estimated sum called 200 zuz. If you convert the money from the time of our Sages into today’s terms, it comes to something like 300 or 400 shekels—just as an example—enough to eat morning and evening for a whole year. In an Ashkenazic ketubah, where the obligation is discussed as a Torah obligation, the coinage was worth eight times as much, so it comes to something like 2,500 or 3,000 shekels. That’s the amount in today’s terms, but in the time of our Sages, it effectively gave a woman a full year in which she wouldn’t have to worry about supporting herself until she found another match. That’s the foundation of the ketubah, the basic sum before all the other details written in it. The 200 zuz are what’s called the ikar ketubah for a virgin; for a convert, a non-virgin, a widow, and so on, it is 100. That is the basic ketubah obligation. Now, why is this so important? To make it difficult for a husband to divorce his wife, so that every little argument doesn’t end with him saying, “You’re divorced,” and the two of them separating. For example, in other countries or religions, or in Islam, he slaps her three times, tells her she’s divorced, and that’s the end of it. He owes her nothing, and she’s left in limbo. By contrast, as we’ll soon see, the ketubah is

08:22 Speaker 2 It secures the wife’s rights: even after her husband’s death, she can live in the home, support herself from his assets, and so on; there are provisions concerning the children as well. The husband’s basic obligation under Torah law, as the Rambam states, is “her food, her clothing, and her marital rights.” Let’s explain. “Her food” covers all her financial needs relating to food, drink, and the like. “Her clothing” covers everything to do with clothing, cosmetics, makeup—all the things a woman needs and considers part of who she is. And then there are her marital rights. The whole reason for marriage is that the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply is the first positive commandment in the Torah. A man who lives without a wife lives without blessing, without peace, and so on; he is not even called a complete person. So it is a positive commandment under Torah law for a man to marry. That is embodied in what is called “her marital rights.” Of course, there are distinctions in halachah concerning how, what, when, and all the conditions involved. So those are the husband’s obligations under Torah law: her food, her clothing, and her marital rights. As for obligations established by the Sages, there are seven more things to which a wife is entitled from her husband. The first, which we mentioned, is the basic kesubah payment. That is the amount he gives her if they part ways, and it is meant to support her for an entire year. By the way, today this is expressed in kesubos as fifty-two thousand shekels or twenty thousand dollars; that is the minimum amount written. One must be very careful not to put exaggerated, unrealistic sums in a kesubah—eighteen million shekels or whatever. Because if, G-d forbid, they end up divorcing and he has to pay but cannot, he may leave her unable to remarry, or a legal process begins. The kesubah is a legally binding document by all opinions, in all rabbinical courts in Israel and around the world. In other words, there are witnesses, the husband’s agreement, the agreement of

10:33 Speaker 2 the wife, and a stated sum of money. Right? Don’t treat it as a merely symbolic document; it has binding legal and financial force. Another thing the husband undertakes in the kesubah is what is called redeeming captives. In other words, if, G-d forbid, the wife is taken captive, he undertakes to redeem her at the price demanded, by whatever means will free her from the hands of non-Jews. Another obligation is medical care. If a woman becomes ill, one of the husband’s obligations is to see to her treatment. Or nowadays, if he has taken out premium health insurance for himself, he cannot leave her with basic coverage; he must upgrade her medical coverage too. If he is accustomed to getting treatments, or sees a dentist, or whatever he does for his own health, he must make sure his wife has at least the same. As our Sages put it in halachic language, “She rises with him and does not descend with him.” Right? More broadly, the Alter Rebbe rules, “Honor your wives so that you may become wealthy.” At first glance, what is the connection? The Jewish people are considered the bride, and Hakadosh Boruch Hu the groom. Hakadosh Boruch Hu says: What I see you do for your wife, I will do for you. That is why one of the ways to merit wealth is specifically to honor your wife, both materially and in the way you speak to her. Especially since, as the Alter Rebbe says, she is quick to tears and the consequences of wronging her come quickly. So in the positive direction too, when she is happy and content, the blessing can come—and does come—immediately. Another matter, G-d forbid, is burial. There are many expenses connected with a burial. In the time of our Sages there was also what was called lamentation, and various other details surrounding burial. That too is one of the husband’s obligations. There is also the matter of a residence: he must provide her with a home to live in. By the way, that applies even after his death. In other words, if, for example, he owns a

12:46 Speaker 2 house or other property and passes away, his wife is entitled to live in his home for the rest of her life. Now, in the time of our Sages this was very significant—as it is today too, but especially then—because it was accepted for an older man to marry a young woman, or for a man to have several wives, and the age difference inevitably meant that he sometimes passed away before her. Let’s take an example from the Torah. Yaakov Avinu was eighty-two, and Rachel and Leah were twelve at the time of the wedding, so there was a very large difference. Avraham Avinu was twenty-six at the time of his wedding and she was sixteen. That’s ten years, which is less. But with Yitzchak too, there is a significant difference: he was forty and she was three. So we see that men also live, objectively, shorter lives than women, and they are usually older at the time of the wedding. That is why our Sages made provision for a woman to live in the home they had shared after her husband’s death, and to benefit from his assets for the rest of her life—unless she finds someone else to marry, or she demands the kesubah payment and says, “I’ll manage on my own.” That is another option. There is another provision the husband owes his wife, called kesubas benin dichrin. It is not practiced today, but I’ll explain the concept in a sentence. It shows how much thought and special consideration our Sages gave to the couple’s welfare. What is kesubas benin dichrin? Say a couple marries and has one son, and the wife brought an apartment into the marriage—her father gave her an apartment. Some time later she passes away, and now the husband inherits his wife. The apartment belongs to him. He marries another woman, and they have, say, four sons. Now, after the husband passes away, that apartment is divided

14:55 Speaker 2 among five or six heirs. The first wife’s father comes and says, “Wait a minute. A few years ago I bought an apartment for my daughter when she married, for two million shekels. Now, when I walk down the street a few years later, it isn’t hers at all, and my grandchildren may be left with only ten percent.” So our Sages made provision for that too. This is called—and the first wife’s sons inherit the assets she brought in, while another wife’s children inherit the assets she brought in. That way, a person’s money is not lost to his grandchildren. The last thing our Sages instituted is called support for daughters. A woman marries and has daughters. After some time, say she passes away—or the couple divorces, and so on—the husband is still obligated to support the daughters. Those are the ten obligations of the husband. By the way, in other marital property agreements, outside Judaism, you do not find anything like so many provisions, or so much consideration and concern on the part of our Sages for the woman’s future. Another time we’ll discuss the obligations a wife has toward her husband. The first obligation that appears in our Sages—by the way, everything we are discussing now appears in tractates Kesubos and Yevamos, in Even HaEzer, and of course also in the Rambam’s laws of marriage—is that the wages a woman earns go to her husband. What is called “a woman’s earnings belong to her husband.” But we have to bear in mind that in the time of our Sages, her earnings were generally something rather marginal. If she worked at home sewing or weaving, or nursed a child who was not hers—there was no Materna[?] then—she would receive a certain sum, but it was not the household’s main source of support. So since she lived in her husband’s home and he supported her in all the ways and particulars we mentioned earlier, the products of her work are

17:08 Speaker 2 of her husband. Another matter is anything she finds. If a woman finds something, it belongs to her husband. What does “to her husband” mean? For the support of the family. Not that he keeps it for himself or gives it to his own family, but for the support of their family and the life they share. Another matter: a husband inherits his wife and all her property after her death. He supported her, they lived together, and she accumulated various assets. So he receives the inheritance. Another matter is the proceeds from her property during her lifetime. Our Sages were very concerned about women’s rights. For example, if she brings an apartment into the marriage, the apartment does not have to be registered in her husband’s name; it can remain in her name. This is called nichsei melog. If it is transferred into the husband’s name, it becomes nichsei tzon barzel, which is governed by different laws. But if she brings an asset—say, a car, an apartment, a refrigerator, or anything else—and wants it to remain in her name because she is not sure the marriage will last, that is called nichsei melog, and it remains in her name. Say the apartment is in her name, she has several apartments, and they receive rent from them. That rent goes to her husband—meaning, toward the life they share. So the husband has a right to the proceeds from her assets. Or suppose they marry and she has a substantial savings fund in the bank, which presumably earns some interest. That interest goes toward their shared life—what is termed “to her husband”—but the principal remains hers throughout. This is for the woman’s benefit. It is a provision of halachah that you do not find in other legal systems, where everything is divided fifty-fifty, and so on. So those are four basic matters in which a woman has obligations. There are other customary things that are not written in the ketubah but are part of the wife’s obligations.

19:20 Speaker 2 These are fairly simple, relevant things, but halachah nevertheless specifies them. For example, in the time of our Sages, a woman would grind grain, bake, do laundry, cook, nurse her own child, and so on. Incidentally, if her husband has a baby with another woman, she is not obligated to nurse that baby, though he can ask her to. Or if twins are born, she is not obligated to nurse both of them. She can tell him to get formula for the second child, or something else. In other words, the Torah takes great care to protect a woman’s rights. There is also a very spiritual dimension to this: the husband represents Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and the wife represents Knesses Yisroel, the collective soul of the Jewish people. In that sense, the Torah protects Jewish souls. The Rebbe speaks about how, from this perspective too, there is an allusion here to Rabbeinu Gershom, and so on. But looking at the practical, legal halachic dimension, there are certain obligations a wife has toward her husband. Incidentally, she is not obligated to bring a dowry either. It is simply customary to do so, and in return the husband increases the amount he undertakes to pay her in the ketubah. So these are the main obligations of a wife toward her husband. Of course, it is important to note that this depends on local custom. A husband cannot require his wife to do household tasks beyond what is customary. For example, he cannot require her to paint the house before Pesach, because that is not customary, right? Or if there is a plumbing problem, he cannot say, “Come, I’ll teach you how to fix the system, and you can repair it.” Rather, she does the things it is customary for a woman to do for her husband, and not the things it is not customary for her to do. Of course, if she is wealthy, or he is wealthy, or she brought assets into the marriage, her obligations toward her husband decrease.

21:22 Speaker 2 But it is important to note that there are particular tasks she is obligated to perform in any case. These are called acts of affection: making his bed, pouring him a drink. She remains obligated in various things connected with the affection between husband and wife. And there is another requirement that remains even if she brings all the wealth in the world into the marriage: she must not be idle. Idleness leads to inactivity, to promiscuity, to madness. This has also been demonstrated today in studies of wealthy women and men who do nothing; it leads them to psychological difficulties, depression, madness, and so on. So there are basic obligations a woman has, but there are obligations she can be exempt from depending on her financial standing. There is another halachic concept relating to the dowry a woman brings into the marriage. The dowry is divided into two kinds of assets: nichsei tzon barzel and nichsei melog. What is the difference between them? When a woman brings assets to the marriage, she can ask that they be classified as nichsei melog. For example, if she brings a car, she wants it to remain registered in her name. Her husband can, of course, benefit from and use the car, since that is considered the “proceeds” of the car, but it remains in her name. Since it is in her name, if its value falls after several years of marriage, that is not her husband’s responsibility; it is hers. The same applies to an orchard, an apartment, or any other asset: it remains in her name, and if its value falls or rises, that is her concern. Her husband is entitled only to the proceeds. But if the woman wants to preserve the value of the asset—the car, the house, or whatever she brings in—she asks for it to be recorded as nichsei tzon barzel. This is specified in the ketubah.

23:26 Speaker 2 Then, for example, if the car was recorded in the ketubah as nichsei tzon barzel and was worth, say, a hundred thousand shekels, but over the years its value fell, and they divorce when it is worth forty thousand shekels, the husband owes the woman a hundred thousand shekels at the time of the divorce. Why? Because it is nichsei tzon barzel. It was registered in his name. He accepted responsibility for any kind of loss to the car, including depreciation, and must pay her. She has to decide which of the two categories the asset will be recorded under. On the other hand, take another example: if it is an apartment, they recorded it as nichsei tzon barzel, and its value rose, then if they divorce he owes her its original value, and he can keep the gain. But if the apartment’s value fell, he still owes her its original value, and he bears the loss. That is why there are these two categories of assets, nichsei tzon barzel and nichsei melog. There are various other details as well. For instance, what does this mean regarding proceeds? The husband is entitled to the proceeds from both kinds of assets. Today, it is not customary to specify the assets in the ketubah, so that they do not become nichsei tzon barzel, and also because people are not familiar with the details and the differences between the laws. So instead, they make a financial agreement before the ketubah, or, at the time of the get, the beis din requires an agreement dividing the property and settling the financial matters. What they agree to is what applies. As is well known, in monetary matters it depends both on local custom and on the mutual agreement of the two parties; what they agree to is what applies.