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Lichyos Chassidus – Tanya – Rabbi Farkash · Episode 78 · 11 Elul 5780 · 14:55

Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 30 - Part 4

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Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 30 - Part 4

Machine translation into English of the automatic Hebrew transcript.

00:00 Speaker 1 Matters of “do good.” A person needs to weigh and examine himself to see the particular way his yetzer operates in the area of “do good,” which is where the main challenges of a beinoni lie. That includes davening with all one’s heart, doing acts of kindness, and learning not just a little more than usual, but much more than usual. So, to round out the picture, I’m bringing here a few examples the Rebbe gives of doing good. Later, the Rebbe also gives examples of “turn away from evil.” Because even when it comes to turning away from evil—generally speaking, the difference between a beinoni and a rasha is in turning away from evil, while doing good concerns positive action. But the Rebbe explains that, as far as Hashem’s will is concerned, “turn away from evil” and “do good” are the same. Then you’ll see that he goes on to say that even in turning away from evil, a person can find matters that are seemingly within the beinoni’s permitted sphere, and here too there needs to be an enormous struggle. He gives examples of things within that sphere for which a person can find all sorts of justifications, and the beinoni is not careful about them because he lacks that struggle. What example does the Rebbe explain? He gives the example of stopping in the middle of a pleasant conversation—stopping in the middle of a pleasant conversation and a story that reflects badly on someone else. He adds that this is so even if the criticism is very slight, even if it is true, and even if one says it to clear oneself. In other words, there are three aspects here that might seem to justify saying it. First, it’s a very slight criticism that won’t upset the other person. It’s not something that would make him say, “You’re talking about me,” because it’s so insignificant that nobody minds your saying it. It’s a very slight criticism. And the

02:08 Speaker 1 second thing is that it’s true. The third is that he says it to clear himself. What does it mean to clear himself? He brings the example of what Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbeinu Hakadosh. Rabbi Shimon said to his father, Rabbeinu Hakadosh, about the get, the folded get: “I didn’t write it. Yehuda Chayata wrote it.” So what did Rabbeinu Hakadosh say? Rabbi Shimon—yes. So what did we explain here? What happened there was that Rabbi Shimon, the son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, brought the get, and Rabbi Yehuda saw it. The get was completely valid; he just didn’t like the particular way it had been made. So he asked, “Who wrote this?” And Rabbi Shimon said, “I didn’t write it. Yehuda Chayata wrote it.” Now, what happened there? The get was kosher, and there was no problem with it at all. On the contrary, saying this didn’t cause Yehuda Chayata any trouble. Nobody thought that because of this Yehuda Chayata was no longer a scribe. Yehuda Chayata remained the writer of the get; everything was fine. It was just not the kind of get Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi liked; he didn’t want a get made that way. So it was a very slight criticism. Second, it was also true. And third, it was true that Rabbi Shimon hadn’t written it; the other person had. Most importantly, this wasn’t a serious matter. Did he say it because he wanted to inform on Yehuda Chayata? If he had said it because he wanted to say something bad about Yehuda Chayata, that really would be considered

03:53 Speaker 1 lashon hara. But that wasn’t his intention at all. His intention was to clear himself. There is an obligation to revere one’s father and mother. So when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi told him that he didn’t like the way this get had been written, Rabbi Shimon wanted to clear himself. He said that someone else had written it. Of course, if it had been something more

08:15 Speaker 2 The matter of honoring his parents was that he cleared himself. Nevertheless, his father told him, “Keep away from lashon hara.” It would have been enough to say, “I didn’t write it.” Ah, you’re worried whether he’ll believe you or not. Fine, that’s the negative force. But as far as clearing yourself is concerned, and with all your concern for honoring your parents, you should have said only, “I didn’t write it,” without adding that another person did. That’s it. So we also see this from the fact that it was a son speaking to his father. There’s another interesting point as well—I don’t remember where I saw it many years ago, and I couldn’t find it now. The Rebbe once focused on the wording “Rabbeinu Hakadosh.” It doesn’t say “Rabbeinu HaNasi,” but “Rabbeinu Hakadosh.” That too is precise. In Tanya, there are a number of such expressions. Sometimes we read how the Rebbe focuses on the wording “Rabbeinu Hakadosh”: it shows that he is “Rabbeinu”—a rebbe who belongs to all of the Jewish people. If it had said, “Rabbi Shimon said to his father, Rabbeinu HaNasi,” that would be a private matter. Rabbeinu HaNasi was Rabbeinu HaNasi, a great rabbi and an exceptional person. But “Rabbeinu Hakadosh” emphasizes “Rabbeinu”: a rebbe is a teacher. A rebbe teaches all of the Jewish people how to conduct themselves. So it says “Rabbeinu Hakadosh,” because this is something that applies to everyone. These are points that—I’ve already discussed this. In any case, this is another point the Rebbe notes in Tanya. What else do we see from it? How precise every word of Tanya is. The Rebbe focuses on the wording in Tanya. Look inside. The Rebbe says “even”—do you have a Tanya? It’s written above, all right, around the sixth line. The Rebbe says: “And even in the category of ‘turn away from evil,’ every discerning person can find within himself that he does not turn away from evil completely, in every possible respect.”

10:16 Speaker 2 “In every possible respect.” What this means is that even if a person examines himself intellectually, calmly and thoughtfully, he’ll see that even in turning away from evil he isn’t yet one hundred percent there. Even in that area, there are still matters that prevent it from being complete in every possible respect. Why couldn’t the Rebbe just say “completely”? Why use this sort of expression, “in every possible respect”? It’s a beautiful expression, yes, and the young men here have learned Bava Basra. Right? Do you recognize it from Bava Basra? Have you learned it yet in Bava Basra? English. You haven’t learned the English of Bava Basra either. What did you learn? In any case, this expression appears in the Gemara in Bava Basra. Where does the expression “bakol, mikol, kol” appear? There in Bava Basra, where it speaks about [unclear]. It’s certainly a beautiful expression that conveys completeness. But why does the Rebbe need a literary expression? Tanya doesn’t need flowery language or a phrase like that. Why does the Rebbe write “bakol, mikol, kol”? The Rebbe offers a wonderful insight. The Gemara in Bava Basra gives the source of this expression, “bakol, mikol, kol.” The Gemara brings three proofs from Scripture that the Patriarchs merited a foretaste of the World to Come, and derives this from the verses containing “bakol, mikol, kol.” Of Avraham it says, “And Hashem blessed Avraham with everything.” “And Avraham was old, advanced in years, and Hashem blessed Avraham with everything.” Of Yitzchak it says, “And I ate of everything.” You know how it goes. And then—no, “The voice is the voice of Yaakov.” In any case, then there’s the verse about Yaakov. Of Yaakov it says, “I have everything.” So there are these—these—these expressions, all of them in there. In other words, it

12:30 Speaker 2 This refers to the forefathers, right, Yankel? So the Rebbe points out that the wording is precise: the Rebbe brings the phrase “in everything, with everything, and through everything” here because serving Hashem completely, in an all-encompassing way, is connected with the middos. There are three middos: Avraham represents love, which is chessed. Yitzchak represents awe, which is gevurah. And Yaakov represents truth, which is tiferes. Those are the particulars—the three middos that make up completeness in serving Hashem. In this world, these three also exist in kelipah: misplaced love, misplaced fear, and other undesirable things, and misplaced compassion. In other words, these three aspects also have a manifestation in kelipah. So the three examples the Rebbe gives next correspond to these three middos. Stopping in the middle of a pleasant conversation. What is a pleasant conversation? “Pleasant” is connected with love. It means talking about trivial things, bits and pieces of conversation. That is a form of love belonging to kelipah, and it corresponds to Avraham in this world. Speaking disparagingly about a friend: disparagement is connected with gevurah. Something forceful and negative belongs to the middah of—of gevurah, corresponding to Yitzchak. Then there is “telling a lie.” A lie relates to truth, and truth is Yaakov—except that here it is in this world, where the truth is not ours. So because the Rebbe gives three examples from this world, he also uses language that refers to the middos: “in everything, with everything, and through everything.” That is the point the Rebbe makes there about the Tanya: every word in Tanya is precise in the extreme. The Alter Rebbe continues: “My colleagues, the students of Tosafos.” Beyond this, one can find all sorts of these seemingly minor things that people do not notice—subtle things, like the “dust” of lashon hara. Dust: there are matters that fall into the category of “dust.” In other words, these are very real things. One can find all sorts of such things that a person encounters. “And also regarding ‘Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you.’”

15:02 Speaker 2 “And also regarding ‘Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you.’” Here the Alter Rebbe introduces something new, which was not included in the earlier discussion: permitted things. There is a special avodah connected with “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you.” Until now we were talking about forbidden things—perhaps not outright prohibitions, but subtle prohibitions that a person can stumble over. Here the Alter Rebbe begins discussing permitted things. But even with permitted things there is a requirement, the avodah of “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you,” and here too a beinoni can always find areas in which he has not been careful enough. “For ‘Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you’ is a Torah-level obligation.” So there is a particular gravity to it. On the one hand, it is harder to notice: because the thing is permitted, it is very easy to fool yourself into thinking it does not apply to you. A person can easily stumble in these matters precisely because the thing itself is permitted. On the other hand, the requirement to sanctify oneself with regard to permitted things is a Torah-level obligation, as it says, “You shall be holy,” and so forth, and “You shall sanctify yourselves,” and so forth. Those are two verses, one in Parshas Kedoshim and one in Parshas Emor, I think. From them we learn the requirement to sanctify oneself with regard to permitted things. It is a Torah-level obligation, “and the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah,” and so forth. Even if it were not a Torah-level obligation, even if it were rabbinic, a rabbinic requirement is also, in a certain respect, more stringent than the words of the Torah. We know that the Gemara says in several places that the words of the Sages are more stringent than the words of the Torah. So what is the Rebbe establishing here? On the

17:01 Speaker 2 one hand, he says it is a Torah-level obligation, and then he says that the words of the Sages are more stringent. What? What? What happened? Why does he seem to go back and forth? This is connected with a dispute among the halachic authorities. There is a dispute among the Rishonim as to whether “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you” is a Torah-level obligation or a rabbinic one: a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban. The Rambam did not include “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you” among the 613 mitzvos. It is not there. The Rambam does not count it [unclear]; he regards it as a general principle. The Rambam has a rule that a general mitzvah is not counted among the 613 mitzvos, and so forth. The Ramban disagrees. He writes that this too is a mitzvah. What is the specific mitzvah? “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you.” There is a passage by the Ramban on this, and anyone can look at it and learn it. It is at the beginning of Parshas Kedoshim, where the Ramban explains at length how a person can become “depraved within the bounds of the Torah.” He can be depraved—what do you call it in Yiddish? [unclear]—live like an animal, indulge in excesses, all within the bounds of the Torah. Everything suits his reasoning: this tastes good, and all of that; this is kosher, this is proper, and so on. But within the bounds of the Torah, he is depraved. Depraved within the bounds of the Torah. That is the point of “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you.” The Ramban says it is indeed a Torah-level obligation. That is also the meaning in Tanya. First the Alter Rebbe writes that “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you” is a Torah-level obligation, following the Ramban and those who hold that view. Then he adds “the words of the Sages”: even if we follow the Rambam, Sefer HaChinuch, and other authorities who hold that it is rabbinic, the words of the Sages are more stringent, and so forth. All these are examples

19:00 Speaker 2 that the Rebbe gives here of things in which even a beinoni needs to battle his impulses. “All these, and many others like them, are among the sins that a person treads on with his heels.” But what happens? A person does not attach importance to such transgressions. Why not? Because he treads on them with his heels. There is a category called “sins that a person treads on with his heels.” In other words, there are transgressions that a person treats lightly, dismisses. “Treads on with his heels” means he tramples on them. He does not value them or consider them important. And they also “come to seem permitted because he transgressed and repeated it,” and so forth. There are two problems here. The first is that these are seemingly minor things that people dismiss. “Treads on with his heels”: I dismiss them. I do not give them their proper weight because I think they are not so bad. There is a second problem: after a person does one of these things, commits a transgression, the first time it hurts him; it bothers him. Once he has done it, though, the second or third time he no longer feels how bad it is. What did I do, after all? That is the biggest problem. The Gemara says, “Once a person commits a transgression and repeats it, it becomes to him as though it were permitted.” The Gemara says, “It becomes to him as though it were permitted.” What does that mean? If I commit a transgression once, that is it—it becomes permitted? The Gemara says it becomes to him as though it were permitted. G-d forbid. Then there is a second time, a third time, and each time it is the same. But for the person, once he has transgressed a first and second time—at first he thought that if he committed this transgression after

21:03 Speaker 2 He thinks Heaven will give him some kind of punishment. He did it once and saw that nothing happened. So the second time, he just moves on, and that’s that. This can happen for those reasons: either because he didn’t take it seriously to begin with—the person doesn’t give it its true weight; everyone does it—or, on the other hand, because he’s done it once or twice and it no longer feels like such a big deal. They tell an interesting story. There was once one of the leaders in Poland, [unclear]. In Poland there was a Jew whom people called Yitzchak Schwartz—Yitzchak the Black. That’s what they called him. That’s what they called him. [unclear] Once a Jew, a rabbi, came to this leader and said, “Yitzchak Schwartz told me such and such.” He quoted something in his name. The leader looked at him and said, “One who calls another person by a derogatory name has no share in the World to Come.” Someone who gives another person a derogatory nickname has no share in the World to Come. So he said, “But half of Poland calls him Yitzchak Schwartz!” The leader replied, “There’s room in Gehinnom for half of Poland too, not just for me.” Yes. In other words, the fact that everyone calls him that doesn’t make it any less serious. And by the way, while we’re on the subject, here in Argentina there’s a problem with giving people nicknames. Names like Flaco, Gordo, Alto, Bajo, Negro, Blanco. People take this very lightly from the outset. They give boys and other people these names, and there are other names too. I won’t mention them here so as not to bring them up. Everyone knows

23:14 Speaker 2 what I mean. This is very serious. There is an explicit warning about it. [unclear] writes about the severe things the Gemara says concerning it, and we need to be very careful. “But everyone does it!” Not everyone—and even if they did, there’s room for everyone there. That’s what we were saying. Yes, so we need to be careful about these things too. That’s the point. There’s a question the Rebbe asks: Why does the Alter Rebbe bring both “You shall be holy” and “You shall sanctify yourselves” here? He brings two passages from the Gemara. Why bring both? In Orach Chaim, the principal ruling cites only one verse. In the ruling in Orach Chaim, [unclear] raises the question of doubt. He cites only the verse “And you shall sanctify yourselves.” And another thing: on the contrary, in the ruling in Orach Chaim he doesn’t say that. He presents it as something obvious, because there’s no doubt that it’s a question of doubt. He says it’s obvious, a matter of appearance. The principal ruling in Orach Chaim also brings the second question; they said this specifically about Yosef too. What accounts for this difference? With Hashem’s help.