Chapter 8 - Part One

00:00 Today we’re continuing with chapter 8 of Tanya. In chapter 8, the Alter Rebbe finishes up several very important points connected to the subject of chapter 7. The Alter Rebbe spoke there about kelipah and how kelipah has the power to bring down the soul. That is certainly true of the three impure kelipos, but even kelipas nogah—which includes things that are permitted—has the ability to bring down the soul when a person uses them to satisfy a craving. So in the previous chapter, the Alter Rebbe explained the difference between kelipas nogah and the three impure kelipos, and how one can afterward rectify the permitted things that belong to kelipas nogah. If a person does teshuvah, he can later elevate them, because they are essentially permitted. But with forbidden things, by contrast, one cannot simply elevate them. There are, however, ways to do so, as the Alter Rebbe explained regarding teshuvah out of love. Through a special intention, a Jew has the ability to bring about rectification even for such things. All right, that was chapter 7. In chapter 8, the Alter Rebbe goes to the opposite extreme. In chapter 7, the main subject was kelipas nogah: how it, too, brings down the soul when something is not done for the sake of Heaven, but can nevertheless be rectified. Here the Alter Rebbe is going to tell us the reverse: what happens with the three impure kelipos when a person wants to elevate something from them to holiness afterward. So the Alter Rebbe begins by making another point about the gravity of the matter. From the previous chapter, we understood the difference between something permitted and something forbidden: when something permitted is used to satisfy a craving, it descends to the three impure kelipos, but because it is permitted, it can be elevated. Something forbidden, by contrast, cannot be elevated.

02:05 That is because it is bound and held by the external forces. So ordinarily, it remains there; it cannot be elevated to holiness without something exceptional, as we learned. Here the Alter Rebbe gives another point that emphasizes how serious this is. Why is it so serious? The Alter Rebbe says: “That is why they are called ‘forbidden.’” This gives us a fuller explanation of why forbidden foods are called “forbidden”—how severe their status is. As we said, “forbidden” means bound and held by the external forces. The Alter Rebbe says: “For even one who eats forbidden food unknowingly.” What happens if a person ate treif food, non-kosher food, without knowing? He simply didn’t know it wasn’t kosher. He thought it was kosher and ate it by mistake. He ate it for the sake of Heaven: he thought it was kosher, and while eating it, he had a good intention. He intended to use the strength from that food to serve Hashem. Not only that, says Tanya: “And he actually did so.” He didn’t just have that intention while eating; he actually followed through. After he finished eating, he sat down to learn or to daven. He used the strength he got from that food—which was in fact treif, non-kosher food—to serve Hashem afterward. He did so: “He studied and prayed with the strength of that food.” He learned. He davened with the strength of the non-kosher food he had eaten. So he had all the right intentions, and the poor man was unaware. He didn’t know. It’s not

04:01 that he knew; he simply didn’t know. This is a kind of inadvertent transgression. Yet, the Alter Rebbe says, forbidden things are bound and held by the external forces to such an extent that “the vitality in it does not ascend and become clothed in the words of Torah and prayer.” Even so, it cannot be elevated. Although he didn’t know, ate it for the sake of Heaven, and actually learned and davened with that strength, it does not ascend; it is not elevated to holiness. “The vitality in it does not ascend and become clothed in the words of Torah and prayer as it does with permitted food.” No. It does not have the advantage that permitted things have, of being able to be elevated, “because it is held by the sitra achra of the three impure kelipos.” The Alter Rebbe wants to emphasize this as a further explanation of why it is called forbidden: it is held by the external forces, bound in the hands of the kelipos. It is held by them to such an extent that even in this case—where he didn’t know it was forbidden, ate it, then learned and davened with its strength, having intended to do so for the sake of Heaven—it is still called forbidden. It is inherently bound there and cannot be elevated to holiness. What does this teach us? What is the Alter Rebbe’s point—what is the novel insight here? Simply put, the person actually became full. He ate a good meal; the poor man didn’t know it was forbidden, but he ate and actually became full. He actually gained strength, and he actually used that strength to serve Hashem. Outwardly, there is no difference at all between him and someone else who ate kosher food. The person

05:54 who ate kosher food ate physical food and became full, and that gave him strength. With that strength, he learned and davened. This person did the same thing. The only difference is that one food was forbidden and the other was kosher. But in practice, he did gain physical strength from it; it filled him up, and with that strength he learned and davened. So he did something good. And that is precisely the striking point about something forbidden: even though you actually gained strength from it and actually used that strength for holiness, it remains held by the external forces. Once something belongs to the three impure kelipos, its connection to the realm of kelipos is so strong that none of this helps. It remains there. The Rebbe gives an explanation of this, adding a little more detail. What exactly is the point here? What is the real difference between something permitted and something forbidden? With something permitted, even if a person ate it to satisfy a craving, so that it fell to the three impure kelipos because of his intention, he can still bring it back and elevate it. Once he returns to serving Hashem and uses that strength for holiness, it ascends to holiness. With something forbidden, it is the opposite extreme: even if he intended it for the sake of Heaven and actually used its strength for that purpose, it still cannot ascend. What is the underlying idea? The Rebbe adds a point: the whole notion that a physical thing can be elevated is itself remarkable. After all, what connection is there between the physical and the spiritual? Food

07:49 is physical. Food is a physical thing, and physicality is separate from spirituality. Why should a person be able to elevate something physical at all? When you learn and daven, those are spiritual activities. But food is physical. It is meat, bread—physical things. The very notion that a person can take something physical and make it a vessel for G-dliness is a novel development. It is not something ordinary; it was made possible at the Giving of the Torah. As is well known, before the Giving of the Torah this was not possible. Before the Giving of the Torah, there was no ability to elevate the physical. In other words, physicality in itself is separate from spirituality, and there is no way to elevate it. What happened, then? Hakadosh Boruch Hu gave us a gift, a power: when a Jew uses something physical to serve Hashem, he can refine that physical thing. Through this, the refinement reaches the body and the animal soul. So the entire idea of a physical thing becoming a vessel for G-dliness was made possible through the power of Hashem’s very Essence. It is similar to the idea that Hakadosh Boruch Hu alone has the power to create something from nothing—a new creation that can come about only through His own power. Likewise, a Jew has the ability to turn something into nothing: to take something physical and transform it into something spiritual. Hayom Yom says several times that a Jew has the ability to turn something into nothing. Hakadosh Boruch Hu created the world from nothing into something, and a Jew turns something into nothing. That is remarkable; it is a new possibility. And since this whole possibility is a novel development, it depends on Hashem’s will. So if Hashem willed that a particular thing should be permitted,

09:45 In other words, Hakadosh Boruch Hu placed it in a person’s hands, subject to his choice, so a person has the ability to elevate it. A person has the power, through his freedom of choice, to take something physical and make it a vessel for G-dliness when he eats it or uses it for the sake of Heaven. And here there is a further point: even if it underwent a temporary descent, since it is fundamentally something that can be elevated, a person has the power to elevate it. But something that is forbidden—when the Torah, when Hakadosh Boruch Hu, says that this thing is forbidden, that it is something Hakadosh Boruch Hu does not want—it is bound to the kelipos. It remains in a true state of kelipah, of yesh. Yesh is something that, on its own, cannot be elevated. Ah, the person has all the best intentions—what difference does that make? The thing itself belongs to the world of kelipos. It does not belong to me; it cannot be elevated. At any rate, that is one point the Rebbe makes here. Now the Alter Rebbe adds another point. So far, we are talking about forbidden things, Torah prohibitions. The Alter Rebbe says there is something else as well: even a rabbinic prohibition. The Alter Rebbe is saying that what we have discussed—a person eats something inadvertently; he did not know it was forbidden, and it is a forbidden thing, but he did not know that and ate it for the sake of Heaven—does not become elevated. The Alter Rebbe says this applies not only to Torah prohibitions but also to rabbinic prohibitions. What does that mean? What is the significance? What does the Alter Rebbe mean by “even a rabbinic prohibition”? Because seemingly there is reason to say—and this is what a number of halachic authorities write—that all

11:29 of this applies only to Torah prohibitions. We say that even if it was inadvertent, even if he did not know and ate it, it cannot be elevated. When does that apply? To prohibitions from the Torah. Because with a Torah prohibition, even an inadvertent act is significant. Why? Because a Torah prohibition, as is known, is an issur cheftza—a prohibition inherent in the object. The object itself, the food itself, is forbidden, and so even if the act was inadvertent, it had an effect. Here you have an object of kelipah, an object of the sitra achra. And, simply speaking, why is an inadvertent act prohibited? The Sages prohibited it because an inadvertent act can lead to a deliberate one. So it has that aspect to it. That is why even an inadvertent violation is forbidden. But with a rabbinic prohibition—as many halachic authorities write—the thing itself is not inherently forbidden. It is not an issur cheftza. By the letter of the law it is permitted. Rather, the Sages instituted a decree, enacted a regulation. The Sages made a safeguard. It is something the Sages instituted for a person, to protect him from falling. Simply speaking, what is the reason for all the rabbinic decrees? Why did the Sages make decrees? Because they did not want a person to fall into a more serious prohibition, a Torah prohibition. So they made a safeguard around the safeguard, all kinds of decrees and regulations, so that a person would not fall into Torah prohibitions. But the thing itself is not forbidden. So if the thing itself is not forbidden, what if he ate it in the way we learned here? He did not know it was forbidden by rabbinic law; he did not know, and he ate it for the sake of Heaven. He learned, he davened. Why should it not be elevated to holiness? Reason would suggest that it can indeed be elevated to holiness. The thing is not inherently forbidden; it is only

13:41 forbidden because of a decree of the Sages, a rabbinic enactment, a safeguard. But inherently it is not forbidden, and he did it inadvertently. In other words, he had no intention of doing something forbidden, and he had the right intention. Why should he not be able to elevate it to holiness? The Alter Rebbe introduces the point that even a rabbinic prohibition cannot be elevated. What is the reason? The Alter Rebbe writes that “the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah,” and so on. The Alter Rebbe says that even something forbidden by rabbinic law cannot be elevated because, in truth, the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah. In one particular respect, there is a stringency in rabbinic matters, even more than in matters of Torah law. That is, as it says in the Gemara, we see in a number of areas that the Sages reinforced their own rulings. It is discussed by the halachic authorities. We learned this too: the Sages gave their rulings greater stringency precisely so that people would not come to disregard them. There are several reasons given for saying that the words of the Sages are more stringent. As for the deeper explanation of this idea—well, first of all, the Rebbe discusses at great length the question we have raised. The Rebbe seeks to show that it appears from this passage in Tanya that a rabbinic prohibition is also an issur cheftza, a prohibition inherent in the object. That is unlike what we said earlier, that some halachic authorities write that a rabbinic prohibition is only an issur gavra, a prohibition on the person. From the Alter Rebbe, it appears that a rabbinic prohibition is an issur cheftza, which is why, even when it is inadvertent, it cannot be elevated. And that is the meaning of “the words of the Sages are more stringent.” In other words, the words of the Sages are more stringent: their rulings, too, involve an issur cheftza. That is one way of looking at the matter overall. The Rebbe says not necessarily: one can also say that this cannot be conclusively proved from Tanya. It is not explicit that the Alter Rebbe holds that rabbinic prohibitions are an issur cheftza, because it may be

16:00 due to an issur gavra as well, and yet an inadvertent violation is forbidden. There is reason to say that even if a rabbinic prohibition is not an issur cheftza but only an issur gavra, an inadvertent violation is nevertheless forbidden. Why? Because even an inadvertent transgression requires atonement. The Alter Rebbe says in Tanya, in Igeres Hakodesh, section 28: Why do we bring a sin-offering for an inadvertent transgression? The person is not at fault. Why must he bring an offering? Why does he need atonement? The Alter Rebbe says that even an inadvertent transgression comes from the animal soul gaining the upper hand. A healthy person does not fall out of bed in the middle of the night. Likewise, a healthy animal does not jump into a fire, even though it is an animal. It has an instinct, a nature. Human nature is not to do something harmful. A person naturally protects himself from doing something harmful. So if a Jew knows that a certain thing is harmful, he will not do it even inadvertently. The whole reason a person can stumble into something inadvertently is that he has become coarse, more materialistic—the animal soul has gained the upper hand. So it turns out that an inadvertent transgression is also connected with the gavra, the person, not only with the cheftza, the object. Therefore, even if we assume that a rabbinic prohibition is only an issur gavra, the fact that a person stumbled into a rabbinic prohibition nevertheless shows that he is not in a good state, and he needs atonement. All this explains, in general terms, why we say that even something prohibited by rabbinic law cannot be elevated to holiness. Now, the Alter Rebbe adds here, “Moreover, the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah.” What, in fact, is the explanation? Why is there one respect in which the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah? One explanation is that the words—

18:07 the words of the Sages mark the boundary between evil and good. The words of the Sages. What did we say? What is the purpose of the words of the Sages? The Sages reinforced the words of—sorry, the Sages made a safeguard. There is the thing the Torah forbade outright, and the Sages added further enactments, further decrees, further barriers, so that a person would not fall into outright evil. So it turns out that between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition there is a boundary: the person has not yet crossed over to the side of impurity. Right? There are still several stages before that; he has not yet reached the prohibition. But the moment he also violates a rabbinic prohibition, that means he has crossed the boundary between evil and good. He has crossed the boundary over to the side that is not good. So in this particular respect, the words of the Sages are more stringent. It is like saying to a person: We do not want someone to bow down to an idol. So we say there are several other things that come before bowing down. The Sages forbade other acts that are not, in themselves, bowing down. But because they could lead to it—yes, one may not bend down, one may not [unclear], all kinds of things the Sages forbade because they could lead you to bow down to an animal. So this means that the Sages added all kinds of safeguards to protect a person. When a person violates a Torah prohibition, he has already violated the most serious thing. When a person violates a rabbinic decree, that means he has crossed the thin barrier between holiness and kelipah. So in one respect it is worse. I need to understand this point. That is one explanation I saw, but there is a deeper one. The Rebbe says this about other matters, and it can be understood even better in connection with a rabbinic prohibition. A rabbinic prohibition expresses

20:27 In a certain sense, it expresses a Jew’s connection with Hakadosh Boruch Hu even more than a Torah prohibition does. A Torah prohibition means that the Torah says explicitly: You may not do this. Hakadosh Boruch Hu said explicitly: No. Where did a rabbinic prohibition come from? It isn’t written. The Torah didn’t say it. But what happened? The Sages understood that Hakadosh Boruch Hu really doesn’t want this either. Even though He didn’t say so explicitly, we learn from the verses and their hints that this, too, is what He wants. In other words, rabbinic prohibitions express a deeper connection between a Jew and Hakadosh Boruch Hu. There are things that a Jew, by virtue of his inner connection to G-dliness, feels are not appropriate. They shouldn’t be done. So here, something deeper in a Jew’s connection with Hakadosh Boruch Hu is expressed—something that isn’t expressed in a Torah prohibition. To put it another way: a Torah prohibition is what you need when the connection is external. When two people don’t know each other, one doesn’t know what the other permits, what he forbids, or what he needs. He has to be told about everything: yes to this, no to that; do this, don’t do that. But when a person has an inner connection with someone, he understands even the things the other person doesn’t say explicitly. From the hints, he understands what the other person wants or doesn’t want. So it turns out that a rabbinic prohibition, specifically, expresses something deeper in a Jew’s connection with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That is why “the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah.” This is also explained in the maamarim: that is why they are called sofrim, scribes. There is the sefer, the book, and there is the sofer, the scribe. The Written Torah is called a book, and the scribe writes the book. That means the scribe is on a higher level than the book. This is the idea

22:35 of the words of the Sages: they grasped the Divine will with greater subtlety and depth, and therefore they can say what is permitted and what is forbidden. The Alter Rebbe continues: “Therefore, the evil inclination and the power that desires forbidden things is a demon from among the foreign demons—the evil inclination of the nations, whose souls derive from the three impure kelipos. By contrast, the evil inclination and the power that desires permitted things in order to satisfy its appetite is a demon from among the Jewish demons, since it can return to holiness, as explained above.” The Alter Rebbe is saying that, on this basis, we can understand why the Kabbalistic texts, the Zohar, call the evil inclination for forbidden things shedin nochra’in, foreign demons. That is, as though it were a non-Jewish force—the animal soul, shedin nochra’in. And the power that desires permitted things is called shedin Yehuda’in, Jewish demons. At first glance, what is the difference? As we said earlier, seemingly even permitted things are forbidden when indulged in out of desire. Even permitted things, when pursued for the sake of desire, bring the soul down. So what exactly is the difference—so much so that one is called a non-Jew and the other a Jew? But according to what we’ve explained, it makes sense. Things associated with kelipas nogah are things that the Torah actually gives us the ability to elevate. A person has it in his hands to elevate them, and therefore they do belong to a Jew. A Jew has a connection to them because he can take them and turn them into avodas Hashem. He can elevate them with his own hands and make them into vessels for G-dliness. By contrast, with forbidden things, even if he studies and davens using the energy from eating them, they remain forbidden. In other words, they cannot be elevated, and therefore they do not belong to a Jew. They belong to a non-Jew. In this way, the Alter Rebbe wants to explain to us just how great

24:43 the distinction and distance are between permitted things and forbidden things. Forbidden things are, in essence, something that has no place with a Jew. They belong to the non-Jew; they are associated with him and assist him. That is shedin nochra’in. Except that, G-d forbid, sometimes shedin nochra’in get hold of a Jew and pull him toward the root of kelipah. But in essence, a Jew has no connection to that. As the Rambam writes, a Jew essentially has no connection to matters of sin and transgression. By contrast, when it comes to permitted things, they are in our hands. A Jew can elevate them. So they do belong to a Jew. That is shedin Yehuda’in, and one can make something holy out of them. I remember once, [unclear] of Rabbeinu Chasam Sofer [unclear] spoke about 19 Kislev and 20 Kislev and said that people should know that 20 Kislev was loftier than 19 Kislev. Why? He said that on 19 Kislev, the Alter Rebbe was imprisoned by a non-Jew, and the celebration of his liberation was that he got out of the non-Jew’s hands. On 20 Kislev, by contrast, the Alter Rebbe was with a Jew. That was the imprisonment when the Alter Rebbe remained at a misnaged’s home for three hours. So that is the difference between shedin nochra’in and shedin Yehuda’in. On the one hand, shedin nochra’in are worse. On the other hand, precisely because they are foreign, you know they are not Jewish; they have nothing to do with you. So from the outset, you aren’t swayed by them. But when it comes to shedin Yehuda’in, he is a Jew, and that Jew draws you in. That is much worse, because a person can become much more confused there. Much greater caution is needed. The Jewish evil inclination is much harder to fight than the non-Jewish evil inclination. Incidentally, this gives us an explanation of something in Tanya.