Likkutei Amarim Chapter 5 · 5785

00:00 Speaker 1 That’s not why we were late. It was because he made himself black coffee.

00:04 Speaker 2 Wow.

00:04 Speaker 1 So I told him, “But Chani always makes you coffee at the class.” What, do I have to now...

00:08 Speaker 2 Stronger.

00:09 Speaker 1 You know, he comes from work, he’s been at work all day, so he needs something to wake him up before the class.

00:16 Speaker 2 Wow.

00:18 Speaker 7 Okay, at the end of chapter 4 he spoke about the garments of the soul. That’s it, that’s about enough. At the end of the chapter there, he says that...

00:28 Speaker 1 I have no water left.

00:34 Speaker 2 I have some. Just a moment.

00:38 Speaker 1 Throw that up.

00:39 Speaker 2 The way you... the book, the Rebbe—it reminds me.

00:41 Speaker 1 What enthusiasm.

00:43 Speaker 2 Mommy slipped away, but no.

00:43 Speaker 1 Chani doesn’t want to.

00:45 Speaker 2 But where did you get that from?

00:46 Speaker 1 What’s going on here?

00:47 Speaker 2 Ah, that made life too easy.

00:53 Speaker 7 So at the end of that chapter, the Alter Rebbe gives an analogy: someone who fulfills mitzvos through the garments of the soul is like someone embracing the king. Then he continues the analogy and says it is also as though the king embraces him. He gives two explanations of the analogy. Throughout the chapter, he spoke about how mitzvos are Hashem’s will, and therefore they embrace a person. But what is this point he brings at the end—that through Torah study, not only does Hakadosh Boruch Hu embrace a person, but the person also embraces the King, Hakadosh Boruch Hu? Where? How does a person embrace Hakadosh Boruch Hu by fulfilling mitzvos? That wasn’t explained anywhere in the chapter. He said it in the analogy at the end, but he didn’t explain the idea itself. So in this chapter, the Alter Rebbe explains that a person’s embrace of Hakadosh Boruch Hu really doesn’t apply to all mitzvos. It applies only to the mitzvah of Torah study. And what is the explanation in chapter 5? That through the mitzvah of Torah study, not only does G-dliness, holiness, envelop the person; the person envelops it too. Let’s look at the text. Chapter 5: “To further explain thoroughly the expression ‘grasped’ used by Eliyahu in Pesach Eliyahu”—which we say on Erev Shabbos. Eliyahu Hanavi says, “No thought can grasp You.” No thought can grasp Hakadosh Boruch Hu. But why does he need to rule that out? Do you rule out something that isn’t possible in the first place? So what does he mean? “Whenever the intellect comprehends and understands an idea, the intellect grasps that idea and encompasses it.” That’s...

02:58 Speaker 7 Right, this isn’t only when a person studies Torah. With any intellectual idea, when a person understands it, his mind encompasses it. How is that called “grasping”? What does “grasping” mean? I’ve grasped the idea—so I’ve grasped it. How do you grasp a ball?

03:17 Speaker 1 With your hands.

03:18 Speaker 7 From both sides. You can’t grasp it from just one side; it won’t lift up. To grasp something, you have to enclose it on all sides. That’s how the intellect grasps the idea. “The intellect grasps the idea and encompasses it, and consequently the idea is grasped, encompassed, and clothed within the intellect that comprehended and understood it.” And there’s another thing: “The intellect is clothed in the idea while comprehending and grasping it.” There are two things. When a person is thinking something through in order to understand an idea, he’s—how do we put it?—“I’m immersed in this right now. Leave me alone, don’t disturb me, I’m immersed in it.” Right? Why? That’s how he feels. He has entered into the idea. It’s bigger than he is. Why doesn’t he understand it yet? Like with a physical object: if it’s bigger than him, he can’t grasp it. Grasping comes after he’s understood it. Then he has the idea in his grasp. But before he understands it, the idea, so to speak, grasps and encompasses him. Those are the stage of thinking it through and the later stage of understanding. Ah, so “the idea is grasped”—yes—and “the intellect is also clothed in the idea.” When? “While comprehending it.” While he is busy trying to comprehend and grasp the idea with his mind, he is clothed within it. “For example, when a person understands and comprehends a halachah in the Mishnah or Gemara thoroughly and correctly.” He understands it—not just generally; he knows it thoroughly, with all the arguments, all the different sides, and all the practical implications. What follows from it. When he understands it that way, “his intellect grasps and encompasses it,” because he encompasses every side of the discussion, “and his intellect is also clothed in it at that time,” while he is engaged with the subject and studying it. He is examining it, and it encompasses him as well.

05:39 Speaker 7 “Now, this halachah is the wisdom and will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. It arose in His will that if Reuven makes a certain claim, for example, and Shimon makes another, the ruling between them should be such and such.” Why does he need to give an example? What wouldn’t we understand without the example?

06:09 Speaker 8 To understand that both sides are, so to speak, His will. It’s not just one thing. The example is that one says this and the other says that. Sometimes you might think only one side is right, that only one side has a point. But here it’s as though both sides are expressions of His will, and Hashem’s will is...

06:29 Speaker 7 What does the example add to the explanation?

06:32 Speaker 8 Because it may be something that never happened and never will? “Both these and those are the words of the living G-d.” No, it was...

06:39 Speaker 7 We’re trying to explain that when a person studies something, he’s immersed in it and it encompasses him as well. Fine, but why this example? And if you’re going to give an example, give an example. Why go straight to a halachah about one person making one claim and another making a different claim? That’s a law about claims and counterclaims; it’s Choshen Mishpat, the laws for judges. It’s somewhere near the end of the fourth section of the Shulchan Aruch. Give a practical halachah, something about the holidays that everyone knows.

07:07 Speaker 8 The same applies there too.

07:08 Speaker 7 What’s relevant—

07:09 Speaker 8 It’s not just about what’s right. Wait.

07:11 Speaker 7 Why give an example at all? And if you do give one, why this kind of example? What is the example? If one person claims this and the other claims that, the ruling will be such and such. One of them is lying; one of them is a liar. When two people come to a rabbi, one says, “This is what happened,” and the other says, “No, this is what happened.”

07:39 Speaker 8 Clearly someone is lying.

07:40 Speaker 7 One of them is a liar.

07:42 Speaker 8 Why? One saw a six; the other saw a nine.

07:47 Speaker 7 But—what is so special about this example that the Alter Rebbe goes all the way there and chooses this particular one? And he says even more: “Even if this matter never happened and never will happen—if these claims and demands never come before a court.” A person might study a halachah in a section of the Shulchan Aruch that most people don’t study at all. Not only that, it’s a halachah in which one party is a liar. And beyond that, it describes a situation with claims that may never have arisen and may never arise.

08:32 Speaker 9 Like the rebellious son.

08:33 Speaker 7 Hmm?

08:33 Speaker 9 Like the rebellious son.

08:34 Speaker 7 Like that halachah. Who says people will come with precisely those claims? It doesn’t have to happen. Yes. Nevertheless, that’s the point. Since it arose in the will and wisdom of Hakadosh Boruch Hu that if one person makes this claim and the other makes that claim, the ruling should be such and such, then when a person knows and understands that ruling in his mind, as a halachah set out in the Mishnah, Gemara, or halachic authorities, he comprehends, grasps, and encompasses in his mind the will and wisdom of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Of this, Eliyahu said, “No thought can grasp Him,” nor His will or His wisdom. What does that mean? We’ve already learned that when Hakadosh Boruch Hu gave the Torah, He gave Himself in the Torah. “I am Hashem your G-d”—the word Anochi is an acronym for “I have written and given My very self.” Hakadosh Boruch Hu condensed His very essence into every detail of the Torah. Someone could ask: How far does that go? When one of the parties makes a false claim, surely the liar’s claim doesn’t come from Hakadosh Boruch Hu. Hakadosh Boruch Hu said the ruling must be truthful, but the liar’s claim isn’t from Him. It’s the liar who makes it. Right? What does the Alter Rebbe say? No. The liar’s claim, too, comes from—it too is the will and wisdom of Hakadosh Boruch Hu. What does that mean? When we think about why we need halachah—why do we need halachos? Every mitzvah has laws about how to fulfill it.

10:32 Speaker 9 To know what needs to be done.

10:34 Speaker 7 Hmm?

10:34 Speaker 9 To know what needs to be done.

10:37 Speaker 7 So on a simple level, how do we understand it, feel about it, and act? Why did Hakadosh Boruch Hu give us halachah? So we would know how to behave.

10:47 Speaker 9 Operating instructions.

10:48 Speaker 7 Yes. Hakadosh Boruch Hu wanted us to fulfill the mitzvah. How do we fulfill it? He explains how. The role, the very purpose of halachah, is to teach us. What is the Alter Rebbe saying here?

11:00 Speaker 9 Even if the halachah gives us nothing.

11:04 Speaker 7 If that’s the whole purpose of halachah, how can there be halachos that may never have happened and may never happen? What do we need them for? The Alter Rebbe says: the fact that there are halachos that may never have happened teaches us something about all halachos. They aren’t there just to teach us what to do. Halachos are Torah, and Torah is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s wisdom. That’s how He understands it, so to speak. Hakadosh Boruch Hu has, so to speak, a line of reasoning, and His reasoning dictates that if there is a world and there are people, and one person makes this claim and another makes that claim, then this will be the ruling. The whole reality of halachah was not created for us at all. The entire Torah is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s wisdom. It isn’t about us. There may be a person, and if there is, and he finds himself in such a situation and wants to act in accordance with how Hakadosh Boruch Hu understands it, then he’ll follow the halachah. But halachah itself isn’t about human beings at all. It is His will, His wisdom. It preceded the world; it is He Himself. It’s not at all—yes? So when we study halachah in order to connect with Hakadosh Boruch Hu, it makes no difference whether it’s a halachah that applies in practice, or one that applies only to a few people—most people aren’t going to study to become dayanim, with its laws of purity and niddah. It doesn’t even matter if it’s a halachah concerning something that may never have happened and may never happen. That isn’t relevant at all. Because what all halachos, from the first to the last, have in common is

13:00 Speaker 7 that they are Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s wisdom. So when a person studies halachah, it doesn’t matter which halachah—even one involving false claims, even one concerning something that may never have happened and may never happen. In every case, he is studying Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s wisdom. And what is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s wisdom? We already learned in the previous chapter—sorry, in chapter 2—that He and His wisdom are one. So if a person grasps the halachah now, if he understands what it says—what is it that the halachah says? The halachah is His wisdom. And what is His wisdom? His wisdom is He Himself. So by grasping the halachah with his mind, he grasps Hakadosh Boruch Hu Himself. That very Hakadosh Boruch Hu of whom Eliyahu said, “No thought can grasp Him”—because He placed Himself within the Torah, when I study the Torah, His wisdom, I grasp Him. Hakadosh Boruch Hu Himself is within me, and I have grasped Him. That is the true meaning of studying halachah. All right? Is that clear? “No thought can grasp Him, nor His will and wisdom, except as they are clothed in the halachos set before us.” Why? Because that is how He chose it to be. And at that same time, one’s mind is also clothed in them. We said this earlier: when he examines a halachah, yes? Then it... then it surrounds him. And when he knows it accurately and thoroughly, he surrounds it. This is a wondrous union, the like of which, or anything comparable to it, is not found at all in the physical world: to become truly one and united from every side and angle. In other words, how can one thing unite with another and become one with it—both surrounded by it and surrounding it at the same time, united with it completely? Where can that happen? Only in Torah study. The Alter Rebbe writes

15:10 Speaker 7 here that it cannot happen in the physical world. In the physical world, it’s impossible to be both surrounded and surrounding. That can happen only in the spiritual realm. Our Rebbe says—the Rebbe spoke several times about this line in Tanya—that not only is it impossible in the physical world, it is also impossible in the spiritual realm. What does it mean that it’s impossible in the spiritual realm?

15:32 Speaker 10 No—

15:32 Speaker 7 If someone studies one of the worldly disciplines, the natural sciences, yes? He studies some subject, understands it very well, delves into it, and... then seemingly it’s exactly the same thing, isn’t it? He surrounds it, he is clothed in it, and he unites with it. It’s exactly the same thing, no?

15:52 Speaker 10 We need a professor.

15:53 Speaker 7 Right. The Rebbe says no, it’s entirely different. The way a Jew unites with Hakadosh Boruch Hu through Torah study—“a wondrous union, the like of which, or anything comparable to it, is not found at all in the physical world, to become truly one and united from every side and angle”—that happens specifically through studying halachos, not through studying secular disciplines. The Rebbe doesn’t explain it. The Rebbe says it several times without explaining it. Why doesn’t the Rebbe explain? The explanation is simple; it doesn’t need explaining.

16:31 Speaker 11 Because there isn’t, so to speak, someone standing behind that knowledge.

16:34 Speaker 7 What is the difference between worldly wisdom and Divine wisdom, the wisdom of the Torah? What is the fundamental difference?

16:44 Speaker 11 That it comes from... that it’s true, it’s, it’s...

16:48 Speaker 7 Worldly wisdom can be true; it doesn’t have to be false. But Torah wisdom is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s wisdom. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is infinite, so His wisdom is infinite, right? Unlimited. The wisdom of worldly disciplines is ultimately limited. So worldly wisdom—

17:03 Speaker 11 You can understand it all the way to its limit.

17:04 Speaker 7 You can understand it all the way to its limit. But with the wisdom of Torah, however much a person studies, delves into it and grasps it, it still remains something that surrounds him. This kind of union—being both surrounding and surrounded completely, so that even when he understands it fully, he is still surrounded by it—exists only in Torah study. “This is the infinitely great and wondrous advantage of the mitzvah of knowing and comprehending Torah over all the practical mitzvos.” As we discussed in the previous chapter, through all the practical mitzvos, Hakadosh Boruch Hu—G-dliness—surrounds the person, but is not enclosed within him. So what was the analogy at the end of the previous chapter? That referred to Torah. This, then, is Torah’s advantage over all the mitzvos. And it’s not only an advantage over practical mitzvos, but even over mitzvos that depend on speech—even over the mitzvah of speaking words of Torah. Speech, too, is something that surrounds; it isn’t internal.

18:20 Speaker 11 Not the speech itself.

18:21 Speaker 7 What?

18:22 Speaker 11 Torah study itself isn’t a mitzvah of action.

18:25 Speaker 7 The mitzvah of Torah study certainly involves speech. He doesn’t fulfill his obligation if he doesn’t say the words aloud, but if he doesn’t understand, he hasn’t studied.

18:37 Speaker 11 They’re opposites within the mitzvah.

18:38 Speaker 7 What?

18:38 Speaker 11 They’re opposites within the mitzvah, because he read—because he reads the Megillah.

18:42 Speaker 7 If he reads something that is definitely Torah, then yes.

18:47 Speaker 11 Wow.

18:48 Speaker 7 Mm?

18:48 Speaker 11 What? That he keeps reading.

18:51 Speaker 7 When a person reads Tehillim without understanding a single word, he is saying the words. That’s holy.

18:57 Speaker 11 But that’s the mitzvah of Torah study.

18:58 Speaker 7 Huh?

18:59 Speaker 11 It counts as the mitzvah of Torah study.

19:01 Speaker 7 Yes, it’s the mitzvah of “you shall speak of them.” He is speaking words of Torah.

19:07 Speaker 11 Then why is it specifically associated with prayer? I mean, when people pray for something.

19:11 Speaker 7 Prayer is prayer; it isn’t necessarily words of Torah.

19:15 Speaker 11 With the prayer.

19:16 Speaker 7 What?

19:17 Speaker 11 Torah study. So why is Tehillim associated with prayer if it’s actually Torah study?

19:21 Speaker 7 Tehillim. Tehillim is preparation for prayer.

19:24 Speaker 11 I don’t mean preparing with Tehillim. I mean when someone wants to pray. Afterward.

19:27 Speaker 7 What?

19:28 Speaker 11 After prayer. Rabbi Elazar [unclear] Tehillim.

19:31 Speaker 7 Ah, the Tehillim said after prayer.

19:33 Speaker 11 With Tehillim.

19:34 Speaker 7 Because a Jew should say Tehillim all the time, to purify the air.

19:37 Speaker 11 No, but when people pray—I mean, when they want to pray, they take out lots of Tehillim. Ah. That’s the sort of thing I’m talking about. Where did this idea come from, that Tehillim is brought into prayer? When I want to pray, they give me Tehillim, because it contains requests. Sorry.

19:50 Speaker 7 There’s a letter from the Alter Rebbe, printed in the Tehillas Hashem siddur, where he writes that the Tehillim our Sages instituted to be said before prayer are the greatest preparation. I remember the wording there: “There is no greater preparation than this.” It’s preparation for prayer.

20:08 Speaker 11 Yes, no, I’m not talking about that. I mean, someone isn’t feeling well. All right, let’s say Tehillim. [unclear]

20:14 Speaker 7 That’s a segulah, and it isn’t related to what we’re discussing here. Here we’re talking about uniting with Hakadosh Boruch Hu: uniting in a way that it enters him, and he surrounds it—surrounds it through understanding, when he grasps it. With speech, he doesn’t grasp it. I mean, a person can speak and understand what he’s saying, but the grasping happens through understanding.

20:35 Speaker 11 So it could be from here until... I mean, it’s more

20:38 Speaker 7 We’ll see in a moment, we’ll see. Better, not better. First, what he’s been saying up to this point is that this is the advantage. As we discussed earlier, through mitzvos a person can also encompass G-dliness. We’ve just explained that. What? This is the advantage of Torah over all the mitzvos. Through all the mitzvos performed in speech and action, the light of Hashem clothes the soul and surrounds it from head to foot. But in knowing Torah, besides the intellect being clothed in Hashem’s wisdom, as it is with all the other mitzvos, Torah has something additional, something unique to Torah: Hashem’s wisdom is also within him—what his intellect grasps, apprehends, and encompasses, to the extent that he can grasp and understand it through knowing Torah. He can’t grasp all of it, yes, but what he does grasp, he truly grasps. And Hashem is not divided into parts. When he truly grasps it, he also grasps Hashem Himself, each person according to his intellect and his capacity for knowledge and understanding of Pardes. “And because in know—” Now we’ll begin a new point, an additional point. Because in knowing Torah, the Torah is clothed in the person’s soul and intellect and encompassed within them, therefore—so that’s why what? Why it is called—Torah is called the bread and nourishment of the soul. When a person davens, we don’t say that davening is nourishment for his soul. We don’t say that when he performs mitzvos either. We say it only about studying Torah. Why? What, what, what is the similarity between eating bread and studying Torah? Physical bread nourishes the body when a person brings it right inside himself. And not only does it enter him; there it becomes blood and flesh of his flesh. The bread doesn’t remain bread. It breaks down and is digested, and becomes part of the person’s body. Then he lives and continues to exist. In other words, it goes further than that. Not only does it become one with the person; it is his life—it becomes the person’s life. So too—

22:54 Speaker 7 In knowing and understanding Torah within a person’s soul, it’s not just that he studies Torah and encompasses and grasps it. It’s not just that. It is digested within him and changes—or he changes; I don’t know how to put it—and becomes one with him until he becomes Torah. It gives him life.

23:17 Speaker 11 They say the Torah becomes his own; it is called by his name. When a person studies Torah, he brings the Torah back.

23:24 Speaker 7 That’s connected. We’ll read a few more words in a moment and expand on it. “When he has studied it well, with the concentration of his intellect, until it is grasped by his intellect and becomes united with him, and they become one.” If he really studies it well, with intellectual concentration, until it is grasped—not just some superficial kind of study—then it becomes nourishment for the soul. Torah becomes nourishment for his soul and life within it. Just as bread gives a person life, Torah gives life to the soul: “Life within it from the Life of life Himself, blessed be He, Who is clothed in His wisdom and Torah within it.” I think I mentioned this here once, on some occasion. There’s something from the Rebbe that... I don’t know if it’s from the Rebbe; at any rate, it’s brought in Chassidus. What does “children who were taken captive” mean? That’s the language of the Gemara. The Rambam brings it. What are children who were taken captive among non-Jews and then grew up and became—why do you still call him a child, a child who was taken captive? Today he’s fifty years old, he’s a politician, and he’s shouting. Is that a child? You could say a soul that was taken captive. Why “a child who was taken captive”?

24:41 Speaker 12 Yes, a soul that—

24:43 Speaker 7 Because he hasn’t studied Torah, his soul hasn’t grown; it has remained like—it has remained a child. The soul—we don’t see it and aren’t so aware of it, because it’s a spiritual thing. But the soul grows; the soul develops. When a person studies Torah, his intellect gradually develops: he understands greater things, understands more readily, understands more deeply. In his emotions, his love of Hashem develops further, his awe of Hashem develops further, his faith develops further. The more a person studies Torah, the more it gives him life. What does it mean to give life to the soul? The life of the G-dly soul is understanding and sensing G-dliness. If a person doesn’t study Torah, it has no source from which to—it doesn’t receive life. It literally gives life to the soul. That’s what makes it grow. This isn’t just a figure of speech. It’s much deeper than what I explained at the beginning. At the beginning, he asked—we asked how a person could grasp G-dliness at all. So he explained how a person can grasp it. Then he said it isn’t just an external grasp; it becomes one with him, like food. What does “like food” mean? It gives life to the person, to the soul. And this is what is meant by “Your Torah is within my innards,” as it says in Eitz Chayim, gate 44, chapter 3, that the garments of souls in Gan Eden are the mitzvos, and Torah is nourishment for whom? Here he adds: for souls that engaged in Torah study for its own sake in this world. If a person studies Torah not for its own sake—

26:28 Speaker 12 In the case that, um—

26:30 Speaker 7 That doesn’t happen. For Torah to become one with a person, it’s not enough to study it in depth; the study also has to be for its own sake. What does “for its own sake” mean?

26:39 Speaker 12 That we should write down that we are the Torah.

26:41 Speaker 7 In order—in order to become united with Hakadosh Boruch Hu through study. As it says in the Zohar, Vayikra, page 73: “For its own sake”—oh, he says it explicitly—“in order to bind his soul to Hashem.” When a person studies Torah, that has to be the goal. In other words, if a person studies halachos, he’s studying Torah; he studies halachos in order to know what to do. Right? If he studies in order to know what to do—what Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants me to do—then he is connected to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. But if he studies in order to know what to do and doesn’t think about Hakadosh Boruch Hu at all, that isn’t called studying for its own sake. At any rate, it’s a very low level of studying for its own sake. There are many levels. “In order to bind his soul to Hashem through understanding Torah, each according to his intellect,” as it says in Pri Eitz Chayim. There’s a parenthesis here. In the Alter Rebbe’s Tanya, a parenthesis always addresses something that isn’t understood and needs explaining. What’s missing here?

27:52 Speaker 12 Why does he bring up speaking only now?

27:55 Speaker 7 That...?

27:56 Speaker 12 Bring it up—ah, say it only now.

27:59 Speaker 7 It’s connected, yes. We spoke about the advantage of mitzvos and the advantage of Torah, right? The advantage of mitzvos is that they are an encompassing light, while the advantage of Torah is that it is an inner light: you grasp it internally.

28:10 Speaker 12 And now he said that with you it both encompasses and is encompassed.

28:12 Speaker 7 Encompasses and is encompassed. What did we say was Torah’s main advantage? That it is nourishment, right? What advantage does Torah have over mitzvos? Mitzvos only encompass; they are only a garment. Torah is internal, and it is nourishment. Yes, but in chapter 4 we learned that the garments are loftier than the nourishment. Remember learning that?

28:37 Speaker 12 Loftier than the soul.

28:38 Speaker 7 Loftier than everything—the garments are He Himself. So how can you tell me that Torah is loftier than all the mitzvos, and that Torah study takes precedence over them, and so on? It’s the most important mitzvah. The mitzvos are the garments. That’s the main thing. You’ve been explaining at length how important and how great it is that through nourishment you grasp and connect with Hakadosh Boruch Hu—but garments are even greater. Yes? Is the question clear? So he explains in the parenthesis: “Nourishment is an inner light, and garments are encompassing lights. Therefore our Sages said that Torah study is equal to all the mitzvos.” Why? “Because the mitzvos are only garments,” only a garment, “whereas Torah is both nourishment and a garment for the intellectual soul.” Why? As we said at the beginning of the chapter, “it is clothed in Torah through studying and learning it, and certainly when he speaks it aloud, for the breath of speech becomes an encompassing light, as stated in Pri Eitz Chayim.” So the fact that Torah is nourishment doesn’t mean it is only nourishment and is therefore less than all the mitzvos. It is both nourishment and a garment. It has both advantages, and therefore it is above all the mitzvos. So with that we’ve finished chapter 5—the laws, what’s it called, the laws of the G-dly soul. We discussed how the essence of the G-dly soul is bittul to Hakadosh Boruch Hu. It has ten faculties and three garments. The principal garment is specifically Torah—not that the mitzvos aren’t garments, but the principal garment is Torah, because through it the soul is given life, and it also has the advantage of an encompassing light. The next chapters, the next three chapters, will explain those same matters as they apply, by contrast, to the animal soul. Now there’s something wonderful here. How much time do we have? We don’t need much time; it’s very easy.

30:50 Speaker 12 We have another quarter of an hour.

30:51 Speaker 7 Ah, great.

30:53 Speaker 13 There’s no bus at that time. It’s really hard.

30:57 Speaker 7 Great.

30:58 Speaker 12 I—

31:00 Speaker 7 About Purim 5718, I assume everyone has heard about it, right?

31:07 Speaker 12 It’s the king’s hand, uh, [unclear].

31:09 Speaker 7 “Whoever extends a hand is given,” all those stories...

31:15 Speaker 13 That Purim.

31:16 Speaker 7 A Purim like that hasn’t happened, and I don’t know. So far, so far, so far, it hasn’t happened.

31:24 Speaker 13 What hasn’t happened?

31:25 Speaker 12 Another Purim.

31:25 Speaker 7 There has been no parallel to Purim 5718 with the Rebbe. There was something extraordinary about it. I photographed this. I couldn’t find the book, so in the end I photographed it on my phone. That’s why it looks like this.

31:42 Speaker 12 Good.

31:45 Speaker 7 Ah, there’s a book called Bedarchei Hachassidim. Yes, it’s a book by Rabbi Yoel Kahn. Here he spends two pages describing what happened the day after that farbrengen.

31:58 Speaker 12 You could say he didn’t remember anything.

32:01 Speaker 7 Yes, but he explains. He explains exactly why, and he explains the point. How do we know the Rebbe didn’t remember? He told the story, but you only remember the headline. Here he explains it. The Rebbe—who did the Rebbe tell? The Rebbe told him.

32:17 Speaker 12 Ah, when the Rebbe brought up the maamar in passing, the rabbi said, “I don’t remember what...”

32:22 Speaker 14 Yes.

32:23 Speaker 12 Look, he didn’t find the source.

32:24 Speaker 7 So this, this is the sour—this is the source. What you remember are bits—

32:28 Speaker 12 I’m finding the source.

32:29 Speaker 7 So those bits and pieces you remember—that’s the source.

32:34 Speaker 14 What a shame.

32:35 Speaker 7 The Purim farbrengen of 5718 was a special and extraordinary farbrengen. When the Rebbe came in, and throughout nearly the entire farbrengen, nothing about him appeared different from usual. But toward the end, it was apparent that the Rebbe had said a lot of l’chaim. There were very unusual talks.

32:51 Speaker 14 Until the end?

32:53 Speaker 7 After—well, that’s the whole story. Afterward the Rebbe went out, but then they wouldn’t let him get into the car because of all the—

33:00 Speaker 14 So if the Rebbe didn’t give his approval, how did the rabbi here, like, write it down?

33:05 Speaker 7 What?

33:05 Speaker 14 Like—

33:06 Speaker 7 Who said the Rebbe didn’t give his approval?

33:07 Speaker 14 No. I mean, if the Rebbe didn’t remember, then how...

33:10 Speaker 7 Let me show you. “It later emerged from the Rebbetzin that the Rebbe had already taken large, large cups of mashke while still at home before the farbrengen.” An aside: at this farbrengen, the person pouring the Rebbe l’chaim was Reb Mordechai Mentlik. When the older chassidim noticed that the Rebbe was taking a lot of mashke, they nudged him with their elbows not to pour so much, because it could harm the Rebbe’s health. He didn’t listen and kept pouring for the Rebbe. At some point, the Rebbe noticed this little tussle behind—under the table, and joked, “Mordechai would not bow or prostrate himself.” At the beginning of the farbrengen, the Rebbe said two sichos. Then he said the maamar “A person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim until he does not know.” The maamar spoke at length about the eshel. What is that? “Avraham planted an eshel in Be’er Sheva.” Eshel is spelled aleph, shin, lamed. He explains that the aleph is also pele, wonder, and the aleph...

34:17 Speaker 14 Wow, like eating, drinking and accompanying guests on their way.

34:19 Speaker 7 What?

34:20 Speaker 14 Eating, drinking and accompanying guests on their way.

34:22 Speaker 12 Yes, that’s what I thought too.

34:25 Speaker 7 That’s the... that’s the Midrash. Eating, drinking and accompanying guests on their way.

34:28 Speaker 12 Right, that’s what I said.

34:29 Speaker 14 How is that connected to Purim?

34:33 Speaker 7 You have to study the maamar. It’s one of the wonderful maamarim.

34:35 Speaker 12 Believe me.

34:36 Speaker 7 A maamar the Rebbe said at that farbrengen. This year, I studied that maamar I don’t know how many times.

34:43 Speaker 14 Is it edited?

34:44 Speaker 7 What?

34:44 Speaker 14 Is it edited?

34:45 Speaker 7 The maamar? No, it isn’t edited. It’s long—about ten sections—and it isn’t edited.

34:50 Speaker 14 Wow.

34:51 Speaker 7 But it’s explained very, very clearly. I mean, compared with unedited maamarim, it’s explained very clearly. Although in a moment he’ll say here that the Rebbe explains ideas there that—I don’t want to say the opposite of, but they’re different from what’s explained everywhere else in Chassidus. One maamar explains it this way; throughout Chassidus it’s explained differently.

35:17 Speaker 12 If I’m going up, let’s go.

35:19 Speaker 7 Anyway, the Rebbe explains “Avraham planted an eshel in Be’er Sheva.” He explains eshel at great length, over several sections: eshel is the Shema, and Be’er Sheva refers to the seven blessings of the Shema. “He planted an eshel in Be’er Sheva”—the eshel, the principles of the Shema, must be planted within the blessings of the Shema. That’s the...

35:39 Speaker 14 Those are seven blessings.

35:39 Speaker 7 Which...

35:40 Speaker 12 It varies.

35:41 Speaker 7 In the morning, two before and one after; in the evening, two before and two after.

35:46 Speaker 12 Yes, yes.

35:48 Speaker 7 The Rebbe explains that this is the idea of “Avraham planted an eshel in Be’er Sheva”: to take the... the “until he does not know,” the... the wonder, and plant it within Be’er Sheva. That’s the idea of Purim—having the two opposites together. We’ll see a little more of that shortly. By the way, among other things, the Rebbe said this in the maamar: Chassidus speaks a great deal about a desire that has no reason and a desire that has a reason. We’ve discussed this here several times. Right?

36:17 Speaker 12 Maybe. That’s a current teaching of...

36:20 Speaker 7 There’s a desire where a person wants something; he...

36:23 Speaker 12 Ah, okay.

36:24 Speaker 7 Needs it. And there’s a desire where the inner reason is felt. The Rebbe said: “Contrary to the common assumption that a desire with a reason is on a lower level than a desire without a reason, the opposite is true: specifically the desire with a reason is higher.” Many maamarim of Chassidus say that a desire beyond reason is higher. But here the Rebbe said that isn’t so, and even called it a common assumption.

36:48 Speaker 12 Interesting.

36:49 Speaker 7 In every maamar... No, he puts it gently here. Open any maamar of Chassidus about desire, and it explains that there’s a desire...

36:56 Speaker 12 Even maamarim of the Alter Rebbe.

36:58 Speaker 7 There is a simple desire. “Simple” means without a reason—it’s desire itself. When some reason, some cause, is part of the desire, it’s already a composite desire; it’s no longer simple. Here the Rebbe explains the exact opposite, at great length, with proofs and analogies.

37:17 Speaker 12 Interesting.

37:18 Speaker 7 After the maamar there were several more sichos, but throughout that time nothing unusual was apparent about the Rebbe. Only toward the end of the farbrengen, about an hour before it ended, was it apparent that the Rebbe was having difficulty speaking. It was hard for him to speak. That was all. The farbrengen went on until four or five in the morning. That often happened in those years, especially on Purim.

37:36 Speaker 12 What a shame I missed it.

37:39 Speaker 7 The Purim farbrengen was on Thursday. On Shabbos after davening—we’re talking about two days after the farbrengen, yes?—on Shabbos morning after davening, one of the secretaries approached me and said the Rebbe was calling me into his room. I went in. Reb Avraham Shemtov was there too; he was already in the room with the Rebbe, waiting. The Rebbe was sitting there wearing a tallis and said to us, “Up through the maamar, I made an effort and I remember. What happened afterward?” We were completely bewildered. With the Rebbe Rashab, the chassidim who reviewed the maamarim would go in to him and repeat the maamar before him, but that was so the Rebbe could comment and correct anything that needed correcting. Something entirely different happened here. The Rebbe asked us to repeat, to reconstruct for him, part of the maamar he himself had said. Since the Rebbe asked, we began repeating two sections of what had been said. With some of what we said, it seemed as though the Rebbe remembered it; with other parts, it seemed that the Rebbe didn’t remember at all what he had said. What’s more, in the middle the Rebbe stopped us and asked, “What? What’s the source for that?” We were very bewildered. How could we know the source for what the Rebbe had said in a maamar of Chassidus? Who’s telling this? Reb Yoel Kahn. Reb Yoel Kahn says, “I heard the Rebbe say it. Chassidus explains it differently.” The Rebbe said it, fine, but... The Rebbe asked again, “Are you absolutely certain that I said that? How could I have said such a thing? It’s explained differently—the opposite way.” So we nodded, because I couldn’t even speak. Then the Rebbe said, “Well, if so, find a source for it. If I said it, find a source.” We were in the room for twenty minutes. The Rebbe saw that we were very bewildered. He stopped and let us leave. He said that presumably we would put the contents of the farbrengen in writing. That’s the story. Now what does he explain? I think...

39:38 Speaker 7 This story reflects something very deep about the Rebbe’s connection and unity with G-dliness. There is a movement here of complete affirmation and complete negation.

39:46 Speaker 12 At the same time.

39:48 Speaker 7 A striking, clear example of how one’s very being, in all its strength, comes from utter self-nullification before Hakadosh Boruch Hu. That’s the idea of Purim. In one of the sichos the Rebbe said at that farbrengen, he quoted the Gemara: “I am grateful to my head, for when I reach Modim, it bows on its own.” I’m grateful to my head because when I reach Modim in davening, it bends down by itself. I don’t have to make it bend; it bends on its own. And he explained—this is a Gemara—that this doesn’t happen because of a person’s intellect, with the intellect telling the head to bend. Here it doesn’t tell it to. Nor does it come from the will, where the person wants his head to bend. “On its own” means by itself. In other words, it doesn’t come from the will.

40:38 Speaker 3 Wait, I didn’t understand. What, what does that mean?

40:41 Speaker 4 Say it happens, but it isn’t natural.

40:44 Speaker 3 Okay.

40:45 Speaker 4 It’s a habit from doing it.

40:46 Speaker 3 Okay. There was some—one of the—

40:48 Speaker 7 It’s talking about one of the Tannaim. When he reached Modim, he—

40:53 Speaker 3 For him it was natural.

40:53 Speaker 7 For him it was natural.

40:55 Speaker 4 No, but they say...

40:57 Speaker 3 You have to work at it so that it becomes natural.

41:00 Speaker 4 In a way—

41:00 Speaker 7 It did not come from his intellect, his will, or even his conscious awareness. It happened on its own. Since that Tanna was literally “a part of G-d above,” his physical head was also literally a part of G-d above. So when Hakadosh Boruch Hu bent down, his head bent down. The part behaves as the essence does. The Rebbe gave the example of a person’s reflection in a mirror. Although the mirror shows the image of a whole person, the truth is that the reflection has no will, no pleasure, and no power of its own. However the person standing before the mirror moves, the image in the mirror moves. That is also the meaning of “As water reflects a face to a face, so does the heart of man to man”—the person below reflecting the Supernal Man. In other words, the person below is only a reflection of the Supernal Man. Hakadosh Boruch Hu lowers His head now, so he lowers his head too. He is not doing it because... It is who he himself is. This expresses an extraordinarily high level of bittul: a person’s entire being is so completely nullified that he “bowed of his own accord.” A Jew has worked on himself until he is so nullified to Hakadosh Boruch Hu that his body acts on its own in accordance with the Divine will. We’ll soon see how this relates to the maamar. Usually, a person acts knowingly and willingly, even when his actions accord with Hashem’s will and he does them only because Hashem wants them, only because of the command. We’re talking about a Jew who is a tzaddik and does only what Hakadosh Boruch Hu says. He does nothing else. His pleasure is Hakadosh Boruch Hu’s pleasure, and the same is true of his will and everything else. But ultimately, he does it knowingly and willingly. He decides to fulfill the Divine will. He does what Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants, but he is doing what Hakadosh Boruch Hu wants. It does not happen automatically. “He bowed

43:01 Speaker 7 of his own accord” means that his bittul is so deep that his very being automatically accords with Hashem’s will. No command at all is needed. This is like the distinction brought in the teachings of our Sages between the bittul of a chariot, which needs a person to direct it to move, and the bittul of the body’s limbs to the soul: the limbs obey its will automatically. In other words, the car, the chariot, has no will of its own. It is completely nullified to the driver. What does that bittul mean?

43:29 Speaker 3 But the driver has to tell it.

43:30 Speaker 7 The driver has to tell it where to go. But a person’s limbs have a much higher level of bittul. You don’t need to tell them what to do; they do what the person wants. They are completely united with the soul. You don’t need to command them.

43:49 Speaker 4 It’s like what happened with Bat Ami, isn’t it?

43:51 Speaker 7 Hmm?

43:52 Speaker 4 That there is only one reality, believing in Hashem, and then, as it were, automatically...

43:57 Speaker 7 I don’t know. No, I don’t understand what you mean. Let’s finish this here. It is similar to what is told about the Alter Rebbe: every Erev Shabbos, he would become drowsy on his own because Above it was a time of dormita, a state of sleep. This was unlike Reb Hillel [?], who would lie down to sleep at that time.

44:09 Speaker 3 Why?

44:11 Speaker 7 Now, here comes the point—the great novelty. In the story we mentioned, about what happened with the Rebbe during the maamar, something much deeper is expressed: a bittul far deeper even than that of the body’s limbs to the soul. Why? Usually, bittul that operates automatically means that a person is so nullified that his actions happen on their own, in accordance with what is happening Above, without any command. Like that Tanna’s head bowing, or the Alter Rebbe falling asleep. So what was nullified? The action—the head, the hand, the body. The limbs are nullified to the soul; the action is nullified. Here, though, we’re talking about saying very profound things in the comprehension of G-dliness, something ordinarily bound up with the person himself, with his intellectual grasp, his very sense of self.

45:09 Speaker 5 As if...

45:10 Speaker 7 How can you explain something? What does it mean to explain? The Rebbe is now explaining something to me so that I will understand it. He has to think about how to put what he sees into words that I can understand. If he is thinking about that now, how can he be nullified at the same time? These are simply two things that contradict each other. They cannot both happen at once. When a person is nullified to G-dliness, like a prophet who is nullified to G-dliness, [unclear]. He might even take off his clothes; it says that they would do that. He doesn’t feel what he is doing. Here, the Rebbe was, on the one hand, fully engaged as a person—and not in a physical action, but in the mind, where a person feels his own sense of self most strongly. And these were not simple matters, either. They were the deepest matters, not explained anywhere else, explained only here. Yet the Rebbe said them with such bittul that it was not he who said them. He was not there at all. It was not him. It was Hakadosh Boruch Hu speaking. Do you grasp how extraordinary that is? Simply put, to state and clarify profound ideas, a person has to labor to understand them and engage his own faculties. Yet these very things were said as though they came on their own. The state in which they were said was beyond the bounds of a person’s own being. A person cannot just do that; it wasn’t a coincidence. The Rebbe said that he really—he had taken mashke, as one should. So much so that the Rebbe did not remember at all what he had said. That itself shows that these were not things he already knew and had retrieved from memory. After all, the Rebbe does not forget. If these were things the Rebbe had seen somewhere—no. These were profound Torah insights that arose anew in his mind and understanding.

47:24 Speaker 7 In other words, the very act of delivering a profound maamar, which belongs to the person’s conscious faculties, happened automatically, from Above. The very sense of self, the understanding and the deep thought, arose not from the person’s own being but from the depth of his bittul. Profound Torah teachings, belonging to human intellect and to the person himself, were spoken entirely beyond the bounds of the speaker’s own being, but from Above. Not only his power of action, but his mind too was completely devoted and functioned not on the basis of his own faculties, but from Above. Now he goes on to explain this point. Where—when did this story happen? It happened on Purim. Why specifically on Purim?

48:17 Speaker 5 That is “ad d’lo yada.”

48:18 Speaker 7 Because that is exactly what Purim is about. It is exactly what the Rebbe explains in this maamar: what Purim is about. On Purim, everyone asks: What does “ad d’lo yada”—“until one does not know”—mean? The halachah says that a person should drink wine until he becomes intoxicated and falls asleep in his drunkenness. That is the wording of our Sages, and it is brought as halachah in the Shulchan Aruch. How can such a thing be demanded of a Jew? Here the Rebbe explains what the demand is: that a person reach such bittul that, beyond reason and understanding, he acts from a sense of G-dliness. That in a state of “not knowing,” he senses the Divine intent in Torah and mitzvos. Two opposites together. That is what Purim is about.

49:10 Speaker 5 So that everyone should understand it.

49:11 Speaker 7 Huh?

49:11 Speaker 5 That they should drink and really understand it.

49:13 Speaker 6 We need to learn how to teach that.

49:15 Speaker 5 First they should understand how to drink.

49:18 Speaker 6 That’s important too.

49:26 Speaker 5 Isn’t it?

49:27 Speaker 7 Yes.