Explanation of the First Mishnah in Tractate Shabbos According to Chassidus

00:01 The beginning of Tractate Shabbos. There are the well-known questions about it, even on the straightforward level of Torah study: questions raised by Tosafos and by the commentators. The first is Tosafos’s question: Why does Tractate Shabbos open with the laws of transferring between domains? At this point, we haven’t even learned that there are thirty-nine categories of labor, and transferring is listed at the end of those thirty-nine. So why begin Tractate Shabbos with its laws? A second question, also raised by Tosafos, is why it begins with “Yetzi’os HaShabbos”—“the departures of Shabbos”—rather than “Hotza’os,” transfers out. We’re discussing the laws of transferring, so why does it say “Yetzi’os HaShabbos”? A third question concerns bringing something in. The Mishnah discusses both taking something out and bringing something in. In fact, it begins with bringing something in: “The poor person extended his hand inside.” So why does the Mishnah call all this “Yetzi’os HaShabbos”? This leads into an entire give-and-take among the early and later commentators, and in the Gemara as well. How is bringing something in classified? Are bringing in and taking out the same thing? Is bringing in a primary category of labor or a derivative? In practice, the Mishnah begins with “Yetzi’os HaShabbos,” which seemingly refers to taking out, and then moves into bringing in. So the question is really twofold: Why does the Mishnah begin with a term suggesting taking out when there are two actions? We have to debate the wording and say that “yetzi’os” doesn’t mean taking out but refers to domains, or offer various other explanations. Why use wording that specifically suggests taking out? And why is taking out considered more important than bringing in? Everyone agrees that taking out is a primary category of labor; there isn’t even a suggestion otherwise. With bringing in, by contrast, there is a dispute over whether it is a primary category or a derivative. Why is taking out

02:21 especially given what the Gemara says, which Tosafos quotes here: “What difference does it make whether one takes it out or brings it in?” So why is taking out considered the principal category on Shabbos, the primary form of labor, while most halachic authorities consider bringing in only a derivative? Why should taking out be any more significant than bringing in? These are questions on the straightforward level of Torah study, and the commentators discuss them at length. But since the answer to all of them is really one answer, we also need to look at what this means according to Chassidus. Especially in Tractate Shabbos, since Shabbos is connected with the inner dimension of Torah. As the Rebbe Rashab writes in Kuntres Eitz HaChayim, Shabbos is a day holy to Hashem, on which one should engage in the inner dimension of Torah. Shabbos therefore has a special connection to it. So we need to understand the answers to all these questions according to Chassidus as well. There is a brief explanation of this Mishnah in the name of the Arizal, brought in the Arizal’s Likkutei HaShas. He says a few words about the Mishnah, “The departures of Shabbos are two that are four, inside.” The Arizal says that the initial letters of “Yetzi’os HaShabbos” are Yud-Hei. This apparently gives a Kabbalistic explanation for why it says “yetzi’os” and not “hotza’os.” Yud-Hei is connected with Shabbos, for it is known that on Shabbos the name Yud-Hei shines forth. The distinction between Yud-Hei and Vav-Hei is that Vav-Hei is associated with the levels of revelation present during the weekdays. That part of the Name is connected with the world. Yud-Hei, by contrast, represents Chochmah and Binah, which are above the world. On Shabbos, the name Yud-Hei shines forth, and therefore

04:38 the initial letters of “Yetzi’os HaShabbos” are Yud-Hei, the revelation associated with Shabbos. What does “two that are four” mean? The Arizal says that Yud-Hei consists of two letters. Indeed, Yud-Hei is a name in its own right, one of Hashem’s names: “Yud-Hei, the Rock of worlds.” Yud-Hei is considered a name even without Vav-Hei. But what does “two that are four” mean? He says that Yud-Hei has the numerical value of Havayah. When the letter yud is written out in full—yud-vav-daled—its numerical value is twenty. Hei, written hei-alef, has the numerical value of six. So the two letters yud and hei, written out in full, have a numerical value of twenty-six, the numerical value of the name Havayah. That, the Arizal says, is the meaning of “The departures of Shabbos are two that are four”: Yud-Hei, the name revealed on Shabbos, is two—only the two letters yud and hei—but it actually includes four, because the entire name Havayah is contained within it. Yud-Hei has the numerical value of twenty-six, the value of all four letters of the name Havayah. That is what the Arizal writes. Now, to explain the matter in greater detail according to Chassidus. Of course, the Arizal’s explanation also provides a Kabbalistic answer to why it says “yetzi’os” rather than “hotza’os.” It answers that first question. There are two edited hadranim by the Rebbe on the Rambam. There are other hadranim that were not edited, but two edited ones by the Rebbe. One appears in Likkutei Sichos, volume 14, in Parshas Va’eschanan, and the other in Sefer HaSichos 5748, Yud Shvat. I had the privilege of being at that farbrengen that Shabbos. It wasn’t during Sukkos; it was on Shabbos. Yud Shvat fell on Friday. The Rebbe held a farbrengen on Shabbos and delivered a hadran. The Rebbe explained the first Mishnah according to Chassidus. The Mishnah

06:52 a hadran on the first Mishnah according to Chassidus. I even remember the Rebbe saying at the farbrengen that there is a discussion about whether one may study the revealed dimension of Torah on Shabbos. The Rebbe said something along those lines. Some people—the Rebbe said that one should make a siyum. If a siyum has to be made on Shabbos, then there would be no need to make a siyum on the study of the revealed dimension of Torah at all. I remember there was some point about this. The Rebbe spoke about it and, in practice, took a position on the matter. I don’t remember the details, but I remember the Rebbe addressing that point. In any case, the Rebbe delivered a hadran. The Rebbe said [...] that he would present the hadran according to Chassidus, and that was at the farbrengen. It was a very beautiful explanation of the first Mishnah according to Chassidus, which essentially answers most of the questions, especially when taken together with the two hadranim. First, a general point to help us understand this subject, which will also help us bring vitality to our learning—the vitality of Chassidus, as they say. To study Chassidus through the revealed dimension of Torah, and the revealed dimension through Chassidus. As the Rebbe said in a yechidus in 5752, the last yechidus, one should study the revealed dimension of Torah with the vitality of Chassidus. Tractate Shabbos: What is Shabbos about? The Rebbe cites Sefer HaChinuch, a book that explains the 613 mitzvos and gives their reasons. It says that the purpose of the mitzvah of Shabbos is to establish faith within a person—faith that... I don’t remember the wording. The idea of Shabbos is that Hakadosh Boruch Hu gave us this day so that a person would establish in his mind faith in Hashem’s existence, faith in Divine Providence, and faith in creation from nothing. When Shabbos arrives and a person reflects that “in six days Hashem made the heavens and the earth, and on the seventh day He rested,” it reminds him that there is

08:53 the Creator of the world. It reminds him that this world has a Master; it reminds him that the world is constantly being brought into being by Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and through this it strengthens his faith in G-dliness. That, in general, is the basic meaning of Shabbos according to Sefer HaChinuch. Chassidus adds even more depth to this. Shabbos has this idea of... In general, we know the difference between the reality of Hakadosh Boruch Hu above—the world of Atzilus, as it is called in Chassidus—and this physical world, known as the world of Asiyah. In Chassidus they are called a private domain and a public domain. The world of Atzilus is called a private domain. The Rebbe cites the Arizal, who says that the four domains of Shabbos correspond to the four worlds. The private domain is the world of Atzilus. Why? Because Atzilus is a world of oneness. “He and His life-force are one, and He and His vessels are one.” So it is a private domain. By contrast, Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah are a public domain. And the world of Asiyah in particular is the main public domain, for there it is a “mountain of separation,” as the Alter Rebbe writes in Tanya, chapter 33, that this physical world is called a “mountain of separation.” It is a world of separation, a world of multiplicity—the opposite of G-dliness, the opposite of oneness. Then there are the exempt area and the karmelis, corresponding to the worlds of Beriah and Yetzirah. These are domains in between: not quite a private domain and not quite a public domain. They are the domains known as a karmelis and an exempt area, whose laws are rabbinic. In any case, the four domains are connected to the four worlds. In general, the main thing we are learning here in the Mishnah is the two extremes: there is a private domain and there is a public domain. What does this mean? During the weekdays, a person is in the public domain, the “mountain of separation.” During the weekdays, a person

10:56 is in the world, occupied with the world and doing work. And work belongs to the “mountain of separation,” the public domain: worldly matters, this world, physicality, and all your activities and everything you do during the six days. But then Shabbos arrives. Shabbos is the time of ascent, when the worlds—the world—rises. All the worlds rise to the world of Atzilus. For, as we say in the Shabbos prayers, “On it He rested from all His works, and on the seventh day He ascended and sat upon His throne of glory.” Shabbos is the day when all the worlds rise to a higher world, the world of Atzilus, and consequently there is only a private domain. There is no separate existence. This is the deeper meaning of Shabbos: on Shabbos, a Jew must live in such a way that there is no going out from the private domain to the public domain. If I carry from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbos, I am, as it were, undermining the entire point of Shabbos. On Shabbos we want to emphasize that there is no multitude; there is only the One. The private domain is the domain of the One and Only of the world. When you carry something out, you are, as it were, taking it out of the domain of the One and Only of the world—the opposite of Shabbos. Shabbos means that everything rises; everything is a private domain. When you do work, you take something from the private domain to the public domain. That undermines the entire idea of Shabbos. This explains the prohibition against carrying: why carrying is prohibited on Shabbos. The Rebbe cites a Midrash in a sicha in volume 14 and discusses it at greater length. What does the Midrash say? Turnus Rufus, who was a heretic, asked Rabbi Akiva: If Hakadosh Boruch Hu honors Shabbos, how is it that He works on Shabbos? Rain falls and trees grow—He does all thirty-nine forms of work on Shabbos, though He is supposedly resting. Rabbi Akiva answered him: The prohibited work involves taking something from one domain to another. But for Hakadosh Boruch Hu, everything is one domain. Since there is no public domain for Him, there is no work for Him. The Rebbe asks: He answered only about one of the forms of work. There are another thirty-eight forms. The heretic’s question was not only about carrying on Shabbos, but about the other forms of work too. So how does that answer him? The explanation is that this is actually the inner point of every form of work prohibited on Shabbos. What is that point? It is that a person performs an action. When a person works, the plain meaning of work is that you take something out of the private domain into the public domain. On Shabbos, a Jew stands before Hakadosh Boruch Hu. When you stand before Hakadosh Boruch Hu, there is no world, no separate existence, and consequently no work. As explained in works of Chassidus: when one stands before the king, “Who would make a gesture before the king?” If a person stands before the king and makes a certain movement, then work is a rebellion against the kingship. Before the king, one makes no movement at all. On Shabbos, a Jew must be in a state of complete bittul, and consequently work has no place. So it emerges that the entire prohibition against work on Shabbos is really an outgrowth, an extension, of the idea of going from the private domain to the public domain. Work means that you take something that did not belong to the public domain, that was in a state of oneness and was not being put to use, and the moment you use it, work with it, act upon it, you are, as it were, taking it out of the domain of the One—the One and Only of the world—and into the domain of the many. This is the opposite of Shabbos. On Shabbos there is no multitude; there is only the One. That is Rabbi Akiva’s answer to the heretic. There are further details, but they are explained in the sicha. So what is the fundamental point here? The fundamental point

13:03 Carrying from one domain to another. But for Hakadosh Boruch Hu, everything is one domain. Since there is no public domain for Him, there is no melachah for Him. The Rebbe asks: That answers only one of the melachos. There are another thirty-eight melachos. The heretic’s question about Shabbos wasn’t only about carrying; it concerned the other melachos too. So how does this answer him? The explanation is that this is actually the inner point of every Shabbos melachah. What is the underlying idea of a melachah? It is a person doing something. When a person works, performs a melachah, the basic idea is that he takes something from a private domain into a public domain. On Shabbos, a Jew stands before Hakadosh Boruch Hu. When you stand before Hakadosh Boruch Hu, there is no world, no independent existence, and therefore no melachah. As explained in Chassidus, when one stands before the king, “one who makes a gesture in the presence of the king”—if a person stands before the king and makes a gesture, that is a rebellion against the king. Before the king, one makes no movement at all. On Shabbos, a Jew must be in a state of complete bittul, so melachah has no place. So it turns out that the entire prohibition of melachah on Shabbos is really an extension of the idea of carrying from a private domain into a public domain. Melachah means that you take something that did not belong to the public domain—it was in a private domain and was not being used—and the moment you use it, work with it, act upon it, you are, so to speak, taking it out of the domain of the One and Only of the world and bringing it into the public domain. That is the opposite of Shabbos. On Shabbos there is no public domain; there is only the One. That is the answer Rabbi Akiva gave the heretic. There are further details, but they are explained in the sicha. So what is the underlying principle here? The principle is

15:02 is that carrying is actually the essence of the whole idea of Shabbos. According to Chassidus, carrying expresses the essence of Shabbos, and on this basis, what are we saying? On this basis, all the questions raised here from the perspective of Nigleh are answered. The first question: Why does it begin with the laws of carrying? With this explanation, it is wonderful. Why begin with the laws of carrying? Because carrying is the foundation of the entire tractate of Shabbos. The whole tractate opens by saying, “The acts of carrying on Shabbos are two that are four.” Understand that Shabbos is a time when everything should be in the state of a private domain, and the moment you leave the private domain, you leave Shabbos. That is the idea of “the departures of Shabbos.” It is the opposite of Shabbos, and everything that follows develops this. That is the foundation. Carrying is the foundation of all the forms of work prohibited on Shabbos. The entire structure of those forms of work is built on this foundation. And why does it say “departures” in the plural, rather than “departure”? As we said, because Shabbos is connected with the private domain, with the name Havayah, and within it specifically with the name Yud-Hei. The difference between Yud-Hei and Vav-Hei is that Vav-Hei is already more connected with the order of tzimtzum, whereas Yud-Hei represents what is above tzimtzum. Consequently, that is the name specifically associated with the private domain, and therefore Yud-Hei is an acronym for Yetzios HaShabbos, “the departures of Shabbos.” This also answers why the wording is... Why? Why do we say that taking out is the primary form of work, rather than bringing in? Because it is readily understood: the entire basis of the prohibition on Shabbos is taking something from the private domain to the public domain. That is the basis of the prohibition against carrying. According to the inner meaning, what is forbidden is taking something from the private domain to the public domain. The problem here is taking it out to the public domain. That is the main problem according to Chassidus. Bringing it into the private domain

16:59 Actually, according to the inner meaning of things, there shouldn’t have been a problem. No, yes, we’ll understand. We’re saying that on Shabbos it’s forbidden. Why? Because it involves birurim, the work of refining and elevating. There’s no work of birurim on Shabbos. That’s what you wanted to say. Yes. So bringing something in is also forbidden, because bringing it in is connected to the work of birurim. Ah, I hadn’t understood that; now I hear. Okay, good. So the fundamental prohibition on Shabbos is taking something out. It’s forbidden to take something from a private domain into a public domain. That’s the main point, and that’s why Tractate Shabbos begins specifically with “The acts of taking out on Shabbos.” The prohibition against bringing something in is derived from taking something out. And he adds that here, too, there is a prohibition against bringing something in. Bringing something in means bringing something from the world into Atzilus. That is a matter of birur, and since on Shabbos there is no work of birurim, there is no bringing in. Okay, good. In any case, it’s clear that taking something out is the main point. Bringing something in is a derivative; it isn’t the essence. That’s why the opening words are specifically “The acts of taking out on Shabbos.” Now there’s a story here that isn’t very well known. The Rebbe mentioned it briefly at a farbrengen on Purim 5718. Only now, with the publication of Toras Menachem, has it become clear that the source is a chossid named Rabbi Bichovsky. He was a chossid, but he wasn’t a Lubavitch chossid. He belonged to the Chabad circles associated with the Tzemach Tzedek’s other sons: Reb Chaim Eliezer Bichovsky. He printed many books of Chassidus, Derech Mitzvosecha and so on, well-known books, including Sefer Hachakirah from Jerusalem. He printed many books of Chassidus in the time of the Rebbe Rashab, and at the time he wasn’t accepted. The Rebbe Rashab opposed it, and people didn’t study his books. But afterward, over the course of

19:20 later generations, by the seventh generation, the Rebbe had already brought him in. His books were all included too. So much so that in the later years the Rebbe also instructed that a book of his writings be printed. It’s called Kisvei Bichovsky. We have a few copies here in the yeshiva. It came out in 5750. That was really in the later years; the Rebbe had sent it to the printer many years earlier. I don’t know why. In short, it was printed in the period before Gimmel Tammuz. In any case, Kisvei Bichovsky contains the full, lengthy account, and it also has the Rebbe’s endorsement, in the sense that the Rebbe repeated this thought at a farbrengen. In short, this is a well-founded teaching. It’s not that he wasn’t regarded as a chossid; his accounts are generally considered reliable. Reb Yechezkel relates, based on what he heard, a story about the Alter Rebbe. He says that when the Alter Rebbe arrived in Mezritch, he saw the Maggid of Mezritch studying Tractate Shabbos. The Maggid was studying the first Mishnah of Tractate Shabbos, and then began to explain the Mishnah to him. He gives the explanation the Maggid offered the Alter Rebbe. It’s very interesting. I’ll repeat it briefly. He said this: First, “the acts of taking out on Shabbos”—as we said, the initials are yud-hei. “Two that are four” refers to the four letters of the name Havayah. There is yud-hei and vav-hei: two that are four. The essence of the name Havayah is yud-hei, and that includes vav-hei as well. “Inside” refers to the world of Atzilus. “Two that are four outside,” he says, refers to the name Adnai. The revelation of yud-hei and vav-hei in Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah comes through Havayah being enclothed in Adnai. So Adnai is

21:17 the “two that are four outside.” According to Kabbalah, the letters of Adnai are also divided into two. Kabbalah explains that division, so here too it is “two that are four.” Never mind the reason or the explanation for that. In any case, yud-hei and vav-hei are the “two that are four inside,” and Adnai is the “two that are four outside.” Then the Maggid of Mezritch went on: What is the avodah? The avodah is to connect the four letters of the name Havayah with Adnai. In other words, the avodah is to connect Atzilus with Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. That is the work of serving Hashem; that is why the soul descends into this world. The householder, says the Maggid, is Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is called the householder. He is the householder. Who is the poor man? The poor man represents the souls of the Jewish people. So he says, “The poor man stands inside and the householder outside”—sorry, the poor man stands outside. Knesses Yisroel is in Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. Most souls are there; they are “outside.” “The householder inside” refers to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. He is above, in the world of Atzilus. What does “the poor man extended his hand inside” mean? The point here is that a Jew carries out the avodah of “with all your might.” The poor man represents the souls of the Jewish people. A Jew serves Hashem by arousing his love for Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and he wants to elevate that love to Atzilus—to reach the highest love, the ahavah rabbah associated with the world of Atzilus. So “the poor man extended” means that he strips away [unclear] and rises from a limited love, the love of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah, to the love of the world of Atzilus, “inside.” “And placed something into the householder’s hand.” What does that mean? It

23:20 means that he reaches bittul bimetzius, not merely bittul hayesh. That is the meaning of “placed something into the householder’s hand.” That’s one stage. Then there is “took something from it and brought it out”—the avodah of shov, returning. Love is ratzo, the upward striving. After that comes shov: “took something from it.” He takes the strength from Hakadosh Boruch Hu, from above in Atzilus, and draws it down through the performance of mitzvos. He draws G-dliness from Atzilus down here, “and brought it out” into Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. What is the ruling? “The poor man is liable; the householder is exempt.” What does that mean? “The poor man is liable” means that a person who serves Hashem in this way is obligated to continue serving Hashem this way. And “the householder is exempt,” he says, means exempt and permitted. What does it mean that the householder is exempt? That he doesn’t need to resort to the kindness of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. He accomplishes it all through his own efforts. Chassidus explains that sometimes, when a person can do the work through his own efforts, that is the chief virtue: he doesn’t need strength to be given to him from above. He does it himself, like those who are pure of heart, and so on. That’s one side. Then there’s the other side, the opposite: “The householder extended his hand.” There’s a situation in which a person cannot do the work. He is at a very low point and cannot lift himself up. Then “the householder extended his hand outside and placed something into the poor man’s hand.” In other words, the householder is Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and He gives him an arousal from above. He bestows love upon the person, gives him everything from above, and “places something into the poor man’s hand.” He acts upon the poor man. He gives him everything, all the way. He

25:27 It means that all the work does not come from the person. All the work is through an awakening from Above, as explained in the maamarim: the person does not... “When the man emits seed first, a female is born”—he has done nothing. Everything is given to him from Above; everything is bestowed on him from Above. This is “the householder extended his hand outside and placed something into the poor man’s hand.” But there is another way: “or he took something from it and brought it inside.” Here, too, Hakadosh Boruch Hu reveals it from Above, but He arouses the hidden love. After all, every Jew has a hidden love for Hakadosh Boruch Hu. So he gives from within himself: Hakadosh Boruch Hu brings the—out of concealment into revelation, also through an awakening from Above, a heavenly voice and so on, and arouses it within him. “And he took something from it and brought it inside”: Hakadosh Boruch Hu brings it up to Atzilus, as it says that the angels take a Jew’s prayers, even when they are without proper intention, kiss them, embrace them, raise them up, and they become crowns. So it goes from below upward, but it is all done by Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Thus, the householder is liable and the poor man is exempt. That is to say, even there we say that if this is the way the person serves Hashem, since he is not a vessel—he is poor and destitute—Hakadosh Boruch Hu is obliged to keep helping him all his life, to give him the work from Above downward, while the poor man is exempt and it is permitted. It all comes from Above. Then there is a third level, where both are exempt: each one did part of the work. There is the—“the poor man extended his hand inside.” An awakening from below began on the person’s part, but he could not complete it. He needed help from Above, as in “One who comes to purify himself is assisted.” He does the work, but he needs assistance from Above. So this is called half the

27:16 work being done by the person and half the work being done by Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Or the reverse: it began with an awakening from Above. First the person was aroused from Above, and that affected him so that he awoke and began to act. He carried on and completed the work. In both these cases, we say that both are exempt. What does Rashi say? “Both are exempt”—exempt, but prohibited. The Maggid says: Perhaps they are exempt, but asur—bound. Asur, as in beis ha’asurim, a prison. They are bound and tied together. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is bound to the person, and the person is bound to Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and each, as it were, completes the other. It is specifically through both of them that the work is completed. So they are bound and tied together: they must always remain connected to each other in order to do the work. This is the meaning of the Mishnah according to Chassidus. He relates here that when the Alter Rebbe heard this explanation, he said—the way he tells it, the Alter Rebbe asked the Maggid: If so, why does Tosafos ask that hotzaos should have been written with a hei? According to this, it must be written with a yud, because this is the concept of Yud-Hei. So what is Tosafos asking in the first place? Why would Tosafos think it should begin with a hei? If we are speaking here about Yud-Hei, it must begin with a yud. Of course, this is a question according to Chassidus. Yes. So the Maggid answered him that Tosafos asks this because, in serving Hashem, the main thing is the work itself, specifically when it proceeds from below upward. What constitutes work is precisely what comes from below—bringing in. And therefore, the first example in the Mishnah is the poor man: “the poor man extended his hand,” which is the work of the soul. That is why Tosafos asks: It should have begun with a hei. Hei represents below; yud represents Above, while hei is below.

29:13 So that is why Tosafos asks: Tractate Shabbos should have begun specifically with a hei, emphasizing the advantage of bringing in, the advantage of proceeding from below upward, rather than with a yud, which represents Above downward. And what does Tosafos answer? “The language of the verse”—the Written Torah. Everything in the Written Torah is written in a way that proceeds from Above downward, and that is why it follows the language of the verse. So it is written Yud-Hei, from Above downward. But from the standpoint of a person’s service, the main work is “the poor man extended his hand”—the work of the soul. Here we see an insight into the interpretation of a Mishnah: how a Mishnah is studied according to Chassidus. According to this account, this was one of the first exchanges between the Maggid and the Alter Rebbe, and it contains very strong foundations of Chabad Chassidus. It is all in the first Mishnah. In any case, may Hashem help us study Tractate Shabbos over the course of this year, and may it truly be a precious Shabbos. Shabbos—“a Torah scholar is called Shabbos.” As is well known, a bochur who sits in yeshiva and learns Torah—his whole life, his whole week, is a state of Shabbos. And may we truly merit, very soon, “Shabbos and rest for everlasting life,” with the coming of Moshiach Tzidkeinu.