Likkutei Amarim Tanya - Chapter 6 - Part 2

00:00 We’re here in Tanya, in the middle of chapter 6, on page 10b, page twenty. We’re holding in the middle of the page, where there’s a period here. Since this is the middle of the chapter, we’ll briefly review what the Alter Rebbe has explained from the beginning of chapter 6 up to this point. In the preceding four chapters—2, 3, 4, and 5—the Alter Rebbe discussed the nature of the G-dly soul and everything connected with it. He explained what the G-dly soul is, what its faculties are—the ten sefiros, the soul’s ten faculties. Then he came to the garments of the G-dly soul and explained how it fulfills its purpose: to be connected with G-dliness through observing mitzvos. He also discussed the greatness of Torah and mitzvos, and so on. That was in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. In chapter 6, the Alter Rebbe began to explain the other side, what is called the animal soul. “G-d made one corresponding to the other.” So just as there is a G-dly soul, there is an animal soul; and just as the G-dly soul is composed—what’s the word?—of ten faculties, ten faculties of the soul, and three garments, the animal soul is composed the same way. “G-d made one corresponding to the other.” It, too, is composed of ten faculties and three garments. We spoke at length about the differences in wording, which reflect differences in content. But in any case, the point is that the animal soul, too, has intellect and emotional attributes. The difference is that in one, the emotional attributes are primary, while in the other, the intellect is primary, and so on. But the point is that the animal soul, too, has ten faculties of the soul, as well as the soul’s garments. Now, we discussed what falls under that opposing side: both forbidden things and permitted things that are not for the sake of Heaven. All of that is included in the animal soul, which

02:48 we said in chapter 1 of Tanya receives its life from the sitra achra. Yes, “one soul originates in kelipah and sitra achra.” The Alter Rebbe says that the animal soul receives its life from the sitra achra. What is sitra achra? Usually—without studying Chassidus—we understand the term sitra achra to mean impurity. We call the evil side sitra achra. Things that are evil, things that are impure, are called sitra achra: things that are not good, things that are bad. That is the understanding the Alter Rebbe comes to rule out here. He introduces a new understanding and says, “The meaning is...” The Alter Rebbe explains the meaning of sitra achra: it is “the other side,” which is not the side of holiness. In other words, how do we define sitra achra? It is something that is not holiness. Put differently, the Alter Rebbe is telling us that sitra achra has no name of its own. It has no name, no name of its own. We want—I want to define what sitra achra is. I want to define the side that stands opposite holiness. But I have no name for it. I call it “the other side,” sitra achra. Why doesn’t it have a name? Call it something! Call it evil; call it impurity. Call it something. No. [unclear] It’s called sitra achra. That’s its name: “the other side.” Why? Because sitra achra really has no definition of its own. Sitra achra means anything that is not holiness. Anything that is not clearly, unequivocally holy—whatever it may be—is sitra achra,

04:52 the other side. What’s new about this? It is a tremendous insight. We explained it before, but many of the boys were absent when we learned this passage in the Tanya class. That was back in Shvat. We were talking about the Rebbe, and there were campaigns and all sorts of things. But the essential point is this: without studying Chassidus at all, a person thinks of everything as falling into three categories. There are mitzvos, there are things from which we must “turn away from evil,” and there are permitted things. There are things we’re obligated to do—mitzvos. There are forbidden things, and then there are all the permitted things. Usually, those are the three categories. What we’re obligated to do, a mitzvah, is holiness. Forbidden things, things that Hakadosh Boruch Hu forbids—“fear of Hashem is hatred of evil,” “turn away from evil”—are kelipah, impurity. And permitted things are simply permitted; they fall into the category of the permissible. So without studying Chassidus, without understanding what the Alter Rebbe is teaching us here, when we say sitra achra, we mean the things we must turn away from, things that are outright evil. That’s what I call sitra achra. That’s sitra achra. It’s written; it’s kelipah, it’s “turn away from evil,” it’s in the teachings of our Sages. [unclear] All kinds of things that are outright evil—that is called sitra achra. But then there’s this whole category of permitted things. So many things are permitted: food that is kosher according to halachah, games, trips, idle talk. Among permitted things, there are all kinds of activities that are neither things we must turn away from nor mitzvos. They’re in the permitted category. So they aren’t evil, they aren’t impure, they aren’t repulsive. But that is what the Alter Rebbe explains here is not the case. He comes to explain that there aren’t three categories; there are only two. That is the great insight of the entire Tanya. The Alter Rebbe returns to this several

06:58 times. There is holiness, and anything that is not holiness is impurity, sitra achra. It is the other side, the opposite side. It may be something that is, in itself, permitted by the Torah; the Torah does not forbid it. But if it is not part of serving Hashem, if it is not connected with Hakadosh Boruch Hu, it is not holiness or G-dliness. Then it is sitra achra, the other side. Why is that so? Why? What’s wrong with it? It’s permitted. Of course the Torah doesn’t forbid it. So why? Why would I say it’s called sitra achra? Why is a permitted thing sitra achra? The Torah doesn’t forbid it. You’re allowed to eat it, allowed to play; it’s permitted. Why is it called sitra achra? The Alter Rebbe explains that holiness means bittul to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. The side of holiness means anything that is nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That is what holiness means. Holiness is bittul. There is nothing apart from Him. Holiness means bittul, bittul to G-dliness. Anything that is nullified to Him, blessed be He, is holiness. Holiness means that Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present there. That is what holiness means: Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present there. Here, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present.

08:15 Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present where there is bittul. Where there is no bittul, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is not present. “Hakadosh Boruch Hu rests only upon that which is nullified to Him, blessed be He.” Holiness is bittul. Why? Because Hakadosh Boruch Hu—what is Hakadosh Boruch Hu? “There is nothing else besides Him.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu: “There is nothing else besides Me.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu is everything. There’s a well-known story that the Rebbe Maharash was asked as a child—I don’t remember who asked him—what Hakadosh Boruch Hu is. So he said that Hakadosh Boruch Hu means that He is—well, does someone here remember the wording? Everything. Well? Apart from Him, absolutely nothing; He is everything. What I mean is, the point was that Hakadosh Boruch Hu means He is everything, and apart from Him there is nothing at all. That was it. But he used some very powerful words. I can’t remember them right now. Yes. In other words, G-dliness means that He is everything and there is nothing else besides Him. That is what G-dliness means. There is nothing apart from Him. So something that reveals this, something that expresses the point, that cries out, “There is nothing else besides Him,” something that is nullified—that is holiness. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present there, so it is holiness. Something that is not nullified, that asserts itself as an independent existence—Hakadosh Boruch Hu is not present there. And that is what the Alter Rebbe is saying here. Therefore, even if something is permitted, if it is not connected with G-dliness, it is not nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. He eats. Why does he eat? Because he likes eating, because of the pleasure of eating. He plays because of the pleasure of playing. In other words, he does not connect it with G-dliness, so it is not G-dliness. It is not bittul. Therefore, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is not present there.

10:12 Hakadosh Boruch Hu is not there. So that is a contradiction. This is really the central point of all Chassidus. It is the foundation of everything. Yes, the foundation of everything in Chassidus: Hakadosh Boruch Hu means “there is nothing besides Him.” Something that is not nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, that exists independently, is a contradiction. That is the point. [unclear] That is why the Alter Rebbe says that specifically angels, who are nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and likewise every Jew, who is nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, have this quality of bittul. The Alter Rebbe said something here before this point, and it leads directly into what follows. We need to read it. I’ll read it inside. Take a look. Do you have a Tanya? It’s really worth having a written copy of Tanya. This isn’t... You need a Tanya so you can look inside. You’re not listening to a lecture here. Everyone needs a Tanya to look inside, or at least one for every two people. But look inside the Tanya. I’ll read what the Alter Rebbe says again, so we can get to what follows. “And Hakadosh Boruch Hu rests only upon something that is nullified to Him, blessed be He—whether in actual practice, like the supernal angels.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu reveals Himself. Holiness means the resting of the Shechinah. Where does Hakadosh Boruch Hu reveal Himself? Only upon something that is nullified. “Whether in actual practice, like the supernal angels, or in potential, like every Jew below, who has the capacity to be utterly nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu by giving his life for the sanctification of Hashem’s name.” For the Shechinah to rest—for holiness to rest, which means the resting of the Shechinah—there has to be bittul. What kind of bittul? He says that with angels, it is bittul in actual practice. Angels are nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu in actual practice. They feel the Divine life-force and nullify themselves to Hakadosh Boruch Hu

12:14 in actual practice by singing praise and standing in a state of bittul all the time. They bow in awe; in holiness and awe, they are nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu in actual practice. Because of that, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present among the angels. Their bittul is actual bittul. That is why we say in davening, “You alone are Hashem. You made them, and You give life to them all, and the host of heaven bows down to You.” For the host of heaven, “You give life to them all”—that Hakadosh Boruch Hu gives life to everything—is revealed. But who is actually nullified? The angels, the host of heaven, “bow down” in actual practice, because they feel this bittul. So for them, bittul is actual. When he comes to a Jew, the Alter Rebbe says that in actual practice, the Jew is not necessarily nullified. There are Jews who are, and Jews who are not, nullified in actual practice. “In actual practice” means in the physical body, as expressed in thought and action. So a Jew is not nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu twenty-four hours a day like an angel. But a Jew has it in potential. “Or in potential, like every Jew below, who has the capacity to be utterly nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu.” What does that mean? Since a Jew has the potential to be nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, does Hakadosh Boruch Hu therefore rest upon him? He has the potential to be nullified; if he wants to, he will be. So what? Anything could become nullified if it wanted to. What does that mean? Because he has the possibility of becoming nullified, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present within him? If a non-Jew—if a non-Jew works on himself to become nullified, would that apply to him too? What does it mean that a Jew has the capacity to be nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu? What is the point here? So it is clear that this is not what the text means. “In potential” does not mean simply that it is possible, that he has the ability and, if he wants to, he will become nullified. “In potential”

14:13 means that he has this quality within him. In other words, on a subtle level, it is present within him. Here, “in potential” does not mean a matter of [unclear]; it means that there is a faculty in the soul. A Jew has this faculty in his soul, a faculty that is within him all the time. There is a place in his soul where he has this bittul. It is not necessarily expressed in actual practice, but a Jew inherently—as we understand from the maamar—has this point of the essence of the soul. A Jew inherently has a connection to G-dliness; he has a part of G-dliness, and he has bittul to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. It is within him. What happens, then? Some reveal it in actual practice, while at times a spirit of folly covers it over. But “in potential” means that inwardly he has this quality. Deep down he has this bittul, whether because “his mazal sees” or because of the essence of the soul, as he explains there in the maamar. He has it in potential, and therefore, because of this point, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is present within him all the time. The Shechinah is present in potential. Of course, he needs to bring it out in actual practice for it to be present in actual practice. But for a Jew, because he inherently has this bittul in potential, he consequently has the Shechinah. Now the Alter Rebbe continues: on this basis, we can explain several more things. According to this explanation—now look inside. He says: “And it was not for nothing that our Sages said that even one person who sits and studies Torah has the Shechinah resting upon him.” This is what our Sages say: when one Jew sits and studies Torah, the Shechinah rests upon him. One Jew sits and studies Torah, and he has the Shechinah. What

16:11 is the explanation for this? There is a Mishnah that speaks of ten people sitting and engaging in Torah, five, even two, and even one. What is the question? It is a novelty that even when just one Jew sits and studies Torah—there is only one person there—we still say that the Shechinah rests upon him. So the Alter Rebbe explains that when a Jew studies Torah, the resting of the Shechinah is a result of his having this bittul in potential. In other words, say a non-Jew studies Torah. What happens when a non-Jew studies Torah? Nothing happens. His Torah study will not bring about the resting of the Shechinah upon him. It is specifically when a Jew studies Torah that the Shechinah rests upon him. Why? As we explained earlier, a Jew inherently has bittul to G-dliness by virtue of his soul. He has this bittul; he has the capacity for mesirus nefesh. It may not be expressed in actual practice; it may remain concealed, only in potential. So when he sits and engages in Torah, that means he is nullifying himself in actual practice. He is studying Torah. What does it mean to study Torah? He wants to know what it says; he wants to learn Torah. A Torah scholar is someone who wants to know what Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants. He sits and learns. He studies a page of Gemara, Mesillas Yesharim, Shulchan Aruch. What does a Torah scholar’s study mean? He wants to know what Hakadosh Boruch Hu says. He is nullified, so he nullifies himself in actual practice. Consequently, the Shechinah rests upon him, because a Jew inherently has the capacity for mesirus nefesh. By virtue of his soul, he has bittul to Hakadosh Boruch Hu.

17:52 So when he actually studies Torah, he brings that... he reveals that bittul in practice. More than that, says the Alter Rebbe, “Wherever there are ten, the Shechinah always rests.” The Sages say the same thing: when ten people, ten Jews, are in one place, the Shechinah always rests there. Even if they are not studying Torah. Why? What is the explanation? They aren’t studying Torah. Why should that happen? But there are ten people, and therefore the Shechinah rests there. The Zohar gives the same explanation. A Jew inherently has this bittul. A Jew inherently has bittul to G-dliness in potential, the ability to reach a state of mesirus nefesh. He has this capacity for bittul, so in himself he is a vessel for the Shechinah to rest upon. It’s just that when he is alone, it remains hidden. When ten Jews are in one place, there is an inclusion of ten kinds of Jews. On the basis of this explanation, it would seem that when ten Jews are in one place, the point of yechidah is revealed. When ten Jews are in one place, something new is revealed. The Rebbe also explains this at length in one of the sichos, in connection with the concept of a community. Yes, the concept of a community. What does “community” mean? Kedushah and a community. Why can’t nine people say Kaddish or Kedushah, while ten can say Kedushah? What has changed? Ten people. The point is that ten brings something new. It does not mean that ten individuals have simply been added together. When ten people come together, ten signifies completeness. Ten vessels, ten sefiros—that is completeness. So when ten Jews join together, a new point is revealed. Something new.

19:52 Something beyond the ten, and the aspect of yechidah is revealed as well; it is revealed anew. The Rebbe also explains in one of the sichos that this is why we derive the requirement for a minyan specifically from the spies. We derive the entire concept of ten among the Jewish people from the spies. The spies were described with the words, “How long must I bear with this evil congregation?” A congregation means ten. We learn it from an evil congregation. Why do we derive the whole concept of ten from an evil congregation, from wicked people? Because the fact that ten Jews bring the Shechinah is not dependent on their actual spiritual standing. In practice, they may be wicked. But because ten Jews have come together, something beyond their own state is revealed—the aspect of yechidah. And from the standpoint of yechidah, every Jew is complete. That is how the Rebbe explains it. The Rebbe explains several matters, even in halachah, through this very point. For example, there is a very interesting halachah: on Yom Tov, when people would go up to the Beis Hamikdash, all the vessels there were considered pure. There is such a halachah: on Yom Tov, all amei ha’aretz were presumed pure. They would go up to the Beis Hamikdash and touch various things, and there was no impurity—everything was pure. Why? Because an am ha’aretz is presumed pure during the festival. Afterward, when they went home, the presumption of impurity returned. So much so that it says they would immerse all the vessels after Yom Tov; they would immerse the vessels of the Beis Hamikdash. So what happened? If you trust an am ha’aretz

21:58 then why does it change? Why don’t you trust him after Yom Tov? If you don’t trust an am ha’aretz, why do you say everything is pure on Yom Tov? What is happening here? It needs an explanation. So the Rebbe explains this point about a community in one of the sichos. When the Jews would go up for the festival, something new came into being: a community. In other words, a new entity was formed, with a new nature. It was not simply a large number of individuals. It was a new entity. As a result, the am ha’aretz lost his separate, individual identity. There was now a community with a different nature, and this had a practical effect in halachah as well: the vessels were pure; everything was pure. Once Yom Tov ended, once the festival was over, they became individuals again. The communal entity was gone. Each person returned to his individual status, and if he was an am ha’aretz, he was not relied upon. So even in halachah we see this point: when ten come together, something new is revealed, something beyond their own state. How does the Alter Rebbe explain this? It all connects to the point we made earlier. A Jew inherently has bittul; he has yechidah. It’s just that as long as he is alone, it is not revealed. It is revealed through Torah study or through ten coming together. In other words, there are two ways a Jew can bring this bittul into the open: through studying Torah, or through ten people sitting together and engaging in Torah. Reb Nissan used to say: It says there in Tanya, “Wherever there are ten, the Shechinah always rests.” What does “always” mean? It means even if they

23:37 are not studying Torah. The Alter Rebbe says it more explicitly in Igeres Hakodesh: “Wherever there are ten, the Shechinah rests upon them even if they are not engaged in Torah.” There it is stated more explicitly. So Reb Nissan used to say: What does that mean? How could ten Jews be in one place and not be engaged in Torah? What would they be doing? Now, if you suggest they are engaging in mockery, the Rebbe uses very strong words about that in Igeres Hakodesh: if they speak words of mockery, they drive away the Shechinah and dishonor it there. So Reb Nissan asked: What is meant by “if they are not engaged in Torah”? They aren’t making jokes, they aren’t going off on their own, they aren’t talking, and they aren’t studying Torah. So what are they doing? What is this other possibility, where they are not engaged in Torah? Reb Nissan said that it means a farbrengen. At a farbrengen, people sit together, and they do not always speak words of Torah the whole time. Sometimes they sing, sometimes they talk; sometimes something comes of it, sometimes it doesn’t. At a farbrengen, a person doesn’t always know how to begin. It isn’t a matter of sitting down now to study Torah for twenty-four hours, and a lot of time goes by. There is a story about the Tzemach Tzedek—I don’t remember exactly how it went—that at first he did not want to participate in farbrengens because they were without Torah, until the Rebbe told him that he needed to farbreng with chassidim. Then he began to value farbrengens. He said that he gained more from a farbrengen than from all his Torah study. So he said, we would spend a lot of time, because sometimes at a farbrengen you need to sleep; at a farbrengen you need to sleep, and it isn’t... But the point here is the very existence of this form. The Rebbe meant that there is a form with Torah

25:21 and there is a form without it.