Likkutei Amarim Tanya, Chapter 27 - Part 4

00:01 Yes, so we’re in the middle of chapter 27, on page 34, the third line. “And concerning this, Iyov said…” In chapter 1 of Tanya, on the very first page, the Alter Rebbe brought several teachings of our Sages to introduce the subject of tzaddikim, beinonim, and reshaim. He raised several questions from those teachings. He quoted the Gemara in Bava Basra, which says, “You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim.” Iyov was speaking to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and among other things he said, “Master of the Universe, You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim.” So the Alter Rebbe asked: “But ‘tzaddik or rasha’ is not said.” The Gemara says that when a soul descends into the world, an angel declares various things about what that person will be, but does not say whether he will be a tzaddik or a rasha. On the face of it, that’s because there has to be free choice. How could it be declared that a person will be a tzaddik or a rasha? That’s something a person must choose for himself. Yet Iyov comes along and says, “You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim.” That was one of the questions the Alter Rebbe raised on the first page of Tanya. The Alter Rebbe answered half of that question in chapter 14, and here in chapter 27 he answers the other half. He already answered the part about “You created tzaddikim” in chapter 14. What was his answer? That “You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim” refers to two kinds of souls. There are souls on the level of tzaddikim, and there are souls on the level of beinonim. That’s the whole principle the Alter Rebbe explained in chapter 14: “The level of the beinoni is within the reach of every person, and every person should strive toward it.” It applies to everyone. Every person must, can, and is able to be a beinoni in thought, speech, and action. The freedom, ability, and choice

02:34 have been given to everyone to be a beinoni. The level of a tzaddik, by contrast, is not within everyone’s reach. It belongs only to particular souls to whom Hakadosh Boruch Hu has given that kind of soul—souls of tzaddikim, with a special mission and a special avodah. That is the meaning of “You created tzaddikim.” It does not mean that someone is created to be a tzaddik or a rasha in his actual conduct. Of course there is free choice in that. “You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim” refers to souls. Some people have special souls, souls of tzaddikim, with a special role: they can transform the soul. A person cannot simply attain the level of Moshe Rabbeinu. Most souls, by contrast, do not have that capacity. That was the subject of chapter 14, but he had not yet finished explaining what “You created reshaim” means. It apparently refers to beinonim, yet he calls them reshaim. Why? As we saw in chapters 13 and 14 of Tanya, the beinoni is called “like a rasha.” “The beinoni is like a rasha.” “Like a rasha” does not mean he is actually a rasha; he is a beinoni. Here the Alter Rebbe completes that explanation and addresses “reshaim.” He says: Concerning this, Iyov said, “You created reshaim.” What exactly does that mean? G-d forbid, it does not mean that Hakadosh Boruch Hu created them to be reshaim. As we said, there is free choice. So what did he mean by “You created reshaim”? “Not that they should actually be reshaim,” G-d forbid. It does not mean reshaim in the literal sense, in practice. A person has to work on himself. Hakadosh Boruch Hu gives you the ability not to be a rasha, but to be a beinoni—or the opposite. So what does “You created reshaim” mean? Rather, that they should experience something like the conduct of reshaim. It refers to their struggle, because

04:37 in practice, the struggle they face resembles that of reshaim. “The conduct of reshaim” means that their kind of struggle is like the struggle of a rasha. What is a rasha? A rasha is someone who has desires and troubling thoughts, but does not overcome them. He dwells on them in his heart, and then they find expression in actual thought, speech, and action. The beinoni, by contrast, is G-d forbid not a rasha in practice, but he faces those same difficulties, those same issues that a rasha faces. He has the same kind of yetzer hara, with its desires and struggles, as the Alter Rebbe said earlier: “That they should experience something like the conduct of reshaim in their thoughts and musings alone.” As far as their thoughts and musings are concerned, it resembles the conduct of reshaim, “and they will constantly struggle to divert their minds from them.” This person has to spend his whole life fighting his desires and troubling thoughts, practicing iskafya—subduing the sitra achra within him. That is the whole point. Why was this person created? “And they will not be able to eliminate it entirely.” Even after he practices iskafya, and even when he actually overcomes it in thought, speech, and action, he still has not defeated it. The troubling thoughts arise again, and the desires return. So he is constantly in a situation somewhat like that of the reshaim: “For this is accomplished by tzaddikim.” Eliminating it entirely belongs to the avodah of tzaddikim. That is not your mission. That is not what you were born for. So “You created reshaim” refers to the state of the soul. Given the state of his soul, he constantly faces

06:35 struggles and desires. In that particular respect he is called a rasha—not, G-d forbid, because he is one in practice. He has that inner condition, that struggle that reshaim have. But what does he actually do? Just the opposite: he fights those impulses and practices iskafya. Yet even after he practices iskafya, they come back. That is what Iyov meant when he said, “You created reshaim.” So what does the Alter Rebbe add here in chapter 27 that he had not already said in chapter 14? What is new in this explanation compared with what the Alter Rebbe said earlier? Earlier, what was the explanation? Why do we apply “You created reshaim” to the beinoni, in the phrase “You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim”? Why is the beinoni called a rasha? It was explained that “tzaddikim” and “reshaim” refer to the essential nature of the soul. As for the soul’s garments—look, the beinoni’s thought, speech, and action are as they should be. When we speak of “You created tzaddikim, and You created reshaim,” we are speaking about the soul’s essential nature. That was explained in chapter 13. In terms of the soul’s essential nature, the tzaddik’s soul has already been transformed to good. Yes, he despises evil and loves Hakadosh Boruch Hu completely; his soul, too, has been transformed to good. The beinoni, by contrast, has the soul of a rasha, because the essential nature of his soul has not yet been transformed. That was the point discussed in chapter 13. There was another point in chapter 13 as well: the Alter Rebbe gave another reason he is called “like a rasha,” as in “Consider yourself like a rasha”—a reason relating even to the garments. It is true that the beinoni’s garments—thought, speech, and action—are in perfect order. But why are his thought, speech, and action in perfect order? Not because he himself has truly been transformed to good, but because

08:42 That Hakadosh Boruch Hu helped him. This is what the Alter Rebbe explains in chapter 13: a beinoni needs help from Heaven. If Hakadosh Boruch Hu did not help him, he could not overcome it. That help and assistance from above—the Divine power, the Divine light—is what gives him strength. So both in terms of his inner state, he is called “like a rasha,” because he still has a yetzer hara, and in terms of his thought, speech, and action, because he has not inherently ruled it out; rather, Hakadosh Boruch Hu helps him. That is why he is called “like a rasha.” This was explained in chapter 13. What the Alter Rebbe adds here is why he is called a rasha also in terms of the struggle: “like the conduct of the wicked.” It is not only about the inner state we are discussing here, but also about the struggle. He is constantly in a state like that of the rasha: the rasha is constantly at war, and he too is constantly at war. That struggle is called “like the conduct of the wicked.” The wicked have a struggle, and he has a struggle. The difference is that the rasha does not win; he falls in the struggle. The beinoni, in practice, does not give in. But the struggle itself—that is the point he adds here to what he said earlier. The Alter Rebbe says: “And there are two kinds of satisfaction before Him Above.” So what follows from this? There is something wonderful specifically about the service of beinonim. That is what the Alter Rebbe has said here: there is something wonderful specifically about the service of beinonim, the service of iskafya. We say that Hakadosh Boruch Hu derives greater satisfaction from iskafya, and that it is specifically through iskafya that the kelipos are broken and the light of Ein Sof is drawn down in a way it is not drawn down through anything else, not even through ishapcha. On the other hand, we speak of the service of tzaddikim. What exactly is the difference

10:40 between the service of beinonim and the service of tzaddikim? On the one hand, we say that there is a particular advantage in the beinoni. On the other hand, we also said that a person must strive to become a tzaddik. That is why we explained the Alter Rebbe’s wording: he should not be deeply distressed, but he should be somewhat distressed. Why? Because, in practice, he is made to swear, “Be a tzaddik.” So a person does need to try to reach the level of a tzaddik. How do we understand this? The Alter Rebbe now comes to explain: “And there are two kinds of satisfaction before Him Above.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu has two kinds of satisfaction, from the service of beinonim and from the service of tzaddikim. Broadly speaking, these are the service of iskafya and the service of ishapcha—two different kinds of satisfaction. What is the difference? “One is from the complete nullification of the sitra achra, and the transformation of bitterness to sweetness and darkness to light, through the tzaddikim.” In the service of tzaddikim, Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s satisfaction does not come from the struggle, from iskafya. On the contrary, it comes from the nullification of the sitra achra, when the sitra achra is completely nullified. That is what the service of the beinoni accomplishes—the tzaddik, sorry. He completely nullifies the sitra achra, to the point that there is “a transformation of bitterness to sweetness and darkness to light, through the tzaddikim.” What does that mean? What do we say about the service of tzaddikim? A tzaddik reaches a love for Hakadosh Boruch Hu that is utterly complete. His love for Hakadosh Boruch Hu is so strong that it leaves no room at all for the animal soul. No room remains; it is completely nullified. And then we spoke of something more. If you remember chapter 9, the Alter Rebbe explained that in the service of tzaddikim there is love like flames of fire, and there is love of delights. First there is love like flames of fire: his love grows like a fire, an ever-greater thirst,

12:46 until, as the Alter Rebbe said there, the feeling of love is so full and overflowing that it spills over entirely to the animal soul as well. Those are the flames of fire, the nullification of the sitra achra. In other words, no part of his body or soul remains that his love for Hakadosh Boruch Hu does not reach. After that, the Alter Rebbe says, he rises and reaches an even higher level: love of delights. What is love of delights? It is not only that the sitra achra is nullified; it is also transformed. That is the difference between love like flames of fire and love of delights. Love like flames of fire burns the animal soul, nullifies it, breaks it. Fire, quite simply, is a means of breaking, nullifying, negating. But when he reaches love of delights—the tzaddik rises and reaches the level of love of delights—then the sitra achra is not only nullified; it is transformed. These are the levels of turning darkness into light and bitterness into sweetness through the tzaddikim. And Hakadosh Boruch Hu derives a particular satisfaction from the nullification of the sitra achra, all the way to its transformation. But there is another kind of satisfaction, the one we are discussing here in Tanya for the beinoni, the second kind. There is another kind of satisfaction: “When the sitra achra is subdued while it is still in its full strength and might.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu derives a particular satisfaction that has nothing to do with nullifying or negating the sitra achra. On the contrary, Hakadosh Boruch Hu derives particular satisfaction when the sitra achra is in its full strength and might, remains in its full strength and might, and while it is still in that state, one breaks its hold. For “when the sitra achra is subdued while it is still in its full strength and might, and it raises itself like an eagle, Hashem brings it down from there through an awakening from below, by means of the beinoni.” So what is the Alter Rebbe teaching us here? A wonderful new insight, a central point in this chapter, in the passage the Alter Rebbe is explaining

14:54 here. Until now, we thought of reaching the level of a beinoni as a path to a destination, a direction. There is one goal: nullifying the sitra achra, ishapcha. That is the goal. The beinoni is on the road, on the way. Ultimately, Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s satisfaction comes when the sitra achra is finished. Its nullification is the greatest satisfaction: the superiority of light that comes from darkness, and so on. That is what Hakadosh Boruch Hu is waiting for—the complete nullification of the sitra achra, darkness transformed into light. The beinoni has not reached the end; he is in the middle, so Hakadosh Boruch Hu derives satisfaction from that too. It is somewhat like the expression in a sicha of Reb Yehoshua[?] concerning the Tzemach Tzedek: “What difference does it make to me whether he kills all of it or half of it?” Sometimes the matter is explained that way. In other words, the beinoni has not killed all of it; he has killed half of it. But killing half of it is also something. “What difference does it make to me whether he kills all of it or half of it?” Killing half of it is also a goal. The Tzemach Tzedek already said [unclear] that killing half of it is also something. So I am saying that, simply put, he has killed half of it. He has not finished, but that too is something. Hakadosh Boruch Hu enjoys that too. The Alter Rebbe comes to rule out that understanding here. The Alter Rebbe says: No, there is something distinctive here. There is a particular satisfaction in the service of tzaddikim, and a particular satisfaction specifically in the service of the beinoni. In the service of beinonim, on the contrary, Hakadosh Boruch Hu has a special delight when the sitra achra is in its full strength and might, and nevertheless you break its hold—you practice iskafya. For Hakadosh Boruch Hu, that is something especially significant: a particular satisfaction, a particular delight. In the Basi Legani maamarim, the Rebbe emphasizes this point very strongly. There is also

17:03 In particular, this brings us to the theme of the day: the avodah of netzach—victory. Right? In Basi Legani, the Rebbe speaks about netzach. We can already say that we’re in—yes, this is netzach shebenetzach, something special. So this subject is explained in Basi Legani: the avodah of netzach. The whole foundation of Basi Legani begins with the chapter we just studied, chapter 11 of the Frierdiker Rebbe’s Yud Shvat maamar, which the Rebbe discussed in the 5711 maamar of Basi Legani. The Frierdiker Rebbe begins explaining there, and the Rebbe expands on the whole idea, that there is a special quality to the attribute of netzach: winning the war opens the treasuries and brings about the boundless spending of their treasures, and so on. In one of the maamarim, the Rebbe explains that the primary expression of netzach is specifically in the avodah of beinonim, not in the avodah of tzaddikim. In the maamar of 5721—those who studied it this year saw that there is a discussion there, and it isn’t clear. Not in the Shabbos maamar; in the Motzaei Shabbos maamar there is a bit of a contradiction between the two maamarim. It isn’t entirely clear. But there is the edited maamar, the maamar of 5727, where the Rebbe returns to this whole subject. There the Rebbe says explicitly that the primary expression of netzach, for which the treasures are spent, is specifically the netzach in the avodah of beinonim: when a person is in the midst of a battle, while it is still at full strength and power, and he wins. That is the main thing; that is the greatest delight, the satisfaction that comes specifically from iskafya. The Rebbe says explicitly there that ishapcha has its own advantage, its own perfection, its own great purpose. Still, the spending of the treasures is specifically for this matter of— the Rebbe quotes the Alter Rebbe’s words here: “to bring down the sitra achra while it is still at full strength and power.” Specifically in this, in the movement of iskafya, there

19:05 is the primary expression of netzach in the soul. And that is why it is specifically here that we find this spending of the treasures, which does not occur in any other form of avodah. In other words, iskafya has an advantage over ishapcha. This is also what the Alter Rebbe goes on to say here: “And this is the meaning of the verse, ‘Make me delicacies such as I love.’” “Delicacies” is plural. There are two kinds of satisfaction, two kinds of delicacies. This is what the Shechinah says to her children, the Jewish people as a whole, as explained in Tikkunei Zohar. The Zohar explains that when Yitzchak said to Yaakov, “Make me delicacies,” he was asking him for food, right? The Zohar says that this verse is actually about the Shechinah asking the Jewish people. Yaakov, after all, represents Knesses Yisroel, the collective souls of the Jewish people. And Yitzchak’s request to Yaakov, “Make me delicacies,” is the Shechinah’s request of Knesses Yisroel: during exile, in our service of Hashem, we must make delicacies. “Delicacies” is plural; there are two kinds. Just as with physical delicacies there are two kinds of treats—one made from pleasant, sweet foods, and the other from sharp and sour things, which are seasoned and prepared so well that they become delicacies that refresh the soul—so too there are two kinds of delight. The delight from the avodah of tzaddikim, ishapcha, is like pleasant, sweet foods. The delight from the avodah of beinonim is like sharp and sour foods that come to refresh the soul, which is the idea of iskafya. Here too you can see an allusion to iskafya, because the Alter Rebbe adds the words “to refresh the soul.” Where do we speak of refreshing the soul? Specifically with sour delicacies. In other words, iskafya has an advantage over ishapcha. With Hashem’s help, we’ll explain this further in the next class.